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

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

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THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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THE RESURRECTION AND THE ORIGIN OF THE CHURCH IN JERUSALEM.

There are various ways of approaching the study of early Christianity. One way is to begin with Paul. The writings that have come down to us in the New Testament under his name, so far as they are genuine, are primary sources for the history of the apostolic age. Pfleiderer, for example, begins his *Urchristentum* with the words: "One can only regret that we know so little that is certain about the first beginnings of the Christian Church, but the fact itself can not well be contested. Only from the time of the emergence of the Apostle Paul, in whose Epistles authentic information is preserved, does the historical darkness become in a measure illuminated; concerning the first beginnings of the Church, however, Paul gives but scanty hints (1 Cor. 15: 3ff.), from which a distinct conception of the process can not be obtained. This lack, moreover, is not fully supplied by the Gospels and Acts which were written later." [2] A more common way, however, even among those who share Pflei-

[1] An address delivered in substance at the opening of the ninety-fifth session of Princeton Theological Seminary on Friday, September 21, 1906.

[2] *Urchristentum*[2] I, p. 1. Man mag es bedauern, dass wir über die ersten Anfänge der christlichen Kirche so wenig Sicheres wissen, aber die Tatsache selbst ist nicht wohl zu bestreiten. Erst vom Auftreten des Apostels Paulus an, in dessen Briefen authentische Nachrichten

derer's opinion of the secondary character of Acts as a source for the history of the apostolic age is to begin with Jewish Christianity or the Church in Jerusalem. Only recently von Dobschütz has placed the discussion of Jewish Christianity and the origin of the Church in Jerusalem in the forefront of the problems which still seek solution at the hands of the historians of the apostolic age.[8]

That any attempt to write the history of the apostolic age without taking account of the life and work of Jesus must prove inadequate will not be denied. For whether we learn of this from Paul or from other sources, it is the fact of the life and work, death and resurrection of Jesus which is the *prius* of the subsequent history. The resurrection, it is true, is often eliminated from the statement of the factual basis upon which the early Church rested and of which account must be taken by historians of the apostolic age, and in its place is put the belief of the disciples in the resurrection. But whatever view be taken of the resurrection of Jesus as narrated in the New Testament, it will be admitted that the history of the apostolic age can not be understood apart from the person of Jesus: what He was, what He did, what He taught, what impression He made on his disciples and what they believed concerning Him.

The relation which Jesus sustained to the early Church can not be limited to mere temporal succession. It might be explained as causal without conscious intention or as teleological. If the Church was not merely the result of the Messianic work of Jesus, but the particular result intended and prepared for by Jesus, is the efficient cause of its origin to be sought in an activity of Jesus or was the founding of the Church accomplished by others without any direct par-

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vorliegen, lichtet sich das geschichtliche Dunkel einigermassen, aber über die erste Entstehung der Kirche gibt Paulus nur einige ganz durftige Andeutungen (I Kor. 15, 3ff.), aus welchen sich ein deutliches Bild des Hergangs nicht gewinnen lässt. Diese Lücke wird auch durch die später geschriebenen Evangelien und die Apostelgeschichte nicht völlig ausgefüllt.

[8] *Probleme des apostolischen Zeitalters,* 1904.

ticipation of Jesus? At this point two essentially different views of the origin of the Church divide. The issue concerns the nature of Jesus and of his Messianic work. If Jesus' activity ceased forever with his death and his Messianic work was finally terminated by that event, Jesus Himself can have taken no active part in the origin of the Church. This seems to be implicated in Weizsäcker's view, though he seeks to escape it by casting around the beginning of the Church's life a shroud of mystery, called the immediate in its creative power.[4] Wernle also allows for Christian faith, which affirms the reality of the spiritual world, the shadowy possibility of an activity of Jesus in producing through the form of visions the faith of the disciples in the resurrection,—a faith which issued in the founding of the Church. But as an historian he confesses that he is compelled to seek the guarantee of the reality of the appearances of Jesus after his death in their effect, and this he traces to the impression which Jesus made on his disciples during his earthly ministry.[5]

There is another view of Jesus' person and work which implicates a different view of the origin of the Church. The

[4] Weizsäcker, *Das apostolische Zeitalter*², p. 5. "Auch unter dieser Auffassung bliebt etwas, was nicht weiter zu erklären ist, wie bei allen höheren Anfängen im Gebiete des religiösen Lebens, das Unmittelbare in seiner schöpferischen Gewalt, und die letzte Ursache desselben liegt jenseits geschichtlicher Forschung."

[5] Wernle, *Die Anfänge unserer Religion*², p. 82. Das Urteil über diese Erscheinungen hängt ab vom Zutrauen zu Paulus und seinem Berichterstatter, mehr noch vom philosophischen und religiösen Standort, vom "Glauben" des Beurteilers. Rein wissenschaftliche Erwägungen können da nicht entscheiden, wo es sich um das Ja oder Nein der unsichtbaren Welt und die möglichkeit des Verkers mit Geistern handelt. Daher sind alle Erklärungsversuche, deren Grundlage das Axiom bildet, dass unsere sinnenfällige Welt die einzige Realität ist, notwendig und überzeugend nur für den Erklärer selbst. Der christliche Glaube rechnet immer mit der Realität des Jenseits, das unser Ziel ist; es macht daher für den Christen gar keine Schwierigkeit, das wirkliche, durch eine Vision vermittelte Hineinragen Jesu in unsere Welt für den Grund des Auferstehungsglaubens anzunehmen.

Aus einem anderen Grund kann sich der Historiker mit dieser Annahme, selbst wenn er sie billigt, nicht begnügen. Der blosse Glaube

New Testament does not limit Jesus' activity to his earthly life. The Gospels represent Jesus as acting directly on men after his death and resurrection and as promising an activity mediated by the Spirit. This is the view also of Paul and Acts. The Gospels, moreover, in reporting the words of Jesus make it plain that He expected to exercise his Messianic functions after his death and to come again on the clouds of heaven in royal Messianic dignity. This expectation forms an essential element of Jesus' Messianic consciousness. It can not have had its origin in the appearances and the faith which they produced, since the two differ in form. The witness of the New Testament to an activity of Jesus subsequent to his death is thus twofold; on the one hand prophetic in form and constituting an element in Jesus' Messianic consciousness, and on the other hand experiential in form and consisting of direct testimony.

The New Testament view of Jesus' Messianic activity presupposes and includes the actual resurrection of Jesus as the opposing view denies and excludes it. The two views agree that the disciples believed in the resurrection. They differ in regard to the origin of this belief. The point at issue between them concerns the relation which Jesus sustained to this belief. The interpretation of this relation may in either view implicate an activity of Jesus after his death. The issue between them will thus turn ultimately on the question of an activity of Jesus after his resurrection or on the resurrection itself. The witness of the New Testament to the resurrection and to an activity of Jesus after his resurrection is both prophetic and experiential in form. The genuineness of the prophetic witness of Jesus to

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an dieses Wunder macht die Entstehung des Christentums von einem Zufall abhängig, als wäre ohne diese Geschichte die Sache Jesu untergegangen. Aber in der Person Jesu war eine so gewaltige, siegesmächtige Erlöserkraft, die durch den schmachvollen Tod doch auf keine Weise zu vernichten war. "Er war zu gross, um sterben zu können" (Lagarde), d. h. der Eindruck, den er gemacht, die Gemeinschaft, in der man mit ihm gelebt hatte, waren zu gross, zu fest und unzerstörbar."

his resurrection is not, however, so generally admitted. Weizsäcker regards Jesus' predictions of his resurrection as unhistorical, but lays great stress on the prophecy of his coming in glory.[6] The principal argument against the historicity of these predictions is the psychological difficulty of the unbelief of the disciples when the resurrection was reported to them. But Jesus' predictions of his resurrection are closely associated in the Gospels with the announcement of his approaching suffering and death (Mk. 8: 31; 9: 9, 12f, 31; 10: 33f; 14: 27 and ||s.). The disciples did not comprehend Jesus' meaning; the thought of his suffering was too hard for them. Moreover, it was in connection with the announcement of his passion and resurrection that Jesus explicitly predicted his coming in glory (Mk. 8: 31ff). This thought certainly took strong hold of the disciples' minds. On the way up to Jerusalem they disputed about the places of honor in the Messiah's kingdom. The transfiguration, the triumphal entry, the cleansing of the temple, the eschatological discourse, must all have contributed to produce a state of mind such as the disciples manifested. When, therefore, death came instead of the expected glory, it brought confusion. The prophecy of his coming in glory thus confirms the predictions of the resurrection. But if Jesus predicted his resurrection, joining it as He did with the designation of Himself as Messiah and with the prediction of his suffering, the thought of the resurrection must be admitted to a place in his Messianic consciousness along with the thought of his suffering. And if so, then it was conceived by Him as part of his Messianic work. From this it may be inferred that Jesus in predicting his resurrection thought of his Messianic activity as extending beyond his passion. The view therefore which would limit Jesus' activity by his death contradicts an essential element of his Messianic consciousness manifested in the double form of the prophecy of his return in glory and the prediction of his resurrection.

[6] Weizsäcker, *Das apostolische Zeitalter*[2], p. 14.

But if it be admitted that Jesus expected his Messianic work to extend beyond his death, that he expected to rise from the dead and come in glory, the question of the realization of this expectation in either form becomes a subject of testimony. It is important to bear in mind that the tradition which contains Jesus' prediction of his resurrection contains also a definite statement of time,—"on the third day" or "after three days" (Mt. 16:21; Mk. 8:31, etc),—an element so firmly fixed in the early tradition that it appears in Paul (1 Cor. 15: 4). What, then, is the nature of the testimony which goes to accredit the realization by Jesus of his expected resurrection on the third day after his death? The early tradition about the life of Jesus embodied in the Synoptic Gospels bears witness to the resurrection both by its account of the empty grave and by its description of the appearances of Jesus (Mt. 28: 1ff.; Mk. 16: 1ff.; Lk. 24: 1ff.). Paul witnesses to the resurrection on the third day,—derived probably from the tradition current in Jerusalem (*ὃ καὶ παρέλαβον*)—and adds his testimony to the fact of the resurrection based on an appearance of Jesus to him (1 Cor. 15: 3ff.). The testimony of Acts and of John both to the fact and the time of the resurrection agrees with that of the earlier evidence (Acts 10:40; Jn. 20: 1ff). Indeed, the witness of the New Testament to the resurrection is so pervasive that the fact of its witness can not be denied. Those who do not accept this witness usually seek to weaken its force either by pointing out its lack of consistency or by limiting its witness to the belief of the disciples.

The principal reasons urged in support of the view that the witness of the New Testament to the resurrection is not consistent arise out of the nature of the documentary evidence. No one of the Gospels contains a complete account of all that happened in connection wtih this event. Moreover, Paul's list of the appearances is not exhaustive. There are in the nature of the case, here as elsewhere in the Gospels, differences of detail which are the proper subject

of harmonistic study. One of the chief differences is the double tradition given by the Gospels in regard to the place of the appearances of Jesus. The Matthew-Mark tradition is said to report appearances only in Galilee; Luke mentions appearances only in Jerusalem, while John (including the twenty-first chapter) narrates appearances both in Jerusalem and in Galilee. Apart from the twenty-first chapter, which is often treated separately as constituting an appendix, the Fourth Gospel agrees with the Gospel of Luke in recording appearances only in Jerusalem.

The arguments in defense of the thesis that the Gospels do not present a consistent account of the place of the appearances of Jesus have been stated by Schmiedel in the *Encyclopedia Biblica,* IV, art. "Resurrection- and Ascension-Narratives," c. 4039-4087. The starting point of the argument is the supposed divergence of two forms of Gospel tradition. The earlier form, preserved in Matthew-Mark, narrates appearances of Jesus only in Galilee: the later form given in Luke-John localizes the appearances in Jerusalem.

Without entering upon the question of the relative priority of the different forms of Gospel tradition, it will be sufficient (and of primary importance for the real issue) to determine in as objective a manner as possible, that is, on the basis of the documentary evidence which contains this tradition, both what the Gospel tradition in regard to the localization of the appearances is and what relation the different elements of it sustain to one another.

The Gospel of Mark in its earliest transmitted form does not narrate an appearance of Jesus. The message of the angel in 16:7; cf. 14:28, may justify the inference that, had the author completed his Gospel, or in case he did and the original ending has been lost, the Gospel would have contained an account of an appearance of Jesus to the disciples in Galilee. It could not, however, be fairly inferred that the original ending would not have contained an account of an appearance in Jerusalem. Matthew's narrative,

which is here closely parallel with Mark, records both the reference to Galilee (Mt. 26:32; 28:7; cf. Mk. 14:28; 16:7) and an appearance of Jesus in Jerusalem as well as an appearance in Galilee (Mt. 28:9, 16ff.). It may, however, be fairly inferred from the Gospel of Mark that the disciples were in Jerusalem on the day of the resurrection (Mk. 16:7).

The Gospel of Matthew records Jesus' promise to go before the disciples into Galilee (26:32); the message of the angel to the women, "Behold He goeth before you into Galilee" (28:7); an appearance of Jesus to the women in Jerusalem (28:9); his message to the disciples bidding them repair to Galilee (28:10); and finally an appearance of Jesus to the eleven disciples in Galilee (28:16ff.). From Matthew's narrative, as from Mark's, it may be inferred that the disciples were in Jerusalem on the day of the resurrection.

What support do these facts, together with reasonable inferences from them, give to the theory that the earliest form of Gospel tradition embodied in Matthew-Mark locates the appearances of Jesus in Galilee? Mark does not narrate an appearance of Jesus; Matthews narrates two appearances,—one in Jerusalem and one in Galilee. Matthew, it is true, does not record an appearance to the disciples in Jerusalem, but this silence can not be construed as excluding such an appearance without doing injustice to the nature of the Gospel, which even in this chapter gives indication of a fuller tradition than that which it contains (28:16).

But the record by Matthew, one of the chief witnesses for the localization of the appearances in Galilee, of an appearance in Jerusalem although only to the women (28:9f.), furnishes a difficulty for the theory now under consideration. What are the grounds upon which its authenticity is questioned? For the discussion of this point Schmiedel refers to his article on the "Gospels" in the *Encyclopedia Biblica,* II, c. 1878, sec. 138. Attention is first called to the fact that "the appearance in Jerusalem

to the two women (Mt. 28: 9f.) is almost universally given up," and then follow the reasons for this view, in which Schmiedel concurs. The first reason advanced is "the silence of all the other accounts." But there are only two canonical Gospels, Matthew and Mark, and an extra-canonical Gospel, that of Peter, which contain the supposedly earlier form of the Gospel tradition regarding the appearances, and of these Mark and the Gospel of Peter do not narrate an appearance of Jesus. If the silence of all the other accounts be understood of Luke-John, the primary witnesses for the tradition which locates the appearances in Jerusalem, then the argument is simply an appeal to a tradition which is *ex hypothesi* later in origin and secondary in character for the purpose of discrediting an element in one of the witnesses to a tradition which is held to be earlier in time and generally more trustworthy on the subject of the localization of the appearances, except for this one element. In order to estimate the argument from silence in this case, let it be supposed that the Luke-John tradition had mentioned this appearance. What effect would this have had on the judgment concerning the historicity of Matthew's record? The passage in Matthew would still have been open to the suspicion of influence from the supposedly secondary tradition. But there is another reason for giving up the appearance of Mt. 28: 9f. "In it Jesus only repeats the direction which the women had already received through the angel." The form of the words is, however, not the same in the two instances, and the similarity of content would only furnish an indication of common origin were it proven that the appearance in question did not occur.

But, it is argued, "If the disciples had seen Jesus in Jerusalem, as Luke states, it would be absolutely incomprehensible how Mark and Matthew came to require them to repair to Galilee before they could receive a manifestation of Jesus." But neither Matthew nor Mark makes this requirement. They record the message of the angel and of Jesus bidding the disciples go to Galilee and promising that they

would see Jesus there. The reason for the record in Matthew-Mark of the message to the disciples to repair to Galilee is probably to be connected with Jesus' purpose expressed before his death in the remark to the disciples that after his resurrection He would go before them into Galilee. The reference to Galilee in the Matthew-Mark tradition should be explained as due not to ignorance and exclusion of Jesus' appearances in Jerusalem, but to the fact that Galilee was the place indicated by Jesus before his death for meeting with his disciples and that there this tradition knew of a singularly significant appearance of Jesus.

The view that is held concerning the origin of the double tradition contained in the Gospels about the place of the appearances will affect the judgment of value placed upon the different elements which enter into this tradition. It is argued that if we can not understand how the Matthew-Mark tradition arose on the hypothesis of the priority of the Luke-John tradition, the converse is quite easy to understand. Schmiedel suggests the following account of the origin of the Luke-John tradition (*Ency. Bib.*, IV. c. 4072). Even before Luke and John wrote "there had sprung up, irrespective of Mark and Matthew, the feeling that Jesus must in any case have already appeared to the disciples in Jerusalem; it presented itself to Luke and John with a certain degree of authority, and these writers had not now any occasion to invent, but simply to choose what seemed to them the more probable representation, and then, when in the preparation of their respective books they reached the order to go to Galilee, merely to pass over it or get around it as no longer compatible with the new view." But how did the Matthew-Mark tradition originate? The tradition which locates the appearances in Galilee is not the more natural or reasonable supposing that Matthew and Mark were dependent on conjecture. "Thus the tradition which induced them to place the appearances in Galilee must have been one of very great stability." Schmiedel's view of the origin of this tradition is given toward the close of his

article, where he discusses the first appearance of Jesus. Following Matthew-Mark he places Jesus' first appearance in Galilee and following Paul he describes it as an appearance to Peter. After discussing the nature of the appearances, the conclusion is reached that they were subjective visions. But what was the occasion of such a subjective vision on the part of Peter? In agreement with Weizsäcker, Schmiedel denies that it was the predictions by Jesus of his resurrection. Jesus' prophecies that He would return in glory are more important. But most important in Schmiedel's opinion was the fact that Peter had denied his Lord. "The form of Him whom Peter had denied must have come up before him with ever renewed vividness, however he may have struggled to escape it. Though at first he may have said to himself that this was a mere creation of his fancy, it is certainly not too bold a conjecture that a moment came when he believed he saw his Lord bodily present before him, whether it was that the eye was turned upon him with reproach and rebuke, or whether it was that it already assured him of that forgiveness for which, beyond all doubt, he had been praying with all the energy of his soul." (*Ency. Bib.* IV, c. 4085). What could happen to Peter might happen to others, and all the more so after it had happened to Peter. For "could he but once find himself able to say that he had seen Jesus, the others no longer needed to be able to raise themselves out of their state of prostration by their own strength; what had happened to Peter supplied what was wanting in this respect." Although Schmiedel does not specifically connect the origin of the Matthew-Mark tradition of the appearances with Peter, such a connection may fairly be inferred from the significance attributed to Peter's vision of Jesus. And yet if this be the origin of this form of Gospel tradition it is strange that of the two Gospels which supposedly contain it, Matthew alone narrates an appearance in Galilee, not, however, to Peter alone, but to the Eleven.

But it is held that the Matthew-Mark tradition, although

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of great stability and of Petrine origin, is not self-consistent. Both Matthew and Mark imply that the disciples were present in Jerusalem on the day of the resurrection,—a fact which is not only inconsistent with the occurrence of the first appearance in Galilee, but also one of the sources of the tradition preserved in Luke-John which locates the appearances in Jerusalem (*Ency. Bib.* II, c. 1879. IV, c. 4072). This inconsistency does not, however, discredit the Matthew-Mark tradition in regard to the place of the appearances; it simply shows that Matthew and Mark were mistaken in supposing that the disciples were still in Jerusalem on the day of the resurrection. This appears from the fact recorded both by Matthew (26: 56) and by Mark (14: 50) that the disciples were dispersed after the arrest of Jesus,—a fact which is omitted by Luke. Peter, moreover, would hardly have exposed himself gratuitously to further danger after his denial. Only women were present at the crucifixion. Where were the disciples? Schmiedel confesses that this is not told, but suggests that "it is not difficult to conjecture that they had gone to their native Galilee,"—a fact insufficiently veiled in the angelic command that they should go there.

A little evidence is worth more than much conjecture. There is some evidence in Matthew-Mark that the disciples were in Jerusalem on the day of the resurrection. A little evidence should be advanced to show that they were not there. Instead of evidence it is suggested that Matthew and Mark sought to remove the inconsistency in their narratives by recording the message of the angel to the women, whereas Luke-John secured consistency by dropping altogether the references to Galilee and transferring the appearances to Jerusalem. Such a treatment of the evidence, however, involves a highly artificial explanation of the message to the disciples and a very precarious use of the argument from silence.

Schmiedel's thesis, in a word, is this: The Gospel tradition concerning the place of the appearances of Jesus is

not only two-fold, but inconsistent. The earlier form represented in Matthew-Mark locates the appearances in Galilee, and this is the more trustworthy of the two. But an examination of the historical evidence yields the following facts. Mark mentions no place; Matthew mentions an appearance in Jerusalem and one in Galilee; it may fairly be inferred from Matthew and Mark that the disciples were in Jerusalem on the day of the resurrection; the Gospel of Peter mentions no place; Paul mentions no place.

The tradition which locates appearances of Jesus in Jerusalem is said to be secondary. What is the nature of the evidence which witnesses to this form of Gospel tradition? Matthew, one of the chief witnesses to the primary or Galilean form, narrates an appearance in Jerusalem (28: 9f.). Luke narrates an appearance of Jesus to Cleopas and a companion as they were journeying from Jerusalem to Emmaus on Easter Sunday (24: 13-32). On the return of these two to Jerusalem the disciples announce to them that Jesus had appeared to Simon (24: 33f.). Luke then narrates an appearance of Jesus to the disciples who were assembled in Jerusalem and closes with an account of Jesus' separation from the disciples, probably on the Mount of Olives, toward Bethany (24: 36-53, cf. Acts 1: 12). Thus Luke describes two appearances of Jesus, one near and one in Jerusalem. He mentions an appearance to Peter, but does not definitely locate it. The time of this appearance, however, makes it impossible to think of Galilee as the place of its occurrence. John narrates an appearance of Jesus to Mary Magdalene at the sepulchre (20: 1-18) and two appearances to the disciples in Jerusalem, one on the evening of Easter Sunday, when Thomas was absent, and one a week later, when Thomas was present (20: 19-23, 24-29). The twenty-first chapter of John records an appearance to certain of the disciples in Galilee. The Gospel according to the Hebrews narrates an appearance to James, the Lord's brother (cf. 1 Cor. 15: 7). No place is mentioned, but the reference to

the servant of the high priest makes it natural to think of Jerusalem.[7]

What relation does the Luke-John tradition sustain to the Matthew-Mark tradition? Both traditions are well attested. They could be regarded as contradictory, and thus mutually exclusive, only on the theory that the Gospel narratives are complete, or that some one of them contains a complete record by which the others are to be judged. Such a theory, however, is not only opposed by 1 Cor. 15: 1-8; it would do great injustice to the Gospels, which manifestly are not and do not claim to be complete. Even where completeness may have been sought, as in the case of Luke (cf. 1: 3), its attainment must have been limited by the sources of information to which he had access. Contradiction might, however, arise out of the narratives themselves if the two traditions described the appearances in such a way as to be mutually exclusive. The Matthew-Mark tradition does not, either by its temporal or by its local elements, exclude appearances in Jerusalem. Does the Luke-John tradition exclude appearances in Galilee? It is urged that Luke not only locates the appearances in Jerusalem, but places them all on one day, the ascension occurring on Easter Sunday (cf. also Barn. 15: 9). This interpretation of Luke is inconsistent with Acts 1: 3, which mentions a period of forty days between the resurrection and the ascension. Inasmuch as Acts and the Third Gospel come from the same author,[8] there is a presumption against this view of the last chapter of the Gospel. What are the facts? It is true that Luke does not mention the message of the angel or the message of Jesus bidding the disciples go to Galilee. His silence may have been due to the sources upon which he depended, but in any event it does not contradict the Matthew-Mark tradition. Moreover, a careful examina-

[7] Jerome, *de viris inlustribus*, 2. "Dominus autem cum dedisset sindonem servo sacerdotis, ivit ad Iacobum et apparuit ei."

[8] Cf. Harnack, *Lukas der Arzt der Verfasser des dritten Evangeliums und der Apostelgeschichte*. 1906.

tion of the last chapter of the Gospel will reveal indications that the events there recorded did not occur on one day. The narrative begins with the visit of the women to the grave, and this is definitely placed on the first day of the week. The next event is the appearance of Jesus to Cleopas and his companion, and the time is again definitely stated as on the same day and as toward evening, the self-revelation of Jesus taking place at the evening meal (24: 13, 29). In that very hour the two disciples arose and returned to Jerusalem to the assembled disciples, who announced that Jesus had appeared to Simon, and they in turn narrated Jesus' appearance to them. While they were speaking Jesus stood in their midst, talked with them, ate in their presence and expounded to them the Scriptures. He finally led them out toward Bethany and was separated from them. Apparently there is no break in the temporal order. Every step is definitely linked to the preceding by some note of time (24: 13, 29, 33) or participial clause used temporally (24: 36) until 24: 44, 50. The particle of connection in both these verses is δέ. In the one a saying of Jesus is introduced, in the other an action of Jesus. The saying may have been spoken in connection with the appearance narrated in 24: 36-43, or it may have been spoken at a later time. The latter interpretation is the more probable. The action introduced in 24: 50 can not well be connected temporally with this saying if the saying be temporally connected with the preceding appearance. This appearance was on the evening of Easter Sunday, and such a connection would necessitate the conclusion that the ascension occurred at night (but cf. Acts 1: 9f). Plummer remarks on Luke 24: 44-49:[9] "The section seems to be a condensation of what was said by Christ to the Apostles between the Resurrection and the Ascension, partly on Easter Day and partly on other occasions. But we have no sure data by which to determine what was said that same evening, and what was spoken later. Thus Lange assigns only ver. 44 to

[9] *International Critical Commentary.* St Luke. p. 561.

Easter Day, Godet at least vv. 44, 45, Euthymius vv. 44-49, while Meyer and others assign all the remaining verses also (44-53) to this same evening. On the other hand, Didon would give the whole of this section to a later occasion, after the manifestations in Galilee. It is evident that the command to remain ἐν τῇ πόλει (ver. 49) cannot have been given until after those manifestations, and was almost certainly given in Jerusalem." Again, speaking of the Ascension and the conclusion of the Gospel, Plummer says (*ibid.*, p. 564) :--"It is incredible that he can mean that, late at night (vv.29, 33), Jesus led them out to Bethany, and ascended in the dark. So remarkable a feature would hardly have escaped mention. Probably δέ both here and in ver. 44 introduces a new occasion." If it be conceded that the last chapter of Luke does not require a time for the Ascension in conflict with all the other evidence, then the Luke-John tradition may be held together with the Matthew-Mark tradition, the four Gospels yielding a tradition which is indeed twofold but not inconsistent.

It is sometimes said that the witness of the New Testament to the resurrection cannot be used for historical purposes, whatever may be its value for religious purposes. Such a fact as the resurrection is thought to lie beyond the sphere of historical criticism, because the principles of historical criticism are held to be inapplicable where the miraculous is implicated. What underlies this view is, however, simply a philosophical naturalism in which no place can be found for the miraculous. As a matter of fact, historical criticism does and must subject the witness of the New Testament to the resurrection to a close and careful scrutiny. If the principles of historical criticism be naturalistic, no amount of the best historical evidence will suffice to accredit such an event as the resurrection; but if the principles of historical criticism admit the possibility of the miraculous, a possibility not denied by Schmiedel,[10] then the work of

[10] *Ency. Bib.* IV, c. 4040. "The present examination of the subject will not start from the proposition that miracles are impossible."

investigating the historicity of the resurrection does fall within the sphere of historical criticism and the question concerning the actual occurrence of this miracle resolves itself into a matter of evidence. It may indeed be confessed that the way in which a miracle is wrought may not be known, and that the power by which it is wrought is inscrutible, but concerning the occurrence of such an event the historical evidence must decide.

The evidence of the New Testament which accredits the historicity of the resurrection is early and clear. However much it may differ in detail, it witnesses to the fact both consistently and pervasively. It should receive at the hands of an historical criticism, which is not held in bondage by the limitations of naturalistic principles, the same recognition that is accorded to the New Testament witness to the belief of the disciples in the resurrection. Historical criticism can not, without ceasing to be historical, give up either of these facts. The differences which exist in the different narratives of the resurrection do not invalidate this judgment. For were they incapable of being so reconciled as to present an account complete and consistent in all its details, this should not affect the verdict that ought to be rendered concerning the fact upon which all the evidence is agreed. The differences, however, are not the essential element of the problem. There are differences in regard to the time, place, and attendant circumstances. One of these has been considered, the supposed inconsistency in the statements of the Gospels about the place of the appearances. Other questions arise, such as the order of the appearances, the persons to whom Jesus appeared, and the arrangement of the various events. But these difficulties, inherent in the nature of the sources and the consequent *lacunae* in our knowledge, do not render uncertain the evidence for the fact of the resurrection to which all the elements which make up the New Testament witness give consent.

But it may be said, according to the testimony of the New Testament itself, no one saw the resurrection. Its witness

to the resurrection therefore may be simply an inference drawn by the disciples from their experience of the appearances. The New Testament, it is true, does not describe the resurrection, and in this respect its narratives compare favorably with the account of that event given in the apocryphal Gospel of Peter. The New Testament, however, is consistent in representing Jesus as the subject of the resurrection, as the one who experienced it and therefore as the one best able on the basis of an adequate experience to testify to the fact. The value of the testimony of the disciples to the resurrection, however, is not lessened by its inferential character. For the validity of inferential testimony depends on the validity of its premises and the accuracy of the process by which the conclusion is reached. In other words, the value of inferential testimony lies in its nature as reasoning. In order to test it there is need simply to ascertain, what are the facts which constitute the premises, what is the conclusion, and then to inquire, is the conclusion warranted by the facts. What, then, are the facts which constitute the premises of the inferential judgment given in the witness of the disciples to the resurrection? The death and burial of Jesus, the empty grave observed on the morning of the third day after the crucifixion, the appearance of angels who announce the resurrection, and finally the various appearances of Jesus, who both by act and by word witnesses to his resurrection. The disciples disbelieved the report of the women about the grave and the appearance of the angels (Lk. 24:11) and some doubted when Jesus appeared to them (Mt. 28:17). In the case of Paul the premise of fact is not so extensive. It does include, however, the one essential fact in the appearance of Jesus to him, by means of which Paul was fully convinced of Jesus' resurrection,—a conclusion quite in accord with and subsequently confirmed more in detail by the tradition of the early church. When now the test of logic is applied to the conclusion from these premises as given in the inferential testimony of the disciples

and Paul to the resurrection it can not well be denied that the conclusion follows logically from the premises.

There can be very little question about the validity of the testimony of the New Testament to the resurrection, and consequently about the fact of the resurrection (since as a miraculous event its actual occurrence is simply a question of evidence), if the premises upon which this testimony rests once be granted. Hence the debate about the resurrection usually finds its natural center in the question regarding the validity of the premises upon which this testimony rests, and the center of this center is the question concerning the appearances of Jesus. For if reality once be admitted to the appearances as described in the New Testament, it will be difficult to escape the conclusion given in the New Testament witness to the fact of the resurrection.

Objection may be made to the New Testament testimony to the resurrection on the ground that this is the only testimony available, and, being limited to Christian sources, is the less valuable, by reason of the possibility that its only and sufficient origin may have been the purpose of the Christian consciousness to glorify Jesus. But the purpose to glorify Jesus is not an unworthy purpose. The New Testament writers attributes such a purpose to God, and among other things include in this purpose the resurrection (Rom. 6:4; Acts 3:13ff., cf. Phil. 2:9; Jn. 13:32). The purpose to glorify Jesus becomes an unworthy purpose only when in its interest something is said to have happened to Jesus, such as the resurrection, which did not happen. This is the point implied in the objection. No evidence is advanced to show that Jesus did not rise. If he did, the objection has no force. Moreover, it will be admitted that if the resurrection be a fact, the natural sources from which evidence could be expected would be Christian documents. It would be strange if such were not the case. When, therefore, Christian documents present such evidence, and this is found to be early, pervasive and consistent, it can not be dismissed as untrustworthy simply because it is Christian. It is not sufficient to

suggest that, being Christian, it may have had its origin in the Christian consciousness. To do so is, in plain language, to bring the charge of false witnessing against the Christian consciousness, and such a charge should be supported by some more substantial evidence than a mere possibility.

Let us consider for a moment the problem raised by the Christian character and origin of the evidence for the resurrection. The resurrection, like the miracles which Jesus wrought, was not a show-miracle. In the temptation Jesus set aside firmly the idea of a mere wonder-working Messiah (Mt. 4:3ff.; Lk. 4:3ff.). When the Scribes and Pharisees demanded a sign from heaven Jesus refused (Mk. 8:11). His miracles were ever kept in close relation with his work, usually requiring or calling forth a receptive attitude of faith on the part of those to whom He brought help. It is recorded that Jesus did not many mighty works in Nazareth because of their unbelief (Mt. 13:58; Mk. 6:5). In like manner the resurrection stands in closest relation to Jesus' work and to that receptive attitude of faith which his work was designed to produce. As an event which happened to Jesus it had its first and deepest meaning for Jesus Himself, for by it He passed out of the power of death, to which He had submitted Himself, into that new life which He now has with God. As the incarnation marks the historic beginning of the humiliation of the Son of God, so the resurrection marks the historic close of the humiliation and the historic beginning of Jesus' exaltation and glorification. This event was for Him resurrection from death and contains in itself all the meaning and potency of Jesus' death as Messiah; it was also resurrection into a life, in which all the rich blessings of Jesus' Messianic work, as this was brought to completion in the self-sacrifice of Calvary, are the possession of Jesus. But as the humiliation of Jesus was not for Himself, so the blessings of his death were not for Himself alone. The resurrection, therefore, by which He entered upon the full possession of these blessings, must have been of the greatest significance, not only for Jesus, but also

for those who with Him have an interest in his Messianic work. At that time these were above others those in whose hearts faith had quickened a loving devotion, the women who had been with Him in Galilee and had come up with Him to the last Passover and the men whom He had gathered about Himself and instructed. As during his earthly life Jesus labored to implant and develop faith, so after his resurrection He followed the same course. And as He knew before his death that unbelief would not be changed into faith though one rose from the dead (Lk. 16:31; Jn. 11:46ff.), so He neither came down from the cross at the taunt of his enemies (Mk. 15:32) nor went to them after his resurrection to compel their faith. For the faith which Jesus came to bring, the faith which He desires, has moral qualities which cease to be so soon as faith becomes something compelled from without rather than something which springs from within. By this, however, it is not meant that the cause of faith is purely subjective, but that faith as distinguished from the object of faith is a voluntary disposition in which there is not only the element of recognition, the assent of the intellect, but also the element of appreciation, the consent of the whole nature. If either of these elements be neglected the resulting conception of faith will be partial and inadequate. An undue insistance on the intellectual element to the exclusion of the appreciative element, sometimes called the moral or practical, yields a purely theoretic and formal conception of faith. Quite as serious a change in the nature of faith follows an undue and exclusive insistance on the appreciative element in faith. If the moral and spiritual elements of faith be emphasized and faith be conceived as consisting essentially in the spiritual evaluation of phenomena, then this emotional and volitional appreciation of knowable truth, which between persons takes the form of trust, will leave little room for the intellectual apprehension of truth. Such a conception, however, cuts faith off from its object; for the phenomena, of which faith expresses personal appreciation in terms of value judgments, are ulti-

mately subjective experiences. If the theoretic or truth content of faith be affirmed only on grounds of moral and spiritual appreciation, faith can not speak with certainty about an object transcending the subjective sphere. But the faith which Jesus sought to inspire had an object, whether presented in the form of a message, an event, or a person, and this object, however mediated to consciousness in the sphere of knowledge, was not simply a phenomenon of consciousness or a purely subjective experience. Faith, therefore, while in its nature a subjective state, has a relational aspect which can be explained only in terms of its object. This gives to it a theoretic or knowledge content which transcends the subjective sphere. Faith and knowledge both have a theoretic content, but faith brings to its theoretic content a judgment of appreciation or value which in the sphere of personal relations takes the form of trust.

If Jesus sought to quicken faith in his message and in Himself before his death, it is but natural that his activity subsequent to his death and resurrection should have been directed toward the same end. The purpose, therefore, of the appearances to those who had faith in Him must be understood in the light both of Jesus' work of implanting a true faith and of the relation of the resurrection to such a faith. This faith, both before and after Jesus' death, had for its essential content Jesus the Messiah. Of this content, however, Jesus' own self-consciousness and perfect knowledge of his work were the standard, into conformity with which, in its measure, it was necessary that faith in Him should be brought. In other words, the work of informing faith was, equally with that of quickening faith, an essential part of Jesus' work. The Gospel records of the earthly ministry of Jesus reveal how much he did to give to faith an adequate content. This work He continued after his resurrection both by personal intercourse with his disciples and after his ascension through the agency of the Holy Spirit. Since the resurrection stood in closest relation to Jesus Himself and to the content of faith, which before his death

He had sought to perfect, it was but natural that the self-revelation of Jesus after his resurrection should have been made to those of faith. The Gospel records reveal plainly the fact that the appearances of Jesus had a very direct relation to faith. They were intended,—and hence their recurrence and the words of instruction which accompany them,—to inform the faith of the disciples in regard to Jesus Himself and his work. This informing of faith consisted primarily in the self-revelation of Jesus in such a manner as to convince the disciples not only of his resurrection, but also of his entrance into a life in which his Messianic power and authority were henceforth to be exercised, without restriction of time and space, in the interest of his Messianic kingdom. The Gospels narrate appearances of Jesus to the women and to his disciples. To those whom He had prepared to appreciate the significance of his Messianic work Jesus manifested Himself that their faith might more perfectly lay hold of Him in his triumphant Messianic life. Such a faith had, of course, moral qualities which could not be supplied by mere sensible apprehension, and hence Matthew tells of some who doubted when Jesus appeared to them (Mt. 28: 17). But while the early appearances were made chiefly to those who had believed on Him (cf. Acts 10: 39ff.), Jesus was not limited to the disciples in his self-revelation. When it pleased Him, He made revelation of Himself to his brother James (1 Cor. 15: 7) and later to one of the most bitter persecutors of his cause; and with the same purpose of quickening and informing faith He made of James a steadfast servant in the ministry of his Gospel to the Jewish nation, and of Paul a faithful and efficient witness among the Gentiles to his resurrection and saving power.

In the case of the appearance to James and to Paul, as in that of the appearances to those who had already believed on Him, the New Testament clearly describes the activity of a person, an activity voluntarily determined and directed toward a definite end. Viewed, therefore, in the light of

Jesus' activity before his death and in the light of the end of that activity in the quickening and informing of faith, the New Testament narratives of the activity of Jesus after his resurrection in manifesting Himself to the women, his disciples, James and Paul are self-consistent. It is only when these narratives are isolated from Jesus' whole life and work that objection can be made to them on the ground of the limitation of the appearances to the disciples, and its corollary, the Christian character and origin of the evidence for the resurrection. But when the appearances are conceived of as forming an organic part of Jesus' work and as contributing in their measure to a purpose consistently adhered to, the New Testament account of them is both perfectly natural and intrinsically reasonable. For if Jesus' work culminated in his death and resurrection and his work was directed toward stimulating and informing faith, then it was a matter of very great importance for the perfecting of faith in Himself as Messiah that Jesus should by his own self-revelation convince his disciples of his triumph over death and entrance upon another stage of his Messianic life. And this was the more important if Jesus intended to use the disciples in the building of his Messianic community or Church (Mt. 16: 18). This could be done only on the basis of a faith which consciously embraced Jesus as Messiah and realized in its essential elements the nature of his Messianic work. And if this work included the resurrection it was important for the faith of the disciples in Jesus' Messiahship and for the Church, which, through the disciples, Jesus founded, that Jesus should Himself inform their faith that they in turn might become true witnesses of Him and his work in the witness which they bore to his resurrection.

The Gospels locate the first appearances of Jesus in or near Jerusalem and assign them to the day of the resurrection. The appointment of Galilee by Jesus before his death as a place of meeting after his resurrection and the messages to his disciples to go there reveal a desire on Jesus' part to meet with them there. The appearances in Jerusalem, which

require the lapse of at least a week's time, make it impossible to suppose that the departure of the disciples to Galilee was a flight or that their state of mind on arrival was one of utter dejection. After the appearances in Galilee the disciples came again to Jerusalem, and were there at the time of Jesus' last appearance to them, which terminated with the ascension. The account given in the Gospels of the appearances of Jesus first in Jerusalem, then in Galilee, and finally in Jerusalem, furnishes a satisfactory explanation both of the belief of the disciples in the resurrection and of the origin of the Church in Jerusalem. This explanation, it is true, has explanatory value only on the theory, to which the New Testament is committed, that Jesus really rose from the dead on the third day after his crucifixion and entered upon a state of being in which his activity, though freed from the limitations of space and time, was in certain instances personally exercised in the sphere of space and time in the interest of the continuance of his Messianic work.

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prefigurement in Scripture. Of his poetical works, however, the most important are his two psalteries of the Virgin. In the *Psalterium Minus* there are 150 four-line stanzas. In the *Psalterium Majus* there are 150 Psalms, following in thought, and also to some extent in length the book of Psalms.[1]

Then in addition to these psalteries he composed canticles and litanies of the Virgin, and also the *Speculum Beatae Mariae Virginis,* an expository work of 18 chapters on the angelic salutation.

All the other theologians gave Mary her due place in their works. Thomas Aquinas devotes to this subject in the *Summa Theologia,* part iii, questions xxvii and xxviii. In the first question he takes up the sanctification of Mary and discusses the time of her sanctification, whether before conception or in the womb before birth; the effect of this sanctification, whether all pollution of sin was taken away from her and whether she was enabled to live absolutely without sin; whether she thus obtained a plentitude of grace. In the second question he discusses her virginity, asking whether she was a virgin in conception, in and after her parturition, and whether she had taken a vow of virginity, answering all these in the affirmative.[2]

Questions xxix and xxx are devoted to the marriage of Mary and the annunciation. In general, all theological discussions about Mary revolve around the problems of her sanctification and virginity.

In St. Bernard, the great preacher of his day, we find

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[1] The method can best be illustrated by an example. Bonaventura xiv., 200. Psalmus 2. "Quare fremuerunt inimici nostri: et adversus nos meditati sunt inania?

Protegat nos dextera tua, Mater Dei: ut acies terribilis, confundens et destruens eos.

Venite ad eam, qui laboratis et tribulati estis: et dabit refrigerium animabus vestris.

Accedite ad eam in tentationibus vestris: et stabilet nos serenitas multus ejus.

Benedicite illam in toto carde vestro: misericordiae enim illius plena est terra."

[2] Thomas Aquinas, iv., 243-268.

numerous sermons on the occasion of the great festivals in honour of the Virgin. Thus we have a series of sermons on the Purification, the Annunciation, the Assumption, and the Nativity of Mary.[3] Those were the four great festivals then in vogue in the Western Church. The festival of the Conception, as we shall see later, was opposed by Bernard, and consequently he has no sermons on that occasion. In many other writers of this period we find hymns and prayers addressed to the Virgin on such special occasions. Anselm is a good example of this.[4]

It is not to be supposed that these treatises are entirely of an *a priori* nature, woven exclusively out of the threads of scholastic speculation. They all quote Scripture in abundance. In fact, there is a Scriptural basis for every thought and for every argument. It is surprising for the first time to read these works, and to notice the wide and exhaustive study of Scripture. All portions of the Old and New Testaments are ransacked for references to Mary. Of course some passages of Scripture are more popular than others. Much is made of the discourses of Mary in the New Testament, what she said to others and what others said to her.[5] In the Old Testament by far the most popular book is the Canticles, but the Psalms and the Wisdom Literature are also greatly used. In Albertus Magnus, *De Laudibus B. V. Mariae,* we have thirty-two detailed explanations of passages taken from the Canticles, twenty-five from the Psalms, fifteen from Isaiah, twelve from Proverbs, and nine from Genesis. All the Canonical writings of the Old Testament are represented with the exception of Joshua, Ruth, 1 Samuel, 1 Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Lamentations, Daniel, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Zephaniah and Malachi. Thus it is seen that every portion of the Old Testament had been carefully examined for its bearings on Mariolatry, with the exception

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[3] Bernard, clxxxiii, 265-437.
[4] Anselm, clviii, 962-966.
[5] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 5-58. Bonaventura, xiv, 232-292.

of that *"terra incognito,"* the book of the twelve.[6] In the New Testament, for obvious reasons, Luke and Revelations are the books to which reference is chiefly made, furnishing twelve and eight passages respectively. The Epistles are entirely neglected, with the exception of one passage in 1 Corinthians. In his choice of Scripture Albertus Magnus is merely a representative of his class. All other writers have practically the same range in their Scriptural references. It is significant, and yet the reason is manifest, why they could not make use of the Fourth Gospel or the Epistles. Here there was little that could be made to refer to the Virgin, and yet we find that they were examined thoroughly, and whatever could be of value for their purposes was taken.[7]

If the Scriptural studies of the Schoolmen were exhaustive in their range, a similar eulogy cannot be passed on their interpretation. They were lacking entirely in historical perspective and critical exegesis, too much attention being given to allegorical interpretations and to the play on words. The defects of the Vulgate and its Latin phraseology often led them into errors. This much can be said of them, that they searched the Scriptures díligently, but on the other hand they fell into grievous and palpable errors in their interpretation and application.

In this essay we propose first to give the theologians' idea of Mary, and then to describe the influence of this idea upon the religious life and character of the times. Accordingly we shall start with the doctrine of the sinlessness of Mary, touching briefly on the immaculate conception, and discussing more fully the perpetual virginity. Then, the perfection and consequent incorrouptibility of the body of Mary will lead by easy gradations to the doctrine of her assumption and exaltation. At this point we shall start to notice Mary's place in the plan of salvation. She becomes the mediator and intercessor of men with Christ, in fact

[6] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 540.
[7] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 57-9.

salvation is virtually made to depend on Mary. She had the power to wash away sins and save from damnation. She has special power against the devil. Out of these conceptions as to the person and power of Mary developed the worship of Mary, which, however, also received a doctrinal and Scriptural justification. Finally we shall indicate the influence of this worship of Mary on practical morality.

I.

The logical starting point of Mariolatry is the remarkable position occupied by Mary among women. In the Middle Ages men thought and argued as follows: Mary alone of all women was deemed worthy to be the Mother of God. and at the same time to be a virgin mother. In these two respects she was signally honored by the Lord. "God," says one author, "has made man in four ways; from the earth as Adam; from man alone as Eve; from man and woman as ourselves; but from woman alone Christ, because He has reserved for Himself this privilege." [8]

Since Mary was thus doubly blessed, there must have been something in her character to merit this divine approbation. Anselm says, "For thou, as the most chaste of women, wast foreordained in the mind of God before every other creature, to procreate God Himself, very man of thy flesh."[9] This was the beginning of every speculation and every popular belief.

The sinlessness of Mary was a universally accepted doctrine. The process of reasoning leading up to this doctrine was about as follows: Mary had been chosen to become the mother of the Son of God. Her body had become the tabernacle of deity. Therefore Mary must be exalted far above all other created beings, as to her alone had been given this honour. Therefore Mary must have been absolutely sinless, as it would not have been fitting for God to have lodged in a sinful being.[10] It is always assumed that Mary was

[8] Honorius Augustodunensis, clxxii, 517. Anselm, clviii, 406.
[9] Anselm, clix, 315.
[10] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 249-252.

free from all actual sin.[11] Some of the Schoolmen, however, were not satisfied with this. It was not enough to assume the actual sinlessness; it was thought desirable by some to prove her freedom from original sin, virtually the doctrine of the immaculate conception. This gave rise to one of the great theological controversies of the age. It was held by many in opposition to the doctrine of the immaculate conception that Mary was born free from sin, having been conceived in sin but sanctified in the womb.[12] Bernard in his famous letter to the canons of Lyons concerning the conception of the Virgin, attacks the institution of this festival, showing how the doctrine of the immaculate conception was un-Scriptural and without any foundation.[13] Thomas Aquinas takes substantially the same ground, opposing the doctrine of the immaculate conception, and arguing that Mary could not have been completely sanctified before the moment of the infusion of the soul, as in that case she would not have needed the redemption and salvation of Christ, which was to be universal. Unless Mary had had some guilt, she could not have been an object of grace.[14] Therefore Mary could not have been sanctified previous to animation. Duns Scotus was the great defender of this doctrine of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary, which in 1854 under Pius IX. was formally declared to be the dogma of the Roman Church.

The proof of this doctrine was thoroughly scholastic. The mediation of Christ is perfect. This mediation of Christ in order to have been perfect, must have preserved from all sin, as well as have saved. Therefore, in order to have been a perfect mediator, Christ must have entirely preserved one person at least from all sin, both actual and original. This person could only have been the Virgin Mary.[15] Duns Scotus not only argues in favour of this

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[11] Bonaventura, xiv, 249. Bernard, clxxxii, 334.
[12] Bonaventura, xiv, 263. Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 89.
[13] Bernard, clxxxii, 332-6.
[14] Thomas Aquinas, 247-8.
[15] Duns Scotus, xxiii, 263-4.

doctrine, but he states his own personal belief in it.[16] Twice he summarizes the views of his great scholastic forerunners, and endeavors to dispose of their arguments, which asserted that Mary had inherited original sin.[17] To put the problem more concretely, Duns Scotus held that Mary was completely sanctified previous to the exact moment of her conception, while the opposing theologians taught that this sanctification took place in the interval between her conception and her birth. Theoretically a very short period of time intervened between these two sanctifications. A few seconds would be sufficient to separate pre- and post-conceptual sanctification. The question on which the theologians divided was this: Did the Holy Spirit commence to act upon Mary at the exact moment when the soul was infused, or did it commence its influence somewhat later in time? In the former case there was no possibility of original sin, in the latter it was present.

This discussion regarding the immaculate conception of the Virgin is of great interest, as it is a typical strife of the Schoolmen. The doctrine, however, was not deep-seated in the popular consciousness, and it does not to any great extent influence the ordinary mediæval conception of the position and power of Mary.

Far more attractive to the ordinary mind and of far greater influence on society was the doctrine of Mary's true and perpetual virginity. It was a popular theme with every writer and preacher. It was believed that early in life Mary had taken a vow of virginity. That was a special merit for a Jewish woman, for sterility was held accursed among the Jews.[18] If Mary, however, had taken this vow

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[16] Duns Scotus, xiv, 171. "Omnes enim naturaliter concepti, habent unde contrahent originale, ex vi suae conceptionis, et nisi ex privilegio aliquis eximatur (ut de B. Virgine credimus) de facto omnes illud contrahunt."

[17] Duns Scotus, xiv, 159; xxiii, 261.

[18] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 145-6, quotes Lk. 10:42. "Optimam partem elegit sibi Maria." Bernard, clxxxiii, 428. T. Aquinas, iv, 264. Articulus, iv. Utrum mater Dei virginitatem voverit.

of virginity, how was it that she consented to be married to Joseph? Some explanation had to be found, and Duns Scotus was equal to the emergency. Mary's marriage was necessary to free her from all suspicion. It was a real marriage, though never consummated in the ordinary sense of the word. Mary kept her vow of virginity to her dying day. Virginity and marriage are by no means incompatible. Joseph was aware of this vow on the part of Mary, as can be inferred from the words "Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife."[19] Thus all natural objections to marrying after taking such a vow are refuted, but far better than this is the positive statement of prophecy. The perpetual virginity was precisely foretold. The passage referred to by all the writers who discuss this subject is Ez. 44: 2-3, "This gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, neither shall any man enter in by it."[20]

This vow of virginity and its observance resulted in a superlative excellence of character; it gave to Mary above all other things the truest humility. Mary is the true pattern of humility as well as the perfect model of chastity. These two virtues are coördinate and coëxistent. Christ entered Mary only because he was delighted with her virginal humility and humble virginity.[21] The vow of virginity led to perfect humility and this to the coming of the Holy Spirit. Bernard argues that without this humility the Holy Spirit would never have overshadowed her, and quotes in support of this Is. 66: 2: "Super quem requiescat spiritus meus, nisi super humilem et quietum."[22] As a result of this vow of virginity not only was she given the grace of humility and thus made fit for the special operation of the Spirit, and the conceiving and bearing of the Son of God, but she was also specially blessed above all women in

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[19] Duns Scotus, xix, 274-9. Hugo de St. Victor 858-70. T. Aquinas, iv, 269.

[20] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 192. T. Aquinas, iv, 262. Aquinas quotes this as used by Augustine to refute the Helvidian error.

[21] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 39-40.

[22] Bernard, clxxxiii, 59.

being spared the pangs of child-birth.[23] It is important to note the emphasis placed by the mediæval church upon this vow of virginity by Mary, because it became the basis for much of their thought about celibacy. In fact the virgin birth was to it not so much a sign of the supernatural nature of the incarnation, as a proof of the divine sanction and approval of celibacy.

The belief in the personal beauty and bodily perfection of the Virgin was an outgrowth of the belief in her perpetual virginity. Albertus Mangus states this very definitely. Mary was of surpassing beauty, the direct result of her virginity.[24] Could any more conclusive argument be produced in behalf of her celibacy? Again, such perfection was necessary. Mary was the tabernacle of the Most High. Was it not appropriate that she should be beautiful above other women? She was also the city of God. Was it not fitting that she should be more perfect physically than all others?[25] The line of argument then was as follows: On account of her virginity Mary was given a perfect body. Then on account of her spiritual and physical perfection she was selected to be the mother of God.

Let us try to define more closely her physical perfection. This is a difficult matter, as all statements are indefinite or allegorical. Still she was regarded as a woman of surpassing beauty, as appears from many a hymn in her honour, as for example in the lines,

"Tuam pulchritudinem Sol et Luna mirantur," and again "Pulchra ut Luna apud Deum."[26] This is made still clearer from those great artistic works of surpassing loveliness, scattered throughout the Italian peninsula, which were produced in the latter portion of this period. Giotto and Fra Angelico and Raphael would never have painted their great Madonnas without their corresponding theological antece-

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[23] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 9. Bonaventura, xiv, 208. Psalm 62.
[24] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 10.
[25] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 252, 279.
[26] Bonaventura, xiv, 201, 263.

dents. Again, Mary appeared frequently in visions to her faithful servants and in all she was reported as a woman of exceeding beauty and charm.[27]

It was believed that Mary had a glorified body during her earthly life, though the exact nature of this glorification is not stated. As a result of this glorification Joseph was not able to look upon her face, and this was proved inferentially from the case of Moses. "If, therefore, the face of the prophet appeared so beautiful after his conversation with God, what do you think of the face of the Mother of the Word?"[28]

Albertus Magnus discusses at great length the bodily perfections of the Virgin, but everything is symbolized. For example, the head of Mary is as Mt. Carmel on account of the eminence of her contemplation. In his *Laudibus Beatae Virginis Mariae*" he has an entire chapter on the corporal beauty of the Virgin, but it is entirely taken up with allegorizing. We there learn not only what the head, but also what the hair, the forehead, the eyes, the face, the ears, the nose, the lips, the mouth, the throat, the neck, the shoulders, the arms, the hands, the paps, the back, the abdomen, the umbilicus, the shins and the feet, as well as the figure in general indicate. This may not be very satisfactory as a description of Mary, but it is a characteristic example of much literature relating to her.[29]

Another element in the doctrine relating to the body of Mary was the belief in its incorruptibility. In this Mary differed from all other created beings, for they were all under the curse—dust thou art and unto dust thou shalt return. The proof text for this belief was Ps. 132:8: "Arise, O Lord, into thy resting place; thou and the ark of thy strength." Christ was the Lord, the ark was the body of Mary, and of necessity it was incorruptible.[30] At

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[27] Caesar von Heisterbach, liii, 14, 15.
[28] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 279.
[29] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 279-320.
[30] Bonaventura, xiv, 236.

death the body of Mary did not decay like that of other mortals.[31] Its glorification was completed, and thus it was made fit for its assumption. The glorification of the body and the assumption were ever interdependent.[32] The body and spirit together are glorified at the assumption.[33]

As the belief in the incorruptibility of the body of Mary leads to the doctrine of her assumption, so the latter is but the earthly beginning of her heavenly exaltation. Mary was highly exalted above all others in heaven. She was frequently called the Queen of Heaven, and as such is exalted far above all angels. Bernard reasons that it is much easier to believe that the mother of God was exalted above the angels than that the son of God was made a little lower than the angels.[34] Albertus Magnus says that since on earth Mary surpasses all others in grace, so in Heaven she must surpass all others in glory.[35] As usual, Scripture was employed to prove every statement, and the prophets were found to have predicted also the exaltation. We have already seen how Ezekiel referred to the Virgin as the "closed gate." In Ps. 87: 2 she is again referred to in the same terms: "The Lord loveth the gates of Zion more than all the dwellings of Jacob." Again Mary is referred to not only as the gate of the city, but also as the city itself. In the Latin all this is much plainer. Ps. 86: 5: "Et ipse fundavit eam Altissimus." This is taken to mean that God Himself is the founder of Zion (eam), or that He has specially exalted the Virgin. "Eam" is feminine, and can always be taken to refer to the Virgin. This is typical of all scholastic exegesis, and it also indicates how the Vulgate

[31] Bonaventura, xiv, 204. Ps. 204. Here are found these remarkable lines: "Sancta casta, et florigera ubera tua: quae florem viriditatis perpetuae eruperunt. Decor pulchritudinis tuae corruptionem non videbit: et vultus tui gratia in perpetuum non marescet."

[32] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 22. "Sine corruptione etiam putridinis et incinerationis in corpore creditur de mundo assumpta."

[33] Bonaventura, xiv, 269. "Videlicet quod beata Maria jam cum corpore sit assumpta, et corpus jam omnino cum anima sit glorificatum."

[34] Bernard, clxxxiii, 426.

[35] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 160. On this point he quotes Jerome.

affected much of the scholastic theology. Let us take another example of this. Cant. 6: 8-9, "Viderunt eam filiae Sion et beatissimam praedicaverunt." The daughters of Zion are the heavenly hosts, and the "eam" of course refers to the Virgin.[36]

To what extent these ideas of the incorruptibility of the body of Mary, her assumption, and her glorification, gained ground among the people can be seen in their popularity in art. These three themes are discussed in all the schools of art. Among the common pictures in Italy is one of the disciples going to the opened tomb of Mary, and finding her body gone and flowers sprung up in its place. The assumption has been immortalized by Titian's greatest masterpiece, and the exaltation and glorification have been described by such artists as Fra Angelico and Fra Lippo Lippi in pictures entitled "The Coronation of the Virgin."[37] People in religious ecstacies frequently had visions of the glorified Virgin. For example, a certain pious nun of the convent of Walberberg (in the Rhine region) was in the chapel one night, taking part in the services conducted by a Cistercian Abbot. Suddenly this nun Christina saw the heavens opened, and the Virgin Mary seated upon a glorious throne, surrounded by a great company of saints.[38]

What was believed concerning the mind and the intellectual powers of the Virgin during her life? To what extent was she supposed in this respect to escape the limitations of ordinary human nature? It was said and believed that her knowledge was unlimited. Of her only could it be said that in her were all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.[39] Christ had revealed to her all this wisdom, as was foretold in Cant. 1: 3: "Introduxit me rex (Christus) in cellaria sua (the secrets of Scripture)." Furthermore, the New Testament narrative indicates that Mary was a woman of wisdom and knowledge. Seven of her conversations are

[36] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 539-566. Maria civitas Dei.
[37] Kugler, i and ii.
[38] Caesar of Heisterbach, xlvii, 125.
[39] Anselm, clviii, 649.

reported, and of these two were with Christ and two with angels.[40] In Lk. 2: 19 we read: "But Mary kept all these sayings, pondering them in her heart." Thus she was not only honored by Christ and the angels, but she had the faculty of memory to a remarkable degree. All these sayings of angels and of Christ were remembered by her. Later they were of great value, as the four Evangelists frequently had to refer to her, and much of the material of the Gospels was obtained from her. It was naturally very easy to identify Mary with the Wisdom of the Old Testament; in fact, it was much more natural with the Vulgate as authority. "Sapientia" is wisdom personified, and "ea," the pronoun referring to wisdom, can always be applied to the Virgin Mary.[41]

II.

So far we have noticed some of the conceptions concerning the person and character of the Virgin. These are a necessary theological foundation for certain beliefs, of greater interest and more vital importance. We shall now consider the power of the Virgin, both in the relation to the salvation of men, and to the practical details of living.

In the plan of salvation a very high place was given to Mary. The more the divinity of Christ was emphasized and his humanity forgotten, the greater was the emphasis laid upon the mediatorial work of Mary. In the darkness of the Middle Ages to all but a few chosen spirits Christ had taken the place of the Jehovah of the Old Testament, and Mary had become the High Priest of the New Covenant. We have already referred to her exaltation, but this is to be noticed particularly, for it gives her a specific place in the plan of salvation. It makes her the mediator between Christ and man. She alone is able to intercede with Christ for humanity. She is the only way of approach to Christ. Anselm says: "Through thee, most glorious Lady,

[40] Albertus Magnus, 260.
[41] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 256-8.

we are worthy to approach thy son, Jesus, who has deigned to descend to us through thee."[42] In Bonaventura's "*Te Matrem Dei laudamus,*" we read: "Thou sittest with the Son, at the right hand of the Father."[43] Even more plainly Bernard states his belief: "Man now has a secure means of access to God, where he has the Son as Mediator of his cause with the Father, and with the Son the Mother, The Son with naked body shows his side and the wounds to the Father; Mary shows to the Son her breast and paps. She can in no way be refused, when such wonderful tokens of grace assist."[44] "Mary is the refuge of all sinners. To thee all sinners flee because thy Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, has provided thee as a refuge for us after Himself."[45] It would be easy to multiply such quotations indefinitely, but do we find a practice in common life corresponding to such a belief?

In a certain sense this is very plainly shown to be the fact by one of the great legends of the Middle Ages, which was known and believed all over Western Europe. It is the story of a certain young man named Theophilus, who had given the devil a written contract promising to serve him and at the same time denying Christ. In penitence he implored not Christ, but the Virgin to help him. The Mother approached the Son and makes supplication for the sinner. Christ takes pity, pardons the sinner, and the Virgin is enabled to recover the contract from the devil for the pardoned young man.[46] This legend appears frequently in various settings, but in all of them we find Mary as the intercessor and the merciful one, whereas Christ sits far removed as a just judge, and one who can be moved to gracious forgiveness only by the supplications of a more merciful mother.

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[42] Anselm, clviii, 960.

[43] Bonaventura, xiv, 223.

[44] Bernard. Quoted by Bonaventura in *Speculum*, xiv, 265.

[45] Anselm, clix, 945.

[46] Godfridus Vindocinensis, clvii, 270. Here the legend of Theophilus is related in a sermon on a festivity of Mary, to illustrate her clemency. The story is related in English in de Voragine, v, 109-110.

Christ is regarded as angry at sinners, and only to be moved from his anger by Mary. In the *"Psalterium Minus"* of Bonaventura we read: "To thee (Mary) the just judge (Christ) yieldeth and forgetteth his anger."[47] The justice of the Son damns, but the mercy of Mary reconciles the angered Son with the sinner. Those, who fear the justice of God and hesitate to approach him, can find a refuge in Mary.[48] These are not merely theological dogmas, they were realities of Christian belief and experience. They are attested by many a work of art and many a story of Christian experience. Let us examine the legend of Theophilus in the form in which it appears in Cæsar of Heisterbach. A certain young man,—ruined through reckless extravagance—in his efforts to retrieve his fortunes, had made a compact with the devil, denying Christ. He was urged also to deny the Virgin, but this he refused to do, and the bargain was declared off. In double sorrow, regret at the loss of the riches promised by the devil, and penitence on account of his denial of Christ, he went into a chapel to pray. Over the high altar hung a picture of the Mother with the Child Jesus in her arms. He was afraid to pray to Christ, and so he implored the Virgin to intercede for him. The Mother turned her face to Christ and said, "Sweetest Son, have mercy upon this man." Christ answered not, but turned his face away. Again the Mother interceded, but Christ turning away from her, said, "That man has denied me, what can I do for him." At this Mary placed her Son upon the altar and, descending from the picture, she kneeled down and earnestly implored Christ: "Oh, Son, I beseech thee, pardon his sin for my sake." The Christ resisted his mother no longer. Instead he raised her up, saying, "Mother, never could I deny thee anything: On thy account he is forgiven all."[49]

In this story—given in all sincerity by the author and apparently believed by all—Christ is angered at the sinner, is

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[47] Bonaventura, xiv, 190.
[48] Albertus Magnus, xxvi, 69, 70 and 74.
[49] Caesar von Heisterbach, liii, 214-7.

implacable, and finally his wrath is only appeased by the entreaty of the Mother. Let us take another illustration of this same attitude towards Mary.

"There was a clerk who was vain and riotous, but always he loved much our Lady, the Mother of God, and said every day his hours. And he saw on a night a vision that he was in judgment before our Lord, and our Lord said to them that were there: 'What judgment shall we do of this clerk? devise ye it for I have long suffered him, and see no sign yet of amendment.' Then our Lord gave upon him sentence of damnation, and all they approved it. Then arose the Blessed Virgin and said to her son, 'I pray thee, debonair son, of thy mercy for this man, so that thou assuage him the sentence of damnation, and that he may live yet, by the grace of one, which is condemned to death by his merits.' And our Lord said to her: 'I deliver him at thy request, for to know if I shall see his correction.' Then our Lady turned her towards him and said: 'Go, and sin no more lest it happen worse to thee.' "[50]

The words of the Psalm of Bonaventura must have been a true record of much of the Christian experience of that period:

"Sinners find Grace before the Lord,
Through Thee, O fountain of Grace and Salvation."[51]

Finally the work of Mary in the salvation of men is summed up. Some go so far as to teach that Mary is the real cause of salvation. In true scholastic style it is argued that Christ could never have come to this world unless it had been for the Virgin, and her fitness to be receptacle of the Deity.[52] In other words, the incarnation was only possible on account of the holiness of Mary, and therefore the redemption of mankind was due to Mary and her perfect character. Let us examine some of the titles given to Mary, as they are full of meaning. She is prayed to as:

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[50] De Voragine, v, 109.
[51] Bonaventura, xiv, 201. Ps. 9.
[52] Bonaventura, xiv, 250.

"O regina, et domina mundi, scala coeli,
Thronus Dei, janua paradisi."[53]

Most of her names have similar implications. She is "medicamentum curationis,"[54] "vitae via," "vitae datrix," "spes humana," "damnatorum venia."[55] In all, it is taught in some way or another that Mary is a cause of human salvation. They are names which evangelical Christians could apply to Christ and to Christ alone.

There are two names which seem to have been extremely popular, and which were discussed at great length by many a writer. These names are Stella and Mare, and Mary's work in salvation is contained and set forth in them. Mary is a Star, and especially a Star of the sea,[56] for she is there not only exalted above all angels, but just as a star guides mariners to their haven so this glorious Star will guide sinners to the celestial shore.[57] Mary is also the sea (note the play on words, sea being mare). She is the sea in the plentitude of her graces, and just as the Red Sea destroyed the Egyptians but allowed the people of God to pass through unharmed, so she destroys all heretics, but saves believers.[58]

What was the virtue of Mary's special power to save men, and to bring about the forgiveness of their sins? Theologians asserted that the guilt as well as the actual transgression was removed by the grace of Mary.[59] All sins were washed away by her clemency.[60] Through her great mercy sinners were freed from the danger of damnation.[61] Now all this power of Mary in effecting human salvation is logically due to the fulness of her grace, which is far greater

[53] Anselm, clviii, 962.
[54] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 35.
[55] Bonaventura, xiv, 190, 3, 4, and 8.
[56] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 23. Bernard, clxxxiii.
[57] Bonaventura, xiv, 238.
[58] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 26. Al. Mag. p. 21, in discussing Mary as Star gives her the name Lucifer: "quia in utero suo novem mensibus portavit lucem ueram." Bon. xiv, 237.
[59] Damiani, cxlv, 935.
[60] Bonaventura, xiv, 204.
[61] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 70.

than the sum of all human sins.[62] Out of this fulness of her own grace she can give help to others. Historically the doctrine developed in like manner. First the idea of her perfect sinlessness was elaborated, and then from this the theory of her supererogatory work was naturally evolved.

The mediæval man had a profound belief in a personal devil. He was ever seeking in person to destroy men, but Mary was their watchful guardian. We are told that Mary is a bitter sea, submerging demons.[63] "For her servants she fights against the devil."[64] Such a belief was a source of strength and comfort, for it was also held that Mary had special power over demons and over the devil himself. In fact, demons were supposed to have a special aversion to even the name of Mary. Just as men fear death and avoid it, so demons were supposed to fear and tremble at and flee before the Virgin. It was a popular belief that, as the soul left the body of the believer at death, angels and demons contended for its possession. In the Campo Santo at Pisa there is an old fresco by Orcagna (Vasari) called the Triumph of Death, which illustrates this. It was Mary who, aided the angels when sore pressed, and snatched the endangered soul from the claws of the demons.[65] Again we may find an illustration of this in the story of the monk Werner of Eberbach. He was a man of noted piety, but at death, as the soul was about to leave the body, he saw the demons surrounding him, and in his anguish he cried out: "Holy Mary, save me from these evil spirits." In the very moment of death the Virgin appeared to him, and convulsively he cried out: "Welcome, thrice welcome, dearest Mary". Thus Werner was saved in the very hour of death from the power of the demons by the Virgin herself.[66]

It is not only however in death that Mary helps her followers, but in the temptations of every day life she also can

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[62] Anselm, clvii, 963.
[63] Bonaventura, xiv, 237.
[64] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 81.
[65] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 81.
[66] Caesar von Heisterbach, xlvii, 198.

repel the seducer. The story is told of a certain novice, who had been tempted again and again by the devil in person, and who was advised on such occasions to always repeat the Ave Maria. He followed this advice, and found that the very name of the Virgin had power to frighten away the prince of demons.[67] Such instances could be multiplied indefinitely, but they would all show that Mary was regarded as the special personal protector against personal demons

III.

With such beliefs in the sinlessness, clemency and power of Mary, it is easy to see how she should be worshipped as a divine being. Mary and Christ were regarded as vitally the same, for was not the incarnation the fulfillment of the prophecy that "the two shall be one flesh?" It was even taught that in the sacrifice of the Mass we partake of the body and blood of Mary as well as of that of Christ, and that thus daily Mary works out the salvation of men. Albertus Magnus says: "Not only then had that flesh brought about the salvation of the world or its redemption, but also daily it is bringing it about; because we feed upon her flesh and drink of her blood in the sacrament of the Son; because the flesh of the Mother and the Son is one flesh."[68] The same writer states very emphatically that the love of Mary and that of Christ are one and the same thing, and that they cannot be separated in our worship.[69] Therefore to love and worship Christ necessitates the love and worship of Mary.

Albertus Magnus has developed at great length the Scriptural reasons for Mary worship. If we know his process of reasoning, we also know how every other writer thought on this matter. First of all, the Scriptures are full of the honour due to Mary by men and angels and even by Christ Himself. Mary alone of all mortals had been honored by

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[67] Caesar von Heisterbach, liii, 22.
[68] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 144.
[69] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 92.

the angelic salutation. (It is interesting to note that Paul was supposed to have advocated the worship of Mary in Rom. 16: 6,—"Salute Mariam".) In fact the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament had specially ordered the worship of the Mother. Ps. 99: 5,—"And worship at his footstool: Holy is He." Of course this "scabellum" or footstool was the Virgin Mother.[70] Gratitude and love should lead us to worship Mary. Mary is the spiritual mother of all believers. In Lk. 2: 7 we are told that she "brought forth her first-born son" and in Rom. 8: 29 we read of Christ as the first-born among many brothers. From this the universal motherhood of Mary is apparent, as also the obligation of every Christian to worship her.[71] We worship God the Father, and Christ our Brother. Why not also Mary, the the Mother, they would say.

Lack of faith in Mary and in her right to be worshipped was a mortal sin. Bonaventura in his *"Quicunque vult"* (a Marian creed on the plan of the Athanasian creed) makes the following startling statement, while referring to such faith in Mary: "If anyone does not preserve entire and inviolate this faith, without doubt he shall perish for ever."[72] In actual life Mary was regarded as jealous for her own honour, punishing those who detracted from her, and rewarding those who were most faithful in their worship. In the court chapel at Veldenz (near Bernkastel) there is an old picture of the Virgin. Once a noble Lady from the castle entered the chapel, and seeing the old picture, spoke of it in slighting terms. The Virgin, incensed at the disrespect, foretold to another lady a life of misery and hardship for the offender, which soon came to pass. In a few days she was robbed of all her property by her son, and ever after lived as a beggar in great poverty. Thus Mary punished all those who in any way insulted her majesty.[73] On the

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[70] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 57 and 59. Vulgate for Psalm 99: 5: "Adorate scabellum pedum ejus, quoniam sanctum est."

[71] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 44.

[72] Bonaventura, xiv, 223.

[73] Caesar von Heisterbach, xlvii, 171.

other hand nothing was supposed to please Mary more than a great zeal for her worship. The following anecdote shows this: "There was a priest of a parish, who was of honest and good life, and could say no mass but mass of our Lady, the which he sang devoutly in the honour of her, wherefore he was accused before the bishop, and was anon called before him. And the priest confessed that he could say none other mass, wherefore the bishop reproved him sore as unconning and an idiot, and suspended him of his mass, that he should no more sing none from then forth on. And then our blessed Lady appeared to the bishop and blamed him much because he had so entreated her chaplain, and said to him that he should die within thirty days if he re-established him not again to his office accustomed. Then the bishop was afeared, and sent for the priest and prayed him of forgiveness, and bade him that he should not sing but of our Lady." [74]

There is one other question which it is desirable to discuss here. To what extent did this worship of Mary affect the moral life? Mary along with the saints frequently appeared in person to help and protect her worshippers. Instances of this are frequent in all mediaeval literature of the narrative type, such as Caesar of Heisterbach. What we want to note is rather whether this Mariolatry to any appreciable extent modified or helped the moral life of Christians. We have seen how the perpetual virginity of Mary was her chief virtue, and an irrefutable argument in favour of celibacy. Thus Mary was related in a peculiar manner to chastity and to all social vices. She demanded from her servants the greatest purity. A characteristic of all true followers of Mary is "munditia" or cleanness. The opposite or "immunditia" is specially hateful to the Virgin. This term is defined "in the wide sense of the word uncleanness, and embraces fornication, adultery, lewdness, incest, sodomy, etc." But the Virgin demands a much higher morality than the purely external. Her servants to be pure must abstain "from

[74] De Voragine, v, 108.

all illicit and perverse thoughts, which separate them from God, from all imaginations, pleasurable feelings, desires, memories, excitations, and sympathies of this nature."[75] This is the highest form of morality; in its essence it is thoroughly Christian. If the worship of Mary had even lead some souls to such a high plane of moral living and this we know it actually did, it was not a wholly unmixed evil. The great mistake was that men had not been satisfied with honoring her as an example of the purest womanhood, but had gone on to worship her as divine and as the mediator with Christ. Like all else in the Church of Rome there was an element of truth, which produced good fruits, as well as an element of falsehood and superstition which brought forth its evil fruits.

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[75] Albertus Magnus, xxxvi, 126-8. "Large autem sumpto vocabulo immunditia complectitur fornicationem, adulteriam, moechiam, incestum, sodomiticum, etc." p. 127.

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GERMAN INFLUENCE ON RELIGIOUS LIFE AND THOUGHT IN AMERICA DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD.

PART I.

To the student of history, who interprets that term to mean ideas as much as events, who believes with Lord Acton, that that science derives its best virtue from regions beyond the sphere of state, American civilization to-day offers not only much tempting material for speculation, but even more food for sober reflection. The nineteenth century was one of development and expansion mainly along lines which already existed in the colonial period or were marked out at the foundation of the national government. Our political system, which forms the backbone of the nation, is but the natural growth and adaptation of the institutions of English common law and has undergone no serious modification from the influence of that stream of foreign immigration which has flowed almost uninterruptedly into the United States since the early twenties. The English language, with all that it means for civilization, has maintained its ascendency, and the first generation of children, springing from foreign-born parents, have, as a rule, adopted that tongue without a struggle. The evangelical type of Protestant Christianity, which traces its origin back to the Great Awakening of 1740, was for over a century certainly the most potent element in American culture. It was this spiritual force, more than any other, which kept even pace with the march of civilization toward the West, dotted the country from the Alleghenies to the Pacific with denominational colleges and ably maintained its position of social leadership in all humanitarian and philanthropic enterprises for the moral and intellectual improvement of the rapidly expanding nation. And finally, the ideal of liberal

culture in education, which came into being at the beginning of the nineteenth century as the successor to the older classical training for theological ends, may be said to have dominated our institutions of learning until about the year 1875. For it was not until this period that the growth of scientific schools, which had been founded first about 1850, began to assume formidable proportions and to exert a modifying influence on the traditional course of study.

In contrast to the nineteenth, the twentieth century promises to be one of change and transition. On all sides signs of departure from the traditions of the past are visible. Everywhere unsolved problems are emerging and unsettled conflicts growing more intense. The flood of foreign immigrants, that still continues to pour into our land, forebodes a serious modification, if not a transformation, in the racial character of our people. In our industrial system the reaction from the unfettered individualism and free competition of the first half of the nineteenth century, has led to that vast combination of capital which has had such a corrupting influence on public life and whose regulation is now taxing the best efforts of our legislators. This in turn has called forth the organization of labor, and the consequent conflict between labor and capital has given a powerful impulse to that socialistic movement which is manifesting itself in the agitation for the public ownership of utilities in our large municipalities.

Parallel to these transitions in the industrial and social sphere, changes equally significant are being accomplished in the realm of culture. Not only has modern science vastly widened the boundaries of human knowledge, but the modern scientific spirit has also pervaded the older branches of intellectual pursuit. In religion the center of gravity seems to have shifted from speculation about the life to come to amelioration of the life here. While the Church has been making unparalleled efforts along charitable and humanitarian lines, the so-called higher criticism has been at work seriously sapping the foundations of the

old theology. Nay, so fierce have become the assaults of critical rationalism on the fundamental theistic conceptions themselves that the twentieth century bids fair to become the great battleground between faith and knowledge, theology and science, idealism and materialism. Education, the slowest of all cultural forces to change, has undergone similar transformations. In many quarters the old landmarks have been swept almost entirely away. For the old ideal of culture with its fixed course of study has been substituted the ideal of social efficiency, with its more or less restricted elective system. The development of the physical sciences has led to the marvellous growth of technical schools and all our larger institutions have been forced to establish post-graduate departments in which original research is encouraged in order to meet the demands of a more complex and heterogeneous civilization. And lastly in the realm of letters, signs of a transition are not lacking. The great representatives of that older interpretation of life which held to individual responsibility in ethics, regarded man as the maker of events and clung to the poetic forms developed under the influence of the Renaissance, have all passed away. In their stead a new generation has sprung up which, in problem novels and problem plays, seeks to interpret life in terms of heredity and environment, lays exclusive emphasis on characterization and situation and in its search for a new form in which to embody its new ideal, boldly asserts that classical absolutism has been overthrown forever. While it may be freely acknowledged that no member of the new school compares in literary stature with the best representatives of the old, yet it must be borne in mind that a time of shifting social conditions and unstable ethical conviction is never conducive to the production of great literature. With all their shortcomings, the new novel and new drama are permeated with deep moral earnestness and show an intense sympathy with the masses in their struggle for social and intellectual improvement. Literature seems to be changing from an aristocratic to a democratic type. And wrapped

up within these studies in sombre drab and gray may lie the germs of the poetry of the future.

Now all these changes, problems and conflicts should not be made subjects of vain regret and fruitless pessimism. They have all emerged as the necessary results of expansion and development. Some of them, at least, are the very *conditiones sine quibus non* of national progress. In these cosmopolitan days of unrestricted communication and intercourse they but emphasize the old truth more than ever, that each succeeding generation must conquer life anew. On the other hand, it would be reckless to assert that all these transitions and transformations are for good. But in our attitude toward them we dare not be determined by traditional considerations alone. Since the United States has attained the dignity of a world-power, with all the responsibilities and opportunities that such a position involves, there is need, as never before, of a dispassionate study of the forces which are exercising this transforming influence on our social, educational and religious ideals. Only thus can we hope to understand their meaning, to estimate their power and to gain some standard by which their quality and character may be fairly judged and appreciated.

With this end in view we propose in the following pages to trace the history of a set of forces, which, during the last twenty-five years, has become the most conspicuous, if not the most potent influences, in determining the character of American culture. These forces may be summed up under the name German influence. In the form of immigration it has made the largest single contribution to our population. German blood is, therefore, bound to be a very important factor in the gradual evolution of a distinctly American physical and intellectual type. As a result of this immigration, a new ecclesiastical organization, the Lutheran Church, has been making gigantic strides forward in the Middle West. Its number of communicants already exceeds that of the various Presbyterian organizations in the United States. Lutheranism is, therefore, no longer an

element to be easily absorbed by other churches, but one likely to leave a deep impression on the religious character of our people. In the educational sphere it is German influence again which, more than any other factor, has transformed the old American college into the new American university, a type whose form and spirit have been largely determined by the state institutions of the Middle West. Not only are most of our professors in the institutions of higher learning to-day German trained, but the methods employed, as well as the results communicated in theology, philosophy, history and the sciences are largely the products of German thought and research. In literature itself, the influence of the contemporary German drama is already making itself felt, and finally, that all the progress we have made in musical art, is due to German inspiration and German methods is a fact too obvious to need further comment.

According to the last census, there had come to the United States between the years 1821 and 1900[1] over five million emigrants from Germany. During the same period 3,024,222 English and 3,871,255 Irish emigrants came to our shores. Whatever moulding influence our English political system and the English language may exercise, these figures at once dispel the illusion that the American people is Anglo-Saxon so far as blood and temperament is concerned. A conservative estimate[2] shows that certainly one-third and more probably, owing to the great fecundity of the German marriage, one-half of our population is of German descent. In the light of these facts, is not the assertion that German influences are altering the racial character of our people quite justified? Will the Anglo-Saxon racial type be strong enough to maintain itself against the Celt and the German, not to mention the great influx from the Latin races which

[1] Emigration did not set in strongly until after the war of 1812. Previous to 1821 no official statistics in regard to immigration are to be had.

[2] Julius Goebel: *Das Deutschthum in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nord-Amerika.* München, 1904.

has come to the United States within the last decade? Or is history only repeating itself and are the German genius with its steadiness and fidelity to nature, the Celtic genius with its sentiment, grace, charm and spirituality, and the Anglo-Saxon genius with its talent for affairs, again to commingle and produce a type, as Matthew Arnold[3] thinks they have done in England, which shall make American institutions and American civilization the dominant forces in the progress of the world? These are questions upon which ethnologists may speculate but which time alone can answer. Herbert Spencer would tell us that the German, the Celt and the Anglo-Saxon are not races too divergent in character to mingle harmoniously. In the process of Americanization, their commingling will cause no deterioration in the racial character of our people. But in any case, we may feel sure that German idealism, German conscientiousness, German emotionalism and German love of music will not be eliminated without leaving marked traces on the American culture of the future.

The tremendous growth of Lutheranism in the Middle West is another cultural element which merits consideration. It is unquestionably the direct result of immigration. But as the English language gradually supplants the German, the Swedish, and the Danish, this church will undoubtedly become a more and more powerful factor in the religious life of the nation. While the Lutheran Church in Germany has abdicated its position of social leadership[4] in favor of art, music and the drama and, as a result, has sunk into the position of a mere repository for a creed, Lutheranism in America has expanded with astonishing rapidity. In the city of Chicago there are as many communicants in the Lutheran Church as in the Episcopal, Presbyterian and

[3] Compare his suggestive essay: *Celtic Literature*, particularly Chaps. IV. and V.

[4] During the decade 1895-1905 the number of Protestant theological students at the German Universities has decreased fifty per cent. from 4347 to 2186. During the same period the number of Catholic theological students has increased from 1079 to 1680.

Methodist combined.[5] In St. Louis, Cleveland, Buffalo, Detroit, Milwaukee and Minneapolis the Lutheran Church stands first. To-day the total number of communicants in the United States is 1,789,766,[6] giving it fourth place in rank as a religious power. While this church has a very loose organization and no fewer than seventeen varieties of Lutherans can be counted, yet its significance as a cultural and religious factor should not be overlooked. If German science tends to reduce the world to matter and motion, if German higher criticism has shaken man's confidence in the inspiration of Scripture and German critical rationalism his reliance on philosophy, here at least, is a German influence which will tend to keep alive the idea of man's spiritual calling and eternal destiny. Among the masses in the cities of the Middle West it will serve as a powerful check upon the materialistic tendencies of the day. While its great mission is at present to safeguard the moral and spiritual welfare of the immigrant against the tendency toward indifference and barbarism, which always besets migration from an old to a new environment, yet it may have a larger part to play in the religious life of the future, if the present drift toward Episcopalianism is a trustworthy sign of the times. It was Joubert who remarked that the austere sects excite the most enthusiasm at first, but the temperate sects have always been the most enduring. With its elastic theology, its less austere attitude toward the joys of life, its elaborate ritual and use of music, the Lutheran Church will have a powerful attraction for those who lay little emphasis on the logical formulation of creeds but much

[5] Compare: Henry Eyster Jacobs: *A History of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States.* New York 1893, pp. 446-447.

[6] The statistics gathered by H. K. Carroll for the *Christian Advocate* (1905) are as follows:

Baptists	5,150,185	Moravians	16,327
Catholic	10,233,824	Presbyterians	1,687,697
Congregationalists	667,951	Prot. Episcopal	807,924
Lutherans	1,789,766	Schwenkfelders	600
Mennonites	60,953	Unitarians	71,000
Methodists	6,256,738		

on the æsthetic and emotional in worship. And if there be any nisus among the American sects toward a visible ecclesiastical unity, as the counterpart of the Church one and invisible, the affinity between the Lutheran and the Episcopal organizations would make them the most natural allies. As early as 1750 the Episcopal Church in America began to absorb the Swedish Lutheran congregations in Delaware and Pennsylvania. In 1761 the Bishop of London, induced by the impending change in language in Pennsylvania from the German to the English, proposed[7] that the Episcopal and Lutheran churches in America be united. Future generations may witness the consummation of some such plan.

The beginning of German influence on our higher institutions of learning dates back to 1837, the year in which the University of Michigan was founded by legislative enactment. This was the first of those State universities in the West which are avowedly fashioned after the German model. From the beginning, these institutions were designed to form the capstone of a State system of education. They were equipped with three of the traditional four faculties. In their organization no distinction was made between the school of arts and the school of sciences. Depending upon the State for support, their courses of study have been promptly adapted to the demands of public opinion. As a consequence, they have aimed at social efficiency rather than culture in education, and lay the chief emphasis on those courses which will render the student most useful to society and the State. But not merely in their external character do they show a closer kinship with the German than the English university type. Their faculties are permeated with the spirit of original research and have become the most ardent champions of the methods of scientific classification and generalization. While these State universities undoubtedly lack some of the humanizing traditions from the colonial period, which still cling to the older institutions along the Atlantic seaboard, yet their transforming influence as

[7] H. E. Jacobs, *ibid.*, p. 280 ff.

educational factors cannot be gainsaid. When we recall that no fewer than ten State universities exist to-day, with a registration[8] ranging from 1377 students at the University of Indiana to 4521 at the University of Michigan, that in 1868 Cornell University was established with the same ideal of public utility as the State universities, that Harvard in the early seventies began those reforms which have ended in a free elective system, to be followed in 1876 by the foundation of Johns Hopkins, an institution expressly for advanced work, and that, finally, Yale in 1900 was compelled to take a long step in the same direction, we cannot escape the inference that it is the State institutions of the West that have fixed the American university type, and that this type, German in form as well as spirit, is the one best suited to the democratic genius of the American people and to the spirit of the times.

The predominance of the contemporary German drama on the American stage is another sign of the influence which German thought is exercising on American culture. During the last ten years the dramas of Sudermann, Hauptmann and Halbe, in English versions, have entirely supplanted the French society plays which for two decades or more had been one of the chief sources of supply. As a recent historian[9] of German literature observes, these dramas "deal directly or indirectly with the conflicts in modern German social life, the struggle between monarchy and democracy,

[8] For statistics of registration at the American universities during the last five years, see: Rudolf Tombo, Jr., *University Registration Statistics* in *Science*, Dec. 8, 1905. Prof. Tombo's remarks are valuable as many misleading tables have been published in various newspapers. The author of the present paper does not wish the inference drawn that he lays undue weight on mere figures. The equipment of a university, the personelle of its instructors, the standard of scholarship it maintains are all factors to be considered. However, several of the State universities have a splendid equipment, among their professors are to be found some of the most eminent scholars, jurists and scientists of the country, and during the last five years several of them have raised their standards at the cost of a decrease in registration.

[9] Kuno Francke: *A History of German Literature*, 6th ed. New York. 1905.

between society and the individual, between the Church and free thought, between industrialism and humanity, between materialism and idealism." The authors of them "are steeped in Ibsen and Nietzsche, they sympathize with the revolt of the masses against autocratic and plutocratic class rule; with the rebellion of the individual against the soulless conventions of society, etc." The significance of this German drama lies in the fact that it is an attempt to adapt poetry to modern ideas of social evolution. A new dramatic form is sought in which to embody these new ideas. According to the teachings of Richard Wagner, this drama is to take its place as one of the highest moral agencies in the world with the interpretation and sanctification of life as its supreme mission. This new school does not consider it the function of poetry to solve social problems. Its office is, at most, to hold up social ideals. Now, whether or no, we agree with Francke that the German drama of the last decade has helped "to raise the social strife to a higher level and to make it, instead of an instrument of destruction, an instrument of progress and human happiness," its popularity is not the least of the signs how keenly the new generation in Germany feels the insufficiency of the ideals held up in the Latinized drama of Lessing and Schiller. Under the influence of the modern scientific spirit, the classicism of the Renaissance is slowly losing its sway over contemporary culture.

What the future of this drama will be in America it would be rash to predict. In England its spirit already pervades the work of that arch-iconoclast, George Bernard Shaw. And here in New York, just a short while ago, one of our most recent successful playwrights, Charles Klein,[10] gave utterance to the dictum first pronounced by Frederich Hebbel, from whom Ibsen drew his first inspiration, that the drama must always concern itself with the problematic, for that which is solved has no more need of the dramatist than a healthy man of a physician. Like all the members of this

[10] In the *New York Sun*, Sunday, March 4th, 1906.

school, Klein finds the chief difficulty in characterization, *i. e.*, in the presentation of the problematic in its psychological development. Whether Klein will find imitators and inaugurate a new literary movement remains to be seen, but if America is to pass through the same social conflicts that agitate Europe, we may be sure that the new problem play will find a favorable environment on American soil also.

The strong admixture of German blood in the national veins, the prominent part which Lutheranism is playing in our religious life, the influence of German ideals in education, and the leading position of the German drama in the attempt to put a new poetic construction upon human life, all furnish unmistakable evidence that the German elements in our civilization have ceased to be mere materials for Anglo-Saxon assimilation and have become instead the transforming forces in our culture, which may lead ultimately to a new racial type, to a serious modification in the character of American Christianity, to a new national type of university and to a new poetic interpretation of human life. But whatever the outcome may be, thoughtful Americans cannot afford to be blind to the facts. German influences in American life have reached the point where they warrant a careful study. While the phases just mentioned are obvious to all who have given the subject any consideration, the share which German elements have had in moulding American thought and civilization in the past are not so well known, and it is with these in particular that the present investigation has to do.

A survey of the course which American culture followed previous to the year 1876[11] reveals traces of two pretty well-defined currents of German influence. The first came to us by way of England and was decidedly religious in character, more particularly emotionally religious. John and

[11] The centennial year, in which Johns Hopkins University was founded, may be taken as a convenient land-mark from which to reckon the setting in of the flood-tide of German influence, just considered.

Charles Wesley were its chief representatives in England. and that roving revivalist, George Whitefield, was the medium through which it was communicated to the American people at the time of the Great Awakening, in the year 1740. Impulses fostered by the spirit of German Pietism resulted in a more individualistic and emotional type of religion, which found expression in its subjective side in a new hymnody and on its objective in the beginning of philanthropic enterprises such as orphan schools.

The second current was of a scholarly, philosophic and literary character. It began with the advent of American students at the German universities, about 1820, and reached its climax between 1840 and 1850. The treasures of German scholarship were opened to American students for the first time and under the leadership of Andover Theological Seminary, supported later by Princeton, this led to the reform of Biblical exegesis in America. At Cambridge its philosophical and literary aspects were more in the ascendant. There, the idealism of Fichte and the faith philosophy of Jacobi seized the younger generation of Unitarians and culminated in what is known as the transcendental school of philosophy. This philosophy, in turn, dominated the theological thinking of such men as Emerson, Parker, Ripley and F. H. Hedges, and became one of the chief factors in bringing about the Renaissance of American poetry. An after effect of this same current may be traced in the so-called Mercersburg theology of Drs. Nevin, Schaff and F. A. Rauch, which was an attempt to apply a later form of Hegelianism to the interpretations of Church History. To Dr. Schaff also belongs the honor of having made the results of German research in Church History, chiefly those of Neander, accessible to theological students in America. And finally, to this same movement is due the reform after the Prussian model, of the common school system in Massachusetts by Horace Mann and in Ohio by Calvin E. Stowe, and the establishment of a State university after the German

pattern — the University of Michigan — in 1837, already mentioned above.

It is to the first current of German influence during the colonial period that we must confine ourselves in this paper. Specifically we shall endeavor to show the points of contact and the relations between the Pietistic movement in the Lutheran Church of Germany, the rise of Wesleyanism in England and the change which came over the character of American Christianity at the time of the Great Awakening.

The first half of the eighteenth century witnessed in the Lutheran Church of Germany, in the Established Church of England and among the Protestant sects of America a religious movement which led not only to a decided modification in the character of Protestant Christianity, but also to far-reaching consequences in the domain of national culture. Although German Pietism, English Wesleyanism and the Great Awakening in America, strictly speaking, started independently of each other, yet in their inmost essence, as well as in some of their outward characteristics, they were really one and the same. All three laid the chief emphasis, nay, at times, too exclusive emphasis, on the subjective side of religion. Their aim was to rekindle a vital religious feeling in the heart of the individual, to restore to the human soul its sense of one-ness with the Divine and to make that the center and source of a religion which could be experienced as well as believed. The doctrines these eighteenth century revivalists insisted upon were not new. In great part they only repeated what Luther and the Reformers had already taught; "the inanity of ecclesiastical formalism, the need of inner regeneration and the priesthood of all believers."[12] In their historical aspect, these revivals of emotional religion follow, on the one hand, the subjective trend in the religious Reformation of the sixteenth century, whose essence had been an appeal to the individual conscience.[13] On the other they represent an individualistic

[12] Cf. Francke, *ibid.*, p. 175.

[13] Cf. Ernst Troeltsch: *Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in*

reaction against the empty formalism and sterile dogmatism which in both Germany and England had settled down upon the Church after that institution had become a political as well as an ecclesiastical organization. In some respects they thus parallel the efforts of the Independents in England and mark the collapse of faith in the State Church as an adequate authority upon which to rest belief in Divine revelation.[14] At the same time they seriously undermine the confidence in that half-hearted, rationalizing, deistic method of so many divines who thought the truths of Christianity could be proved by an appeal to common sense and to analogies drawn from physical nature. Theologically speaking, these movements were likewise a reaction against the doctrine of salvation by faith alone. In his bitter dispute with the Papacy, Luther had been forced to carry this doctrine to an extreme. As a result, great laxity in regard to religious practice had followed. The Pietists and the Methodists, therefore, not only return to a cultivation of individual feeling, but aim likewise to restore good works to their proper place in religious life. Schools for orphans and neglected children, care of the poor, the sick and the aged, preaching in prisons, etc., all bear witness to the philanthropic and missionary zeal which was inspired by this new conception of religion.

In another of its phases, this eighteenth century revival of vital religion stands in striking contrast to the Reformation of the sixteenth. The latter was militant in spirit and led to the establishment of many mutually hostile sects. The former was more quiescent and passive. The old strife with the Papacy drops almost entirely out of sight. The religious leaders of the eighteenth century did not aim to found a new sect. Regeneration within the Church itself was the

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der Neuzeit in *Die Kultur der Gégenwart* Teil I. Abteilung 4. Berlin and Leipzig. 1906.

[14] Compare the interesting essay of Mark Pattison, *Tendencies of Religious Thought in England, 1688-1750* in *Essays*, Vol. II. Oxford. 1889.

object of their endeavors. Convinced that mere intellectual assent to logically formulated doctrines meant little without the full co-operation of the heart and will, they attached less importance to particular creeds than to emotional fervor and good conduct. *Ecclesiola in ecclesia* was their motto. The Pietists in Germany never formed a sect at all. Pietism permeated both the Lutheran and German Reformed Churches, but led to no division except in the case of the extremist Zinzendorf, who established the Moravians on an independent basis. But even this same remarkable zealot spent the latter years of his life in making propaganda for a rather chimerical scheme of union among the different Protestant denominations.

Just as little did John Wesley in England intend to organize a dissenting body. During his long life his followers received the sacraments either at the regular services of the Established Church or when in his own societies, always at the hands of priests, regularly ordained. Although the Wesleyan movement, with its compact organization and dissenting practices, was inevitably destined to become a separatist church, yet it was wholly in keeping with the spirit of the new awakening that it did not actually become so until after Wesley's death. Equally characteristic of this new religious spirit was the fact that Methodism, in turn, gave rise to the Evangelical Party, which played a leading part in the history of the Established Church during the century that followed. And here in America, although the censorious spirit of both Whitefield and Gilbert Tennent was the occasion of bitter disputes, rent congregations in twain and even divided the Presbyterian Church into the Old and New Sides, yet when the period of emotional storm and stress had passed, no new religious sects were the result. All the Protestant churches of whatever denomination ultimately felt the vitalizing effect of the new movement and each assimilated its spirit without radical change in any theological tenet.

Pietism in Germany antedates both Wesleyanism in England and the Great Awakening in America. Its rise is bound up with the names of Jacob Spener (1635-1705) and August Hermann Francke (1663-1727). It came at a time when the German nation lay politically, commercially, intellectually and religiously paralyzed from the blows inflicted by the Thirty Years' War; when Germany was supporting no fewer than three hundred petty courts, each claiming a European sovereignty of its own, each with its little army, its crowd of meddlesome officials, its pusillanimous princes, its French mistresses, its French language, its fêtes, hunts and debauches. As an English historian has said: "The annals of this century are among the dreariest in the history of mankind, consisting chiefly of the scandal of buzzing courts and the wrangling of diplomats at never-ending congresses." [15] Public life in Germany had simply reached the nadir of political and moral corruption. And what was still worse, the corruption of the courts spread to the people. For honor and honesty were substituted a cavalier morality, which consisted in a cringing servility toward the ruling aristocracy and a brutal disregard of the rights of social inferiors. A wooden and sterile pedantry ruled at the universities.[16] Poetry was completely divorced from national life and national feeling and consisted either of rimed prose or of meaningless bombast. In religion, the principle *cujus regio ejus religio* was carried through with brutal harshness. In the Palatinate and elsewhere princes arbitrarily changed the religion of the State without the slightest regard for the feelings of their subjects.

Under such dismal conditions it was well for German culture that there was left a small band of men who still struggled to keep alive the ideals of man's spiritual citizenship and eternal destiny. While it cannot be denied that

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[15] James Bryce: *The Holy Roman Empire.* Revised edition. New York. 1905.

[16] Compare Goethe's bitter satire on this condition in *Faust I.*, verses 1851 ff.

their one-sided cultivation of individual feeling had its weak points, not seldom degenerating into a fantastic mysticism which manifested itself in the forms of odd conceits in praise and practice, nevertheless no intellectual or moral force in eighteenth century Germany exercised such a healthy influence as this same Pietism. The efforts of the leaders were not directed toward arousing the people as a whole; they were content to save individual souls and to gather about them the devout and the lowly. But even thus, Pietism became a powerful leaven in strengthening the moral fibre and the self-consciousness of the "Bürger" class in society. While this class in Germany was not destined to exercise a political influence for a long while to come, yet the rise of a bourgeois literature bears witness to its growing importance. Pietism not only inspired such great hymn writers as Gerhardt, Terstergen and Scheffler (Angelus Silesius), but it lent the whole tone to the first literary spokesman of the middle classes, Gellert, and burst forth into a flame of noble patriotic and religious idealism in the poetry of Klopstock. To this Pietism, also, Germany owes the establishment of A. H. Francke's Orphon-House and "Pädagogium" at Halle, which made this central German city the chief seat of evangelical Christianity for over a century. This "Pietas Hallensis" was the prototype of Wesley's school at Kingswood, of his orphan-house at Newcastle, of Whitefield's orphan-house at Savannah and of many other efforts to elevate the destitute and needy. From it as a center radiated many an influence to England, and both directly and indirectly to the American colonies. And finally at this same shrine was enkindled the missionary zeal of Zinzendorf to plant a colony in the New World, where he might realize his ideal of Apostolic Christianity with its community of goods, its schools for the young, its love feasts and its care of the poor.

The history of Wesley's "Holy Club" at Oxford and the rise of Methodism in England are too well known to need

retelling here.[17] All authorities are agreed that the first four decades of the eighteenth century was a period of religious and moral decline in England. While the Church was still a power, yet it seems as if a spiritual lethargy had settled upon the nation after the fierce religious and civil conflicts of the seventeenth century. Archbishop Laud's attempt to elevate the Established Church to the same position of absolute authority which the Roman Hierarchy had once enjoyed, had failed. His theories of Church government existed only in name, never in fact. On the other hand, the strong individualistic tendency among the independent sects had culminated in so much eccentricity and fanaticism that sober-minded men had lost confidence in all such one-sided and extreme interpretations of the meaning and authority of Scripture. As a sort of makeshift between these two extremes, the thoughtful men of the period resorted to common sense as the last court of appeal, which should carefully weigh the evidence and on wholly rational grounds hand down a decision on the truths of the Christian religion, binding upon all. This was essentially the same position as that maintained in Butler's *Analogy* (1736), —a book which was aimed against that "loose kind of deism" popular in the educated circles of the day. As Clerk of the Closet to Queen Caroline, Butler was thoroughly acquainted with aristocratic society. With his deep sense of the reality of religion, he was pained to find "an avowed scorn of religion in some, and a growing disregard of it in the generality.[18] Accordingly he set about to demonstrate

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[17] The best account perhaps can be found in Tyerman's exhaustive work: *Life and Times of John Wesley.* 3 vols. New York. 1872.

A briefer and more readable work with special reference to the social conditions of the times is: *The Life of John Wesley* by C. T. Winchester. New York. 1906.

A brief survey of the subject can also be found in: J. M. Buckley's *A History of the Methodists in the United States.* New York. 1896.

Wesley's *Journals* in his collected *Works* are still, as far as they have been printed, the indispensible source for the facts of his life.

[18] Compare Mark Pattison in the essay quoted above and Matthew Arnold's essay: *Bishop Butler and the Zeit-geist.*

the truths of religion in his closely reasoned arguments. Now, wholly aside from Butler's rather indefinite conception of nature and of the affections, which both modern science and modern psychology have pronounced inadequate for the support of such an analogy, it can hardly be claimed from the practical point of view that the net proceeds of Butler's work were entirely satisfactory. A line of argument which ended in the prudential conclusion that "it was safer to believe than not" might be good as far as it went, but it did not go far enough. Common sense it had, but that was all. The transcendental elements in religion had been wholly lost sight of. Such a conception might keep men moral on prudential grounds, but it was not the kind which enkindled enthusiasm, led to self-sacrifice and inspired with intense missionary zeal.

These were the very elements which Wesleyanism aimed to restore. Although John Wesley himself was a logical reasoner, a great admirer of Bishop Butler and a man who seldom gave vent to his feelings, at least after his youthful period of emotional conflict was over, nevertheless he had a mystical vein in his character and the religion he taught differs widely from the conception of the deists. Above all he insisted on the subjective element in religion. He demanded a conversion, a regeneration of the individual soul and added the requirement that that soul should be able to give a satisfactory account of its religious experience. Furthermore, both he and his followers believed that conversion was not due to man's reasoning on the evidences of religion at all, but was the work of the Divine Spirit. Prayer, good works, and the efforts of the convert might be necessary as conditions of receiving the Divine gift, but conversion and regeneration themselves were essentially the work of God. This is the same position which was so ably elaborated and defended by Jonathan Edwards here in America. The grounds of religious belief were thus shifted from common reason to a subjective experience, and the essential transcendental element was, at the same time, restored to its due

place. And it was just these subjective and transcendental elements, as is now generally recognized, which Wesley learned from the Moravians.

On the condition of English society[19] during the first half of the eighteenth century we need not dwell here. But what Wesleyanism meant as a social regenerating power can be gathered from the judgments of historians. John Richard Green[20] has said that the noblest result of the Wesleyan movement was "the steady attempt, which has never ceased from that day to this, to remedy the guilt, the ignorance, the physical suffering, the social degradation of the profligate and the poor." And a more recent writer[21] has declared that Wesley's greatest service was not to the Church but to the cause of democracy. John Wesley not only brought a message of eternal salvation to that lower half of society, which had been neglected and brutalized, but he was among the first to minister to its temporal wants. It was he who first demonstrated, through his publishing house, the practicability of a good and cheap literature which could be spread broadcast among the people. We may smile to-day at some of the remedies in his *Primitive Physic,* but we should not overlook the significance of these efforts to teach an ignorant class a rational care of their bodies. It was Wesley again who influenced John Howard, the great prison reformer. It was John and Charles Wesley who ushered in a new era of church hymnology, and we shall see that, for both their philanthropic and hymnodic efforts, they had had forerunners in Germany.

The impulse which Wesleyanism gave to the democratic movement of the times was most important for the future development of politics in England. Methodism came at a time of commercial prosperity, when the middle class was laying the foundation for its future control of the state

[19] Compare Buckley: *A History of the Methodists in the United States* and C. T. Winchester: *Life of Wesley,* Chap. IV.

[20] *Short History of the English People.*

[21] F. M. Davenport: *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals.* New York. 1905.

policy in the nineteenth century. It was to this class that Wesley especially appealed, and from it likewise were drawn most of his class leaders and lay preachers. The new religious spirit thus became a powerful leaven in increasing the self-consciousness, the moral force and the sturdy independence of a class, which political economists now consider the most valuable asset in the life of any nation. Parallel with the rise of Wesleyanism, came the development of a bourgeois or commoner literature. Lillo's *George Barnwell* had appeared in 1731 to be followed by Richardson's *Pamela* in 1740. These works were the first attempts in England to depict phases of life and to voice emotions characteristic of the middle class in society. It can hardly be fortuitous that emotionalism in religion and sentimentalism in literature both came into existence at the same time. And finally what Methodism has been as a social force in America dare not be overlooked. Although the first Methodist society was not formed in New York until 1764 or 1765,[22] and the church was not organized until the close of the Revolution, yet to-day it ranks first[23] in numbers among the Protestant denominations. True to its original organization and to its subjective, experimental type of religion, it has always been the ablest in reaching the masses. Judged solely by the magnitude of its growth and the extent of its sway, Methodism must be pronounced the most remarkable fact in the history of Protestantism.

Social and religious conditions in America, at the time of the Great Awakening of 1740, were naturally very different from those in the home countries. Probably a majority of the colonists in the narrow fringe of settlements along the Atlantic coast had come to America as the result of religious dissent of one kind or another. But like plants

[22] It is interesting to note in passing that the founders of this first Methodist society in America, Philip Embury and Barbara Heck, were both descendants of German 'Palatinates' who had settled first in Ballingrane, Ireland.

[23] See table, p. 55, note 6 *Supra*.

torn up by the roots and replanted in a new soil, they had a long and hard struggle to establish themselves in a new environment. Cut off from their native social traditions, with only slight means of intercourse between the separate colonies, engrossed in a bitter struggle for existence against a hostile nature and a hostile savagery, it is not surprising that these colonists sometimes succumbed to the barbarizing tendencies of their surroundings and that the outlook for a vigorous religious growth was not encouraging. In New England, where the church exercised the greatest influence, there had been a marked falling off from the high character of the Puritan and Pilgrim forefathers. The children of the second and third generations, without the stirring experiences of their ancestors and the same deep consciousness of a religious mission to fulfill, tended to become more and more provincial in character. The doctrines of the Reformation they had retained but the power and spirituality of that great religious movement had ceased to exist. The theocratic union of Church and State which the first settlers had set out to establish, in the end proved highly detrimental to vital religion. As men outside the pale of the Church could not hold office and yet had to pay taxes to support both Church and State, this New England theocracy led naturally to the so-called Half-way Covenant, by virtue of which any man, unless of known immoral character, could become a member in full communion in most of the New England churches, regardless of the fact whether he could give a satisfactory account of his own religious experience or no. So far did this practice extend that many of the New England divines, including Solomon Stoddard, the grandfather of Jonathan Edwards, regarded the communion as a "converting ordnance." The effort to do away with this unsatisfactory condition in the church was the cause of Edward's dismissal by the congregation in Northampton, as is well known to all familiar with the life of the great metaphysician. A recent historian[24] has summed up the

[24] Leonard Woolsey Bacon: *A History of American Christianity.*

aspect of affairs in the following sentence: "By the end of the first third of the eighteenth century, New England, politically, ecclesiastically, theologically and morally had come into a state of unstable equilibrium."

The middle colonies showed a wider diversity than elsewhere among Christian people, not only in regard to race and language, but also in point of doctrinal opinion and ecclesiastical connection. Those churches, English, Dutch and German, which depended for support on a transatlantic hierarchy, all suffered woefully from an inadequate supply of means as well as of men properly equipped to carry on the work in a colonial community. The Dutch Reformed Church[25] in New York and New Jersey was dwindling. Although the English, after the conquest of New Amsterdam in 1664, were slow to make religious changes, nevertheless, as the English language gradually gained the upper hand, the Dutch Reformed Church had to fight more and more against adverse conditions. Not the least of these was the mixed character of the population and the fact that most of the settlers in New York had come to America chiefly for the purpose of trade and barter. The Episcopal Church, both in the middle colonies and Virginia, in spite of the prestige lent to it by royal favor, was really in a position of disadvantage. Although the "Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge" had made some missionary efforts in the colonies, yet the lax character of many of the clergymen sent from England, the vile character of some of the royal officials, who were the natural sponsors for this church, gave rise to the popular suspicion that the Established Church was not loyal to the interests of the colonies. In Pennsylvania the state of the church was even more con-

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New York. 1897. Chaps. X and XI contain a fine survey of the Great Awakening and its effects. The author makes free acknowledgment of his indebtedness to this work.

[25] Between 1700-1740 there were sixty-five scattered congregations with only nineteen ministers, almost all from Europe. S. T. Corwin: *History of the Dutch Reformed Church in the United States.* New York. 1895. Chaps. II, III, and IV.

fused. The Quakers had entered upon the second stage of their development and had ceased to be a proselyting sect. The Presbyterian Church, with its center in Philadelphia, was, comparatively speaking, well organized but small. It lacked enthusiasm as the efforts of the Tennents to revitalize religion seem to testify. The German sects, cut off from the English by barriers of language and race feeling, were like sheep having no shepherd. The repeated calls for aid of the Lutherans and German Reformed on the mother churches at home were answered so tardily that only the visit of Zinzendorf to the German churches and his efforts to unite them, finally roused the home churches to greater energy.[26] While the independent German sects, with all restraints removed, followed their centrifugal bent to the extremes of quietism and monasticism.[27] According to the Rev. Samuel Blair,[28] an eye-witness, the state of religion in Pennsylvania was lamentable: "There were some religious people, and a considerable number pretty exact in the observance of the external forms of religion, but with this the most part seemed to rest contented, and to satisfy their consciences with a dead formality. A lamentable ignorance of the main essentials of true practical religion and the doctrines relating thereto, generally prevailed. The nature and necessity of the new birth, were but little known or thought of. The necessity of a conviction of sin and misery, in order to a saving closure with Christ, was hardly known at all, etc., etc." In short, wherever we look, we find the same symptoms. The legalism of New England is

[26] This was in 1740. As a result the Lutheran Church in Halle sent H. M. Muhlenberg (1767) and the German Reformed Michael Schlatter (1747). These men, both Halle students, succeeded finally in reorganizing these churches.

[27] As early as 1700 a number of Germans, among them Kelpius, the hymn writer, lived as hermits along the Wissahickon. Conrad Beissel (1691-1768) founded the monkish "Order of the Solitary" at Ephrata, Pa. See J. H. Dubbs, *German Reformed Church*, p. 261.

[28] In Gillie's *Historical Collections*, Vol. II, p. 150, quoted also by Tyerman: *Life of George Whitefield*, I, 322.

matched by formalism and indifference elsewhere. While differences of race and language emphasize not only the lack of unity among the various Christian bodies but even the total absence of any common bond of sympathy.

Now it was the mission of the Great Awakening to breathe a quickening spirit into these scattered religious communities, to produce a feeling of common spiritual interests and to pave the way for greater unity of action among the colonists. This movement, the only considerable one of an intellectual kind before the political agitation preceding the Revolution, marks the transition from a religion of the reason to a religion of the heart, from the Puritanic or rationalistic to the Methodist or emotional type of Christianity. For better or for worse evangelical or "experimental" religion was to prevail in most of the Protestant churches for a century to come. The honor of having started the movement[29] in America is usually ascribed to Jonathan Edwards. As early as 1734 he had a notable revival in his church at Northampton. His correspondence with Dr. Watts and Dr. Guyse of London, led to the publication there, in 1736, of his *Narrative of Surprising Conversions*. This book came into the hands of John Wesley and can undoubtedly be regarded as one of the immediate causes leading to revivals both in England and in Scotland. How much Wesley was influenced by Edwards may be further gathered from the fact that among the former's publications for the year 1744 is to be found: *The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God, extracted from Mr. Edwards, Minister of Northampton in New England.* Wesley's

[29] For the history of the Great Awakening see: Tracy: *The Great Awakening;* Charles Hodge: *The Constitutional History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States.* Phila., 1840; Robert Ellis Thompson: *A History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States.* New York, 1895. Williston Walker: *A History of the Congregational Church in the United States.* New York, 1894; S. B. Dwight: *Life of Jonathan Edwards.* New York, 1829; Tyerman: *Life of George Whitefield.* London, 1876. Whitefield's *Journal* (London) is still an indispensable original source.

biographer, Tyerman,[80] remarks: "By publishing this calm, pointed, argumentative treatise, Wesley made its sentiments his own." While the English reformer undoubtedly drew his emotional power from German sources it was from the American metaphysician that he learned to harness and guide it into the most effective channels. Edwards' early efforts were quickly followed by scattered revivals at Newark, N. J., under Jonathan Dickinson, at New Brunswick in the church of Gilbert Tennent and under the leadership of Samuel Blair at Londonderry, Pa. But nevertheless, Edwards' revivals and those, which immediately followed elsewhere, were local in their influence. There were no sign that they would become extensive. The first glow of fervour had largely spent its force when the man arrived in May, 1738, who was to make the revival general, to infuse a fervent emotionalism into American Christianity and to strengthen the bond of common religious feeling among the English speaking Christians of North America.

This man was George Whitefield, the first among the members of Wesleys "Holy Club" at Oxford. He had come to America at the request of the Wesleys to take up the missionary work in Georgia. Like them, he, too, came over in the same ship with a number of German Pietists[81] and had ample opportunity to become thoroughly familiar with this quietistic introspective type of religion. Furthermore, it was during this three months sojourn in Georgia that Whitefield visited the Orphan-house[82] of the Salzburger settlement. The leaders of this German colony, Pastors Boltzius and Grünau, had both been trained under Francke at Halle. One of their first cares had been to establish an orphan-house at Ebenezer after the pattern of the "Pietas Hallensis." Although Whitefield had already read of

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[80] *Life and Times of John Wesley*, I, 467.

[81] Salzburger exiles. See Bishop Hurst in *Harper's Magazine*, 1892 (p. 344) for an account of the Salzburger colony.

[82] See Whitefield's *Journal* under date of Tuesday, July 11, 1738, for an account of this visit. Quoted below.

Francke's famous institution, yet this visit was probably the immediate occasion of his desire to establish an orphan-house in Georgia, for on his return to England he immediately set about raising funds for this purpose and in a short time succeeded in collecting more than a thousand pounds. This winter of 1738-1739 in England was a memorable one, too, for Whitefield, as well as for Wesley. After taking orders, the former began that wonderful career as a field preacher which has only few parallels in church history. While both the former and the latter spent much time together in the Moravian society in Fetter Lane, cultivating this new type of emotional religion under the direct tutelage of such men as the Moravian, Peter Böhler.

Filled with this new enthusiasm and the conviction that inner regeneration was the chief need of his age Whitefield embarked for Philadelphia again in August, 1739. The fame of his eloquence had gone before him. The universal desire to hear him shows clearly that the emotional centre of gravity, for the masses at least, still lay in the domain of religion. The details of his whirlwind religious campaign need not be recounted here. From Maine to Georgia he preached to thousands. Everywhere the crowds were seized with the soul-distress which found vent in cries, groans, faintings, convulsions, voices, visions and revelations. Nowhere did he forget to collect large sums for his orphan-house. The fact that he was an ordained clergyman of the Church of England, that he became a Calvinist under the influence of the Tennents and Edwards during this journey, that he did not aim to found a new sect but only to infuse life into the old ones, made him at this time a welcome guest everywhere. While his dramatic powers as an orator enabled him to exert an influence over the masses which seems in our cold critical days almost incredible. His subsequent visits to America, the religious agitations which attended his preaching, his constant concern for the welfare of his orphan-house at Bethesda, Ga., have all been duly recounted by his biographers. Here we need only

survey briefly the effects of this religious upheaval of which he was chief instigator.

To the Presbyterian Church the unrestrained zeal of Whitefield and Gilbert Tennent brought not peace but a sword. The latter's famous Nottingham sermon on the *Dangers of an Unconverted Ministry* was followed in 1741 by the excision of the .New Brunswick Presbytery which was then joined by New York, thus forming a new synod. The Old Side insisted on the importance of organization and method into which men should be trained as ministers. While the New Side, for a time at least, seemed carried away by the zeal to save individual souls at all hazards. Significant for the development of Presbyterianism, however, was the fact that the New Side branch grew from forty-five congregations in 1740 to more than one hundred in 1760, while the Old Side made little advance. An indirect result of the schism was the establishment of the College of New Jersey. This was a New Side institution from the beginning. Its early Presidents; Dickinson, Burr, Edwards, Davies and Finlay, had all taken conspicuous parts in revivals and sympathized strongly with the evangelical type of Christianity. In like manner the number of churches in New England had increased by one hundred and fifty[33] during the same period. The Presbyterian Church was able, too, to strike firm root in Southern soil and to present a bold front to the deadly exclusiveness of the Virginia establishment. And in such men as Devereux Jarrett[34] the influence of the Great Awakening can be traced in the Episcopal Church itself.

But more important still for the spread of the evangelical type of Christianity was the impetus which the new movement gave to the growth of Baptist churches. The individualistic and emotional character of the revival seemed to harmonize well with the temper of the Baptists. Many of

[33] Tracy: *The Great Awakening.*

[34] Tiffany: *A History of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States,* p. 45.

the separatist churches in New England formed by the withdrawal of revival enthusiasts joined this denomination. In the South preachers of this sect were gradually able to win multitudes of converts to the Christian faith. In like manner, the Great Awakening prepared the way for the rapid extension of Methodism. When we bear in mind that today these two sects, similar in the emotional character of their religion and in their revival methods of evangelization, double in number all the other Protestant denominations put together, the immense religious influence flowing from the Great Awakening is apparent.

A new missionary zeal for communicating the Gospel to the ignorant also emanated from the new movement. The Indians and the Negroes from this time forward have the Gospel preached to them. Edwards worked among the Indians at Stockbridge, David Brainerd in New Jersey and missionary efforts in behalf of the red man led to the foundation of Dartmouth College. The only considerable original contribution which America has made to theology may also be considered as a direct outcome of the Great Awakening. For it was chiefly with a view of combating the excesses and saving the good in the new type of religion that Edwards' theological works were written. The general outcome was, therefore, not only a quickening of religious feeling but the deepening of religious conviction and the clearing of theological opinion. A no less notable result was the adoption of a new psalmody. The unmelodious and grotesque rimes which had served as vehicles of worship were gradually supplanted by Isaac Watt's wonderful production: *The Psalms of David Imitated in the Language of the New Testament.* Watt's hymns thus form the transition between the older psalmody confined strictly to Biblical phraseology and the new hymnody of free creation fostered by German influence. This change in the Puritan and Presbyterian churches was almost revolutionary, for it marks the end of the opposition to mere "human composures" as infringements on the entire and exclusive

authority and sufficiency of Scripture. It was the first step toward liturgical forms.

While the predominant individualistic and subjective trend in the Great Awakening undoubtedly served to strengthen that independence and diversity of organization in religious bodies which has made denominationalism the most prominent characteristic of American Christianity, yet, paradoxical as it may seem, this same movement unquestionably fostered among the colonists a feeling of common interest. Heretofore there had been almost no bond of fellowship between the British colonies along the Atlantic seaboard. In the fervour of the revival, the continent awoke to the consciousness of a common spiritual life. Whitefield's extensive travels and his ministrations to all sects alike formed a link which bound all denominations to each other in a common religious purpose. The preaching of Gilbert Tennent in New England, the calling of Dickinson, Burr and Edwards from New England to labors in New Jersey served further to strengthen the good understanding and mutual fellowship. As an outcome of the new zeal in religion the Presbyterian Synod and the Connecticut Consociation of Congregational Churches met together in annual assembly for the ten years immediately preceding the Revolution. When we remember that it was the Congregationalists and the Presbyterians who were most uncompromising in their opposition to the aggressions of the British government, we see that the great religious revival was an important factor also in creating that sentiment of solidarity which was the necessary preparation for the Revolution. And finally the vigorous propagation of rival sects following the Awakening virtually settled, for the future, the very important question of the relation of Church and State. In New England the theocracy, already doomed, now went rapidly to pieces. Elsewhere the growth and strength of the independent sects in the face of what church establishment there was, made it inevitable that in America, sooner or

later, the law of equality and liberty should prevail among the various religious communities.

Pietism, Methodism and the rise of evangelical Christianity in America are, therefore, not only subjects of interest to the theologian and church historian, but a knowledge of them is indispensable to all who would correctly appreciate the development of modern culture. It now remains for us to consider in a subsequent paper their points of contact somewhat in detail.

Princeton University. JOHN PRESTON HOSKINS.

MODERN PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.[1]

I gladly accept this opportunity of expressing to the Board of Directors my full appreciation of the honor their election has conferred. It is indeed a distinction to be asked to serve this Seminary which for nearly one hundred years has held such a conspicuous and honorable place in the history of our church. It is an inspiration to be allowed to assume even in part the duties of predecessors who have been illustrious both for piety and learning. It is a privilege to be associated with the members of a faculty who are no less eminent for Christian scholarship than for loyal devotion to the word of God.

I am more desirous still of signifying my profound sense of the sacredness of the trust imposed upon me and the seriousness of the responsibilities assumed. With this purpose in view, I desire to speak of the present scope and importance of that Department within which my duties shall lie. Aside, however, from all personal considerations such a discussion is demanded by the nature of the occasion; for, the ceremony of the hour formally marks the reorganization of the Practical Department of this Seminary and its enlargement by the establishment of a new chair. The subject therefore suggested for our consideration is Modern Practical Theology.

Because of certain possible implications, the use of the three words united in this theme may need to be defended or explained. For instance, there are those who would deny us the right to employ, in this connection, the rubric "Theology." They remind us, not without force, that we have here to do with the work of the minister and with the

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[1] Address by the Reverend Charles R. Erdman on the occasion of his inauguration as Professor of Practical Theology in the Seminary of the Presbyterian Church at Princeton, N. J., November 13, 1906, 11 a. m., Miller Chapel.

working church—with methods, and service and life; and that Theology is exactly the thing with which here we are not concerned. It may be sufficient to reply that "Theology" is to-day a wider term than when employed by the early Christian writers, who limited it to the doctrine of the nature of God; or as used by Peter Abelard, who, in the twelfth century, first began to employ it to denote scientific instruction concerning God and the Divine Life. It is now popularly understood to designate the entire science of religion and to include the realm of individual Christian experience as well as of the corporate life and activities of the church. We heartily wish that the term had been sacredly guarded as the title of Systematic Theology, the "Queen of the Sciences"; but since this has not been done, we shall assume the right of still using the word to suggest at least that the branches included in the Practical Department form an integral and important part of the curriculum in which Theoolgy is taught.

Then again the term "Practical," when employed as the distinctive designation of one among several coordinate departments, seems to many to be arrogant, polemic, unkind. It is supposed to suggest that the other departments are not practical; that they are indeed useless, to some greater or less degree. It is needless in this presence to emphasize the fact that the word is here employed, with becoming humility, to indicate that this particular discipline aims to show how the useful materials which other departments supply can be put into practice. It teaches how truth can be applied to life. It is specially dependent upon the work of the other departments, yet united with them it forms the crown of the Theological scheme. It aims to transform pupils into preachers; scholars into shepherds of souls; learners into leaders and teachers of men.

Most of all it may be necessary to explain the use of the term "Modern." When united with the word "Theology" it occasions alarm in some quarters and suggests "New Theology," breadth without depth, sentimentality, heresy,

weakness, immaturity, unbelief. Let us then insist that the theology is most truly modern which is most deeply rooted in the past, which holds most tenaciously to truth once for all revealed, but which welcomes increasing light and seeks to adapt its message and its methods to present conditions of life.

It is because the Practical Department still embraces the branches which in the past constituted its essence, while it is at the same time widening its scope to meet certain changing conditions, that this Department is now being given a larger and more prominent place. Such conditions have emerged both within the sphere of Theological instruction and in the field of organized Christian work. In the Seminary curriculum there has been a marked enlargement of the various departments. For instance, we note the rapid growth of the department of "Biblical Exegesis." No Seminary would be considered as possessing a modern equipment if allowed but one Professor for its Exegetical department. This discipline has been divided into the departments of "Old Testament Literature and Exegesis," and "New Testament Literature and Exegesis"; each of these has been broadened to deal with the problems of modern Biblical Criticism; and the whole department has been greatly strengthened by the addition of the admirable discipline known as "Biblical Theology." Of the other departments of study the same widening of scope is in large measure true. If, therefore, the Directors of this Seminary are now determining to strengthen and enlarge the Practical Department, it is with no intention of destroying the delicately adjusted balance of the Theological curriculum, but only of affording to this department a development and place which are proportionate and just.

The novel features which characterize modern Christian activity are still more generally known and recognized. The have been manifested, for example, in an increasing intricacy of church organization; in an endeavor to meet the loud demand for social service; in the scientific development

of Sabbath-school methods; in the enlarging sphere of benevolent and missionary boards; in a recognized comity between religious denominations; in the world-wide extension of Christian associations; in the great forward, evangelistic movements at home and abroad. With such significant modern conditions in mind, the mere mention of the various branches of Practical Theology will suggest the necessity of reconstructing and developing this department, and thus the purpose of the hour will be fulfilled.

First of all, possibly most important of all, stands the discipline of Homiletics, or the "Science of Preaching," with its closely related discipline of Liturgics, or the "Science of Public Worship." The peculiar function of the Theological Seminary has ever been to produce scholarly and spiritual ministers of the Word; but there is a special demand, to-day, for men who are particularly skilled in the art of public speech. It is needless to deny a prevalent religious indifference. The masses are not thronging into the churches. If a preacher is to secure a hearing he must possess more than average ability as a pulpit orator. The most thoughtful and polished sermonizer is a conspicuous failure in the modern ministry unless he can so preach as to attract an audience and to compel men to listen to the message he has carefully prepared. It is therefore natural that the Theological Seminary should now be expected to afford more extended drill in the delivery of sermons, and to place a greater emphasis upon the art of public address. So, too, in the matter of public worship, the recent publication of our "Book of Forms" emphasizes the demand for a ministry more carefully instructed in the principles and practice of the Presbyterian Church. But of the importance of these branches, and of their further development, it is not necessary for me to speak. By the definite action of the Board of Directors the Practical Department in this Seminary is now divided. The instruction in Homiletics and Liturgics is now assigned to a specific chair under the title of "Homilectics"; while the remaining branches of the

department are to constitute the province of a new chair under the inclusive title of "Practical Theology."

Among the latter, Ecclesiastics, or the "Science of Church Government," holds a significant place. It is a familiar and an open question as to whether this particular discipline is properly classified as a branch of Practical Theology. Possibly the discussion may be determined by the particular method which an instructor may pursue. If one should gather from the New Testament all the texts and references relating to the apostolic church and should thus determine and set forth its exact organization and the functions of its officers, while truly dealing with church government, his labors would lie within the sphere of Exegesis.

Or, should one become a master of patristic literature and discover the exact form of church government which emerged in the Post-Apostolic age, or should he discuss those forms of church polity which obtained in later centuries, he might be doing the proper work of the historian. But if one endeavors to set forth the existing principles and practices of the Presbyterian Church, and if he seeks to drill his pupils in the "Form of Government" and the "Book of Discipline," he may be laboring wholly within the sphere of the Practical Theologian. And such discipline is need to-day. Serious problems are continually confronting us, as, for example, with reference to the work and status of the Evangelist, or the relation of Mission Presbyteries to Mission Boards, or the duty of the local church to its lapsed members, or the constitution and province of the church courts, or the relations to be maintained with sister denominations. While less may be said to-day than in other years of a "*jure divino* Presbyterianism," there is no less need than ever that candidates for the Presbyterian ministry should be carefully instructed in those principles which, if peculiar to our polity, we heartily believe to be in harmony with the word of God and in accord with the practice of the primitive church.

The third great branch of Practical Theology which has been given a prominent place in the curriculum of other

years is known as Poimenics or the "Science of Pastoral Care." We are not ready to admit that the need of Pastoral service is ended. In spite of the prominence rightly given to the popular preacher and the place which is afforded to the ordained superintendent of the institutional church, we are firmly convinced that the times demand the continued work of the Christian Pastor. In fact, certain developments in modern life suggest a peculiar need for pastoral work. It is true that a gulf begins to yawn between certain classes and the Christian church. It is by the work of the Christian Pastor that this gulf in no small measure can be bridged; in all homes he is welcome; among all circles he can freely move. Then, too, if leaders of Christian activity are so properly emphasizing to-day the need of "individual work for individuals," a special call comes to the Christian minister to fit himself for pre-eminence in this sphere. Yet in preparation for such work, special training should be given. "Many a one who appears a hero in the toga makes but a sorry figure as soon as he grasps the shepherd's staff." The cure of souls is the "Art of Arts." Yet there are many who seem to imagine that it demands merely common sense and experience to be proficient in this art; while others are satisfied in affirming that "pastors are born, not made." We shall be so bold as to assume that, on the subject of pastoral care, certain suggestions may be made which do not belong to the sphere of innate ideas and need not be learned in the school of failure.

Closely allied with this discipline is that which in olden days was known as Catechetics or the "Science of the Religious Training of the Young." There was a time when such a discipline related more particularly to that drill in the "catechism," which the word may seem to imply. We may use it to-day to designate the science of Sabbath-School organization. This, too, is supposed by many to be a somewhat unnecessary discipline; but those who realize the lessening religious influence of Christian homes, and who have observed the careful development and thoughtful system-

atizing of modern methods in Sabbath School work, are best able to congratulate that sister Seminary which so fully appreciates the demands of the time that it has established a chair to deal specifically with the problems of Sabbath School work.

There is another branch of this department, which is classed under the difficult title of Archagics, or the "Science of Organized Christian Work." The title may be novel, but the discipline is suggested by the words of the Apostle Paul. He declared that pastors and teachers were given "for the perfecting of the saints unto the work of ministering unto the building up of the body of Christ." He implied, therefore, that the pastor should aim at developing the Christian activities of his people, and at leading them into various lines of Christian service. Never before have there been so many forms of organized Christian activity. The pastor is most successful to-day who regards his church as an instrument, not an end; who believes it to be not merely a field to cultivate, but a force to wield; who knows how to utilize such great instruments as the Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, the Society of Christian Endeavor, the Men's Brotherhood;—who is fully aware of the scope and functions and activities of our Missionary Boards;—who is most familiar with the modern movements of the Christian world;—who keeps himself in vital connection with the pulsating life of the universal church. There is therefore an imperative need of more specific and extended instruction in modern forms and methods of Christian work. On the resulting breadth of sympathy and exactness of knowledge the usefulness of the ministry will largely depend.

We should also mention Halieutics or that branch of theological science which has to do with Evangelistic and Missionary work. The great Evangelistic movement in our own church, which has been so largely furthered by the personal activity of a distinguished number of our Board of Trustees, is suggesting the need of ministers specially trained in Evan-

gelistic methods, as well as imbued with Evangelistic fervor and endowed with spiritual power. So, too, the great Missionary awakening of the present day is making a new demand upon our Seminaries, and is suggesting that it is not enough for us to train Pastors and Preachers for service at home, but that our course should be so adjusted as to favor the instruction of Missionary Evangelists, who will be specialists, trained for their unique work in the foreign field. We congratulate that School of Divinity which has recently established a chair of "Missionary Practice and Methods." It suggests to us another line in which the times demand that the Practical Department of the Seminary should be enlarged.

In addition to the branches thus briefly outlined, the Directors have added another and have specifically requested that upon this new Department I should place the chief stress of my future work. It is the so-called Department of English Bible. Here again we are confronted with a title for which some apology must be made and which may appear difficult of defense. The word "English" is not altogether complimentary to the Professor in charge. It may imply a certain ignorance of Hebrew and of Greek, an implication, the truth of which, my modesty or my honesty forbids me to dispute. On the other hand, his colleagues in the Faculty might not be delighted with the word "Bible" if it seemed at all to suggest that this new department was the only one in which that book was properly or specifically taught. The same difficulty emerged when the Department of Biblical Theology was established. Its title seemed to arrogate to this discipline some distinguishing devotion to the Bible; but all fears and offense proved groundless; and the department has been conducted with the modesty which characterizes true greatness. Biblical Theology has simply approached the Scripture with a new aim and applied to the study a new method. Such in part is the case with "English Bible," which is the study of the Scriptures with a distinctly practical aim, and with a definite literary method. It might

be called the "Literary and Homiletic Study of the Bible." It is to be doubted, however, whether this designation would prove more illuminating to the Christian public at large. There is a sense in which this discipline will be preparatory to the work of the other departments as it will secure, first of all, a broad and comprehensive view of the Bible as a whole and then of its separate books in their outline and content. In another sense it will be supplemental to the other departments, as it will cover those portions of the word of God for which in other years no time for special instruction could be found. Yet in the truest sense its field is peculiar and unique, as it aims at such a special, practical spiritual and Evangelistic interpretation of the Bible as will directly equip the preacher for his pulpit and the pastor for his personal work;—to definitely "perfect the man of God and thoroughly furnish him for every good work." The multiplication of Bible Schools and Institutes, the ignorance of the Scriptures openly confessed by ministers, the increasing demand for the Biblical instruction of lay workers, the revival of expository preaching, these and kindred signs of the times have convinced the Directors that for such a department there is a place among the disciplines of the Theological curriculum, and a place second in importance to none.

Such in brief survey is the vast field of Modern Practical Theology. To select from this the portion which can be covered in the few hours of the crowded weekly schedule which are fairly allotted to one Professor, is the chief difficulty of the task I to-day assume. Yet the Board of Directors are confronted by an even more delicate and difficult problem. It is to so adjust this enlarged department to the Seminary curriculum as to do no injustice to the other departments while meeting the imperious demand of the times in establishing this new chair. In the solution of your problem I shall be honored to find myself of any possible service, as I shall need your personal co-operation in the performance of my task.

So far as I know I have accepted your call because of no desire for personal advancement or gain, but because of my appreciation of the important work of this Seminary which I to-day promise to faithfully serve. I have been encouraged by the generous and cordial friendship of the Faculty, whose wise counsels and kind sympathy will make the performance of my daily duties a delight.

Conscious of my limitations and imperfections, my dependence must be upon the sustaining grace of God in Christ Jesus, to Whom be all the glory now and forever. Amen.

Princeton. CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

REVISION OF ARTICLE THIRTY-SIX OF THE CONFESSIO BELGICA.

For many years leading men among the Reformed theologians of Holland have had an objection (*gravamen*) to one of the clauses about the duty of magistrates, in the 36th Article of their Confession of Faith. This clause says that magistrates are in duty bound "to prohibit and extirpate all idolatry and false religion, and to overthrow the kingdom of Antichrist." Most of the ministers and professors of the Reformed churches in Holland no longer believe that this clause is based on, or in harmony with, the teaching of Holy Writ. Many of the older ministers formerly trained at the Theological Seminary in Arnhem, which was incorporated into that of Kampen in the year 1854, declared at their probationer's examination, that they did not agree with it, and in subscribing to the standards of the Church made an exception to this clause. But it was never officially dealt with at provincial or general Synods. Finally, at the close of the Synod held at Middleburg in 1896, this objection was voiced by Dr. Rutgers, the oldest of the Reformed theological professors, and his seven colleagues in the Free University at Amsterdam and in the Theological Seminary at Kampen. The Synod then referred it to a committee of eight, to report at its next meeting. This report was to be circulated for a year among all the Churches at home, and such Reformed Churches abroad as are in correspondence with our own, inviting the latter to be present and to take part, when the matter should come up before the next Synod. The committee, however, failed to do this, and two Synods met, one at Groningen and the other at Arnhem, without any report having been presented. Evidently the committee considered the task too formidable; for they were expected to state not only negatively, but also positively, what, on Scriptural grounds, is to be considered

the duty of the civil power with regard to the Church. They felt unable to do this: first, because in their judgment the present state of affairs differs widely from that in Reformation times; and secondly, because ideas have not yet ripened into a *communis opinio,* fit to be embodied in this part of the Confession.

For this reason the Synod at Arnhem (1902) referred the matter to a new committee of eight, with more limited instructions, to report at its next meeting. It seemed no longer necessary to consult the above-mentioned foreign Churches, these Churches being not numerous enough to represent all the Reformed Churches, and moreover the majority of them having already revised their Confessions or added to them a more explicit explanation on this point. So this feature was omitted from the program.

The new committee having finished their task, the matter came up at the Synod of Utrecht, held in August, 1905. In accordance with the conclusion of their report, this Synod almost unanimously resolved to declare the *gravamen* well-founded, and to exscind the afore-mentioned clause from the Confession. Further, the Synod declared it desirable that in the new editions of the Confession of Faith the omitted clause should be printed at the bottom of the page, with a note explaining its omission.[1] And it was further determined that the government should be informed of the alteration in this Article of the Confession.

Possibly the readers of this REVIEW may be interested in the nature of the elaborate report submitted by the committee, on which the Synod's resolutions were based.

First it was asked: Is it really the meaning of the Confession that idolatry and false religion should be extirpated by force, so that the *gravamen* may be considered well-founded? The answer was in the affirmative. A passage was quoted from Calvin's *Institutio* (Lib. iv, ch. 20, sec. 53), where it is said not only that the magistrate exists to protect

[1] In the authorized edition, printed by order of the Synod, this has been done.

men's lives, etc., but also that neither idolatry nor blasphemy against God and His truth, nor any other such public scandals and offenses against religion may arise and be promulgated among the people, adding that only such civil laws are to be approved of, which do not suffer with impunity true religion to be impaired or defiled by public wickedness. On this and similar passages, the report says, the clause in the Confession must have been based, and moreover it can be proved from many facts in history, that such was also the practice of our forefathers.

Moreover, it appears from most of the Confessions of the Reformed Churches, that such was also their intention, as, for instance, that of the Berne Synod, 1536, the First and Second Helvetic Confession 1562, the English Confession 1553, the Scotch 1560, the Erlanthaler or Hungarian 1562, the Bohemian and the Westminster Confession.[2]

Further, this accords with the unanimous opinion of the most eminent Reformed theologians, not only of Calvin in his Treatise on the errors of Servetus, where he says that heretics are to be punished with the sword, but also of Luther, Beza, Melanchton and Bullinger. Only in later times this severe opinion gave way to more tolerant views.

The Report next proceeds to prove that this statement of Article 36 is not in conformity with the Word of God, and, in order to do so, gives a commentary on the texts referring to the subject. The fathers, in support of their opinion, quoted Old Testament passages which threaten punishment against blasphemy, false prophets and apostacy. But in doing so they were wrong, as the texts do not refer to false religion or false churches, but were applicable to a state of Theocracy such as no longer exists. Romans xiii. 2 and 1 Timothy i. 1, 2, to which Calvin appealed, do not refer to the extirpation of idolatries or the persecution of heretics. The early Church found herself confronted with a pagan govern-

[2] It is, however, remarkable that in none of the Confessions drawn up by Calvin the idea occurs; though from his writings and actions it is clear what his opinions were.

ment. The question we are dealing with now did not then exist. Consequently, it is to be settled only by what is taught in the New Testament on the nature of the kingdom of Christ. "My kingdom is not of this world," the Lord Jesus said to Pilate; "if My kingdom were of this world, then would My servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews; but now is My kingdom not from hence" (Jn. xviii. 36). When Peter drew his sword Christ said: "Put up again thy sword into his place, for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword" (Mt. xxvi. 52). The Apostles, when going forth into the world to found the Church, did so, as St. Paul says, not with carnal weapons (2 Cor. x. 4), but with the sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God (Eph. vi. 17). They wrestled "not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places," and that only with the spiritual "armour of God" (Eph. vi. 12, 13). Their only power lay in the Gospel, "for it is the power of God unto salvation, to every one that believeth" (Rom. i. 16). In this way they founded the Church, banishing heresies, overcoming the world. "This is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith" (1 Jn. v. 9). So the civil power, as the minister of God, dare not resist the ordinance of God, by defending the Church with the sword. Besides, our Lord nowhere promised the magistrate special guidance by the Spirit for the purpose of distinguishing the true Church from the false. History teaches that persecution tends rather to make heresy and idolatry increase. "Heretics," Maretius says, "are to be killed not by the sword, but by the Sword of the Spirit."

The Report shows that the principle laid down in this clause of Article 36 is contrary to Reformation principles, and therefore has been exscinded by most of the Reformed Churches abroad from their Confessions, or at any rate disapproved by them. The case of Servetus does not prove the contrary, his sentence being no error of Calvin's, but

of the age in which he lived, a consequence of Augustine's *"compelle intrare."* In fact, the error had its root deep in history, as the fathers based their erroneous opinions only on texts from the Old Testament, and further on arguments borrowed from the *corpus juris civilis,* the Codex Justinianeus. The right of controlling the Synod, ascribed there to the civil power, which was the old right of the Emperor of Byzantium and introduced anew by the lawyers of the fifteenth century, was considered in the sixteenth century, in all civilized countries of Europe, as unassailable. It should also be remembered that the struggle with the Papacy in the sixteenth century bore a political character, and that the fathers never approved of the Papal inquisition.

Capital punishment of heretics is contrary to two great principles of the Reformation. The first is liberty of conscience, which is to be respected no less by the Church than by the magistrate. The second is, that the magistrate and the Church are two independent powers, which may not encroach on each other's territory. There is neither a *"jus circa sacra"* nor a *"jus in sacra"*. But it should be kept in mind that this Reformation principle has nothing in common with the idea of a neutral State, springing out of religious indifference.

Finally the Report goes on to show that most of the Reformed Churches which hold to the old Confession have revised it on this point, viz., those of England, Scotland and America; the Congregationalists in the Savoy Declaration, 1658, the Presbyterian Church of America in 1729, the Associate Reformed Church in 1777 (lated united with the Associate Church in 1858 under the name of the United Presbyterian Church). In England and in Scotland no revision took place, but an explanation was added to the Confession, so the Presbyterian Church of England, the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland (1846), and the United Original Secessian Church of Scotland. In the (new) Confession of the Calvinistic Methodist Church of Wales (1823) no mention is made at all of the magistrate's duty to extirpate heresy, idolatry or false religion.

After this careful investigation the Report draws the following conclusions:

1. The statement in Article 36 is really intended to say that the magistrate is to prohibit by means of compulsion and force idolatry and false religion (meaning the Papal Church) and to overthrow the kingdom of Antichrist.

2. This opinion is contrary to the teaching of Holy Writ on the difference between the Old and the New Dispensation; contrary to the spiritual nature of Christ's kingdom, and to the prohibition of using in the service of this kingdom any other than spiritual weapons.

3. The erroneous opinion our fathers held, is to be explained from what was in their time the common religious creed, and from the fact that their religious struggle was at the same time a political one. Nevertheless it is contrary to the Reformation principle of every man's right to serve God according to his own conscience, and to the principle of the autonomy of the Church, as owing allegiance to Christ alone; contrary also to the magistrate's duty to acknowledge and respect both the liberty of conscience and the Church's autonomy.

4. Most Reformed Churches which are keeping to the Confession have revised it on this point, or made an addendum.

5. With this proviso, that a distinction should be made between the false idea of neutrality, originating in religious indifference and that the civil power out of respect to the Church of Christ and the liberty of conscience of individuals should abstain from interfering with the affairs of religion, the above mentioned change in the opinion of the Church is to be attributed to the guidance of the Holy Spirit, who, as Christ promised to His disciples, would guide them into all truth.

On these grounds the Report advised the Synod to judge the *gravamen* well-founded, and to take measures to relieve the conscience of the brethren who felt themselves burdened by this article of the Confession.

The committee did not advise adding an explanation as to how the article is to be understood, this being done rather when it is necessary to expound certain parts of the Confession more fully. To have done so in this case for the purpose of revoking a statement in the contents of the Confession might have created a dangerous precedent likely to be resorted to in course of time by those who would seek to weaken the Confession or to teach doctrines contrary to its meaning. Still less advisable would it have been to insert a clause in the formula of subscription, as this might tend dangerously to weaken the character of the Confession, as an expression of the faith of the whole Church. Nor did it seem expedient to formulate the whole article anew, the example of America showing how difficult it is to reach agreement or such completeness of expression as to exclude all misunderstanding.

So the only method left open was to leave out the clause of Art. 36 altogether. The objection made, that in leaving out the clause the duty of the magistrate in regard to idolatry and false religion is not positively defined, need not be taken into consideration, as the *gravamen* only points to the using of force, and the duty of the magistrate to further the kingdom of Christ and to allow the Gospel to be preached everywhere remains intact. It is worth while to note that such a profound thinker as Calvin in the Confessions drawn up by him, nowhere expressly defines this duty.

Thus far the outlines of the Report. The motion to leave out the clause which gave rise to the *gravamen,* was carried by 24 votes against 16, two of these latter being votes of advisory members. A motion declaring that the *gravamen* could not be removed without revising the whole Article, and that the time for such a revision had not yet come, was rejected by 29 to 4 votes.

A protest was entered, however, in the minutes of the Synod, by one of the professors of Divinity, Dr. Honig, of Kampen, because, by leaving out the clause, in his judgment

an important principle had been removed from the Confession; a principle which, though never heretofore formulated in Scriptural terms, nevertheless ought to be maintained in the Confession, as long as the Confession refers to the duty of the magistrate in regard to the First Table of the Law.

The Hague. A. BRUMMELKAMP.

RELATIONS OF CHURCH HISTORY TO PREACHING.[1]

I shall make some remarks this morning on the connection between the course of study in Church History you have been pursuing and the work you are soon to take up as preachers of the Gospel in the Church. It may be taken for granted by you that Church History sustains important and intimate relations to the work of preaching, just because it has been given so large a place in the theological curriculum. Coördinated as it is with the other departments of theological instruction, all of which are intended chiefly to prepare the student to become a teacher of Christianity to the people, and occupying this position in every theological institution, we may expect to find that it exerts an important homiletical influence on the student. At the same time, it is a fact which all of us no doubt have observed, that ministers—certainly our Presbyterian ministers—employ scarcely at all, in the ministrations of the pulpit, the knowledge of the history of the Church they have obtained during their years of preparation. In this respect, the chair of History is in striking contrast to the chairs of Exegesis and Systematic Theology. Whether or not the preacher endeavors to preserve and to increase his knowledge of the original languages of the Bible whose words he is engaged in interpreting, at least by the use he makes of commentaries and expository sermons he continues, during his professional life, the exegetical studies which he began in the Seminary. I am happy in the belief that, from year to year, an increasing number of our ministers engage in the study of the Greek Testament and the Hebrew Scriptures. And I am confident that the sermon of the future, if this belief is correct, will possess a

[1] Informal address delivered to the Senior Class of Princeton Theological Seminary.

freshness and originality and authority far in advance of the sermon of the present day or of the last generation. For as one of the best of all writers on homiletics has said: "No study gives to the sermon of the preacher such a degree of authority and such an originality as does the study of the Bible."

It seems singular, at first sight, that one should speak of originality in connection particularly with interpretation.[2] The two would seem rather to be contrasted than associated. When we speak of originality, we are apt to think, not of the man who interprets the thoughts of others, but of the man who evokes from the recesses of his own mind thoughts peculiarly his own, as most likely to proclaim truth in an individual or original form. But the writer from whom I have quoted begins the profound and striking address in which he asserts Exegesis to be the great source of originality, with the statement that the one absolute originator and creator is God Himself; that He alone evolves or calls from nothing into being both thought and thing. Starting with this great truth, he directs attention to the statement with which Bacon opens the *Novum Organum*, in these words: "The opening of one of the most sagacious and significant of modern treatises in philosophy reads as follows: 'Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much as his observations on the order of nature with regard either to matter or to mind permit him, and neither knows nor is capable of more.'"

What Bacon thus asserts is that man can be original in his statements with regard to nature only as he studies it and correctly interprets it; only as, by careful observation and classification of its phenomena, he comes more and more to understand it, that is, to penetrate beneath its appearances to its original elements. In the same way, unless man studies and classifies the elements of Revelation by careful scrutiny of its phenomena in the languages in which it was first given,

[2] Read Dr. Shedd's admirable discussion of this subject in his chapter on Eloquence and Exegesis. *Homiletics*, pp. 7ff.

he cannot interpret it or be original in his preaching. For there is a profound difference between individuality and originality. Individuality is the mere peculiarity of the individual mind as compared with other minds. But originality, like that of Bacon himself or that of Plato, is the quality that emerges upon the close and continuous study by the individual mind of the original elements of truth. And as a quality of discourse, it is such a statement of common and underlying principles as will attract the attention and command the assent of those whom the speaker addresses, because these original elements of truth are, in a sense, the common possession of both. Hence, it is just in the proportion in which one deeply, earnestly, continuously studies the words of God—words of the Word of God—and is able accurately to interpret them, that his preaching will be fresh and striking and commanding, and in the profoundest sense of the term original. This originality and the authority of which I have already spoken are the peculiar qualities which that part of the Seminary curriculum, embraced under the title Old Testament and New Testament Literature, imparts to pulpit discourse.

The relations between Systematic Theology and preaching are somewhat different. Systematic Theology is truth in a system, a system of truth. It is truth organized by means of a formal principle and correlated to other truths. The aim of the systematic theologian is not merely to unfold the truths of Scripture, but to unfold them according to the laws of thought, and to correlate them to those *a priori* elements which the Bible itself presupposes. Hence Systematic Theology presents Scriptural truth in a series of articulated propositions—propositions that we call doctrines. Systematic Theology is Biblical truth in a logically correlated form. So our symbols, expressing as they do the systematized beliefs of the Church with regard to the statements of the Bible, are theologically constructed. To put it in another form, Systematic Theology is the Bible presented in a discursive way. And it is perhaps for this reason,

namely that Theology itself is constructed according to the laws of discourse, that that department of the Seminary seems most closely related to the sermon or the discourse itself.

In this country, and particularly in our Church, the study of Systematic Theology is perhaps the most popular, at all events, it is the most influential, of the studies in the Theological Seminary. And it is the study most uninterruptedly and faithfully continued after the Seminary course has been completed. Certainly this was true when I was a student in the Seminary; and though an era of theological indifferentism appears to have begun, I have the impression that it must always be and, therefore, is still true. If it is, I can go on to say, that every minister—and particularly every Presbyterian minister—feels obliged to have a theology of his own, and to be able to state it and defend it. I suppose there is no minister of our Church who has not made up his mind upon most of the commonplaces, *loci communes*, of theology; who is not able to state with more or less of distinctness his own view of the being of God and the modes of his subsistence, of the relations of God to man, of the state of man as created and as fallen, of the nature and the design of the atonement, of the application of salvation, of the sacraments, and of eschatology or the last things. But one could not so confidently affirm that all ministers of our Church have adopted an intelligent view of the constitution of the Pentateuch, or of the resulting theory of the history of the religion of Israel, or of the propriety of retaining the conclusion of the Gospel according to Mark in the New Testament, or of the interpretation of the parable of the unjust steward, or of the right of the verse concerning the three witnesses to a place in the first Epistle of John. Our ministers for the most part are systematic theologians, and their sermons are prevailingly theological productions. They are not so generally exegetes as they should be for the purpose of securing freshness, vitality, originality, and authority for their sermons.

But if in preaching they have sacrificed Exegesis to Systematic Theology, they have sacrificed History to both of these departments. I mean by this, that the use of the history of the Church in the preaching of our ministers has been far less conspicuous than the use of either Theology or Exegesis. If you will look, as I have done, over the published sermons of the ministers of the English-speaking pulpits, you will find that most of them have done very little in the way of historical preaching on the historical portions of the Bible, and almost nothing at all on the post-Biblical portions of the history of the Church of Christ. Occasionally a volume of sermons on some of the characters of the Old Testament or of the New is printed. But in the most even of these cases the sermons are substantially doctrinal or practical, and only nominally historical.

Take for example, to refer to sermons that are well-known, the sermon of Bishop Butler on Balaam. I think that sermon one of the finest pieces of homiletical composition in the range of the English pulpit in the eighteenth century. But the sermon upon Balaam is not upon the history of Balaam but upon his character. It does not deal with him in his historical relations in any large way. It does not even tell his story. It is simply an endeavor—a successful one indeed—to unfold the lessons which the obvious character of such a man should teach those whom at the time Bishop Butler was addressing. Or take Robertson's sermon on the character of Eli. It is a discourse of the same kind. Though Eli is made the subject of the discourse, no one would think of going to the sermon of Robertson, with that title, for the purpose of learning anything at all concerning the priests of Israel during the period of the Judges. Of course, all sermons on the history of the Church of the Old Testament or of the New are not of this character. Some of the biographical sermons of the late Dr. W. M. Taylor of the Broadway Tabernacle have infused into them a large historical or narrative element. But even these sermons, on the whole, are doctrinal and expository

and not historical. Now no one values sermons of this kind more highly than I do. I believe them to be most useful, most interesting, most impressive. But only a moment's reflection will convince you that their superior freshness and impressiveness, as compared with abstract or doctrinal sermons, are due to their historical or narrative element. While they are not historical sermons, they derive no little part of the value which they possess as orations or discourses from this historical or narrative element, however small comparatively it may be. This fact ought to make us ponder carefully the question whether, after all, History may not with profit be far more largely employed in pulpit discourse.

To return, then, to the Seminary course and to repeat what I have already said, namely, that those who organized the curriculum evidently intended History to be used by the preacher as a preacher; let us consider for a moment the relation History sustains to the student during the course. What place does History occupy in the curriculum? What is the peculiar and distinctive influence which the founders of our Seminaries intended that it should exert upon the student's mind?

In answer to this question, let me begin with the statement that History is the least indispensable of the departments of the course. If it were necessary to give up one of the chairs in this Seminary or any other, and I should be asked the question; which chair, Hebrew, Greek, Systematic Theology including Apologetics and Dogmatics, Practical Theology, or History could we best dispense with, I should, without a moment's hesitation, answer: we can not give up the study of the Word of God in the Old Testament; we can not give up the study of the Word of God in the New New Testament; we can not give up that great department which seeks to correlate the truth of God to other truths that lie embodied in the human mind, and which by means of them organizes the truth of God into a system; we can not give up the practical department which combines the truths derived from the studies of these other departments into the

form required by the minister as a teacher and guide of men. If we must omit one study, the one study that can be omitted is History. But this is not a necessity. We are not called upon to give up any of these chairs. The question before us is what is the influence which History, as a part of the course, is intended to exert upon the student? And to this question I answer: it is the influence of generous culture. History is the broadening, the cultivating, the catholicizing department of the Seminary. It is the study that correlates the Christian life to all life, that presents Christianity not as a system but as a great historical force energizing in and on the life of the world. It presents Christianity in its contact with the world as modifying the world. It is, therefore, the most encyclopædic, the most general and least specialized of all the studies in the Seminary. It is the department in the study of which one is brought into contact with most subjects and most books. The result is that more than any other it cultivates the student on his literary and humane side. Hence, while if one department had to be dispensed with, History would be selected; yet, being present in the course, there is no more useful department in the Seminary. And if useful in the Seminary to the student, it ought to be just as useful to the preacher himself after his Seminary career is closed, because the studies he pursues are largely the studies he will pursue hereafter. And the need of a humanizing, broadening, cultivating course of studies will be no less necessary to him after his active work has been begun than it is during his Seminary life. If for no other reason than this, I seriously urge you to continue throughout life upon the basis of the course you have been studying here, the earnest study of History.

But I desire particularly to bring before you at this time some of the considerations which will justify you in preaching Christianity in a historical form. In justification of sermons, which I shall later describe at length and which I will now simply call historical sermons, let me call your attention to the composition of the Bible itself. What is

the form in which God's Revelation has been given to us, or, in other words, what is the Bible prevailingly? Is it theology? Is it the exposition of older documents? Or is it history? Take the Old Testament and the New Testament together, regarding them as a single book; and you will find that more than one-half of the Bible is history. In other words, the original form in which the Revelation of God was given to man is not the theological form, not the expository form, not the systematic form, but the narrative or historical form. In God's Revelation truth is embodied; it is given in the concrete; it is made known in the career of a people, or is incarnated and exemplified in the life of an individual. And if you were asked what portion of the Bible, if all the other parts were to be destroyed, you would wish saved; you would unhesitatingly say, let even the Psalms of David and the Prophecies of Isaiah and the Epistles of John and the great Apostle to the Gentiles go, if they must go; but save above all else the four Gospels that preserve the history of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. For from these Gospels we can construct a theology for ourselves; but without them we must fail because we can construct our theology only upon the basis of the Christian history.

Moreover, I ask you to note the fact that Christianity among the religions of the world is peculiar in that it is founded on historical facts in the sense that its great doctrines are the interpretations of historical facts. What, for example, is the fall but history? What but history are the incarnation and atonement and the descent of the Holy Ghost? What but historical processes are the work of sanctification and the conquest of the world by the Church; and what are the general judgment and the consummation of all things but the climax of the history of the Church and the world? I am sure that the more you reflect on the peculiar sense in which Christianity, even in its doctrines, is a historical religion, the more you will be convinced of the wisdom of the fathers in giving so large a place to History

in the curriculum of the Seminary; and the more rational you will regard my urgency in calling you to continue the historical studies you have begun during your Seminary life.

But to come to the historical sermon itself; there are many reasons of a homiletical or oratorical kind which justify and, I may say, even demand that the preacher from time to time employ this mode of discourse. These reasons I can state only in the briefest manner. And the first is the catholic and irenic character which the element of history gives to the sermon. In the discussion of a great doctrine a decided advantage is gained when the preacher presents the doctrine in a way that does not excite opposition. The best irenic presentation of the doctrine of justification by faith is a sermon on that doctrine presented in connection with the circumstances which led to its revival in the sixteenth century. Moreover, it is a well recognized law of discourse that the impact of truth concretely stated is far more powerful than the impact of the same truth when stated in abstract terms; and if this is true of every form of discourse it is true especially of the Christian sermon of which the end is to arouse the will to vigorous evangelical action. Nor is this all. A study of the idea of the sermon will lead you to the conclusion that it is not merely a lecture and not merely an oration. It combines in itself both didactic and oratorical elements. The preacher must not only present the truth clearly but he must present it dynamically. The sermon is a didactic oration. And history, just because it exhibits the living and dramatic movements of the truth, is the mode which most naturally yields itself to the construction of such a discourse. It is also true that the doctrines both of Biblical and of Systematic Theology derive from their careers in the life of the Church as narrated by Church History striking confirmation—confirmation indeed of the very kind which the orator can most favorably employ. And, finally, an individual doctrine can not be unfolded more forcibly in an oratorical manner than in closest association with the historical personage who illustrated or

defended it; so that even when the sermon is substantially theological it may well be formally historical. The mystery of the Trinity can not be presented in a form more profoundly interesting than in association with the heroic life of Athanasius the Great. And what is true of the doctrine of the Trinity as associated with Athanasius is true of the doctrines of the Sovereignty of God and of Justification by faith as associated with the lives and work of John Calvin and Martin Luther.

Justified by the considerations I have presented you may very properly, as I think, begin as soon as you become pastors the preparation of sermons of this kind. Your knowledge of the history of the Church derived from your studies in the Seminary, whatever may be its incompleteness and fragmentary character, is both fresh and far beyond the knowledge possessed by the congregations to which most of you will be called. You are in a position to teach them the history of Christianity. The knowledge and the cultivation you possess. And the department of Practical Theology has shown you how to put your knowledge into homiletical form. You will be denying yourselves the exercise of a great power and the exertion of a great influence if you hesitate and procrastinate. You should not postpone the writing of such sermons until your knowledge of history were enlarged; for you may be sure that you will study history very much in the proportion in which in the form of sermons you produce it.

Supposing you to be ready to adopt this mode of preaching, the first question which will naturally arise is one of proportion; what shall be the proportion between the number of sermons in which you shall preach the Gospel in the historical mode and the number of sermons in which you shall preach the Gospel in other modes? In reply to this question, I should say, that because the sermon of history will require wider reading and larger if not more minute study than your other sermons, you will do well not to think of preaching more than twelve during a year. These twelve you would

better preach in two courses of six; occupying six successive Sunday mornings or evenings at one period of the year, and six others at another period of the year.

As to the structure of the sermons; remember that in the first place they are to be sermons not lectures; that, as in every other sermon, so in these sermons the end is to move the will of the audience to action. The main object of the historical sermon is not to teach history, as the main object of the theological sermon is not to teach theology. Of all sermons the end is to move the will religiously. Hence the narrative or historical portion of the sermons should be written with reference to the movement of the will at the close of the sermon, or, as we say, by means directly of the application.

My experience leads me to believe that in sermons, history can best be employed in its biographic form. The historical sermons which I would commend to you are for the most part historico-biographical sermons; that is to say, the discussion of subjects of a historical character which easily connect themselves with a great personage in whom some great Christian movement is centered or some great doctrine or great element of character is embodied. For the purpose of presenting the life of Christianity in the world to a popular audience no method is so good as that of selecting an individual and making him stand vividly before the congregation in relation to the great movement or doctrine with which he is historically connected. You should tell the story of his life, relating him to the times in which he lived. Take a text and in language, always lofty, never familiar, describe the man and narrate his life; and then with oratorical vigor press home upon the people the evangelical lessons which such a life should teach.

Such a character is Athanasius. I remember that the first historical sermon I preached was on Athanasius. I endeavored to tell the story and describe the character of Athanasius, relating him to his times and to the great doctrine of the Deity of the Son of God. My text was the

opening verse of the first chapter of John: "In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God." The introduction set forth briefly the fact that while the Christian Church from the beginning worshipped Christ, paying him divine honors and looking up to Him as the Lord of the Universe, the doctrines of his Deity was not scientifically formulated by the Church until the fourth century. I went rapidly over the tentative efforts of individual theologians to formulate this great doctrine of the Church's primitive belief. In this way I was led naturally to the address made by Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, to a synod of his clergy in the city of Alexandria in the fourth century in which he affirmed the essential Deity of the preëxistent Logos. This brought me to the fact that he was antagonized by one of his presbyters, Arius, who charged the bishop with holding Sabellianism. The mention of Arius led me to state his views, and to call attention not only to the controversy which ensued between Arius the presbyter, and Alexander, the bishop, but also to the fact that in this controversy Alexander derived great aid from his archdeacon Athanasius. The mention of the name Athanasius gave me a good opportunity to tell the story of his early life. At that point then I took up his birth in Alexandria, the story of his early years, his entrance into the family of Alexander the bishop, his studies in Alexandria. The mention of Alexandria in connection with this subject and with Athanasius led me to speak of its library, its relations to the conflict that had occurred between Christianity and expiring Heathenism in the Diocletian persecution not long before ended, and in this way I brought the story of Athanasius up to the time at which the controversy between Arius and Alexander began. Having thus brought Arius and Athanasius into opposition to one another, it was not difficult to tell the story of their conflict, and of the widespread interest throughout the Eastern world which the controversy caused. Coming to great Council of Nicea in 325 I described the Council, the gathering of bishops from

all quarters—from Mesopotamia on the East to Spain on the West. There is no incident in the early Church history more exciting and dramatic, more interesting than the gathering of the Council of Nicea and its meetings under Constantine and Hosius. It was easy to carry the audience's attention as I moved forward to the result of the Council; and I remember that the attention which the audience gave to the repetition of the Creed of Nicea which announces the Deity of the Logos and the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son as well as the anathema upon all those who say that there was when the Logos was not—I remember, I say, that the attention the audience gave me at that point was more intense than the attention any audience had, up to that time, ever given to a sermon that I preached. Having told the story of the definition of the essential Diety of the Logos, I narrated the subsequent life of Athanasius himself as successor to Alexander. There is no more romantic and dramatic life than his during that time. Again and again he was exiled during the Arian reaction. After concluding the narrative of the life of Athanasius in relation to his times, and especially in relation to the doctrine of the Deity of the Son of God, I turned in conclusion to the lessons of the narrative. As I now recall them they were the following: First the narrative shows how the Church of God has been led to formulate the doctrines of Revelation. After the portrayal of the life of Athanasius in connection with the labors of the Church on the Trinity an opportunity was given me to eulogize the theology of the Church such as I never had before, and to attack those who supposed that within the limits of a brief popular article they could show contradiction in the terms of this great doctrine, upon which the ablest Greek minds had labored for centuries. The second lesson was that of Athanasius' life, his self-sacrifice for the truth. And in this connection, I remember, I quoted an eloquent eulogy upon Athanasius written by Hooker and to be found in his *Ecclesiastical Polity*. The third inference was the great truth, that the Saviour whom

the New Testament presents, is no creature, but the living and eternal God.

Historical sermons do not yield themselves readily to variety of plan; but there is no need of monotony, because variety comes from the variety of subject. The chapters of biography are constructed upon the same chronological plan, and all historical sermons must be constructed in the same way. After having written one sermon you will have no difficulty, if you possess the historical knowledge, in writing others.

In order to write historical sermons well, one must read the great historical writers, particularly those who have made the biographical essay or oration a severe study. I know no better essays for you to read than the well-known essays of Macaulay and some of the early essays of Carlyle, as the essay of Carlyle on Robert Burns and the essays of Macaulay on Macchiavelli, Warren Hastings, Lord Clive. Frederick the Great, the Earl of Chatham and others that will occur to you. Of course, I do not mean that you shall follow Macaulay or any other single writer in a servile fashion. I recommend you to study these essays for the purpose of learning how, in an oratorical manner, to tell the story of a life graphically, and to portray character vividly. Remember that this must be done in a large way. The man who dwells on small dates and small details, and does not learn to paint with broad strokes will fall short of reaching the point of excellence which he should strive to attain. One thing you need not fear. Do not fear, in telling the story of such a life as that of Athanasius, to take the time of your audience. There is nothing to which the people will listen interestedly for a longer time than the story of the life of a great and good man, who, with a heart that throbbed as their hearts throb, a man with passions like theirs, gave himself through life and to death in behalf of a great principle or a great truth or a great movement in the love of God. Be sure that, no matter what time you consume, your audience will be as attentive and alert at the

close as at the beginning and they will be in a frame of mind that will enable you to press home, with a power that will surprise yourself, the Gospel of Christ.

Finally, your people will respect you. They all think they know theology, and they all think they can interpret the Bible. But very few of them think they know history. In this mode of preaching you will be real teachers; you will have docile and delighted pupils; and you will teach your congregation, among other things, a lesson which all congregations need to learn; the lesson, namely, not to despise your youth.

Princeton. JOHN DEWITT.

REVIEWS OF
RECENT LITERATURE

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

The 35th Fernley Lecture.——THE UNREALIZED LOGIC OF RELIGION. A Study in Credibilities. By W. H. FITCHETT, B.A., LL.D., author of *Deeds that Won the Empire, How England Saved Europe,* etc. Eighth thousand. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1905. Crown 8vo. Pp. vi. 275.

It is safe to say that, notable for these qualities as the Fernley Lectures are, few of its thirty-four predecessors surpass Dr. Fitchett's in energy and verve, in eloquence and rhetorical splendor. What he has attempted is not a new statement of the "Evidences of Christianity." He even speaks—a little shamefacedly it is true—of the religious literature known by that name as "distasteful"; chiefly because, it would seem, it gives itself to a formal demonstration of the Christian faith, and formal demonstrations (witness Euclid) are apt to be dry. He addresses not the recluse but the man in the street; and he deals not with formal proofs but with such considerations as appeal to and determine action in plain men seeking plain reasons for practical conclusions. He wishes to gather up some of the incidental evidences of religion which abound in secular life, and to show how a sufficient practical proof of its validity lies unrealized on every side of us. Everything about us when tried by its relation to religion—and to Christianity, the true type of religion—he urges, falls instantly into logical terms with it. And, after all, is there any logic known to the human reason better than "the logic found in the answer of the chambers of a lock to the wards of the key that opens it?" He has designedly, he tells us, selected the specific topics with which he deals from a wide area—historic, scientific, philosophic, literary, religious, secular. The effect he wishes to produce lies in this very broadness of survey and the consentient trend of the mass of impressions derived from it. This effect, briefly, is the conviction induced that religion—and the Christian religion—is credible; that it alone falls in with the trend of things; and

that if faith has its difficulties, "the incredibilities of unbelief when tested at any point, are so vast, that their mere scale constitutes a new argument for Christian belief."

We have already said that Dr. Fitchett's book is eloquent. Let us now add that it is within its limits convincing. We say "within its limits"—for it does not profess to bring forward a demonstration of Christianity. In point of fact its function is merely to remove antecedent presumptions against Christianity. It is keyed, moreover, to general culture rather than to exact science, and is written throughout in the terms of general culture rather than of severely exact knowledge. In all such popular apologetics the danger of overstatement is present, and Dr. Fitchett does not escape this danger. When we read, for example, that "the pledge of the Incarnation with its mystery, the Cross with its atoning suffering, the broken grave with the deliverance of a dying race from death, all the miracles and splendors of our salvation, in a word—is found in the overwhelming revelations of the physical universe"—we are prepared to say it is magnificent, but scarcely ready to admit that it is convincing. So, when at the end of a beautiful chapter on the Supernatural, a tendency is exhibited to a conception of the relation of miracle to law which may end in supposing it but the manifestation of control of law, we draw back from what seems an overstatement in the interest of the argument. From this tendency to overstatement emerges a peril of occasional inconsistency. Now, for example, an idealistic psychology is invoked to bear its witness to religion; and now the postulates of a realistic psychology are rested upon. Now color, for example, appears as the creation of the perceiving mind, and now the wonders of color are appealed to as marvels of God's loving care for the minutest of His works, painting as He does the cup of the lily and the petals of the rose with beauty. Such inconsistencies are scarcely to be avoided when such constant appeal is made to scientific deliverances of different ages. It is interesting indeed to trace the stratification of the science of different epochs in the quotations made in these vivid pages. In the multitude of appeals to the testimony of scientists and of science as expounded by them, we have now the science of the past and now a very new science indeed put upon the witness-stand; and are apparently bidden listen equally to the varying voices. And not only is a wide area of topics treated, but apparently they have been treated at intervals of time; at least there are occasional repititions of ideas, illustrations, cited instances, even rhetorical modes of statement which are most easily explicable on this hypothesis.

Such things as these are inevitable in a series of popular addresses of this kind. What is not inevitable is the vividness of the presentation, the large, fine handling, the high eloquence, and the clear impression of strength and reasonableness made by the treatment of them. We know no book of popular apologetics more strikingly put, or more apt to be useful than this brilliant volume. It sounds like a trumpet-call in the midst of our apathy.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

BEITRÄGE ZUR FÖRDERUNG CHRISTLICHER THEOLOGIE. Herausgegeben von D. A. SCHLATTER und D. W. LÜTGERT. Achter Jahrgang, 1904. Heft 4. Neunter Jahrgang, 1905. Heft 1 und Heft 4. Gütersloh, C. Bertelsmann.

The first of these three *Hefte* of the *Beiträge* is made up of five contributions. It opens with two addresses of Prof. Schlatter, one of which was delivered before the Swiss Preachers' Society on the theme "Christ and Christianity," the other before the University of Tübingen on the theological work of J. T. Beck. In the former the difference between those who make Christianity a system detached or detachable from a personal relation to the present living Christ, and those who place its essence in such a relation, is briefly discussed, almost too briefly for the requirements of such a fundamental and live issue. The author draws a striking parallel between ancient forms of ecclesiasticism or sacramentarianism on the one hand and modern forms of "essence of Christianity" religion on the other hand. He shows that, notwithstanding the great difference in content, they are formally alike in this, that they make Christianity independent of direct, personal connection and communion with the living Saviour. In the other address we receive a vivid sketch of the personality and work of the well-known biblicist theologian Beck. Prof. Schlatter especially emphasizes the intimate union upon which theological instruction and practical religion entered in his work with and relation to his students. In part this was doubtless favored by the ethical basis of Beck's system, but, however caused, it was a feature of his teaching which gave it, according to our author's testimony, exceptional value in a country and at a time where theological training seems to have been almost confined to the impartation of learning. Prof. Schlatter does not fail to point out the weak side in Beck's biblicism, its neglect of the factor of historical development as a necessary guide for the theologian in the interpretation of the biblical truth.

Of the three other contributions in this instalment the first is by Prof. Lütgert on *Die Anbetung Jesu*. In a most lucid and convincing way the relation of Jesus' own teaching to the question of worship paid to Himself is here discussed. That, as a rule, the Saviour does not directly demand worship for his own Person, is explained from the attitude of self-sacrifice and humiliation observed by Him during his earthly state. At the same time it is shown that by his acts and the whole tenor of his work He indirectly invites, nay compels, the attitude of worship in man. In conclusion the current modern objections to the worship of Jesus are answered. The article occupies a worthy place beside Zahn's chapter in his *Skizzen aus dem Leben der alten Kirche* and Schlatter's address on the subject, both of them bearing the same title.

Equally interesting and more fully elaborated is Pastor Ernst Cremer's discussion of the Parables of Luke xv and the Cross.

Cremer here meets the contention so much in vogue at the present time, that the parables of this chapter in Luke, especially that of the prodigal son, leave no room for any atonement as the basis of forgiveness, and in fact prove Jesus to have taught that forgiveness is solely suspended on free grace on God's and a sincere repentance on man's part. As Denney and others have done before him, so the author suggests, that the parable of the prodigal thus interpreted, not only eliminates the cross from the transaction of forgiveness, but the whole Person and work of Jesus as well, so that, in order to urge the above contention consistently, one ought to be willing to go the length of advocating a Christianity in which Christ occupies no longer a necessary place. He further urges that, read and interpreted in the light of their context, these parables do not in the first place illustrate the attitude of God toward the sinner, but that of Jesus, so that the absence of special emphasis on the atonement for this reason alone can create no surprise. Finally, while admitting that Jesus in his attitude toward sinners must reflect the attitude of God, and that, therefore, indirectly the parables teach how God meets the repentant sinner, Cremer shows most skillfully that even so the parable of the prodigal favors the modern view less than the traditional Evangelical doctrine. For, according to the modern view, God in reality does no more than announce his willingness to forgive through the mission of Jesus as a prophet or assure the sinner of the fact of his forgiveness. All God's activity connected with the transaction remains within the sphere of instruction and explanation; nothing objective is done even to show the reality of forgiveness. This is the deistic conception of God in its modern guise, and the author well places over against it the true biblical conception of a God who does reveal Himself and does act on the sinner's behalf, and points out that this latter conception is in reality the conception embodied in the parables. The whole discussion admirably meets a present need, and we wish the article could be translated and offered to a wider public among us.

In conclusion Prof. Riggenbach strengthens his former opinion, to the effect that Origen knew and used the textus receptus of Matth. xxviii. 19, by quoting two fragments from Origen's Commentary on the Fourth Gospel, which have been recently brought to light by Preuschen in his work *The Greek Christian Writers of the First Three Centuries.*

Heft 1 of the year 1905 brings two articles. The former of these is of a rather technical nature. It is an inquiry by Prof. Riggenbach into the relation of the various forms in which the commentary of Pelagius on the Pauline Epistles has come down to us. One of these forms is the exposition that long passed under the name of Jerome. A more original version than this has been recently recognized in a codex of the St. Gall Monastery. It has also been established that the commentary published under the name of Primasius is nothing else than a working-over by some unknown author in an anti-Pelagian spirit of the original work of Pelagius. To these three sources there are still to be added

as a fourth the fragments from pseudo-Primasius which appear in the excerpts from the fathers collected by Smaragd, Abbot of St. Michiel in France, in the ninth century. Prof. Riggenbach notes the strange fact that these excerpts reveal in certain parts great divergence from the ordinary text of pseudo-Primasius, and on the other hand frequently approach closely to the text of Pelagius as found in pseudo-Jerome. He suggests the solution that the sections coinciding with the pseudo-Jerome text of Pelagius were originally in the manuscript of Smaragd marked by a P, and that this *siglum* was intended by the abbot for Pelagius, not for Primasius. Then the author of the first printed text of Smaragd in 1536 mistook the P for Primasius and thus the confusion was introduced. Prof. Riggenbach further suggests that a similar confusion of *sigla* may originally have caused the ascription of the anti-Pelagian work in which large pieces from Pelagius were quoted with the letter P to Primasius.

Of more general interest is the second contribution in this *Heft* on *"Prophecy in the Time before Amos,"* from the hand of Lic. Theol. Franckh. Over against the depreciating view of its character current in the modern evolutionary school, prophetism is here upheld as a phenomenon peculiar to Israel, at least in its essential features. The prophets were not the enthusiastic dervishes or fakirs that the critics make them out to have been. The very etymology of Nabhi, which means properly "speaker," bears witness against this. The author institutes an interesting inquiry into the merits of this etymology, especially in connection with the revelation-character of the Babylonian god Nebu, and the occurrence of this same name in geographical names of Palestine. It is plain, however, that on this particular point nothing more than probabilities can be attained. Nevertheless it is true, as the author pointedly observes, that the etymology of Nabhi from "to speak" is rejected by modern writers chiefly on account of their preconceived notion as to the enthusiastic character of the first prophets. Prophetism on the whole is depicted as a conservative, even reactionary, force, and this is worked out in the sense that for the higher ethical and religious principles which they represented the prophets could appeal to a legitimate traditional religion in which these principles were at least latently inherent. Samuel was by his activity the cause and afterwards the leader of the prophetic revival that arose in his life-time. Though the name Nabhi may have been new in his day, the phenomenon itself was not new. The movement had two sides, political and religious, intimately combined. Between Samuel's time and the time of Ahab prophetism continued as an uninterrupted development. During this intervening period, however, the movement became divided, some of its representatives carrying on the political side in a manner which involved a departure from its original religious principles. Thus false prophecy arose, which sided with the kingship in the latter's conflict with the true prophets. In connection with the designation "Sons of the prophets" the author makes the observation that the singular of this phrase is not Ben Nebhiim, but Ben Nabhi. This would show that

in the later period of the tenth century the relation between the members of the prophetic order and some eminent leader was still the same as in the day of Samuel. Ben Nabhi would be the follower or disciple of such a Nabhi-leader, and Amos vii, 14 ("I was no Nabhi, neither was I a Ben Nabhi"), would have to be interpreted in the sense that Amos disclaims being either a leader or a disciple in any prophetic organization.

The treatise of Lic. Emil Weber on *"The Relations of Rom. i-iii to the Missionary Practice of Paul,"* which makes up *Heft* 4 of the year 1905, may be counted among the best that has been of late contributed towards an appreciation of the manner and extent of the influence of Paul's missionary activity upon his teaching. The author strictly confines himself to the first three chapters of the Epistle to the Romans. These chapters are both by their contents and their form of presentation marked off from the remainder of the Apostle's writings, in that they suggest the presence of a missionary motive. Not in the sense, of course, as if they were written with the purpose of gaining new converts among the readers, for the readers were Christians. Weber's understanding of Paul's purpose is rather this, that by seeking to reproduce and reawaken in the readers' minds the fundamental process, which first made them Christians, he endeavors to strengthen their hold upon the faith. Hence the missionary modes of approach naturally reflect themselves in these chapters, and we are enabled to form a fairly complete idea of the Apostle's missionary practice in general. According to our author, the missionary propaedeutic was directed towards the main purpose of impressing both Jews and Gentiles with the conviction of the divine judgment as a present reality and an approaching certainty. Through the conviction of judgment the mind was made ripe for the reception of the gospel. In general, this agrees with the traditional doctrinal understanding of these chapters, which finds in them the exhibition of the universal and absolute sinfulness and condemnation of mankind, as the basis for the positive structure of the doctrine of salvation in the later parts of the Epistle. But the new aspect of Weber's treatment is that he finds this idea expressed, not in the forms of theological demonstration, but of practical missionary appeal. And the writer claims that the carrying out of the idea in the exegesis of our chapters leads in several instances to the solution of difficulties which even modern exegesis has not been able to overcome. Thus Weber argues, that in Chap. i. 28-32, and especially in Chap. ii. 1-8, the reference is to the philosophical element in the Gentile world, which, while theoretically standing above the common immorality, yet as a matter of fact was deeply immersed in it practically. The pagan philosopher judges the other and doeth practice the same things. The favorite exegesis of the opening verses of the second chapter, according to which the one who judges is the Jew, is combated on what appear to us strong grounds. In Chap. ii. 14-16, Paul's intent is assumed to be this: he seeks to show to the Jew that even among the Gentiles the ultimate effect of the law written upon their hearts is that it issues

into judgment, so that both among Jews and Gentiles this is the common function of the law. And this appears, thus the author interprets the words of Paul, when in the crisis brought about by the gospel-preaching the consciences of the Gentiles bear witness, and their thoughts one with another accuse them. Attaching himself to the reading of the Present tense κρίνει and to the clause "according to my gospel by Jesus Christ," he finds here the present judgment, not that of the last day, and seeks to show that elsewhere also this thought is not unfamiliar to Paul. Undoubtedly this exegesis would furnish a most interesting instance of the missionary trend of Paul's thought in the context; we have not been able, however, to convince ourselves of its correctness. Especially the ἐν ᾗ ἡμέρᾳ stands in the way. Somewhat peculiar, also, but perhaps less open to objection, is the author's understanding of the difficult verses iii, 1-4. The main point to be noticed here is, that he refers the faithfulness of God, which fulfills the content of the λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ not to any national privilege of Israel, as if the problem were identical with that discussed in Chaps. ix-xi, but to the gospel-salvation in its universalistic scope as such. We confess that we have not been able clearly to apprehend how the author, in connection with this idea, conceives of the nexus of thought. For the average reader a more explicit and detailed exposition would here have been desirable. But on the whole the treatise is lucidly written and may be commended to those who are interested in the section it deals with, either from a purely exegetical or from a missionary point of view.

Princeton. GEERHARDUS VOS.

BABYLONISCH-ASSYRISCHE GRAMMATIK MIT ÜBUNGSBUCH (IN TRANSSKRIPTION), von Arthur Ungnad, Dr. Phil. München, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Oskar Beck 1906. Druck von W. Drugulin in Leipzig. 8vo. pp. ix, 163.

There is no longer any doubt that the Old Testament scholar must have a first hand acquaintance with the Babylonian-Assyrian language. Such literature as the *Seven Tablets of Creation*, the story of the flood and the Laws of Hammurabi are sufficient to show this, and when in addition we remember such works as Gunkel's *Schöpfung und Chaos*, or the recent Babel-Bible controversy, it is seen to be imperative that theologians should be able to read the literature for themselves if only for the purpose of testing the results of others. As Dr. Ungnad says in his preface: "Theologians and historians find it often disconcerting when they happen upon texts, which although transliterated and translated, they are not able to test or to understand." Of course it is impossible that every one should master the signs in which this language is written. An elderly man would find it impossible and a younger man might well feel that he could not spare the time. Nor is this necessary. All texts when translated are also transliterated, and it is necessary only that the reader have some knowledge of the grammatical structure of the language and have a lexicon at hand in order to test at least the

correctness of the translation offered. It is for such scholars that Dr. Ungnad has compiled this little grammar, and he has done his work well. The book itself contains 163 + ix pages, of which 61 are devoted to the rules of grammar, 24 to paradigms and the rest to exercises, selections from historical and legal inscriptions, and a glossary. The footnotes to the selected inscriptions and the exercises are so numerous that one will have little difficulty in acquiring a good knowledge of the language without a teacher. With regard to the grammar, though concise it is full. Dr. Ungnad by his previous work and notably by his excellent article on the Syntax of the Laws of Hammurabi (Zeitschrift für Assyriologie, Vol. XVII, XVIII) has shown rare ability in this field, and his Grammar is quite equal to his previous work. For additional study he refers the student to Prof. Delitzseh's more detailed Grammar (which has now appeared in its second edition), but the reader will have gone a long way toward mastering the language before he need discard Dr. Ungnad's Grammar. In saying that the Grammar is full we mean that there is no part unconsidered. The pronouns are carefully and clearly classified, the chief nominal forms are given, the weak verbs are explained and the chief ones enumerated and a few pages devoted to the chief rules of syntax. This has all been made possible within such a short compass by the use of easily understood abbreviations, and a large number of cross references both within the Grammar itself and from the exercises selected for reading to the various sections of the Grammar. To students of comparative Semitic Philology the book will be additionally valuable because it distinguishes the four stages in the development of the language—old, middle, new and late—and notes the chief characteristics of each. The paradigms deserve to be specially noted, for they are the most complete we have yet seen, not only the verbs, strong and weak, being given in detail, but also nouns and adjectives in both genders and three numbers, and the method of affixing the pronominal and other endings during the various periods of the language's life. In short, the book would seem to be eminently suited to the purpose for which it is intended, namely, to enable those who do not desire to learn the many and complicated signs which were used by the Babylonians and Assyrians, to acquire a knowledge of their language without the disconcerting (and often disheartening) presence of the signs. And it may be hoped that now more Old Testament scholars will avail themselves of this opportunity, for the laborers are few in the field.

Princeton. K. D. MACMILLAN.

DE JONGSTE METHODE VOOR DE VERKLARING VAN HET NIEUWE TESTAMENT. Rede bij de overdracht van het Rectoraat aan de Vrije Universiteit op 20 October 1905, gehouden door P. BIESTERVELD. Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1905. 8vo. pp. 124.

It is a great pleasure to see the Professors of the Theological faculty of the Free University of Amsterdam in their successive Rectoral Ad-

dresses so diligent in expounding and defending the Reformed faith against even the newest tendencies of unbelief. Drs. A. Kuyper and H. Bavinck have made the world their debtors in a number of admirable treatises—their compass deserves this name—prepared as Rectoral Addresses. Only three years ago Dr. H. H. Kuyper gave us on such an occasion his excellent *Evolutie of Revelatie,* devoted to an examination of the Pan-Babylonian movement. And now Prof. Biesterveld, in the brochure lying before us, presents us with a careful account and penetrating estimate of the so-called "Relionsgeschichtliche" school and method,—which is the newest development of the destructive critical movement. First of all Prof. Biesterveld traces the rise of the new movement, in an illuminating survey of the progress of recent criticism of the origin of Christianity. Then he seeks to account, in the tendencies of the day, for the rapid spread of the new interpretation of the origin of the Christian religion as a syncretistic product. Next he subjects the methods of the new school to the test of the examination of its mode of dealing with three items,—the tradition of Jesus' life, the origin of Paul's doctrine of the Sacraments and of John's doctrine of the Logos, and the source and meaning of the eschatological images of the Apocalypse. This is followed by a critical exposure of the fundamental errors of the movement. The whole then closes with a determination of the general attitude we should take to the movement. Prof. Biesterveld bases his remarks upon a thorough study of the whole movement he is treating. He writes with notable clearness and vigor, rising at times even to eloquence. His pamphlet is a valuable contribution to the right understanding and proper evaluation of a school of criticism which threatens just now to become dominant; and which, as he himself says, is not only the newest, but the "most radical explanation of Christianity and its origin which has thus far been given."

The attempt to account for Christianity out of syncretism is, no doubt, as old as Celsus; and the old Rationalism did not fail to invoke its aid. But these older suggestions remained only suggestions. Harnack's endeavor to explain the mass of Christian doctrine as Hellenization was more influential, although it must be borne in mind that Harnack did not apply this theory to the origin of Christianity as it lies in its original Scriptures. Another important influence came out of the study of later Judaism, and the effort to find in it some explanation of the doctrines of Christianity. The new school was not born, however, until two other steps were taken. One of these had respect to the conception of religion. Former views were proclaimed too intellectualistic, and its essence—from a Schleiermacherian inheritance—was sought in the feelings. The history of doctrine thus gave place to the history of devotion, and attention was concentrated rather on ecstatic manifestations than on formulations of ideas. As a result the origin of the Christian movement was sought rather in the folk-religion of the Jews than in points of doctrine disputed by the Rabbis. The increasing knowledge of the religion of Babylonia and the discovery of the widespread influence exerted by it throughout the Orient now came in to

explain the folk-religion of Palestine, and the way was open to look upon Christianity as only one of the branches of this broadly spreading tree. Walking in this way was facilitated by the new habit already adverted to of looking upon religion as independent of the intellectual formulas in which (among other things) it expresses itself, and the assumed results of criticism by which knowledge of the teaching of Jesus had been reduced to the vanishing point and Paul had been made the real author of "Christianity" conceived as a special body of conceptions. Thus it easily came about that Jesus was more and more thought of in wide circles chiefly as a deeply religious man, who saw God in everything, and felt His fatherly love over Him; but who naturally expressed Himself in the forms of the folk-religion current in the uncultured circles in which He was reared; while dogmatic Christianity was the product rather of the educated Pharisee Paul, who reproducing and propagating Jesus' piety naturally gave it expression in the forms in which he had been trained, which also go back ultimately to the mythology of the far east. The *religion* of Jesus and Paul was no doubt the same, but a gulf lies between them from the point of view of *theology* as wide as that which separates Paul from the Catholic period. From which we may learn to distinguish between the form and the essense, the kernel and the husk, and to understand that "Christianity" consists not in its doctrinal system—which is merely a development of previous notions current in the world—but in that attitude of soul to God which was so purely exhibited in Jesus and has propagated itself to our own day.

It will not escape the reader that in this view the significance of Jesus to "Christianity" is reduced to the vanishing point. If we understand by "Christianity" the doctrinal system which has for two milleniums gone by that name, it is eliminated altogether: Paul, not Jesus, is openly made the author of dogmatic Christianity. If we understand by "Christianity" simply a filial attitude of heart towards God, Jesus is at best only a striking example of it, not its originator; and his figure, only dimly discerned through the thickets of critical history by the most far-seeing inevitably sinks out of the sight of the majority. We cannot wonder, therefore, that men everywhere are beginning to ask what the profit—or the justification—is of assuming such a figure at all, lying back of this syncretistic development that we call "Christianity." Albert Kalthoff is the most striking representative of this tendency of thought in Germany. To him our Gospels are essentially apocalypses, which have for their end to personify natural forces working in the world; and Christianity is nothing but a social movement of the Jewish slave-proletariat in Italy under the influence of the ideas current in the Judaism of the day. There was no "historical Jesus"; and the liberal theology of the day stultifies itself in assuming such a figure behind the development which it cannot help recognizing. Similarly to Kalthoff, though with explicit rejection of his fundamental Marx-materialistic standpoint, Professor W. B. Smith, in America, asserts that modern criticism has succeeded in eliminating the "historical

Jesus" from the page of history and has left us shut up to the assumption of the rise of what we call "Christianity," without personal founder, as the chrystalization into a consentient religious movement, rising simultaneously at many points of the circum-Mediterranean region, of a body of pre-Christian ideas and sentiments. Thus we have attained openly to that "Christianity without Christ" which has been implicitly contained in the new "History-of-Religion" movement from the beginning. That the chief advocates of this movement have energetically repelled the suggestion that their method leads legitimately to such conclusions, goes without saying. But it can scarcely be denied that their method, as applied by themselves, had lowered the figure of Jesus almost below the horizon and left to Him little part or portion in the religion which goes by his name. And even in the replies they have been stung into making to Kalthoff, they appear more able to expose the crudities of that writer than to rescue for themselves a firm historical basis for their special standpoint. The reader rises from a perusal of the controversial literature called out by the publication of Kalthoff's no doubt ridiculous volumes with a very clear impression that Kalthoff's extremities are not an illegitimate outcome of the proclaimed "results" of the "History-of-Religion" method, and that that school can save itself from these extremities only by saving itself to much more than it has hitherto been willing to admit. Indeed, there seems in place here a stringent "either—or"; either "the historical Jesus" of Paul and the Evangelists (which is the "historical Jesus" of orthodox theology, as is freely admitted, as, *e. g.*, by Wrede, *Paulus*, pp. 105-106), or else no "historical Jesus" at all—if not the positive denial of his existence, at least his reduction to a mere postulate, without cognizable content.

The fundamental principle which underlies the "History-of-Religion" method of investigating the origin of Christianity is that similarity of religious phenomena argues not merely similarity of origin, but common origin, if not direct dependence. The writers of this school proceed in their study of the original Christianity, therefore, by seeking for phenomena in other religions analogous to those exhibited in early Christianity; and when these are found, then searching diligently for some connection between these two sets of phenomena. Thus they endeavor to reduce Christianity to a merely natural reilgion, not only simulating in its phenomena other natural religions, but deriving from them; and it must be confessed that they often go very far afield for their analogies, and assume with great facility the working of influences upon the formation of Christian conceptions and usages, for the contact of which with the originating forces of Christianity there is no historical likelihood. Professor Biesterveld draws from Troeltsch (p. 25) as consequent a statement as may be found in the advocates of this method, of its fundamental principles. These, says Troeltsch, are three: criticism, analogy and correlation. By criticism all appeals to authority are discredited and all traditions are carefully tested to determine their probability. The chief instrument of this criticism is supplied by

analogy. The question must be carefully investigated whether any analogies to the phenomena being studied are supplied by other religious movements. If so, then the principle of correlation comes in: whatever is alike belongs together—and must be interpreted out of similar assumptions. Nothing—no person and no fact—stands isolated in history; all history is of a piece and must be interpreted as such. As in most instances of the kind, the chief difficulty lies less in the enunciation than in the application of the principles of "method." Something may be said for these principles in the abstract. But "analogy" is a very wide term; and when we come to apply "analogy" with a view to determining origins, we are led into a very thicket of difficulties. Professor Biesterveld notes (p. 63) Carl Clemen's attempt to reduce the application of the "analogical" method to some show of reason. The phenomenon investigated, he urges, must not find an easy explanation of its own out of original Christian conceptions; the analogies adduced from other religions must be real analogies; and some historical connection between the assumed cause and the assumed effect must be established. Reasonable rules enough! Shall we assume the derivation of Christian baptism, for example, from the Aztec washings of purification? Shall we assume the origin of the Birth Stories of Christ from those of Buddha—though we lack all historical connection, though we lack all similarity of motive, and though we lack all real likeness of events? Or, if we judge these instances too extreme, shall we at least declare with Paul Jensen that the whole story of Jesus as set down in the Gospels is in essence simply the history of an Israelitish Gilgamish? But after all allowances for differences in grade of analogy are made the whole difficulty is not yet met. The old adage of *gradus non mutant speciem* seems to have its application here too: and the fundamental difficulty of the whole method lies in its confusion of analogies with identities—a confusion, one cannot help recognizing, fostered by an underlying disbelief in the supernatural, which makes the unnatural, no matter how unnatural it may be, seem to the investigator more natural than even the least infusion of the supernatural. It is safe to say, for instance, that unless Pfleiderer had already thoroughly disbelieved in the supernatural birth of Jesus, he would never have dreamed that there was any analogy whatever between the Birth Story of Buddha, which was the natural expression of the Buddhist doctrine of transmigration of souls, and the Birth Story of Jesus; nor would Weinel have brought the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit into relation with the heathen belief in demon influence; nor would Eichhorn and Heitmüller have sought to debase the Christian Sacraments to the level of magic. We think Professor Biesterveld thoroughly justified, therefore, in reducing the entire controversy to a conflict of fundamental principles; and the region where it will ultimately be fought to a finish is the region where the two great principles of supernaturalism and naturalism join in battle. If we begin with the conviction—unuttered or expressed—that the supernatural is impossible or at least non-occurrent—then, of course,

"Christianity" is a syncretistic religion: and it is a matter of very little importance whether such a person as Jesus ever lived. But if we are ever convinced that the supernatural has in any single instance occurred —we shall certainly have no difficulty in perceiving that it is just in Christianity that it has occurred and does occur; and we certainly shall see it manifested above all in Jesus Christ. Meanwhile, it is quite in place to point out that the attempt to carry the anti-supernaturalistic assumption through in an account of the origin of Chirstianity involves a pressure of "analogies" which would not be tolerated in any other region of research—eliminates the greatest figure in all history and reduces his portraiture to the regions of unconscious romance—and leaves the most mighty movement of history hanging in the air without assignable cause. One of the odd phenomena of unbelief is the easiness of its belief. He who will not believe in God not infrequently believes in ghosts. For us it would be harder to believe in Christianity without God than in Christianity with God. You might as well tell us that the oak tree we see there on the mountain-side breasting the storms of a century has no roots, as to tell us that Christianity, like Topsy, "just grow'd" of itself and had no Maker. Christianity remains to-day—objective and subjective Christianity alike —the sufficient proof of the Deity of its Founder and the Divinity of its own origin.

But, then, we suddenly remember, the inventors and propagators of the "History-of-Religion School" do not believe in "Christianity" any more than they believe in "Christ." To them "Christianity" is not "the power of God unto salvation,"—the almighty power of God intruding into the human soul and bringing to it a new birth and through its regeneration regenerating society. They know no Incarnation, no Atonement, no Risen Christ sending down His Spirit to men, no Regeneration by the mighty power of God, no Resurrection to glory. With them Christianity is but a name for the confidence they feel that "it is well with the world." "If sin belongs to men," says Wernle, "forgiveness is the part of God." That is to say, forgiveness is considered a fundamental law of nature. As Harms sharply but justly puts it (quoted by Professor Biesterveld, p. 76), God is thus conceived much as a forgiving machine and forgiveness becomes as much a process of nature as the rising of the sun—recalling to us poor Heine's dying declaration of assurance that God would forgive him, because— "that's what God is for." A naturalistic Christianity, of course, had a naturalistic origin. And here we really touch the root of the matter. He who does not believe in a supernatural salvation will not believe in a supernatural Saviour. A naturalistic view of Christianity carries with it a naturalistic view of its origin, and *vice versa*. The two go logically together; and will ever tend to come together in fact.

We have not wandered as far away from Professor Biesterveld's brochure as we may have seemed to the reader to have done. If anything we have said appears to him true, he will find it in Professor Biesterveld's pages. And he will find there much more that is true and

useful. He will find a very valuable account of the "History-of-Religion School" in its origin and methods. He will find a sufficient refutation of it. And he will find a strong and notable reassertion of the fundamental principles of the Reformed Theology, which is but the scientific formulation of Supernatural Religion.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

THE DAYS OF HIS FLESH. THE EARTHLY LIFE OF OUR LORD AND SAVIOUR JESUS CHRIST. By the REV. DAVID SMITH, M.A. Second Edition. A. C. Armstrong & Son. New York, 1905. pp. xliii, 549.

In the Preface, written from Tullillan U. F. Manse, Kincardine-on-Forth, N. B., the author tells us that the purpose of his work is two-fold. "In the Introduction I have endeavored to vindicate the historicity of the evangelic records and adduce reason for believing, in oppositon to an influential school of modern criticism, that they present Jesus as He actually lived among men, and not as He appeared to a later generation through a haze of reverence and superstition. And in the subsequent chapters I have sought, by interpreting what the Evangelists have written, to justify the Church's faith in Him as the Lord from Heaven." The Introduction gives the critical premises upon which this new Life of Jesus is built. Here the author has endeavored to vindicate the historicity of the Evangelic records. And by historicity he means the generally trustworthy character of the portraiture of Jesus given in the Gospels since in his judgment the Gospels present Jesus as He actually lived among men. And by the Gospels the author means our four canonical Gospels. These are the primary sources for our knowledge of the life of Jesus, and they become, in proportion to their historical trustworthiness, the standard by which any Life of Jesus must be judged.

It is very generally admitted that the first three Gospels embody in written form the early oral tradition of the life of Jesus current in the Jerusalem Church, and Mr. Smith begins his discussion of the Evangelic records by calling attention to the part played by oral tradition and catechetical instruction in the life both of the Jews of Jesus' time and of the early Christians. Localized originally at Jerusalem, the oral tradition underlying our Synoptic Gospels emanated from the Apostles. "The First Gospel represents the tradition as it circulated in Judea and, though it was not written as it stands by Matthew, it was certainly derived from him and is stamped with his authority. The Second Gospel represents the tradition as it circulated in the Roman Church, and it has this connection with Peter, that Mark was his companion and enjoyed the advantage of hearing his discourses. At the request of the believers at Rome, it is said, he wrote a short Gospel, and, when Peter heard it, he affirmed it and sanctioned the reading of it by the Church. The Third Gospel, composed by Luke, the physician of Antioch and the companion of Paul, represents the tradition as it circulated in Asia Minor and Achaia, and is pervaded by the spirit of the Apostle of the Gentiles. The Evangelists were not authors, but editors; they reduced

the oral tradition to writing, and therefore it is that their books are entitled, not the Gospel *of*, but the Gospel *according to*, Matthew, Mark, Luke" (p. xiiif). Examples of the editorial method of the Evangelists may be seen in the Sermon on the Mount, which is "not a single discourse, but a collection of discourses, delivered to different audiences on different occasions"; or again, in Matthew's report of the Lord's commission to the Twelve, or in His judgment of the Pharisees (Mt. xxiii, 13ff; Lk. xi, 37-52), or in the unchronological ordering of many incidents in their narratives. Such editorial freedom was not only warrantable but inevitable, since the oral tradition was all in confusion. Hence sundry mishaps have befallen the oral tradition, although guarded by the Evangelists with scrupulous fidelity, such as slips of memory; fusion of similar but really distinct passages; emendation of what was deemed incredible or unintelligible; the mutilation of obscure logia; when an Old Testament prophecy found its fulfilment in some incident of our Lord's ministry the tradition was apt to be modified into more precise agreement with it; confusion due to erroneous presupposition in the minds of the editors; comments inserted in the tradition as logia of Jesus. (pp. xxiff). Hence one of the great services of the Gospel of John is not simply to supplement but to correct the Synoptic Gospels, as it does in its narrative of the feeding of the five thousand, of the triumphal entry, of the announcement of the betrayal and of the desertion, of the trial before the High Priests and before Pilate (pp. xxviiiff). But the Fourth Gospel does more than correct the Synoptic Gospels; it also supplements them by narrating the Judean ministry of Jesus (implied by the Synoptists) and illumines many passages in the earlier narratives.

Similarly the Synoptic Gospels supplement but do not always illumine the Apostolic tradition which they have embodied. The Apostolic tradition, for example, is said to have begun with the appearance of John the Baptist, "as a glance at Tischendorf's *Synopsis Evangelica* discovers." If this be true, then the Apostolic tradition did not contain an account of Jesus' birth. "Matthew has preserved the account which was given by Joseph and which circulated in Jerusalem"; Luke has preserved Mary's story.

Finally, "there is another and still graver defect in the oral tradition. Comprehending only the ministry of our Lord, it ends with the crucifixion and omits the supreme event of the Resurrection." What reasons are assigned for such an omission? The Apostles were not ignorant of it; and the resurrection certainly held a prominent place in the early Apostolic preaching. 'The fact was first in every mind; it was needless to record it; the Lord's return was believed to be imminent; the Apostles always speak with a certain reticence about the Resurrection; they proclaim the fact, but they refrain from entering into particulars; the story was too sacred to be divulged; when the Synoptists wrote the Apostles were dispersed and they learned only what the women had divulged and this had been distorted by oral transmission.' "The result is that in their account of the Resurrection the Synoptic narra-

tives, elsewhere so remarkably accordant, bristle with discrepancies, which refuse to be harmonized even by the most violent expedients" (p. xxxvi).

To one who accepts Mr. Smith's principles and follows his argument in detail the conclusion reached on p. xli, like the greater part of the discussion which follows, will seem more positive than the premises warrant. "It appears on the result of this investigation that the evangelic history is worthy of all acceptation. Indeed it may be questioned whether any other history carries such credentials or is entitled to equal reliance. It contains indeed a certain admixture of unreliable elements; but these are easily distinguished, and so far from discrediting the mass serve rather to approve its value." To one who does not accept Mr. Smith's principles and has not been convinced by his argument the defect of this conclusion will not be a question of more or less, but the principial question of subjectivism in the criticism of our documentary sources for the life of Jesus. To some the task of distinguishing and separating the supposed unreliable elements in the Gospels from that which is reliable will not appear so easy a matter as it does to Mr. Smith. Nevertheless it is a source of satisfaction in reading his book to observe the limited use that is made of this principle. As compared with the recent Life of Jesus by O. Holtzmann, it is refreshing to find so sane a use made of the historical material furnished by the Fourth Gospel. The tone of the discussion is serious. The author writes with a warm appreciation of his subject. Sometimes the rhetoric is overdone. But the book is full of suggestive thoughts. The notes in particular contain valuable and pertinent information on Jewish subjects (taken largely from Lightfoot and Wetstein), and in the matter of interpretation the opinions of the early Fathers are frequently given. One striking feature of the discussion is the author's view of the origin and meaning of the title "Son of Man." Mr. Smith calls it a nick name, because in its origin it was an opprobrious epithet. "The Jews were looking for a glorious Messiah. They called Him "the Son of God", a title which had of old been borne by the king of Israel as God's representative and viceregent. And when the Baptist pointed to Jesus, a peasant from despised Nazareth, and said: "Behold the Messiah!" they would exclaim in derisive incredulity: "This the Messiah? A Galilean! A Nazarene! A carpenter!" The phrase for "the common folk" in those days was "the son of man," and the multitude would cry: "This is no Son of God; he is one of the sons of man." Jesus would overhear their murmurings and would catch up their contemptuous epithet. A son of man! One of the common folk, "the people of the earth," whom the rulers despised. Yet that was His designation, and He would wear it all the days of His ministry and be known as "the Son of Man." The title thus served as a continual protest against the secular Messianic ideal (p. 49f. and Appendix III, p. 529f.). Mr. Smith fears that the account of the origin of the title may appear conjectural and adduces in support of his view two facts: The Evangelists never call Jesus "the Son of Man"—a silence which finds explanation in the origin of the

title. Jesus Himself, however, used it only in connection with His humiliation and suffering and in connection with His future glory. Mr. Smith thus departs from the trend of recent discussion and denies any connection of the title with Daniel and the Jewish Apocalyptic literature. He denies to it also any Messianic significance. Mr. Smith's attitude toward the demonology of the Gospels is somewhat wavering, but in the end he favors the theory of "gracious accommodation." He makes some concession to the view that the Gospels truly reflect Jesus' attitude toward the phenomenon of possession, but suggests an unpleasant alternative. If Jesus really shared the views of the subject attributed to Him in the Synoptic Gospels, it is the "solitary instance in which He involved Himself in the passing opinions of the day," for in other respects He showed a singular detachment from current theories. But Mr. Smith does not think that Jesus shared these views, and in support of his opinion appeals to the reply of Jesus to the imprisoned John, in which no mention is made of the cure of demoniacs (Lk. vii, 22, cf. p. 108, 191f.). In the interest of consistency, a note of explanation should have been appended to the reply of Jesus to Herod quoted on p. 305: "Behold, I cast out demons and accomplish healings to-day and to-morrow and on the third day I am perfected." The theory of accommodation is seductive. For other instances, cf. pp. 299, note 1, 317, 352, 407, 409 and 429. The use of the historical imagination, especially in the psychological sphere, sometimes produces a result more startling than convincing. This appears chiefly in the use of adjectives descriptive of some mental state or attitude of Jesus. The word "playful," for example, is used frequently of Jesus' attitude (p. 163f, 215, 251f). The adjective "nervous" (p. 402) used to describe Jesus' finger when He stooped down and wrote on the ground accords poorly with the calm, self-possessed attitude of Jesus as set forth in the narrative.

But the author holds, contrary to a prevalent opinion, yet in agreement with the New Testament writers, that the death of Jesus stands in the very center of the Gospel. In commenting on the word of Jesus—"Even as the Son of Man came not to be saved but to save, and to give His life a ransom for many"—Mr. Smith says: "Though He continually emphasized the supreme importance and the absolute necessity of His death, Jesus never taught a doctrine of the atonement, leaving it to His Apostles, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, to penetrate that sacred mystery and discover its significance. Nevertheless He let fall several pregnant suggestions, and the Apostolic teaching is naught else than an explanation of these" (p. 381). In regard to the saying itself the author remarks: "It is only a metaphor, but it expresses a truth which is the very heart of the Gospel and without which there is no Gospel at all; that Jesus died for the sin of the world and by His death won eternal life for all believers" (p. 382). This view of the death of Jesus is held in connection with the belief in the actual bodily Resurrection of Jesus (p. 508ff).

The misprints in the text are few; in the foot notes they are more numerous, especially in the Greek and Hebrew words.

Princeton. W. P. ARMSTRONG.

THE LETTERS TO THE SEVEN CHURCHES OF ASIA AND THEIR PLACE IN THE PLAN OF THE APOCALYPSE. W. M. RAMSAY, D.C.L., Litt.D., LL.D., Professor of Humanity in the University of Aberdeen. New York. A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1905. pp. xv, 446. Price, $3.00 net.

In this book Professor Ramsay again uses his special geographical knowledge and his wide acquaintance with the literature of the Roman Empire in the service of exegesis. His contention is that the obscurity of the Apocalypse is, in some degree at least, due to the failure of scholars to take account of facts in the history or features in the topography of the Asian cities. The Apocalypse was written at a time when the religious history of Asia was in transition. In the Graeco-Asiatic cities there had not yet been perfected the union of Eastern and Western thought in Christianity. We must take account of the Greek element as well as the Judaic. To bring out this European, Western element, he has recourse to ancient writers, to coins of the period, and to the results of his own travels and researches. He finds many of the symbols of the Apocalypse illuminated by these studies. The writer of the book had lived for years in Asia Minor, in contact with both the Jews of the Dispersion and the Christianized pagans of the Asian cities. He was bound to Jewish apocalyptic models and literary forms in composing the Apocalypse;—that is to be expected—"but sometimes the spirit and thought which he expresses in these forms are essentially non-Jewish." As a foundation for his thesis, Professor Ramsay discusses Writing, Travel and Letters among the early Christians, the Transmission of Letters in the First Century, the Relation of the Christian Books to Contemporary Thought and Literature, the Flavian Persecution as depicted in the Apocalypse, the Province of Asia and the Imperial Religion, etc., but when he has done all this and one has read it all, informing as Ramsay's studies always are, the gist of the matter is this: much of the language of the Letters to the Seven Churches is explained by a study of local history, tradition and topography.

Ephesus, Ramsay calls the city of change. Its site has been changed at least three times and each time the character of the city has suffered alteration. This fact every inhabitant would be conscious of and so would appreciate the threatened judgment in the Letter to Ephesus: "I will come to thee and will move thy candlestick out of its place." Their punishment was to be consonant with their previous history. Another change of site was promised unless they repented.

Smyrna, Ramsay calls the city of Life. It had existed in very ancient times, but had declined and according to Strabo for four centuries was obliterated from the roll of Greek cities. It had died but now was again revived and prosperous. It "was dead and lived." So that for them the Sender of the letter is described as One who "was dead and lived." Smyrna could appreciate that epithet. The promise of the reward for faithfulness is also an appeal to local pride. The "crown

of life" is an allusion to a physical peculiarity of the city. It refers to the hill Pagos with its cluster of public buildings on its rounded top. Indeed the phrase "crown of Smyrna" was a familiar one among the inhabitants. The reward for faithfulness was an exchange of a crown of earthly physical beauty for a crown of eternal life.

Pergamum is called for the purpose of this parallelism the Royal city, or the city of Authority. There is antiquarian evidence that it was the chief city of the Empire in Asia. So that there is special fitness in the Sender of the letter describing Himself as "He that hath the sharp two-edged sword." "The writer is uttering the words of Him who bore the symbol of absolute authority." This is an appropriate beginning when writing to the city of authority.

Sardis was the city of death. It was considered an impregnable fortress. The inhabitants were self-confident and vain. But on two occasions the city had been taken by strategy, the victors coming up in the night by a rugged mountain path. When the letter was written Sardis was a city with a past but no future,—a city of death. How appropriate, then, for the writer of the Apocalypse to couch his message to this church in these words: "I know thy works, that thou hast a name, that thou livest and thou art dead . . . if therefore thou shalt not watch, I will come as a thief, and thou shalt not know what hour I will come upon thee." Like Cyrus and Antiochus I will surprise you.

These and the other facts which Professor Ramsay adduces from the circumstances of the readers of these Letters are very striking. Perhaps they were intentional. Can we say more? The book contains much of interest and profit. The historical method of which Professor Ramsay is such a noted and confident champion is here exhibited in all its attractiveness and charm. The preparation of the work, the collection and arrangement of facts, the reproduction of the historical situations all reveal the scholarship of a master. And it may well be that we ought to look in this direction for the solution of many as yet unsolved enigmas of the Apocalypse. But we must protest that the particular instances which have been brought forward as proofs in this work are not altogether satisfactory.

Easton, Pa. LOUIS B. CRANE.

THE CRITICISM OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL. Eight Lectures on the Morse Foundation, delivered in the Union Seminary, New York, in October and November, 1904, by WILLIAM SANDAY, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D., Lady Margaret Professor, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, Hon. Fellow of Exeter College; Fellow of the British Academy, Chaplain in ordinary to the King. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1905.

OUTLINES OF THE LIFE OF CHRIST. By the same author and the same publishers. 1905.

These two notable books, by one of the most distinguished of New Testament scholars, will engage very widely the attention of scholars and thoughtful readers. The Outlines of the Life of Christ, though published in book form since the Criticism of the Fourth Gospel, is the older book of the two, having appeared first as an article in Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible in 1899. The author has made scarcely any change in the text, and has added only a few notes to bring the discussion up to date.

The two books may well be considered together, coming, as they do, from the same author and the same publishers; while both deal with the same subject—that Life which is the hope of all humanity. Both, too, treat the subject in the light of modern criticism, as the title of one of them implies. One deals with the criticism of one Gospel, and the other, with that of the whole New Testament, but especially of the Four Gospels.

Turning first to the Criticism, which contains the eight lectures delivered at Union Seminary, New York, and later in Oxford, one is tempted to traverse, throughout its whole length, the fascinating way along which the writer has led him; but, as this is impossible, it must suffice to point out an interesting object here and there and sometimes lift the eyes to survey from some lookout point the whole wide landscape.

The first lecture contains a "survey of Recent Literature," on the Fourth Gospel; and in the beginning of it, Dr. Sanday tells of what moved him to consent to prepare and deliver this course of lectures.

It was the appearance of four publications—Jülicher's Introduction to the New Testament, Schmiedel's article, John the Son of Zebedee, in the Encyclopædia Biblica, Reville's monograph on the Fourth Gospel and Abbé Loisy's Le Quatrieme Evangile. The criticism of the Gospel in all seemed to him so unfair as to demand an answer.

As the result of many years of special study of the Fourth Gospel and all known facts connected with it, Dr. Sanday defines his position at the beginning of the discussion: "I propose to defend the traditional view, or (as an alternative) something so near the traditional view that it will count for the same thing."

It will quickly be seen, however, that his methods are, in the true sense, stringently critical and scientific. His "survey of the recent literature" on the Gospel is made evidently with first hand knowledge, deep insight and fair discrimination. The views of the different writers are arranged, according to their character, under four heads: (1) Conservative opinion, (2) Mediating Theories, (3) Partition Theories, (4) Uncompromising Rejection.

First of all, under the first head, he places two works of Zahn, of whom he says, "It is no disparagement to other workers in the field of early Christian literature to say that Dr. Zahn is the most learned of them all," and "has a singular command of the whole of this material in its remotest recesses." He gives unstinted praise also to Dr. Bern-

hard Weiss. Beyschlag he mentions as "a good representative of the liberal wing of the defenders of the Fourth Gospel." As more orthodox, he mentions the works of Luthardt, Godet, Milligan, Moulton, and Dr. Marcus Dods, none of whom, however, can be accused of an excess of orthodoxy when estimated by the time-honored standards. Dr. Sanday speaks with evidently deep feeling of Dr. Ezra Abbott, and of his work as "specially typical of the American mind at its best." Westcott and Lightfoot are spoken of in a tone of the fullest appreciation; but Drummond, whose work appeared after arrangements had been made for the delivery of these lectures, is put among the most eminent of this class.

As advocates of "mediating theories" he names first, Delff, whose exceedingly ingenious theory he discusses at length and with such sympathetic interest that it almost seems at times that he is half inclined to agree with him, though the lack of the slightest traditional support is too formidable an obstacle to allow him to do so. His chief temptation comes from the fact that this theory would remove several difficult problems especially that of the so-called John the Presbyter. Dobschütz, Moffatt, and Harnack are mentioned as advocating somewhat similar theories, and Dr. McGiffert as the representative of Moffatt's views in America.

Under the third head, "Partition Theories," the "experiments" of Wendt and Dr. C. A. Briggs are considered the most important. No one can fail to be struck with the ingenuity of the latter's "New Light on the Life of Jesus"; but most readers will be likely to share Dr. Sanday's opinion, that "all attempts of this kind are foredoomed to failure," and for the reason he assigns: "the one rock on which it seems to me that any partition theory must be wrecked is the deep-seated unity of structure and composition which is characteristic of the Gospel." (p. 22). Prof. B. W. Bacon of Yale is also a partitionist. His two articles in the Hibbert Journal (i, 511ff., ii, 323ff.) are characterized as "highly original, very incisive, and exceedingly clever." In fact, Dr. Sanday thinks them rather "too clever," and says, "at least, I find myself differing profoundly from his whole line of argument" (p. 24). He finds Prof. Bacon putting aside the "broad, simple arguments (Irenaeus, Heracleon, Polycrates, Tatian, Clement of Alexandria)", and then spending his strength "in making bricks with a minimum of straw, and even with no straw at all (the argument from silence)."

For some twenty years—1876-1896—critical opinion had been evidently turning more and more toward the traditional view of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel. Harnack had sounded a retreat at the end of this period in the Introduction to his Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis Eusebius, *Die Chronologie* I, and assigned the New Testament writings in general to dates very nearly corresponding to those of tradition, saying that he thought there was but one pseudonymous book in the New Testament. But since that time such vigorous attacks have been made upon the genuineness of the Fourth Gospel that Dr. Sanday felt impelled to rise in its defence.

Dr. Sanday speaks of "Examples of Mistaken Method" in the criticism of this Gospel by those who deny its Johannean authorship, and takes as one example the ingenious devices of Harnack to reduce the value of the explicit testimony of Irenaeus to the authorship of the Apostle John. Harnack endeavors to make out that Irenaeus got his information from Papias of Hierapolis almost entirely, having had only brief intercourse in early youth with Polycarp. His intercourse with Polycarp was of a different character, however, as may be clearly seen from his letter to Florinus, and we cannot believe that he, having been a learner at the feet of Polycarp, could possibly be mistaken in speaking of the Fourth Gospel as written by the Apostle John, with whom Polycarp had been associated as a learner in his younger days; and, as Irenaeus says, told his scholars particulars about John and his "familiarity with those that had seen the Lord." But Dr. Sanday well points out that Polycarp and Papias could not have been the only persons who could tell him of John. Pothinus was bishop of Lyons and Vienne and Irenaeus was his younger co-laborer in that field until the martyrdom of Pothinus in 177 A. D., when he became the head of this Gallic mission. Pothinus was over ninety at the time of his death, and was from Asia Minor, where John, according to almost general consent, spent the last years of his ministry. Dr. Sanday remarks "Pothinus must have been a store-house of traditions and memories" (p. 61) of the last of the Apostles. After this perseceution, too, Irenaeus was in Rome, and there is reason to think that he had resided there at an earlier date.

He was, at any rate, familiar with Rome "to which news and traditions came streaming in from every quarter of the Christian world" (p. 61). He must, then, have been associated, in his younger-manhood in Asia Minor, and later in Rome, with a great number of Christians who from their childhood had known of the Apostle John from those who had been his contemporaries. Dr. Sanday repeats the striking remark of Drummond, that "Critics speak of Irenaeus as though he had fallen out of the moon, paid two or three visits to Polycarp's lecture room, and never known any one else."

Another remark of Drummond's is worth repeating: "I see no reason why the churches of Asia should not have had as well-grounded a certainty that John had once been among them as we have that Goldsmith was once in London." (p. 62.) Harnack seems to Dr. Sanday to be "arguing on the strength of a few particulars in the face of clear and decisive indications" (*ibid*), to use his own words in his *Chronologie.*

Another objection made to the principles of criticism adopted by Harnack and other critics is that they give "undue weight to the exceptional, the abnormal, the eccentric, as compared with that which is normal and regular."

The chief instance in which they offend in this direction is their exploiting of the shadowy alogi, who, as it seems, attributed the authorship of the Fourth Gospel to Cerinthus, as Harnack and others in our day are disposed to attribute it to a second John—John the Presbyter.

Against this there stands the fact that Irenaeus, writing in the episcopate of Eleutheros (171-185 A. D.) is positive in his statement that John the Apostle is its author, and that there are four Gospels and only four accepted by the church as authoritative (Adv. Haer. iii, 11, 9), while Clement of Alexandria, a decade or two later, speaks of the four, and the same four, alone, as "handed down among Christians" (Stromata iii, 13, 93), while Origen, his successor at Alexandria and afterwards a resident of Caesarea, a visitor, at least, to Rome, and a traveller in other parts of the Roman empire, speaks of them as "alone unquestioned in the Church of God under heaven" (Eusebius, h. e. vi, 25, 4), and Tatian, a contemporary of the so-called Alogi, wove these four Gospels into what has lately been named The Earliest Life of our Lord—the Diatessaron. In addition to all this, there comes the same testimony from the Muratorian Fragment.

"This striking uniformity," Dr. Sanday remarks, "from all parts of the Christian world serves to reduce the Alogi to their right dimensions." "Dr. Salmon," he tells us, "was for reducing them to the single person of Caius at Rome."

What Dr. Sanday calls "the oldest solution of the problem of the Fourth Gospel" is the testimony of Eusebius, H. E. iii, 24, and vi, 14, 7, the latter containing the testimony of Clement of Alexandria, who gives it as *παράδοσιν τῶν ἀνέκαθεν πρεσβυτέρων* to the effect that after the first three Gospels were written "last of all, John perceiving that the bodily (or external) facts had been set forth in the (other) Gospels at the instance of his disciples and the inspiration of the spirit, composed a spiritual Gospel."

This accords with the testimony of Origen, Irenaeus, Theophilus of Antioch, Tatian, who used all but four per cent. of this Gospel in making up his harmony, the Diatessaron, and Justin, whose use of it as one of the "memoirs of the apostles" and their companions is undoubted.

It seems strange that Dr. Sanday, in presenting the external evidence, does not insist more than he does on the value of the testimony of Justin Martyr, which has been so enhanced by the discovery of the Diatessaron, which Watkins, in his Bampton Lectures, so aptly called "the key to Justin." It is impossible to believe that when Tatian, the pupil, had all four Gospels in their entirety, Justin, his guide and teacher, should not have had this Gospel. The use of this Gospel more extensively than any of the others in the Diatessaron (96 per cent. of it) demonstrates the fact that it was as fully accepted as the others, while the exclusive use of these four puts the claims of all apocryphal Gospels out of court.

The evidence from the Lewis Syriac palimpsest containing the whole Gospel is also strangely neglected in this discussion.

Harnack attaches great importance to these discoveries. Speaking of the Diatessaron he says (Jahrbucher Preussische, May, 1898):

"The results of the new discovery have been very important. In numerous passages, and in strikingly important ones, we can now say

definitely, 'Thus read in the time of Marcus Aurelius the Gospel text that Tatian read.'"

Of the Lewis Sinaitic palimpsest, he goes on to say, "But of still greater value was the find which we owe to a learned Scotch lady, Mrs. Lewis. . . . As the text is almost completely preserved, this Syrus Sinaiticus is one of the most important witnesses, nay, it is extremely probable that it is the most important witness, for our Gospels." . . . Any one who reads the Gospels in this form has them before him just as the Christians read them seventeen hundred years ago."

I cannot but think, too, that Dr. Sanday underrates the testimony of the early Gnostics. Drummond rightly attributes great importance to the use of this Gospel by the Gnostics of the East and the West and of different schools, as it indicates that it was acknowledged universally before these heretics became separated from the church catholic. The indications in the Ignatian Letters of the existence of this Gospel "well before the end of the first century" (p. 245) are powerfully and convincingly presented by Dr. Sanday. It may be remembered that Harnack, some years ago, effectually cleared up the uncertainty about the advanced state of organization in the church in his reply to Bishop Lightfoot in the Expositor, and thus removed the chief objection to the early date of the Letters—the supposed existence of a diocesan episcopate. (Harnack shows clearly that there is no trace of it in the *genuine* letters.)

As to the de Boor fragment, Dr. Sanday thinks there has been some mistake, and that it is impossible to decide just what may be from Papias, what from Quadratus, and what from the fragmentist; so that no conclusion can be drawn from the statement about the deaths of the two sons of Zebedee. It is certain that John did not die at the same time with James, for he was in Jerusalem at the time of Paul's visit there, of which he speaks in the Epistle to the Galatians. It is also certain that James was killed by Herod and not by the Jews.

Dr. Sanday is at his best in treating the internal evidence. He first considers the claim of first hand authority as seen in such passages as xix, 35, xxi, 24, compared with i, 14, 1 John i, 1-3, as it is generally agreed that the Epistle and the Gospel are from the same hand. He then passes on to the very large number of passages where this is indirectly claimed, and shows that the writer was speaking as an eye witness and as only one within the Apostolic circle could speak. Peter and John are continually found together in the Synoptic Gospels, and Peter and a disciple who declines to write his own name are continually mentioned together in the Fourth Gospel, and there can be no doubt that the veiled disciple is John. This lecture, the third on "The Standpoint of the Author," is powerful and convincing, but the next, with the rather strange title "The Pragmatism of the Gospel," is not less so. The knowledge which the author of the Gospel shows of such classes of facts as the pilgrimages to Jerusalem, the ceremonies of the Jews, the temple, the sects and parties among Jews, Jewish ideas and their peculiar modes of reasoning, the Messianic expectation among them,

could have belonged only to a contemporary and an eye witness of the events narrated, and a hearer of the words spoken. For Schmiedel, Reville and Loisy, it seems, as he says, that the Gospel is only a great *ignotum*, and remarks, "as an *ignotum* the Gospel is really too great to plant down in the middle of the history of the second century without creating a disturbance of all the surrounding conditions which we may be sure would have lasted for years. Imagine this solid mass suddenly thrust into the course of events, as Schmiedel would say, somewhere about 140, between Basilides and Valentinus and their disciples, as it were under the very eyes of Polycarp and Anicetus and Justin and Tatian without so much as making a ripple on the surface" (p. 256). Here the force of the external and internal evidence is shown in combination. They are two witnesses whose testimony cannot but be true.

The unique character of the Gospel must impress itself on every thoughtful mind. Its striking peculiarities and especially its many points of difference from the other three Gospels would have made it impossible to introduce it years after they were written and accepted by the whole church, if it had not been well known to have come from the hand of the last of the Apostles. As Dr. Sanday says, it could never have come in surreptitiously "like a thief over the wall, and at once obtain recognition without any examination of credentials" (p. 247).

The argument for the Johannean authorship of the Fourth Gospel has been dealt with almost exclusively in the foregoing pages, and the character of the Gospel has been referred to only as it bears on the evidence for this. For the discussion on the "Character of the Gospel" (Lecture V), the "Doctrine of the Logos" (Lecture VI), and the "Christology of the Gospel" (Lecture VII) the reader must be referred to the book itself.

We turn now to the second book, the OUTLINES OF THE LIFE OF CHRIST, a mere glance at which must suffice. A full review of this treatise can hardly be called for now, as it has been before the American public for about seven years in the article "Jesus Christ" in Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible. (See notice in the PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW, 1900, p. 174.)

The treatise begins with a statement of the method to be pursued. Instead of following that which is in favor on the continent, that is, to "approach it from the side of the consciousness of Jesus," Dr. Sanday announces his purpose to pursue the opposite course—"not to work from within outwards, but from without inwards," that is, he will begin with the facts, which is the Baconian method.

These facts he treats under four heads:

1. Survey of Conditions.
2. The Public Ministry of Jesus, preceded by that of the Baptist.
3. Supplemental matter, not included in the Public Ministry, and derived from special sources.
4. The Verdict of History.

The "survey of conditions," external and internal, is masterly. The wide sweep of vision is equalled by the microscopic investigation of

particular details. Government, sects and parties, contemporary Judaism viewed on its darker and brighter sides, the special seedplot of Christianity—the humble and pious element waiting for the consolation of Israel,—the Messianic expectation, all pass under rapid but searching review.

The Ministry of Christ is divided into "The Early Ministry," "The Later Ministry," "The Messianic Crisis." "Supplemental matter, especially concerning the nativity and infancy," is then considered. The "Concluding Survey" treats of, A, Christ in History; B, The Person of Christ; C, The Work of Christ. Between the chapters on the Early and Later Ministry is placed a long and most important chapter—treatise, we might call it—on the "Teaching and the Miracles of Christ."

The "differentiation" of this teaching from that of John the Baptist is most strikingly presented. A sentence or two will indicate its character: "The starting point of both is the same. And yet this starting point is soon left behind. The heads of the Baptist's teaching are soon told; the teaching of Jesus expands and ramifies in a thousand directions. It is like passing from the narrow cleft of the Jordan to a Pisgah view over the whole Land of Promise."

The peculiar method of teaching by parables, and a different kind of parable in the Fourth Gospel from the type prevalent in the Synoptics—*παροιμία* rather than *βολή παρα* is treated briefly, but with remarkable insight and discrimination. The "kingdom of heaven" (or of God) is one of the main subjects of our Saviour's teaching, and a confessedly difficult one fully to understand. In correcting what are false views—or, rather, partial and incomplete views—Dr. Sanday uses this language: "The Kingdom of God is not the theocracy of the O T, nor the eschatological Kingdom of the Apocalypses, nor the Christian Church of the present day, or of the Middle Ages, or of the Fathers. These are phases through which it passes: but it outgrows one after the other" (pp. 84, 85).

The treatment of Christ's "self-revelation" in His teaching, and the absence of explicit announcement of His Messiahship and divinity before the proper "hour" for such an announcement is strikingly set forth. As to the true deity of Christ, no uncertain sound is given. The same may be said of the reality of miracles. He sees that the teaching is so closely connected with miracles that no attempt to separate them can be successful, and that the supernatural Christ implies supernatural works. His being God is naturally shown by His doing the works of God. As to the exact view of the miracle in its essence there is no room for discussion here.

One of the most striking passages of this discussion comes under the two headings, "The Christ of the Gospels" and "The Christ of the Apostles," in which is shown the development of the conception of His Person and offices in the minds of the first Christians (pp. 213-221).

To those who have been grieved by the preaching of "another Gospel," too prevalent in our day, in which our Saviour's death is represented after the Bushnel manner, it is refreshing to find one of the first critics

of the age proving from the Scriptures that it was a sacrifice—the presentation of a ransom, and Christ crucified as that One "in whom we have our redemption, the forgiveness of sins."

The Resurrection and Ascension are most satisfactorily treated. "The supplemental matter" concerning the nativity is perhaps the most original and interesting part of the book, presenting the same view substantially as Dr. W. M. Ramsay's, "Was Christ born at Bethlehem?" (London, 1898), but independently of that. The way in which the whole difficulty about the Census of Quirinus was cleared up by the discovery of Egyptian papiri is interestingly told, and the way in which Luke's accuracy as a historian is shown is very striking (pp. 202-206).

"The concluding survey" beautifully crowns a noble structure.

In the foregoing discussion, no reference has been made to Dr. Sanday's views on inspiration as exhibited in these two volumes. It is presumed that readers are acquainted with his book on that subject, Bampton Lectures, 1893.

Bethesda, Md. PARKE P. FLOURNOY.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

CHRISTIAN LIFE IN THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH. By ERNST VON DOBSCHÜTZ, D.D., Ordinary Professor of New Testament Theology in the University of Strassburg. Translated by the REV. GEORGE BREMNER, B.D., and Edited by the REV. W. D. MORRISON, LL.D. London: Williams & Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1904. 8vo, pp. xxxix, 438.

The task which Prof. von Dobschütz has set himself in this attractive volume is to present an exact and detailed picture of the moral condition of Christians during the first century of the Church's existence (A. D. 30–A. D. 130). Perhaps the title under which the book is published is a little too broad. There are two sides to what we commonly know as "Christian life"—a God-ward and a man-ward side, or perhaps we may better say a religious and a moral side. It is the latter of these to which Prof. von Dobschütz confines his survey. The mystical side of the Christian life he puts out of sight. What he undertakes to investigate is its ethical manifestation. He is not attempting, however, a history of Christian Ethics in the first age: he has nothing to do here with the teaching of the Apostles and their successors. What he is essaying is to determine the actual practice of Christians during the first century of their existence in the world. The question he raises is, What kind of people were these early Christians? He wishes to determine by an exact and detailed study whether the Christians did or did not introduce into the world actual moral health: whether they were, or were not, "good men."

The answer Prof. von Dobschütz returns to his question is an affirmative one. The early Christians were good people. As over against

the background of heathen immorality—even of Jewish formalism—they stand forth as lights in the world. They not only taught a high and searching morality: they lived it. He thinks it worth while to emphasize this answer and to substantiate it by an exhibition of the evidence for it drawn out with convincing detail. For it is not the answer which has of late been universally given. At an earlier period, indeed, it was customary to idealize the first Christian communities. Of late, however, too black a picture has often been painted. Hausrath, for example, "from all sorts of statements gleaned in the darkest corners and dipped in the deepest hues" has drawn "a picture so gloomy that one is compelled to wonder where Christianity ever found the power to conquer the ancient world." In his view the worst of Christian Churches of to-day "approaches the ideal of the Sermon on the Mount more closely" than the best of the second century. If we understand Prof. von Dobschütz, he believes Hausrath has exaggerated both the end-terms of the development. He agrees perfectly with Hausrath that Christianity has developed from the beginning until now —if not steadily yet substantially—in moral fibre and moral manifestation. Only he believes it started at a higher level and (probably) has reached at the present a lower level than Hausrath maintained. The difference between the earliest Christianity and the latest in point of moral attainment is less in his view than in Hausrath's. It is the purpose of this volume to show that it started at a higher level and to establish the height of this level.

In Prof. von Dobschütz' view—a view which in our judgment he substantiates—the level from which it started was very high. "It is astonishing," he remarks at the end of his survey of the condition of the Pauline Churches as reflected in Paul's letters—"it is astonishing what Christianity in a relatively short time made out of these motley and confused heathen groups; earnest men working out their salvation with fear and trembling, saints fully aware of the moral tasks of their consecration. If their judgment was often immature, their good-will and vigor were great." Of course the ideal was not realized, least of all by every Christian. "But," Prof. von Dobschütz remarks as he closes his survey of the whole century, "offences against it were exceptions, and have the less significance that they awoke at once the moral consciousness of the spiritual leaders and of the congregations. If even one-half of the Christians lived as we have described, something great was already achieved. Certainly more than half did. The discipline exerted by this majority was, apart from other considerations, an invaluable moral achievement." The actual morality of the Christians, constituted and constitutes to Prof. von Dobschütz' mind, indeed, its best apologetic. "It is the most effective proof of the truth of Christianity." It was so in those early ages themselves: the Apologists appeal, as they were thoroughly entitled to appeal, to what Christians were as a proof of their divine calling. The heathen—Pliny, Lucian, Celsus—were compelled even, against their will, to witness to the correctness of the picture the Apologists drew. As a fact, it was not the

superiority of Christianity's dogmatic system, nor even of its ethical teaching which constituted its power. It was (and it is) the superiority of its life. "Stoicism and Neoplatonism, after all, produced moral thoughts of great beauty and purity; thoughts which are more imposing to superficial contemplation than the simple commandments of Christianity. Yet neither of them could enable artisans and old women to lead a truly philosophical life. Christianity could and did. The Apologists point triumphantly to the realization of the moral ideal among Christians of every rank. That was due to the power which issued from Jesus Christ and actually transformed men." It was in this sign that Christianity conquered, and in it that it must ever conquer, when conquer it will and does.

Professor von Dobschütz' method is to pass the literary remains of the period from A. D. 30 to A. D. 130 in review, reproducing the moral condition of the Churches as reflected in them, in the form of a running comment. This method has some obvious advantages. Not least among them is to be accounted the vividness and life it enables Prof. von Dobschütz to impart to his pages. The result is that he has given us a most engaging book, and the attention of the reader is held unflaggingly to the end. We have been especially attracted by the portrayal of the situation underlying the Shepherd of Hermas in the final chapter. But this method is attended also with some disadvantages. Among these is that it tempts the writer to overload his pages with material not germane or only remotely germane to his subject. Prof. von Dobschütz has not escaped this danger, and his successive chapters read often more like studies in the general situation of the Churches addressed in the several epistles or presupposed in the documents he analyzes, than like specific investigations into the moral condition of the primitive Churches; in a word, like sections in Biblical or Patristic Introduction. The reader finds it almost as much of a task to gather from his flowing and interesting pages a clearly-cut and sufficing account of the morals of the early Christians as it would be to derive this from the original documents themselves. It is a graver matter that it throws into exaggerated prominence an inconvenience which would, no doubt, attend any mode of studying such a subject—we mean the influence on the result of the author's individual opinions as to problems of literary history. The consecution of the New Testament books, for example, and the authenticity, authorship and provenience of them—in this mode of presenting the material—become very important matters indeed, and dominate not only the structure of the volume but the outline of the picture presented in it of early Christian morals.

This is a specially important matter to us, since we do not at all share Prof. von Dobschütz's opinions as to the problems of New Testament Introduction. There is nothing in them, to be sure, peculiar to Prof. von Dobschütz; his views are just the views prevailing in the extremer wing of modern critical reconstruction of the literary history of the New Testament. And no one could expect him (as he himself suggests in the preface) to include a justification of his views on lit-

erary history in this volume. But the value of the volume to all who do not share these views is seriously impaired by the unnecessary prominence given them in its structure; and this the more since Prof. von Dobschütz strives to present his material not statically but dynamically—that is to say, in perspective, with an indication of what he deems the development of Christian morals through the century of which he treats. Obviously divergent views of the consecution of the witnessing documents will work havoc here. If Colossians is to be treated as Paul's; and Ephesians as an imitation of it from the hands of the next generation; and the Pastorals as ecclesiastical documents of a generation later—why, clearly the picture of "the development of morals" (if any such development can be traced) will be different from that derived from these documents conceived as the product of a single pen and of a pediod covering only five or six years. From the latter point of view the confident tracing of a development as witnessed by these documents must seem to rest on an illusion supported by overstrained niceties of interpretation. And in any case Prof. von Dobschütz cannot be acquitted of this fault. When no marked distinction is discovered in the moral condition of Christians as pictured in Philippians, and that pictured in the two Epistles to the Thessalonians; and yet a significant development is traced between the moral assumptions underlying Colossians and Ephesians, it seems obvious that the scales employed do not give equal weights.

We rise from the perusal of Prof. von Dobschütz's book, accordingly, with a great sense of indebtedness to the author and with much spoil in our hands: but we rise from it also with a conviction that there are some things in it which are not derived from the sources. We feel confident that if Prof. von Dobschütz had begun simply by investigating the moral condition of the Churches underlying each document in turn, and then had compared these results and combined them in a single account, he would have spoken less of a regular development through the century; and certainly he would have put the documents into classes differing somewhat from the arrangement he has given them, in what seems to us, so far as the New Testament documents are concerned, not only an unhistorical but also an unnatural order. And, then, had he presented the material thus gained under rubrics derived from the moral categories, instead of in the quasi-chronological order he has preferred, derived from his personal opinions as to the consecution of the documents, his readers would have gained from him not only a truer but a much clearer and more convincing conception of the state of Christian morals during the first Christian century. In a word, in our judgment, Prof. von Dobschütz's study of the morals of the early Church suffers from his wrong views of the composition of the documents with which he deals; and suffers from this unduly on account of the method of presentation which he has adopted.

At the close of the volume, a series of "Notes" (six in all) are printed, in which some interesting ancillary questions are discussed in a more scholastic way than was consonant with the more popular style

of the body of the work. One of these is devoted partly to a justification of the author's view of Paul's curse upon the incestuous man at Corinth; this view we do not find it possible to share. The most important of them is an attempt—the author emphasizes that it is only an "attempt"—to survey the terms employed in early Christian literature to express moral ideas. This is a valuable contribution to a department of study hitherto much neglected: and it may be commended to students as a beginning of importance in a new line of research. The book is fairly well translated, and reads in general smoothly and clearly. The proof-reading is not immaculate. There is even an appearance (perhaps it is only appearance) of assigning a new work to Ignatius with the title of *Heresy* (p. 246), even a treatise to our Lord bearing the designation of *Life of Poverty* (p. 265, what is really meant appears—though even then somewhat awkwardly—upon p. 376).

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

HIERONYMUS. Eine biographische Studie zur alten Kirchengeschichte, von Lic. Dr. Georg GRÜTZMACHER, a. o. Professor der Theologie. *Erste Hälfte: Sein Leben und seine Schriften bis zum Jahre 385.* Leipzig: Dieterich, 1901 [now, Berlin: Trowitzsch und Sohn]. 8vo, pp. viii, 298. *Zweiter Band: Sein Leben und seine Schriften von 385 bis 400.* Berlin: Trowitzsch und Sohn, 1906. 8vo; pp. viii, 270. [The third and concluding volume is yet to appear.]

In these two volumes we have the beginning, and, after an interval of five years, the central portion of a new scientifically grounded and systematically worked out biography of Jerome. Such a biography has been much needed. The learned work of Otto Zöckler (1865) and the interesting sketch of Amédée Thierry (1867, revised 1875) have become in the passage of time insufficient. And although, in the judgment of many, the times are not even yet ripe for undertaking a new biography, —and certainly will not be fully so until we have a new critical edition of Jerome's works in our hands,—yet, as Grützmacher pertinently observes, we seem destined to wait until the Greek kalends for that, and meanwhile a mass of new material has accumulated and the results of research in many directions have been laid at our feet in multitudinous monographs. Perhaps the time has not arrived for the final biography: but the time has arrived fully for a new attempt to portray the man and his times for the men of our times (who will never see this final biography): and Grützmacher has essayed the task. A task indeed he considers it to be; for in addition to the immense labor entailed in acquiring the exact knowledge of the literature and working through the mass of detailed study required for the work, there ever stands before the would-be biographer of Jerome what Grützmacher does not scruple to call "the disagreeable (*unerfreulich*) character of the man" himself. It is here, he thinks, that the real secret of the failure of recent years to give us a new biography of Jerome lies. Grützmacher shares, in other words, the unsympathetic judgment of Jerome's character which

has perhaps been the ruling one since Lagarde; though he seeks to avoid all extremes. "Tossed about by party hate and praise," he remarks, "the portrait of Jerome in history is a very fluctuating one. On the one side he is exalted to heaven; on the other not a good hair is left on him. Our endeavor has been to honor the bare truth. Unprejudiced critics must judge how far we have succeeded. But one thing is certain: —there is scarcely one of his contemporaries who has left behind him so living and interesting a picture of the ecclesiastical, religious and cultural situation of that time as Jerome."

We do not think the reader of the biography Grützmacher has given us will hesitate long in commending his decision to undertake it. Possibly he has not given us one of the great biographies of the world, in which the subject depicted is made to live over again before us and to uncover to us his inmost heart. But certainly he has given us an admirable biography, which will wait long for its better. An immense amount of investigation lies beneath it. The whole relevant literature is fully in command. A clear and consistent portrait of both Jerome and his times is laid before us, in simple, clear and choice language, in sharp outlines and good perspective, illuminated with a multitude of happy observations and well-grounded judgments. Its chief strength lies perhaps in the full background which is laid in for the reader, by virtue of which he is enabled to see Jerome in his surroundings and to estimate his character as it is affected by and reacts upon its environment: in this, and in the penetrating portrayal of the character of Jerome itself as it stands out in full light against this background. Grützmacher, as has been already observed, is not a very great admirer of Jerome: he sees his weaknesses with clear vision and somewhat mercilessly, perhaps, exposes them. But we have not been able to see that he is unjust to him: or in absorption in his defects has failed to recognize his qualities. We have a conviction that we have placed before us here in a very clear illumination essentially the man Jerome was, in his gifts and his failings, in his ambitions and in his passionate and eager but not very profound nature, in his devotion to letters and his avoidance of philosophy—and theology in any true sense of that word.

In casting about for a passage which would fairly represent the quality of the narrative, we have lighted upon the reflections upon the effects upon his character and life-history of the rhetorical training which Jerome received in his youth (I. 120, sq.). As Jerome was essentially a man of letters, these seem to us particularly illuminating for an estimate of his character.

"That such a guileful (*verlogene*) rhetorical training must needs exert a corrupting influence upon the formation of character goes without saying. Feeling for truth was systematically destroyed, the young men being trained to hollow pathos, to wily deceit, to rancorous invective against opponents. No doubt it was possible—Augustine shows it—for individuals even in such an age and after such a training, to retain a sense of truth; the great mass necessarily succumbed morally under such influences. In Jerome's case this training fell upon specially favorable soil; his passionate nature richly endowed with imagination, appropri-

ated to itself the whole apparatus of the sophistical art of declamation. He is and remains throughout life rhetorician and dialectician, however much he jeered later at the rabid-dog eloquence. The rhetorical element is most markedly apparent in his youthful works; he testifies himself, for example, that he wrote his letter to Heliodorus, in which he exhorts him to return to the monkish life, entirely after the rules of rhetoric. Later he sometimes, indeed, strove to restrain his rhetoric. But it is a great self-deception when at Rome in 384 he writes that he has through reading Hebrew lost the rhetorical and stylistic knowledge he possessed as a boy, and an un-Latin expression now and then intrudes itself upon him. Even in his old age he understood well enough how to write such fierce invectives, like his epistle to a mother and her daughter, that his adversaries accused him of not dealing with an actual case, but of only again inventing a rhetorical declamation. As in later years he wrote a great deal and completed one thick commentary after another, he could not expend in his work as much time as earlier on the polishing of his style; and he easily excused himself from no longer pursuing rhetorical artifices. But he never, however late, put a low estimate on form. Nothing sank so deeply into his soul as such a slur upon his style as an unknown monk had given in speaking of his polemic against Jovinian. It must be confessed that he sometimes employed the old sophistic art-prose with such moderation and such tact, that it acts upon us like pictures in which, no doubt, very strong colors are made use of, but only in proper places and in such a manner that in their combination they delight rather than offend the eye. Thus, he gives us a remarkable rhetorical picture of the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans and knows how with fine strokes to draw portraits like those of Blaesilla, the daughter of Paula, for example, which make on us an uncommonly living impression. But on the whole the means he employs are artifices like ear and eye confusing plays on words, alliterations, overstrained pathos. We feel very strongly that he, with his rhetorical and dialectic training, belongs to an age which has lost the high aesthetic ideal."

And now let us put before us the description of a couple of examples of Jerome's actual employment of the rhetorical devices which had become a part of his very soul. Here is a paragraph from Grützmacher's description of his departure to the east to enter upon the hermit-life (I, 147):

"Before Jerome departed for the East, he tarried awhile at Stridon, to say good-bye to his home, his parents, his sister and his relatives. He wished to journey to Jerusalem, as a eunuch for the kingdom of God's sake, and to enter there upon the holy war. Did his separation from his people cost him dear? Later he writes to Heliodorus, whom love for his nephew held at home: 'I too have no breast of iron, no heart of stone; I was not born of flint, nor suckled by a tigress. Through all this I have myself passed.' But then he exhorts him to break away from his people: 'Should your little nephew hang on your neck, should your mother with loosened hair and rent garments press you to the breasts by which you were nourished, should your father, prostrate on the threshhold, adjure you—stride boldly over him and flee with dry eyes to the standard of Christ! True filial love is to be found only in being cruel in such things.' Abstract the rhetorical exaggeration from these words—they nevertheless remain bare of all true feeling. An Augustine in spite of all his enthusiasm for the ascetic ideal could never have written thus. It is significant for his character and for his relation to his parents that Jerome confesses that when many years before he had left home, parents, sister, and relatives, his greatest sacrifice was giving up the richly appointed bath, the luxurious mode of

life which he had previously followed. He parted from his paternal town, Stridon, from his home of peasant simplicity, without love."

And here is a paragraph in which is described for us Jerome's famous letter to Eustochium:

"In a letter which grew to a little book, he gave her directions for the proper virginal life, which naturally he expected to be useful to others also. This little book is as much a shining example of his stylistic talent, as a reflection of his questionable character. And nowhere else in his writings has Jerome set down so completely his ascetic convictions. With rhetorical untruthfulness he professes to have renounced in this little book of instructions for prospective nuns all rhetorical pomp and all flattery. And yet it is precisely this book which is composed with the most ardent rhetoric and in the matter of form polished down to the least details. And both gross and refined flattery fills it from beginning to end. He speaks of his Lordess Eustochium—'for Lordess I must certainly call thee, since thou art the bride of my Lord.' He praises her humility which does not deck itself with riches and distinction, but first out of the Roman nobility consecrates itself in early youth to the virginal life, and will not become the wife of a subordinate soldier but of King Christ Himself. With incredible indelicacy he depicts to Eustochium all his sensual temptations. No doubt antiquity possessed neither the refinement nor the prudery of our day; nevertheless, the lascivious manner in which Jerome makes known to the noble Roman maiden all sorts of filth and vice is nothing less than disgusting. How deeply the imagination of the maiden must have been poisoned by being made familiar with all the infamous practices by which unchaste nuns in that corrupt age hid their illicit intercourse with men!"

And then follows a striking passage (which we must forbear to quote), in which Jerome's praise of virginity—which to him was "the Gospel in the Gospel"—is most instructively expounded.

The passages we have extracted are all from the first volume. This has been an accident. Nevertheless, we seem to ourselves to have enjoyed reading the first volume more than the second. This may be only because it is the first volume. It may be because the formative years of any great man are apt to be the most interesting. It may be, however, because the first volume, dealing with the earlier and more vital years, is the more interesting of the two, and the second, with its chronicle of the performances of Jerome's middle life is taken up too much with the product rather than the processes to be interesting. The first volume opens with a valuable chapter on the sources of our knowledge of Jerome and another on the chronology of his life and works. Then comes an account of his youth, followed by chapters on his hermit life in the East, on his life in Constantinople, and on his first stay in Rome, 382-385. The second volume begins with his travels up to his settlement at Bethlehem, and proceeds with his first year in the convent at Bethlehem, to end with his renewed connection with Rome and his work up to the beginning of the Origenistic controversy. The first volume was published in 1901 as the third part of the sixth volume of Bonwetsch and Seeberg's *Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Kirche,* and of course by the publishers of that serial work,—the Dieterich house at Leipzig. At that time a second volume was supposed

to be all that would be needed to complete the work, and it was expected that it would be ready within two years. It appears only after four years and leaves still a third volume over, the time of the expected appearance of which is prudently left unannounced. The second volume is published by new publishers and apparently is no longer connected with Bonwetsch and Seeberg's series. It is set up in entirely different type from the first volume and is printed on entirely different paper: and although running to nearly the same number of pages, must contain considerably less matter. We happen, despite the larger type and fuller spacing of the second volume, to like the format of the first better. This is, however, only a matter of taste. We shall look for the completion of the work in the yet expected volume third with interest. In this work we have the first adequate biography of Jerome.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

THE CHURCH OF CHRIST, ITS LIFE AND WORK. An attempt to trace the work of the Church in some of its departments from the earliest times to the present day. By A. H. CHARTERIS, D.D., LL.D., Professor Emeritus of Biblical Criticism and Antiquities in the University of Edinburgh; One of His Majesty's Chaplains; Author of *Life of Professor Robertson, Canonicity, etc.* London: Macmillan & Co. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1905. 12mo; pp. xi, 250.

No man of our day has impressed his mark more deeply upon the life of the Church of Scotland than Prof. Charteris. In every recent movement to give more effect to the work of the Church in its impact upon men's lives he has been a factor. In particular, in the organization of work for and of the work of the young, and of the entire work of women, his has been not merely the guiding but the inspiring hand. The Church of Scotland owes him a debt which it can never repay, and of which, happily, it is fully conscious. Perhaps it may not be improper to look upon the book now lying before us as embodying Prof. Charteris' program in the effort he has been making through all these years to arouse the Church to a deeper sense and a fuller overtaking of its responsibilities and privileges. It is cast in a historical form and announces itself on its title-page as a historical undertaking; but surely its significance does not lie in its historical side. In point of fact it is not a history of the work of the Church so much as it is a call to the Church to its work supported by historical elucidations. The material of the book was gathered in the first instance for the *Baird Lectures* of 1887: publication having been postponed, in the first instance by disabling illness, the task of preparing the lectures for the press and giving them in printed form to the world has only now been accomplished. No doubt they have profited in details by the delay. In any event we now have them and are able to read with profit their graciously simple exposition of the Church's nature and task as illustrated by her history.

To put it briefly, Dr. Charteris' fundamental conception of the history of the Church is that of an originally charismatic Church, in which, in the course of time, gifts have been gradually sunk in office. The affinity of this view with that which has been made so familiar by the school of Harnack is obvious; and we fear it cannot be denied that Dr. Charteris manifests more sympathy with the Harnackian standpoint than we can ourselves accord it. Nevertheless, in his main positions, we cannot doubt that he is essentially right. It is true that the Church, in the New Testament conception of it, is "the Body of Christ filled with the Holy Spirit of God" (p. 5). It is true that the Holy Spirit dwelling in the "members" of this Body, distributes of His gifts to each severally as He will. It is true that all these gifts create functions, and that all these functions are to be exercised for the profit of the whole Body. It is true, therefore, that in the ideal Church we shall have "as [possibly] of old, every gift of every member used to bring us into nearer approximation to the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ": that every member shall work harmoniously along with every other member to produce the one great result of a living Church of God in the earth performing its entire task perfectly. It is true also that throughout the history of the Church a tendency has exhibited itself—strongest where the organization of the Church has been farthest removed from the Biblical prescription—to absorb function in office. Nothing could be more important, therefore, than to recall our minds to the fundamental fact, "that it is in the discovery and revival of functions, and not in the mere settlement of orders or grades, that the Church of Christ will find the best means of doing Christ's work in the world" (p. 6); that "the more excellent way for overtaking the work of the Church is to look for and recognize the gifts of man as God's gifts to the Church" (p. 79), every one of which should be utilized for its good; and that it is imperative that "the members of the Church,. as such, should do the work, without being officials who do nothing else" (p. 125). The value of Dr. Charteris' lectures seems to us to lie in their laying their plea out precisely on these lines; and their value seems to us very great. It is a truly noble and nobly true ideal of the Church which he sets before us; and his call to us to realize it is most moving. "The definite purpose," he says, in closing, "from first to last has been to proclaim that in our time there is a call to the Church to awake out of sleep; to realize her mission as the leaven in the world until the whole is leavened" (p. 238). "What is the Church we need in these days?" he asks. "It is," he answers, "not a Sunday lounge, cushioned and shaded, and filled with sweet sounds. It is not a society for the discovery of speculative truth. It is not an alliance for the endowment of research, whether theological, philosophical or physical. It is not a club to promote pleasant and profitable fellowship. Not any one of these things, though all that is best in each of them is in the Church. It is a society of redeemed men and women, banded together to continue and extend Christ's redeeming work upon the earth, bringing sight to the blind, freedom to the cap-

tive, the Gospel of God's love to the poor" (p. 237). Of course, this passage does not contain an adequate definition of the Church of Christ on earth: Dr. Charteris would be the first to allow that it does not: it was not intended to do so. But the antithesis it contains pointedly brings out the side of the conception of the Church which he wishes to emphasize in these lectures: and few of us will doubt that it is an important side, and that it is soundly and forcefully emphasized here.

It is no uncommon experience that in throwing forward into prominence one side of a conception—especially if it be an important side, and more especially still if it seem to be a neglected side—other sides may be permitted to fall too much out of view, perhaps may even be thrust somwehat summarily aside. Dr. Charteris does not seem to us to have wholly escaped this danger. In his very proper zeal for the utilization of all the gifts of God's people for His Church, he appears to us to place them in an unnecessarily sharp antithesis to the organization of the Church under its proper officers. Functions versus officials, —is there any necessary opposition here? In the survey of the New Testament doctrine of the Church, Dr. Charteris seems to us to do far less than justice to the divine prescription of an organization for the Church; and in his remarks on the whole matter to make far less account than ought to be made of the duty of the Church—and its profit—in following in its organization the lines laid down for it by its Divine founder. The New Testament Church was a charismatic Church in which the gifts of the Spirit severally distributed to its members were utilized. It was also an organized Church with its divinely ordained government and its divinely indicated instruments for that government. If order has tended to absorb function in the history of the Church, that is to be regretted and corrected. It is yet to be shown that it would be better to permit function to override order. We see no reason why one should be set over against the other, and we deprecate greatly the tendency (from which Dr. Charteris is not free) to treat all forms of Church organization as alike of human origin, finding their warrant solely in utility. With the Pastoral Epistles in our hand, we cannot help feeling that Dr. Charteris' zeal for the utilization of all gifts has been pressed beyond the mark. He tells us that his lectures have been criticized by some as laying "too much stress upon organization"; by others as making "too little of ministers and elders, of bishops and priests." The two criticisms are not mutually exclusive. Organization may be insisted upon; and yet not that organization which the Divine founder of Christianity has indicated for His Church. Dr. Charteris impressively tells us how the imperfect organization of Protestantism has often made it an easy prey to the better organization of the Roman Church (p. 2); and rightly insists upon a potent and living organization of the forces in the Church making for the conquest of the world. We cannot feel that he lays too great stress on organization. We do feel, however, that he makes too little of the organization which God has indicated for His Church; and we feel persuaded that had he

sought for the elements of this organization in the Acts and Pastoral Epistles with the same inquisitorial zeal with which he has sought for the evidence of the charismatic endowment of the Church in Peter and Paul—he would have found them. The ideal surely is not an ungoverned charismatic Church, but a well-governed charismatic Church. God is not a God of confusion; and it is like Him to have established order and indicated the provisions for securing it in His Church.

Nor can we feel quite comfortable when in his zeal for abounding life in the Church, Dr. Charteris turns aside apparently to depress the value of sound doctrine in the Church. Again, these things are not antitheses but complements. We decidedly do not share the hope that "the cause of Social Reform will one day unite those who quarrel over creeds and doctrinal definitions" (p. 123), if by this is meant that the truth of God (which is for the healing of the nations) should be subordinated to the better organization of human society. The passage which precedes this (on pp. 120-121) in which it is suggested that the creeds of the Protestant Reformation made too much of doctrine and too little of conduct, we must profess not to be able to understand. When it is said that "when our Confession of Faith deals with good works, it refers entirely to their doctrinal value in the sight of God; and there is not one word of counsel—not even borrowing St. Paul's counsel—that they who have believed in God be careful to maintain good works,"—distinct injustice is done to the Confession of Faith, and even to this particular chapter on good works. We are so in heart and soul at one with Dr. Charteris in his plea for the development of the Church into its fullest efficiency along all the lines of the gifts with which God has endowed His people, that we cannot but deprecate most deeply everything in his pleading which would mislead even the careless reader into supposing that he would sanction the shallow antithesis which we hear so frequently about us to the effect that Christianity is not a doctrine but a life. Among the gifts which the Holy Spirit has brought to God's Church are the gifts of knowledge and teaching: and these are not little gifts nor unimportant ones: nor is their relation to conduct remote. When God asks the whole man of us, he asks us to believe what He teaches us as well as to do what He commands: and the homage of the intellect to His revelations of truth is not the least good thing in the world.

We would not dwell upon these flaws in the mode of Dr. Charteris' pleading. They are, doubtless, only the signs of the intensity of his praiseworthy zeal for the realization of the ideal of Church life,—a zeal the intensity of which burns where it touches and impatiently sweeps away everything he fancies obstacles in the path. Much less would we dwell on minute differences of opinion as to the best way to secure specific ends. It is dangerous to differ on matters of practical detail with so experienced an organizer of the practical work of the Church: and we should venture to do so here and there only because, as it seems to us, there is a little impatience manifested with what seems, but perhaps only seems, to stand athwart the path. Suffice it to rejoice,

that the ideal presented is not only a high one, but a Scriptural one; that it is the ideal towards which we should all work with united endeavor; and that it is presented and argued with great charm and force. As the title-page instructs us, the book professes to deal with some departments only of Church work. These departments are, however, the ones of chief importance; the ministry of the Word, the care of the poor, the organization of woman's work, the Church and the young. There are prefixed some chapters on the organization of the Church, and suffixed some on the Church as a society; but these are not the characteristic or the most valuable chapters. With what vividness and real insight does Dr. Charteris trace the history of the Church's practical work, and with what incisiveness does he read us the lessons of it for the present and the future! And how sharply his "sanctified common sense" cuts in now and again to meet unavailing objections to his pleading! Would one interpose that ministry belongs to the ministry,—he replies with pith and point that while the minister must be set apart to minister, he must not be expected to minister apart. Certainly no minister can undertake alone the varied work of the modern parish. "There are men and women in every congregation who can, better than he, direct the schools and charities, and as well as he minister to the sick and anxious. *Not to spare him, but to take order that the work be done*" (p. 78). Would one plead that Sabbath-schools must not be permitted to supplant home training,—he replies crushingly that "this endless debate may be carried on, but the ultimate truth has to be considered and not overlooked, that *these institutions are the Church's portion of the needed work, and not a substitute for home training at all*" (p. 201). It is in such remarks as these which penetrate to the root of the matter that are seen the movements of the mind which has faced these problems practically and not merely theoretically. It seems to us obvious that the Church will never overtake the work she is placed in the world to do until she has heartily and without shrinking adopted Dr. Charteris' ideal for her practical rule of life, and has taken effective order that every one of her members shall be according to his special gifts and graces engaged strenuously in doing the particular work which falls to his share because adapted to his gifts. The Church will have received no bretter present from any of her servants of this generation than these inspiring lectures, if she will only thoroughly learn from them these three things, and make them the mottos of her whole future activity: "Not office but function"; "The gifts of men, God's gifts to the Church"; "Every gift of every member." A Church inspired by these conceptions will differ from a Church whose whole life is expressed in and through its official caste very much as a living organism differs from a machine. May the blessing of God attend Dr. Charteris' message to His Church and give it effect upon us all!

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

THEOLOGISCHER JAHRESBERICHT. Vierundzwanziger Band, 1904. Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. G. KRÜGER und Prof. Dr. W. KOEHLER in Giessen. Vierte Abteilung: KIRCHENGESCHICHTE, bearbeitet von KRÜGER, CLEMEN, VOGT, KÖHLER, HERZ, WERNER, RAUPP. Berlin: C. A. Schwetzschke und Sohn, 1905. New York: G. E. Stechert. 8vo; pp. xii, 802.

As is usually the case, this part of the *Jahresbericht* for 1904 is the most bulky of its sections. It seems that historical study now dominates the whole theological domain. The survey of the historical works of the year 1904 is divided between seven workers: Krüger takes care of the works dealing with the ancient period; Clemen and Vogt, of those dealing with the Middle Ages; Köhler, of those which treat of the period from the Reformation to 1648; Herz, of those belonging to the period from 1648 to 1789; Werner, of those from 1789 to 1900; while Raupp undertakes the actual present. Probably the event of 1904 in the sphere of Church History was the publication of Heinrich Denifle's *Luther und Luthertham in der ersten Entwickelung quellenmässig dargestelt.* The fact is here duly noted and a long list of books called out by this astonishing work catalogued, and briefly characterized. A considerable stir was also caused by the appearance of R. Reitzenstein's remarkable "Studies in Graeco-Egyptian and Early Christian Literature," in which he creates a new religion ,which (such is the modern mode) he at once suggests "gave points" to the founders of Christianity. Krüger speaks with some reserve, but with (we fancy) too great respect for Reitzenstein's conclusions: they appear to us obviously overstrained and in need of careful and prudent testing—although, of course, much of importance is to be learned from his not very readable book by students of Egyptian, Hellenistic and early Christian religious phenomena. The facility with which things are turned upon their heads is illustrated again by P. Drews' attempt, in his studies on the Didaché (*Zeitschrift für neutestament. Wissenschaft*), to manufacture an original Jewish Catechism underlying the Didaché, from which (and from another of the same sort) Paul drew. This Drews considers a more reasonable way of accounting for resemblances between Paul and the Didaché than the obvious one of recognizing that the Didaché draws upon Paul's Epistles. A German translation of Dr. A. Kuyper's Stone Lectures on *Calvinism* appeared in 1904 and it is interesting to read Köhler's comments on it. Dr. Kuyper's general conception of Calvinism is commended; and his discrimination of it from Lutheranism accepted ("It is true: Luther's point of departure was the specifically soteriological principle of justifying faith, Calvin's lay in the general cosmological principle of the sovereignty of God"). But Köhler thinks Dr. Kuyper has modernized Calvinism in his conception of it: and especially he scouts Dr. Kuyper's exposition of the importance of Calvinism to the development of a liberated art and of Calvin's sympathetic conception of the relation of religion to art. We fear that Köhler will have to reckon here not only with Dr. Kuyper, but also

with Prof. Doumergue—or rather, let us say, with Calvin and Calvinism themselves. There is nothing so ill understood in Germany up to to-day as Calvin and Calvinism. The compass of the survey made by this invaluable index to current theological literature is ever widening. The literature of Eastern Europe is finding more and more adequate treatment in it, through the aid of native scholars. Even the literature of the Greek Church is given a place, though not any extensive place. It is extensive enough, however, for us to learn from it that one of the chief theological publications of the Athenian press in 1904 was a treatise by M. Galanos bearing the title Αἱ πλάναι τῶν Προτεσταντῶν "Galanos, the editor of the journal called *Anaplasis*," reports Prof. Diomedes Kyriakos, "has published a work on *The Errors of the Protestants*. The treatise as a defense of the Greek Church has been called out by the scandalous activity of the American missionaries in opposition to our Church in Greece and the Orient. These missionaries, shallow men of limited education and narrow spirit, filled with Protestant fanaticism, teaching an antiquated, strictly orthodox Protestantism, are the cause of the disturbance of the friendly relations subsisting between Protestants and the Orthodox of various localities." So! It seems to be another case of the arrival in Greece of certain barbarians who turn the world upside down. Perhaps enough has been said to suggest the fulness of the survey of the historical literature which the writers of this remarkable review are enabled year by year to lay before its readers. The point of view is not our own: the diligence of the workers is past all praise: and the aid they offer no student can afford to neglect.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

IRENIC THEOLOGY. A Study of Some Antitheses in Religious Thought. By CHARLES MARSH MEAD, Ph.D., D.D., Author of *Supernatural Revelation*, etc. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1905. Small 8vo. pp. x, 375.

Dr. Mead warns us, perhaps somewhat unnecessarily, that this volume is not to be taken as an "attempt to produce a systematic theology." Whether a truly "systematic theology" is possible to man—which Dr. Mead doubts—is a question which may meanwhile be left to one side. The present work, at any rate, undertakes no such ambitious task. It confines itself, as the title advises us, to "a study of some antitheses of religious thought." "Some," not all; not even many: and with no effort to touch upon even all the more important elements which enter into the Christian creed. The doctrine of the Trinity, for example, is disposed of in a footnote (p. 262); the doctrine of Regeneration is lost in a confusion of it with Repentance on the one

side and Sanctification on the other (p. 158); the doctrine of Justification is not so much as mentioned; the whole fields of the Means of Grace and Eschatology are left untilled. If we are to estimate Dr. Mead's work aright, we must take it strictly for what it is, and not give to it in our thought a completeness to which it makes no pretention. It does not contain Dr. Mead's conception of what enters into the Christian religion. It is only "a study of some antitheses in religious thought."

When, however, these studies are characterized as studies in "Irenic Theology" we are not so sure that we can allow the justice of the characterization. Dr. Mead justifies it on the ground that his purpose in them is to "promote the spirit of harmony in religious discussions." This is the determinate purpose of all polemics. He further explains that he has made it his main purpose "to illustrate the fact that antithetic, and even apparently irreconcilable, religious conceptions, are often to be regarded, not as mutually exclusive, but rather as needing to be combined, in order to express the fulness of the body of truth that is to be found in the oracles of God and in the Christian life"; and expresses the hope that what he has written may help "to the cultivation of a broader and more sympathetic judgment of the conflicting views which divide the Christian world." These are most worthy aspirations. But there is nothing distinctive in them. Everybody understands that there is an element of truth in every heresy, and makes it his chief end in studying the history of opinion to disengage these elements of truth from their one-sided assertion and to do justice to them in his own thought: and in so doing he rounds out the orb of truth by giving their due and proper place in it to many really complementary conceptions which have been treated by this or the other party as mutually irreconcilable. If this is to be irenic, then all theological construction is irenics, and polemics is its handmaid: as, indeed, is the case. But if irenic and polemic theology are to be set in opposition to one another, then Dr. Mead's theology is no more irenic than anybody else's. Of this he betrays, indeed, some consciousness. After laying claim for his work to the characterization of Irenics in contrast to Polemics he somewhat naively adds, "The reader may, it is true, detect here and there somewhat of a polemic tone in the treatise itself." The reader certainly will: and not here and there only, but everywhere. The tone and method of the book are indeed distinctly, let us even say unusually, polemic. This is due in part to Dr. Mead's temperament. Dr. Mead is nothing if not critical, and his scalpel is very sharp, and he has skill to use it so that it may cut both neatly and very deep. It is unavoidably incident also to Dr. Mead's method. Had he elected to set forth his own views in a positive statement supported by positive reasons, the whole polemic element might have been excluded or at least thrown into the background. He has chosen, however, to set forth his views through the medium of a study of antitheses, and that means, that his organon is criticism, and criticism is but another name for polemics. The fact that he develops as his own view, ordinarily or occasionally,

not one of the antitheses studied, but something intermediate between the two, or something made up out of the two, or out of parts disengaged from each of the two; or simply the agnostic rejection of both, and the profession of a bald *ignoramus;* so far from diminishing, only increases, the polemic quality of his work. His sword is two-edged and carves out what he deems the truth by alternate strokes to left and right. We are not now criticising this method of defining the truth. It is accompanied with some disadvantage; chief among which is that attention is apt to be absorbed by the antitheses under contemplation, and the truth is therefore apt to be sought only somewhere between them, or at least in relation to them, whereas it may transcend the whole dispute. It is attended also within its own limits with some obvious advantages: by no other method are the outlines of what we deem true thrown out so clearly and sharply, as it is in turn discriminated from opposing ideas on this side and on that. But it certainly is no peculiarly irenic method. It is in point of fact, just the polemic method by way of eminence.

It is a method, as we have hinted, peculiarly well adapted to Dr. Mead's special gifts and customary modes of thinking. The reader will therefore be prepared to expect in this book a choice piece of critical reasoning. And he will not be disappointed. We are not saying that the reasoning is always sound; nor that Dr. Mead always successfully separates out the truth from the opposing antitheses which he examines. Far from it. Dr. Mead is not in this volume reasoning out for himself the truth. He is by the method of a criticism of antitheses presenting to others and seeking to commend to their acceptance the body of opinions he already holds. There is scarcely any opinion which is not with a little skill capable of being set between two opposite views, represented for the nonce as extremes, between which it is the mean, or of which it is the synthesis. Dr. Mead's skill in this matter is very great and in it consists the art of his present exposition of doctrine. His antitheses are not always therefore natural ones. Sometimes they are only the artificial scaffolding of his argument: his preferred method of defining and commending his views. He prefers to bring out his theistic conception as a mean between polytheism and pantheism. He prefers to leave the doctrine of providence hanging undefined between the sovereignty of God and the freedom of man. He prefers to represent the Arminian and Augustinian doctrines of original sin as only opposite sides of the same shield. He prefers to present his Pelagianizing theory of salvation as a convergence of the antithetic conceptions of naturalism and supernaturalism. He prefers to pit against one another the several theories of the person of Christ which have had vogue in the Church, and to make thereby his refusal to accept any solution appear inevitable. He prefers to represent his excessively low view of the atonement as a mean between two extremes,—though what these extremes may be unless they are Christianity and heathenism, it would be hard to say. There is no reason in the world why he should not adopt this mode of presenting and arguing his opinions. But there is no reason why the

reader should fail to recognize that this is only Dr. Mead's preferred way of presenting and arguing his opinions. And there is no reason why the reader should not therefore be wary of attaching importance to the fact that the views Dr. Mead commends to our acceptance are brought before us as "moderate" views, or "mediating" views, or "harmonizing" views, or more commonly as "consensus" views, embodying what all Christians or almost all Christians are agreed upon, and what is, after all, enough for the Christian man to believe in order that he may nourish his Christian life. This is only part of Dr. Mead's method of arguing, and imports nothing more than his skill in presenting his case.

What we have just said suggests what we think the chief fault of Dr. Mead's book. And we think it a very grave fault. Its tendency is to give the impression that doctrinal Christianity is of somewhat secondary importance, or at least that much too great stress has customarily been laid upon it, and that the differences which have divided Christians are after all not differences which matter very much. Dr. Mead is swift and iterant to repudiate any wish to underestimate the importance of right thinking. But the value of this protestation is greatly lessened by the equally frequent and emphatic assurance, which is given in connection with doctrinal dispute after doctrinal dispute, that the issues involved are not of fundamental importance; that the practical side of Christianity is more important than the theoretical; that Christians may agree in worshipping their common God and serving their common Saviour no matter how differently they conceive of His nature and attributes and methods of providential government, of the constitution of His person and the nature of His saving work. This whole line of remarks we consider very bad. It is just in principle doctrinal indifferentism; and if carried to its logical conclusion, it would result in the elimination of Christianity itself from the necessary contents of the Christian faith. Of course, Dr. Mead does not carry it to that extreme. But the logical tendency inherent in constant depreciation of the importance of correct religious thinking in comparison with religious sentiment is very misleading, and cannot fail to work itself out to serious consequences in all in whose minds it takes root. Here is a false antithesis which we commend to Dr. Mead as one better worth resolving into a higher synthesis of right religious thinking and right religious feeling and right religious doing than many of those he has sought to resolve, with more or less success, in this volume.

The doctrinal views which Dr. Mead announces and advocates in this volume are very much those which would be expected of one occupying his historical position. There is observable in them the wavering between old Calvinistic inheritances and new Arminian adoptions which is characteristic of the thinking of the New England of a generation ago. There is the traditional New England doctrine of the application of salvation, which does not know what to do with regeneration, and conceives of salvation as essentially the product of the human will, in repentance and holy living—though not without the assistance of the

Holy Spirit. There is the strong insistence on the deity of Christ natural in one to whom the Unitarian controversy is something more than a chapter in Church History. But there is connected with this clear note an absolute helplessness and even agnosticism with reference to the constitution of the Person of Christ which must be characterized as remarkable. And worst of all, there is a sharply polemic insistence upon the lowest view of the redemptive work of Christ ever held in the Church. The effect of the whole is to leave a sadly strong impression on the mind of the reader that Dr. Mead's doctrinal views run on an unexpectedly low level and that his repeated recommendation to us to lay ltitle stress on doctrinal differences may be rooted in a feeling upon his part that the doctrines of Christianity are not such as are very well worth fighting over. And indeed, if we shared his doctrinal opinions—his agnosticisms, his confusions, his attempted conjunctions of contradictory ideas—we might very likely think so too.

Take, for example, his view of the work of redemption, in the exposition of which the volume culminates, and on which he has expended over a quarter of his space and a very large portion of his polemic zeal. The harshness and hopeless onesidedness of his polemic here, against the doctrine of Satisfaction in all its forms, surpasses even that of the late Dr. G. B. Stevens in his regrettable work on *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation.* Dr. Stevens, for example, was willing to admit that "reconciliation" in Scriptural language was mutual; Dr. Mead will allow nothing of the sort and, indeed, in his whole examination of the Biblical material exhibits a truly remarkable skill in explaining away the obvious. It is quite plain that in this portion of his book he has forgotten the maxim which was to govern it all—that, to wit, there is some truth to be discovered in every view of doctrine which has commanded the suffrages of great masses of men. In the doctrine of Satisfaction he is able to find no truth at all. Acording to his own view Christ's work of redemption has no God-ward aspect whatever. It is directed simply to make sinners feel and recognize the rightfulness and obligatoriness of the Divine law. This He is thought to accomplish by "His unique exposition of the law and uniquer exemplification of a holy life; and by his exhibition of the intense spiritual sorrow and suffering which the sons of men have brought upon the Heavenly Father and the Incarnate Redeemer" (p. 342). That is to say, by Christ's teaching and example and by His manifestation of God's (which is also His own) sorrow for sin. We do not stop to point out the intense legalism of Dr. Mead's conception: even Christ's teaching is made not the proclamation of a Gospel but an "exposition of the law!" What is more important for the moment to observe is that the whole of Christ's function is summed up in inducing repentance in men; while the sole ground of men's acceptance by God is conceived as just their own repentance. Obviously there is here no "atonement" at all and Dr. Mead does not gloze this fact. Nor does he pretend that such a work of Christ as this can be thought essential to salvation. Men can be and are repentant just as well without Christ as with Him. Old Testament

saints, for example, Dr. Mead urges, were saved as truly as New Testament saints are: and, he insists, they were not saved because they believed in a Christ to come, but just because they repented and turned to God in trusting love. Faith in Christ, indeed, is only another way of saying faith in God: "the essential thing is trust in the forgiving love of God" (p. 348). And if the old Jews could exercise this saving faith in God without the least reference to Christ, why, so of course, can anybody, at any time, and in any place. "If Abraham and David, without any knowledge of the historical Christ, could and did exercise saving faith in God, so could all others of the same race and period; so could all others of any race or period" (p. 348). Salvation, therefore, obviously is not "from the Jews," any more than it is in the Name of Jesus, alone of Names given under heaven. It is the common property of all alike, and within each man's reach on his own proper motion. If this be so, of course—let us say it with no heat, but with the mildness of the irenico-critical method—then Christ is dead in vain: there can be imagined no compelling need whatever for His life of shame and for His dreadful cross. Dr. Mead cannot take refuge from this terrible conclusion by suggesting that Christ's atonement may have made for the salvation of men who knew Him not; and he does not attempt to do so (p. 351). He had too frequently told us that Christ did not come to affect and His work does not affect God, but man only: as he phrases it himself, He did not come to appease God, but to manifest Him. At the most, therefore, he can urge (as the earlier Pelagians urged) that the coming of Christ has rendered the repentance on which acceptance is based, easier for men. Nor can he escape (as he attempts to do, p. 349) setting the dolorous life and death of the Saviour of men thus aside as a useless sacrifice, on the ground that the "lifegiving agency of the Word" did not begin at the incarnation, but that all faith in God and repentant turning to Him from the beginning of the world must be conceived as the immanent working of Him who has from the beginning been the light of the world. That is not the question. The question concerns the earthly work of the Incarnate Jesus,—involving His humiliation even unto death and that the death of the cross. It is merely an "avoidance" to seek to shift the point to eternal operations of the pre-Incarnate Logos, which reduces ultimately only to a form of the theory of Divine Immanence. There is no escaping it,—Dr. Mead's theory of the redemptive work of Christ empties it of all redemptive significance, and by so doing eliminates all the Christianity from Christianity. Under this teaching, Christianity becomes only a form of natural religion. Men everywhere and always have been and are saved on the ground of a repentant trust in God, which they have always been and are quite capable of exercising wholly apart from any influence upon them arising from Christ's work on earth and death upon the cross. As this earthly work and death on the cross find their entire function in influencing men, so as to bring them to repentance,—it appears as entirely superfluous, except as it may be contended, perhaps, that it facilitates in men

an act which has often occurred and still often occurs apart from its influence. Christianity is only thus a somewhat improved variety of natural religion. This is precisely what Pelagius taught and Augustine scourged in him with the whip of the Word. It is amazing that it can still be taught in the opening years of the twentieth century: and that apparently without any perception that in it all that can be called by the sacred name of Christianity is conspicuous by its absence.

The extremity of this doctrine of Redemption—if the word Redemption can be retained with reference to a doctrine from which all that can be designated by it has been eliminated—is perhaps matched by the extremity of the correlated doctrine of the passibility of God. Dr. Mead is not content until God appears in his pages as "the Supreme Sufferer of the Universe" (p. 329)—a phrase at least which is not derived from Scripture. Ordinarily, however, there is little that is extreme in Dr. Mead's views. Much of his criticism of opposing opinions is acute and telling. And if there is occasionally an apparent inability to take the exact meaning of the opinions criticised—as in the instances of the distinction made between "certainty" and "necessity" in the determinist doctrine of the will, the use of "permission" with reference to the Divine decree of sin, the meaning of "nature" in the discussions of the Person of Christ,—ordinarily his criticisms reach their mark. We shall not go further into details here, however. Suffice it to say that Dr. Mead seems to us to be strongest on such fundamental questions as those which are concerned with the reality and trustworthiness of a Divine Revelation (his work on which is almost a classic) and on the deity of Christ (his chapter on which is full of fine points of view): and to grow progressively weaker as he rises to the doctrines which deal with—or even touch upon—the process of salvation, whether objective or subjective.

Princeton. B. B. Warfield.

The Christian Doctrine of the Lord's Supper. By the Rev. Robert M. Adamson, M.A. 12mo; pp. x, 288. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1905. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.

There is need just at present of a thoroughly wrought out comprehensive treatise on the Lord's Supper. But Dr. Adamson's pleasantly written little book will scarcely supply this need. It is laid out on a comprehensive plan, but it is hardly worked out with a detail, or, let us say it frankly, an insight which will justify pointing to it as just the book we need. Beginning with a sketch of the Biblical material (Chaps. i and ii), it passes to an account of the history of the doctrine in the Church (Chaps. iii-x); then offers a "constructive restatement of the doctrine" (Chap. xi); and closes with its practical aspects (Chaps. xii-xiv). The culmination is contained, it seems to us, in the last chapter—on "Practical Aspects of the Doctrine"—which is written with a richness of sentiment stirring through it that would go far to making this chapter a useful tract for the people, if published sep-

arately. The book, thoughout, is marked by good feeling and evidently is a product of much reading and thought. But it moves a little too much on the surface of its subject and lacks somewhat in energy both of thought and of expression, as is felt alike in the exegetical, historical, and dogmatic sections.

It is naturally to the central chapter, entitled "Constructive Restatement of the Doctrine," that we turn to obtain an insight into the author's positive teaching with regard to the nature of the Supper. Here too he has sought comprehensiveness rather than depth. It is the Lord's supper, he tells us; and a supper enjoyed by guests is essentially something given by the host. Specifically what is given through the sacrament is the Lord Jesus Himself: "the proper gift through the sacrament is the manifold entity of the God-man as He now exists" (p. 156). Immediately, however, this is explained to mean, that what we receive in this gift is only an inspiration, analogous to the vitalization we are conscious of on contact with men of high gifts and power. Christ is the richest and most liberal nature ever known among men; and when brought into contact with Him we receive of the Divine life so abundant in Him: "What comes to us is a measure of the power, the energy, the virtue, the grace of the God-man" (p. 175). It is in all the aspects of His being and work that the Supper witnesses to Him, so that it becomes to us "both a pledge of immortality, and the means of the resurrection glory" (p. 161). If, then, Christ is thus present with His people in the sacrament, this is "in some sort to assert the Real Presence" (p. 183), although, of course, it is a real *spiritual,* not corporal, presence. When we say "spiritual," however, we mean, not in the Holy Ghost, but in the manner of a spirit to our spirits: accordingly "to be conscious of Christ's presence is simply to be conscious of the living energy of the Lord." It is a presence, in one word, of influence (pp. 175-6). Christ is present consequently in the *sacrament,* not in the elements (pp. 165-6): "There is, therefore, no warrant for singling out bread or wine, or both together, and attempting to use them as the particular centers of the Lord's Presence" (p. 167). This presence may, indeed, be called "objective," but not in the technical sense in which the word is commonly employed in this connection; and the Lord's Supper may be called a "sacrifice," but only in a loose sense (pp. 178-9).

The doctrine of the Lord's Supper commended to us is, therefore, sober and sound enough. What is lacking to it is grip and grasp on the one hand, and a satisfactory basis on the other.

The former matter may be illustrated, as well as by any other item, by the mode in which the action of the Holy Spirit in the Supper is dealt with: and this provides an especially good illustration because the author speaks upon this matter wtih unwonted positiveness. He tells us that "the Personal Presence of Christ" cannot "be banished in favor of that of the Holy Spirit," and adds: "To say that it is the Spirit rather than the Son who is present, is a dangerous misuse of

the truth of the hypostasis,—a misuse which would so dissociate the Second and Third Persons of the Godhead as to result in tritheism" (p. 163); and again: "Neither does it meet the case to call in the agency of the Holy Spirit, and to say that it is merely the Holy Spirit who is personally present" (p. 176). It is safe to say that nobody ever held that it was "merely" the Holy Spirit who is personally present; or ever sought to "banish the Personal Presence of Christ" in" favor of that of the Holy Spirit." And it is as safe to say that no sound thinking can avoid explaining the Presence of the Son by the agency of the Holy Spirit, who is the executive of the Godhead and by whose work it is that all Divine operations are wrought. Accordingly, the Reformed Theology is accustomed to say that it is by the intermediation of the Holy Spirit that, in the Supper as elsewhere, Christ is brought into contact with the heart; the Spirit being conceived, however, not as a buffer to hold Christ off from the heart, but as a link to bind Christ to the heart. It is not this line of thought, but Mr. Adamson's, which perilously dissociates the Persons of the Trinity: and one would think that a simple reading of Romans viii, 9-11, would prove an antidote to such dissociation.

With respect to the latter matter adverted to, perhaps it is enough to call attention to the principle which determines Mr. Adamson's construction. This is purely *a priori*. He does not ask simply, What does the Scripture teach? Indeed, he is prepared (with that guardedness, however, which characterizes his eclectic attitude) to adopt Prof. Paterson's advice not to regard ourselves as bound by the New Testament data, but to reinterpret on the basis of our own thought (p. 178). What he asks throughout is, What is it reasonable to suppose? Being endowed with a very reasonable,—and somewhat diplomatic—mind, he thinks very acceptable things reasonable to suppose. But this is an accident of result in his personal case. It is likely that in the case of no other doctrine has more ruin been wrought in its historical development by falling away from the principle of historical interpretation. It is probable that the whole of the terrible malformation which the doctrine of the Eucharist has suffered in the Church has its roots in an early loss of its historical significance, and in subsequent endeavors by devout but mistaught and often fanatical minds to supply a new significance to it on the basis of what "it is reasonable to suppose." There is no way to recover a true doctrine of the Eucharist except to return to the New Testament pure and simple, and to interpret historically out of the actual situation in and for which it was instituted. So returning, we shall quickly discover that this ordinance, instituted at the Passover feast, or rather during it, is really the Passover feast given a new form by which it has been adapted to the new conditions of the universal Covenant; and that it bears in its bosom the same essential significance which is found in the Passover feast. In one word, it is in its nature not a sacrifice but a sacrificial feast and has for its meaning the essential significance of all sacrificial feasts, as, indeed, is explained to us in I Cor. x. 14-22.

This is not the place to go into details. Suffice it to say that he who will begin with this fundamental fact will soon discover that he has in his hands not only a clue to a true and sufficing explanation of the nature and working of the Lord's Supper, but also an aid of the first importance to the explanation of the various wrong views that have been taken of it throughout its history. The conception of its nature and mode of working which he thus obtains may not differ fundamentally from that which Mr. Adamson has set forth; but Mr. Adamson's general agreement with it will need to be set down not to Mr. Adamson's method, not yet exactly to his acumen, but to the soundness and force of the thought of his Reformed ancestors from whom he has inherited, and to the general reasonableness of his own mind, which spontaneously rejects at least the most *bizarre* of the perversion the doctrine has suffered at the hands of men.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

ETERNAL RETRIBUTION. A TWENTIETH CENTURY STUDY IN ESCHATOLOGY. By G. H. HUMPHREY, A.M., LL.B. Utica, N. Y. 1904. pp. 40.

In this little pamphlet the author seeks to expound and defend the doctrine of eternal retribution. Mr. Humphrey frankly accepts the authority of Scripture, and with considerable clearness and incisiveness urges a more general recognition not only of the truth of this doctrine, but also of its true character. He begins by enumerating some of the causes of antipathy to the doctrine, proceeds to its exposition and proof, and closes with some general remarks and practical conclusions. The essay is very brief, but is well written.

Princeton. C. W. HODGE.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

HEBREW IDEALS. Part II. By JAMES STRACHAN. T. & T. Clark. Edinburgh. Imported by Chas. Scribner's Sons. New York. Cloth. pp. 170. Price, 60 cents net.

All those who had the privilege of reading Part I. of these stories of patriarchal life, will be delighted to receive this second volume, which covers the remaining chapters of the Book of Genesis, beginning with the twenty-fifth, and introducing us to the lives of Jacob and Esau, and carrying us through to the story of Joseph's death. It would be hard to find any commentaries or sermons which make more vivid to us the lives of these ancient heroes, or which discuss them in a manner more helpful and practical. The author proposes as his aim "to take possession of human life, to make certain great ideals current, to commend the highest principles of action and rules of conduct." In carrying out his aim, his method has been to treat his subjects under specific

topics, again sub-dividing each of these chapters by paragraphs, in which the practical application is indicated by headings in large type. This has given great clearness to his discussions and emphasis to his suggestions. The language is peculiarly beautiful, and the references are to a wide range of literature and thought. These books are most cordially recommended to all students of the Old Testament, and especially to Bible Classes, teachers and pastors. They form part of the admirable series of "Handbooks for Bible Classes and Private Students," by Professor Marcus Dodds, D.D., and Rev. Alexander Whyte, D.D.

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

DAS GEBET BEI PAULUS, VON LIC. ALFRED JUNCKER. I Serie. 6 Heft. DER BIBLISCHEN ZEIT- UND STREITFRAGEN ZUR AUFKLÄRUNG DER GEBILDETEN. Herausgegeben von LIC. DR. BOEHMER und LIC. DR. KROPATSCHECK. 1905. Verlag von Edwin Runge in Gr. Lichterfelde. Berlin. 4°. pp. 32.

This little tract is the sixth of a series now publishing, which is meant to expound, in popular language, the conservative views still maintained by many biblical scholars in Germany. The program is, as stated in the prospectus, in view of the deepening religious life of the new century, to meet the needs of those who wish to know the conservative position in regard to the burning theological questions of the day. The prospectus then proceeds to state that the writers are all of one mind in their belief as to a supernatural revelation and are convinced that there is a wonderful history, divinely produced and conducted, whose culmination is reached in Jesus Christ our heavenly Master. This religious conviction, however, does not make the writers blind to what is historically actual, but enables them to reject erroneous and one-sided representations and, by enriching our knowledge of what *is* the truth, serves both faith and the Church.

The brochure before us belongs to the genus "populärisirende Literatur," and is intended for those whom we call "the man on the street," but whom the Germans dignify by the name of "Gebildete." It is, nevertheless, a happy example of what such writing may be: comprehensive and scholarly, yet simple in language and clear in arrangement. The data concerning Paul's prayers are given in summary, with the origin of these prayers in the impartation of the Holy Ghost, their contents, and the spirit in which Paul prayed. The chief interest of the tract, however, centers in the inference from the expressions "through Jesus Christ" and "in the name of Jesus Christ" that Paul addressed our Lord in prayer and evidently regarded him as divine and, in this respect, co-equal with God the Father. The attempts of Heitmüller, Boehme, and v. d. Goltz to evade or weaken this conclusion are passed in review and their weakness to cover the real facts of the case pointed out.

A glance at the names of those who have promised to write these tracts will convince one of the ability of the conservative wing of scholarship in Germany. We commend the series to those who know

how the strife to-day is fiercest around the divinity of our Lord, and who wish to know how the conservative position may make use of the "Religionsgeschichtliche Methode" in support of what are the central dogmas of Christianity.

Lincoln University, Pa. GEORGE JOHNSON.

TELLING BIBLE STORIES. By LOUISE SEYMOUR HOUGHTON. With Introduction by REV. T. T. MUNGER, D.D. 12mo; pp. xv, 286. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1905.

After the Deluge, what? After the flood of "criticism" has swept over the Bible, what? This has become an anxious question for many who have been caught in the current of this "criticism," and have lost their footing on, say, the historicity of the Old Testament narratives. We all remember how it obtruded itself upon the consciousness of Prof. George Adam Smith as he was delivering his Yale Lectures, in the form of, What is the preacher who has become aware of "the facts" to do with the Old Testament? How is he to deal with it in his preaching? And we unfortunately cannot quite forget his response to it, startling to most, shocking to some. It is the same question, or one corner of it, which Mrs. Houghton essays to answer in the book lying before us. What are we, after the "results" of "criticism" have been garnered, to do with the "Bible Stories" we used to tell our children, she asks. And she responds, briefly, Keep on telling them. And, if we do not misunderstand her, she responds in the first instance, Keep on telling them in the same old way; though afterwards this seems greatly modified and made to read rather, Keep on telling them in a very new way indeed,—in this new way, to wit, in the full consciousness that they are in no true sense historical narratives, but myths, legends, epics, *contes,* parables; and with the full intent that they shall be understood in this sense by our children. Mrs. Houghton's primary object seems to be to urge on mothers, who have adopted the new views of the structure and contents of the Bible, or who have been shaken in their confidence in the Bible by them, to continue to employ the Bible Stories as means for the religious instruction of their children, on the two-fold ground: that there is nothing quite equal to them, for this purpose, nothing which so persuasively and so surely brings the child into the consciousness of the presence of God; and that there is really no danger of a child, rationally dealt with, mistaking them for narratives of realities any more than it mistakes *Jack the Giant Killer* or *The Steadfast Little Tin Soldier* for realities. Her ultimate object seems to become to persuade mothers to look upon these Biblical narratives for themselves, and to be careful to teach them to their children, as myths, legends, epics, *contes,* parables, and not as plain narratives of fact. Somewhere, between the first and the last pages, the transition is accomplished, and the dominant interest of the book transformed from a plea for the continued use of "the Bible Stories" for the religious instruction of the children into a plea for the new

"critical" view of the Bible. It is done admirably; and before the reader knows it he finds himself, under the influence of the sympathy aroused by the former plea, almost betrayed into sympathy with the latter.

We have no intention of arguing afresh, merely upon the occasion of Mrs. Houghton's book, the invalidity of the conclusions of the recent destructive criticism of the Bible. The significance of the book to us lies in its attitude, on "critical" presuppositions, towards "teaching Bible Stories." They are not, it seems, to be put upon the shelf as no longer serviceable material. Useless for purposes of history, they remain of supreme value for religious instruction. In them we possess a unique instrument for filling the minds and hearts of the young with a sense of God and Divine things. This is exceedingly interesting, and exceeding valuable as testimony to the religious quality of the Biblical narratives. But it does not seem to have occurred to Mrs. Houghton that there remains in the way a very great difficulty. Rich and strong as the religious suggestion of the "Bible Stories" may be, it remains on the "critical" view mere suggestion and loses all of its authority. Are our children to be expected to adopt views of God—and to order their life upon them—which are commended to them by nothing more than this—that they are pleasant views to have and have been entertained by some old Hebrews? So soon as you reduce the Biblical narratives to stories with religious morals, the sanction of their religious suggestion is reduced to the intrinsic authority of the suggestion itself. If their religious suggestion is accepted and acted upon, it must be simply because we like it. As histories the narratives of Abraham's and Joseph's lives, for example, show us what God is, and what God has done and may be expected to do again for those who serve Him: they give us a real God. As legends they make known to us only how some old dreamers would fain think of God: they give us an imaginary God only. What is to assure us that such a God actually exists, and may be depended on to act after this fashion? The difference between the two views is just the difference between the actual and the longed for. If we can really get along with an imagined God of love—if it suffices us to say of such a God, "Let us suppose"!—we may content ourselves with the new views of the Bible. If we wish to be assured that there is really a real God who loves and who has really acted lovingly towards His servants, we shall crave some assurance that these stories of His loving companionship with men relate something that really happened.

The ultimate fact is that when the path opened by the recent "critical" reconstruction of the Biblical material is followed out to its bitter end, we are left with nothing but the God of our own hearts—in a word with nothing but a "natural religion." All that goes to give us a supernatural religion lies in the fact-character of the narratives which recount the dealings of God with man. If God acted as He is represented in these narratives as acting, then we have a God who intervenes as a "friend" and more than a friend in the affairs of men. If He did not so act, we have only the God we may see in nature. And that such a

"natural religion" is the tendency of Mrs. Houghton's theorizing also, there are numerous indications scattered through her book to suggest, apart from her "critical" theories. We should not like to construct Mrs. Houghton's fundamental theology from this work alone. But she has done very little justice to her fundamental theology in her allusions to it in this work, if it rises much above that essentially natural religion which is known in early Church History as Pelagianism and in these later days as Socinianism. We may well understand that the "Bible Stories" when purged of their element of reality may remain as "myth" or "legend" or the like, charged with "natural religion," and may be very valuable for conveying a knowledge of this natural religion to the youthful mind. Is that all that "Christian mothers" wish to convey to their children? If it is all that they convey to them, it is very clear that the next generation will grow up in no distinctive sense Christian.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

THE TRUTH OF THE APOSTOLIC GOSPEL. By PRINCIPAL R. A. FALCONER, D.Litt. International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations. New York. 1904. Cloth. pp. 148.

This book has for some time been of service to college students and to many others who have come to know the helpfulness of many of the publications of the International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations. As the writer states, he has not intended to furnish a complete system of Christian apologetic, but he has prepared a series of studies in which he employs New Testament quotations and references, to set forth the essence and strength of the Gospel which is its heart. The book is divided into twenty studies, intended to cover as many weeks. Each study is sub-divided into seven parts, one for each day of the week. These briefer sub-divisions are contained on a single page. They are carefully analyzed and the propositions are supported by abundant scripture quotations; while they are at the same time strengthened by references to a large number of helpful works for collateral reading. The discussions include "The Phenomena of the New Testament" in its "New Brotherhood," "New Creation," "New Character," and "New Ideals." The author then gives an explanation of these phenomena, and concludes with four studies on the credibility of the apostolic Gospel.

While the book is specially designed for college students, it will be of great help to those who desire to follow a brief course of study in the New Testament. The writer particularly commends the excellent translation by Richard F. Weymouth, entitled "The New Testament in Modern Speech," as being specially useful in prosecuting these studies.

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE EXPOSITORS' BIBLE. Index by S. G. AYRES, B.A., Librarian of Drew Theological Seminary. A. C. Armstrong & Son. New York. Cloth. pp. 312.

The great popularity of the "Expositors' Bible" makes the publication of this final volume of peculiar interest and value. It appears in the form of a complete index, but it also includes a general preface to the entire series by the editor, W. Robertson Nicoll, M.A., LL.D., Editor of the "British Weekly," etc., and also "Introductions to the Old and New Testament Sections" by W. H. Bennett, M.A., D.D., Professor of Old Testament Exegesis at New College, London, and Walter F. Adeny, M.A., Professor of New Testament Exegesis at Lancashire College, Manchester.

The brief introductory essay by the distinguished editor is worthy of its place in connection with this great work of Bible Exposition, and is one of the most admirable features of the entire series. It declares the supremacy and finality of the Bible as secure and unassailable. In referring to a familiar phrase, Dr. Nicoll affirms that the Bible not only contains, but *is*, the Word of God, and he further adds: "What we say is, that this Book, and this Book only, contains all we know of God; all we shall know until the veil is rent. Let me emphasize this assertion. An American poet has said:

'Slowly the Bible of the race is writ,
Each age, each kindred, adds a text to it.'

This is a statement that we meet with a blank denial. No text has been added to the Bible, no revelation of God has been given, or will be given, in addition to that found within its covers." The writer further alludes to the fact of the unextinguishable life of the Bible, to the unifying spirit by which its several parts are brought into a living combination, and to the witness of Christ, all of which demonstrate its divine character and authority.

The two general introductions lay special stress upon the admirable method of "The Expositors' Bible." As these writers both point out, the books are taken one by one, and each is treated as a distinct entity. Instead of the familiar method of discussing minute phrases, and brief texts, we have in this excellent series the wider handling of larger paragraphs, of great divisions, of extended arguments, which results in a broad and comprehensive view, and thus in an accurate and intelligent undertsanding of the content of Scripture. These introductions further suggest the need of such a new exposition of the Bible as these volumes are designed to fill, and refer to the occasion for such work, due to recent investigations and discoveries in criticism, archaeology, philology and exegesis,—and especially to the previous lack of a commentary of adequate scope compiled on the admirable plan followed by the writers of this series. The introduction to the Old Testament, in particular, shows rather a decided sympathy with the positions of the radical critics which are at times reflected by the individual commentators to whom the treatment of the separate books was entrusted.

As to the specific work of this closing volume, which is of the nature of a complete index to the series, great praise is due to the compiler. His task has been extended and difficult, but it has been successfully and admirably accomplished; his aim has been to prepare a complete, comprehensive, and practical index to this series of commentaries. The index is not divided into separate parts, for the treatment of subjects and texts, and authors; all these references are united in a complete, clear, and helpful summary, which will prove to be of great value in acquiring a knowledge of these volumes, and which will be of great assistance in their practical use.

Princeton. CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE CHURCH OF CHRIST. By A LAYMAN. Funk & Wagnalls Company. London. 1905. Cloth. pp. 336. $1.00 net.

This interesting volume occasioned considerable remark on its first appearance, and has been the subject of numerous reviews. It has received the kindly, generous criticism which is due to an author whose spirit is so sincere, whose faith is so genuine, and whose aim is so high. It is possible that help and inspiration have been given to many, and that the readers of the book have felt anew an increasing longing for a closer union among the followers of Christ. It is this problem of the unity of the church which the writer aims to solve; and with this purpose all the followers of Christ do feel a profound sympathy. It is only to be regretted that the writer has not had a better preparation for his task, and fails in so large a degree in intelligently interpreting the Scripture and in appreciating the significance of the history of the Church. The latter would suggest the many past and present attempts to return to primitive faith and practice as a solution of all religious problems. But to reach an agreement as to what is to be included in primitive faith, or to be followed as primitive practice, is possibly a more serious question than the author seems to suppose. He declares his design to be: "To find the simple truth in regard to the Church of Christ both in faith and practice." He selects the fact of "pardon" as the central principle which involves the essence of Christianity, and suggests that the acceptance of this principle will lead to the abolition of all denominational differences, and to the conversion of the world. While his discussion is serious and interesting, we regret that so large a portion of it deals with religious commonplaces, while its original suggestions are lacking in practicalness and power. The publishers summarize the content of the book in the following comprehensive paragraph: "The author presents Christianity as an original religion, in contrast with all preceding religions; reviews all cases of pardon in the New Testament; maintains that the Church of Christ should be one or identical in organization, teaching and practice with the New Testament Church, before creed, or sect, or party began; that such unity, according to Christ's own words, is essential to its complete and final triumph in the world." As thus suggested, the author makes a most

comprehensive review of all the instances of "pardon" and "salvation" contained in the New Testament narrative. He finds that three conditions are suggested in every instance, faith, repentance and baptism. He then suggests that all other modern devices or additional accompaniments of pardon should be set aside. Simple faith in the Gospel is not to wait on feeling or agonizing prayer; repentance is to be inseparable from such faith in Christ; but baptism is to be in the form of immersion, and the Holy Spirit is given to all who so obey. As to assurance of salvation, the Word of God is to be regarded as sufficient. No extraordinary "light from heaven," no visions, dreams, signs, or tokens of any kind, should be sought or expected. "The Second Blessing" for holiness has no real evidence in evanescent joy and emotion. The Word alone is sufficient to furnish all proof of pardon, assurance, and sanctification.

Having thus discussed the matter of pardon, the writer, in a few brief chapters, applies this general principle to the Church as an organization, and discusses the officers, government, names and sacraments of the Church. The Church of Christ or of God should have no party names, as of Calvin, Luther, Wesley; no bishops or elders presiding over a number of churches; no prelate, no pope, but a bench of elders and deacons in each church; no councils, conferences or assemblies for making laws, or issuing edicts; no creeds, Apostolic, Athanasian, Anglican or Calvinistic; no sacraments save baptism and the Lord's Supper; the former only of adults and by immersion, and the latter, a weekly observance in accordance with the apostolic usage. The adoption of the foregoing views, the author contends, is the only way to unite the Christian Church, to prove Christianity the universal religion, and to convert the world. As has been suggested, no one can fail to endorse the object which the writer has in view, nor to appreciate his earnest, kindly and reverent spirit; yet it seems possible to suggest that in the main portion of his discussion the writer defends positions which few Christians would assail; while in his more original contentions, he reveals a lack of accurate Scripture knowledge. For instance, in attempting to demonstrate the "Newness of Christianity," he fails utterly to appreciate the content and character of the Old Testament revelation. He ignores its typical teaching, its germinal truths, its suggestions of salvation, its wide horizons, and its organic connection with New Testament truth. He proves the "narrowness" of the Old Testament religion, by stating that the word "Gentiles" is found but twenty-one times in the Old Testament, forgetting that the same word is translated "heathen" and "nations," and is found some three hundred times in the original. The author's interpretations of Scripture are often open to serious question, and show lack of careful and thoughtful investigation; so that the conclusions based on these interpretations are far from convincing. The writer may possibly still find some Christians to support his earnest contention that the Pope of Rome is the "Man of Sin," and that the Papacy is "Babylon"; but it is by no means certain that this phase of the discussion strengthens the argument for church

unity. Then, too, the writer seems to ignore the fact that many denominations now exist, which claim to follow the primitive church in the very particulars upon which the writer specially insists; and it is still an open question whether these so-called primitive practices are resulting in the restoration of a true Christianity, or in a conquest of the world. The writer also seems to utterly overlook the fact of the real, vital and essential unity, which now exists among the people of God. In applying his fundamental axiom, that if two men differ, one of them must be wrong, he seems to forget that there may be divergence in non-essentials which in no wise affects a true spiritual unity. To most Christians, corporate union, and compulsory uniformity, appear neither desirable, nor probable of speedy realization; nor does it seem that this present volume will greatly strengthen such movements. If, however, it can be used to increase in any wise a spirit of fellowship among Christians, or a truer devotion to Christ, the work of the author will not have been in vain.

Princeton. CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE SONG OF AGES. Sermons by REGINALD J. CAMPBELL, Minister of the City Temple, London. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1905. 12mo; pp. 208.

This is a disappointing book; it is worse, it is a disheartening book. The sermons it contains were delivered from the most conspicuous pulpit of the greatest city in the world. There are seventeen of them, and the titles and texts prefixed to them lead one to look for fresh and vital presentations of the fundamental truths of the Gospel. But the result of its perusal is disappointment, disheartenment even. For one thing, these sermons are marked by carelessness of thought and statement. The impression of this fault is conveyed by the opening sermon, "The Song of Ages," which gives title to the volume. The text is Rev. xv. 3: "And they sing the song of Moses the servant of God, and the song of the Lamb, saying, Great and marvelous are thy works, Lord God Almighty; just and true are thy ways, Thou King of Saints." Can we call it other than careless when a preacher, who proposes to inquire what the song of Moses and the Lamb is and what it means, proceeds to answer his own question without any further reference to the contents of the song itself than is involved in quoting a portion of it in announcing his text? Is it to be wondered at if one who interprets after this heedless fashion—makes "the song of the Lamb" to be, in the first instance, the hymn which our Saviour and His apostles sang in the upper room just before they set out for the garden of Gethsemane, in face of the statement of Ex. xv. 1, that "Then sang Moses *and the children of Israel* this song unto the Lord," and of Matt. xxvi. 30, that "when they had sung a hymn, they went out into the Mount of Olives" —makes much of the idea that it was Moses alone, Jesus alone, who sang; if he insists that the song that John heard, and which he calls

"the song of Moses and the song of the Lamb," is sung upon the earth quite as much as in heaven, and that it is in its utterance by saints on earth that its significance chiefly lies? John, he says, "looks as it were from heaven, but it was upon earth that he gazed. What he saw from heaven was what you and I are doing, and he describes the sons of God *on earth* (author's *italics*) as singing the song of Moses and the Lamb. True, it is a song of heaven too; but it is a song that is begun on earth, and only those who have sung it here are entitled to sing it there."

With a similar disregard for historic truth, the second sermon on "The Unrecognized Christ" speaks of John the Baptist as having "lived with Jesus all his life," while the third refers to our Lord's hearers in the synagogue of Nazareth as "respectable fishermen and fisherwomen." On page 30 it is said of the catacombs of Rome, "In those gloomy caverns the foundations of the faith that you and I now know were laid, or shall I say, the Church as you and I know it was made possible," and on page 44 that "Jesus never put forward His pretensions; He simply put forward his glad tidings." It might be thought that too much stress is being laid on these and similar inaccuracies of statement and conception, were it not that the preacher seems content to settle the most vital matters of Christian truth and life in the same ill-considered fashion. Sermon X, "The Cleansing Blood," would have us believe that all that the statement of Heb. ix. 22, "Without shedding of blood there is no remission," means is that without great pains there are no great gains. Poets, painters, authors, putting their best selves into their works, are "pouring out their blood for the life of the race," are illustrating "the old, old law that without shedding of blood is no loosening of the fetters from the souls of men—without shedding of blood there is no victory over wrong; without shedding of blood there is no doing away of guilt. Saviour and penitent alike, guilty nation or guilty individual, Christ or sinner, we are identical in this: the blood has to be shed or the sin remains. The battle of righteousness is not fought with rose water. Spiritual manhood is born in the furnace"—and much more of the same sort on other great themes, and but little to correct the misleading impressions which such utterances are sure to make. Alas, alas!

Wooster, Ohio. CHALMERS MARTIN.

LIFE AND LIGHT. Thoughts from the Writings of GEORGE DANA BOARDMAN, with Memorabilia. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press. 1905. 12mo; pp. 185,44.

This beautifully printed book contains twenty extracts of varying length from the sermons and addresses of Dr. Boardman. Most of them bear the final literary form which the author wished them to have; three are outlines merely. These are followed by a portrait of Dr. Boardman and a series of appreciation of his character and services written by well-known men in several walks of life, in his own Church and in other

Churches. The result is to convey a vivid and pleasing impression of the man. Vigor of thought, breadth of sympathy, ripe culture, singular power in the use of words, fervent loyalty to Jesus Christ as at once the Son of God, the Son of Man and the Saviour of the world—these and other high qualities are stamped large upon these pages. Occasionally one is compelled to ask whether there is really such an English word as the rare one which stares at him out of the type; occasionally one suspects that the desire to be epigrammatic has seduced the author into some sacrifice of the truth of things; occasionally a rendering of Scripture seems a change for the worse, as, for example, "I have struggled the good struggle," instead of "I have fought the good fight"; but these are minor defects, and even to mention them is to do injustice to the characteristic felicity of thought and feeling and expression which are here displayed. To choose where all is so admirable is difficult, but one cannot refrain from suggesting that it would be hard to see how an address to college students of to-day could be more felicitous than that delivered at the University of Pennsylvania on the occasion of the first revival of the Olympic Games, or from calling attention to the sanity and breadth of the addresses on "The Unification of Christendom" and "The Disarmament of the Nations."

Wooster, Ohio. CHALMERS MARTIN.

THE DUTY OF IMPERIAL THINKING, AND OTHER CHAPTERS ON THEMES WORTH WHILE. By WILLIAM L. WATKINSON, D.D., LL.D., Author of *The Blind Spot, The Bane and the Antidote,* etc., etc. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 8vo; pp. 270.

Readers of Dr. Watkinson's writings have learned what to expect when his publishers announce a new book from his pen. This volume will not disappoint them. Like preceding ones, it is soundly orthodox in doctrine, exceptionally rich in suggestiveness, abounding in apt illustrations from scientific truth, thoroughly evangelical in spirit and devoutly spiritual in tone. Few writers excel Dr. Watkinson in seeing the obvious truth in a Scripture text—not quite obvious enough, however, to be perceived by the average plodding homilist, but, once it has been pointed out, so provokingly obvious that he can hardly see anything else. In this insight, which is the key to the best exegesis, we are reminded in this book of Dr. Matheson, of Edinburgh.

These chapters are essays rather than sermons, though they are all attached to Scripture texts. They are sermon-seeds, sermon-starters. In ante-vacation days, when the pastor's mind is fagged and his sermon-producing apparatus is working sluggishly, this volume would be a friendly helper in his study. Watkinson is a baptized Emerson, only, unlike the Concord Mystic, he gives us Scripture instead of intuitions and faith instead of philosophy.

Trenton. HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE DEVOTIONAL AND PRACTICAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW TESTAMENT. Edited by W. ROBERTSON NICOLL, D.D., LL.D., Editor of the Expositor's Bible. Vol. I: COLOSSIANS AND THESSALONIANS. By JOSEPH PARKER, D.D. Pp. vii., 303. Vol. II: EPHESIANS. By JOSEPH PARKER, D.D. Pp. 272. Price per volume, $1.25, net. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1904 and 1905.

These two volumes may be regarded as Dr. Parker's legacy to the Church. They are the first in the new series of Devotional and Practical Commentaries, edited by Dr. Robertson Nicoll, and similar in design to the popular Expositor's Bible. Those familiar with Dr. Parker's methods as a commentator will not expect minute and thorough exegesis so much as striking and original comment upon selected portions of the text. He has little patience with the letter that killeth. "It is very neat and natty if we begin to explain armour, and loins girt about with truth, and breastplate, and feet. That is not to expound the passage at all." Yet he writes strongly on "Be strong in the Lord." Of devotional commentators, Bishop Moule in his Colossian and Ephesian "Studies" (Armstrongs, 1898 and 1900) follows more closely the thought of the Apostle; but Dr. Parker has a way of his own of seizing the leading ideas of a passage, clothing them in poetic imagery and applying them to the experience of the reader. He has a firm grasp upon the fundamentals of religion, a sympathetic insight into the needs and struggles of the human heart and a remarkable gift of expression. His comments on Second Thessalonians and Ephesians are especially fresh, vigorous and spiritual. We doubt if he has ever written anything better. The notes on Ephesians are unevenly distributed—only two expressions in chap. I are noticed, while to the single word "till" in chap. IV twenty-eight pages are devoted—but the comment is always suggestive and often eloquent. If the standard of the two opening volumes is maintained the new series will take a worthy place beside its predecessor.

Lincoln University, Pa. WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

JOHN WITHERSPOON. By DAVID WALKER WOODS, JR., M.A. Fleming H. Revell Company. 1906. 8vo. pp. 295.

We commend this book as an attractive sketch of the life and work of John Witherspoon. The author, who, we understand, is a great-grandson of his distinguished subject, reveals an ample knowledge of the colonial period of our history, while his access to many hitherto unpublished documents in the possession of his family has enabled him in an exceptional manner to bring to view the rich and many-sided personality of the famous Scotch-American. It is, indeed, a strong and

beautiful character, one of nature's true noblemen, that is mirrored in these pages: commanding presence, rugged independence of spirit, vigor and versatility of mind, breadth and intensity of sympathy, loyalty to convictions of truth and duty, zeal in behalf of every righteous cause in Church or state, an invincible optimism of faith that did honor to the best traditions of his Calvinistic orthodoxy,—these were characteristics of the man which impress us in this biography, as they impressed his contemporaries, with a sense of his greatness.

Three brief chapters, devoted to the "Scotch Period" of his life, portray the ecclesiastical and religious situation of his youth and early manhood, and furnish repeated evidences of the high ideals of the pastoral office that inspired his labors at Beith and Paisley. It was here, amidst the crying evils of lay patronage in the Scotch Church, that he learned his first lesson of the necessity and importance of championing the rights of the people against a tyrannical use of authority.

His work in America falls under three heads: his administration of Princeton College, as its president; his labors for the higher organization of the Presbyterian Church; and his distinctly political services, especially in the New Jersey Convention (although, acording to our author, Witherspoon had no part in framing the Constitution of New Jersey), in the Continental Congress (of which he was the only clerical member), and in the conduct of the Revolutionary War. It goes without saying that Princetonians will find special delight in the chapter that shows how much Witherspoon did in the sphere of college life to promote the best elements of the *genius hujus loci*, and all readers will admire the insight and boldness that enabled him, on the larger stage of public life, to voice with such telling effect the best American sentiment on the subject of a free church in a free state. Taken as a whole, the book is the most satisfactory account we have seen of Witherspoon's life and achievements.

Here and there, unfortunately, as, for example, on pp. 34, 126 and 131, the proof-reading has been carelessly done.

Princeton. FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

BUSHIDO, THE SOUL OF JAPAN. By INAZO NITOBÉ, A.M., Ph.D., Professor in the Imperial University of Kyoto. With an Introduction by William Elliot Griffis, Author of "The Religions of Japan," etc. Tenth Revised and Enlarged Edition. The Knickerbocker Press. 1905. 12mo. pp. xxv, 203.

A perusal of this beautiful little book will enable one to understand why it has in six years found its way into three Asiatic and five European tongues, and is now entering upon its tenth edition in English. Whoever would know modern Japan must make a study of that characteristic institution of the country—invisible yet everywhere present, the slow organic development of a thousand years—of which Dr. Nitobé, in this modest philosophy of the past millenium of Japanese history, gives the best exposition.

Bu-shi-do, we are told, means literally "military-knight-ways," or the "precepts of knighthood." Broadly speaking, the term is the Japanese equivalent for the chivalry of European feudalism; indeed, as the author shows by adducing a multitude of evidences, the comparison is as judicious as it is natural. The institution is fundamentally an ethical code imposed by long usage upon the warrior class of Japan and by them rendered effectual in the life and literature of the whole nation. Three sources are mentioned for the development of this chivalry, all being religious: Buddhism, which contributed "a sense of calm trust in Fate, a quiet submission to the inevitable, that Stoic composure in the sight of danger or calamity, that disdain of life and friendliness with death"; Shintoism, which emphasized the two most conspicuous features of the emotional life of the Japanese race, patriotism and filial piety; and Confucianism, which furnished the leading ethical doctrines as to the moral relationships between master and servant, husband and wife, friend and friend. The greater part of the book is devoted to an exposition, enriched with many examples from the biographies of ancient and modern worthies of Nippon, of those qualities which concretely manifest the complex spirit of Bushido: rectitude, courage, benevolence, politeness, veracity and sincerity, honor, loyalty, and self-control. The revolting *seppuku*, also known by the more popular term *hara-kiri*, suicidal disembowelment, and its sister institution of private or family vengeance, are represented as but the defects of virtues, a view which, so far as at least the self-immolation is concerned, is altogether too highly idealized in these pages to do justice to the author's Christianity. Subsequent chapters deal with the training and position of woman in Bushido, and the general influence of the institution on the masses of the people. "Unformulated, Bushido was and still is the animating spirit, the motive force" of Japan. We are inclined to think, however that Dr. Nitobé is putting things too strongly when he denies the claims of such authorities as Mr. Speer and Dr. Dennis that "the Christian missionaries contributed an appreciable quota to the making of the new Japan," and when he insists that it "was Bushido, pure and simple, that urged us on for weal or woe." To say the least, it is passing strange that the spirit of Bushido had to wait for precisely this contact with the civilization of the West to rouse itself from the thrall of fatal slumber. Why, moreover, is the author so ready to confess that the cherry blossom of Japan's chivalry is ready to be blown away by the first breath of the new dawn? But if we cannot agree altogether with his analysis of the recent transformation in Japan, we may on independent authority feel sure that "with an enlarged view of life, with the growth of democracy, with better knowledge of other peoples and nations, the Confucian idea of benevolence—dare I also add the Buddhist idea of pity?—will expand into the Christian conception of love," and that here also, as between the old order and the new, the lesser will be blessed of the better.

We cannot understand the propriety, we may say in conclusion, of the author's apologetic note in regard to his use of a borrowed tongue.

Cultured in the literatures of Europe as well as those of China and Japan, he has acquired an English diction that is as choice as his style is strong and graceful.

Princeton. FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

A DIGIT OF THE MOON AND OTHER LOVE STORIES FROM THE HINDOO. Translated from the Original Manuscripts by F. W. BAIN. New York and London. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1905. 8vo. pp. 421.

If the search is for novelty in fiction, there will be found here something new even in the realm of the love story. In form, diction, plot, imagination and ideals the stories are the expression of the Oriental mind and as such reveal the great gulf between the Oriental and the Occidental in all that makes up the inner life. Being mythological, or involving mythology, the narratives open the window into the attitude of the Indian mind toward the Hindoo deities in their relation to the human life. One realizes the fascination that the weird and complicated scheme of deities and incarnations has for the dreamy, poetical people of the East and pities them in their bondage to their imaginations of many gods and goddesses fashioned in the likenesses of men and animals.

The stories are unexpectedly free from the immoral and grossly sensuous. The translation is well done and the prefatory notes to the several stories, characterized by sympathetic familiarity with Hindoo mythology, are enlightening.

Princeton. PAUL MARTIN.

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THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CRITICISM AND THEOLOGY.

Fashion in religious controversy, as in other things, is continually changing, and the methods of apologetics have to change with them. Instead of discussing either the attack or the defence in the abstract, I propose in this paper to illustrate the temper of the times, on both sides, from a few books which lie at this moment on my study table, and seem to me to be exceptionally suggestive.

I do not know that there has been a time within recent memory when the attack on the foundations, records, and doctrines of revealed religion has been more outspoken, confident, and daring. It seems in many quarters to be quite assumed that the older Christianity is dead; that the new conception of the world evolved within the last fifty years or so has given it its death-blow; that the kindest thing the world can now do for it is to see it decently buried. In such a learned quarterly, for example, as *The Hibbert Journal,* on this side of the Atlantic, the assumption in many articles openly is that Christianity, in the old sense, is obsolete, and that the only question left to ask is, what substitute can we find for it? The supernatural, of course, is to be given up; there must be an end, as one article puts it, to "the entangling alliance of religion with history"; religion is to be based on moral and spiritual, or on rational,

intuitions only. This temper, as recent discussions show, is quite as marked in the United States. It believes itself to have already conquered the world of thinking minds; its future victory is thought to be secure.

There are, however, alongside of this self-confident, aggressive temper of the negating type, certain other forces at work which tend in a directly opposite direction. At all times it has been the mistake of unbelief to magnify its own importance, and greatly to exaggerate its range of influence. In a famous controversy in *The Nineteenth Century,* when Mr. Frederick Harrison was vaunting the progress of Positivism, Prof. Huxley made a rather cruel reply. "There is a story often repeated," he said, "and I am afraid none the less mythical on that account, of a valiant and loud-voiced corporal, in command of two full privates, who, falling in with a regiment of the enemy in the dark, orders it to surrender under pain of instant annihilation by his force; and the enemy surrenders accordingly. I am always reminded of this tale when I read the Positivist command to the forces of Christianity and of science; only the enemy shows no more signs of intending to obey now than they have done any time these forty years."[1] The parable applies to more than Positivism.

I take up, for example, such a book as Prof. Foster's recent work on *The Finality of the Christian Religion,* and find there, as in a book of kindred spirit, Prof. N. Schmidt's *The Prophet of Nazareth,* with much personal reverence for Jesus as a religious teacher, an assault, intended to be annihilating, on the credibility of the supernatural narratives in the Gospels. The basal principle of the criticism is that enunciated with perfect frankness, and much show of philosophy, by the author, in the first half of his work. He will not absolutely say that miracles are "impossible." "Still to the scientific understanding of the world and to the intellectual habitude superinduced by science, a miracle cannot

[1] *Nineteenth Century,* Feb., 1889.

be admitted" (p. 130). "So far as the modern man is concerned, he can no longer believe in miracles" (p. 413). "An intelligent man who now affirms his faith in such stories as actual facts can hardly know what intellectual honesty means" (p. 132). This is strange teaching to be expressly endorsed by the University of Chicago, but it faithfully reflects much in the temper of the age. The same note is heard in modern lives of Jesus, like Oscar Holtzmann's, or Bousset's, or Neumann's.

Yet how assumptive and inconsequent it is! While thousands and tens of thousands of capable, intelligent, competent men declare their devout and believing acceptance of the great facts and mysteries of the Christian religion, we are calmly told that because that peculiar quantity, "the modern mind," with the intellectual aptitudes superinduced by science, affirms that such things cannot be, they must be given up, on pain of the person who holds them being charged with intellectual dishonesty! Is miracle, I would ask, the only thing "the modern mind" denies? Does it not also, and quite as emphatically, deny ruling "ends," "ideas," "guidance," God, providence, the soul, and a multitude of other truths, essential to religion? It does this, Prof. Foster himself being witness (p. 231). He tells us how "natural science finds no ideas or ends in nature, and naturalism, with its characteristic dogmatism, goes on to assume that natural science is competent to exhaust reality, and hence to deny the existence of such ends and ideas. The whole is a closed series, a great blind causal bustle," etc. (p. 230). The "modern mind," therefore, so far as this wide, purely scientific class is taken as its representative, would rule out Prof. Foster, with his "ideas" and "ends," as effectually as he rules out believers in miracle.

The truth is that the "habitudes" engendered by science are in no way a safe guide in dealing with moral and spiritual questions. They are often, even as regards nature, unwarrantable "dogmatisms." For after all, Prof. Foster is, strangely enough, a supernaturalist after his own fashion.

He cannot believe in special miracles—that would be a gross outrage on "the modern mind"—but he fights for the life of religion, as against a "naturalistic" view of the world, in belief in a supernatural cause, not only in nature, but above it, and producing effects uncommonly like the miracles that are rejected. Jesus Himself is the supreme example. Psychology cannot explain Him (p. 265). "It is not possible to escape from the recognition of an active and creative moment in the consciousness of Jesus which, just on that account, cannot be causally explained by articulating it in the system of development" (p. 265-6). "The empirical inexplicability of Jesus may as well be conceded" (p. 267). Such new beginnings might be thought of as eternally provided for in the system of the world; "but it is also possible that all this may be otherwise, that an entirely new spiritual force, not even formerly latent in the cosmic system, might appear therein" (p. 268). But have such new beginnings not a place in the physical system as well—say at the origin of life? And if so, why draw the line so sharply between the natural and the spiritual, and declare that higher interposition is excluded in such great facts as the Incarnation and Resurrection? The answer must be, and is, because a different estimate is put upon Jesus Himself and His place in revelation and redemptive history. It is here the ultimate battle must be fought—"What think ye of Christ?"

I turn to another, and not unauthoritative utterance on this subject of "the modern mind." It is the recent brochure of Prof. Julius Kaftan, of Berlin, entitled *Jesus und Paulus, Eine freundschaftliche Steitschrift gegen die Religionsgeschichtlichen Volksbücher von D. Bousset und D. Wrede.* The temper I have above described has found expression in Germany in a series of ably-written and cheaply-published popular booklets, of which those named by Kaftan are among the best known. Both seek to explain Jesus and early Christianity without the introduction of the supernatural. Both indicate the lines the new Christianity is to follow, after miracles and Pauline theology have been

purged out of it. Here, then, we have a phenomenon parallel to the enterprise of Prof. Foster, Prof. Schmidt, and others, in the United States. Prof. Kaftan is a Ritschlian theologian of believing tendency, and a good deal of independence. His little book in reply to Bousset and Wrede is highly significant as showing how the currents are coming to clear division. For Kaftan is not long in striking the key-note of his reply. You profess to belong, he says to the scholars whose views he combats, to a "religious-historical" school. You claim to reach your results by the application of purely historical methods. But it is not so. Your representation, he declares, "has its roots in quite other soil than that of method. It is, put briefly, the so-called 'modern view of the world' that lies behind it" (p. 4). That modern view of the world, the characteristic trait of which is the idea of "unbroken causal connection," rules the whole treatment. Everything in the history has, whether it will or not, to be forced within this frame, and, if it does not suit has to be cut down and altered till it does. Kaftan, as he goes on to make clear, has no respect whatever, either for this "modern view of the world," or for the kind of "history" that is got out of it. "Above all," he says in one place, "I am no lover of the modern view of the world; rather am I astonished that so many thinking men allow themselves to be led astray by this puppet (*Popanz*)" (p. 72). His closing words on the whole movement are: "I conclude, therefore, that this Jesus-religion is an affair without roots. As it has no points of support, either in the Gospel of Jesus or in primitive Christianity, so it will never, not to-day and not in the future, approve itself as a possible form of Christianity" (p. 77). These are strong, but they are true words. They anticipate the verdict which the future will pass on such books as I have already been considering.

Is Prof. Kaftan alone in his judgment on the so-called "modern" views? I think not. Signs of a call for the revision of supposed established conceptions on the "ad-

vanced" side in criticism and theology meet one on every hand.

I take an example from Old Testament Criticism. With what insistence are we told of the "settled" and "assured" character of the "results" of criticism as to the history and religion of the Old Testament? Books pour from the press giving us the true version of the advance of Israel's religion from low Semitic superstitions (tree-, stone-, well-worship, worship of ghosts, totemism, and the like), through the worship of Yahweh as a "tribal god," like Chemosh, and with like rites (images, etc.), up to the sublime monotheism of the Hebrew prophets; then of its lapse after the exile into the legalism of the Priestly code, which at that time took its origin. All this is held to be so sure that question of it is hardly tolerated. Yet what do we find? I take two quite recent publications which may give an answer. One is an address delivered some months ago at a congress at Eisenach by the celebrated Orientalist Hugo Winckler, of Berlin. I have already more than once referred to this address in other connections, but it may very well be alluded to again. As published, it bears the title, *Religionsgeschichtlicher und Geschichtlicher Orient,* and describes itself as "a testing of the presuppositions of the 'religious-historical' treatment of the Old Testament, and of the Wellhausen School." What is the result of the "testing"? An emphatic declaration that, root and branch, the religious-historical theory of Wellhausen is untenable. Winckler is the antipodes of a "conservative" scholar. He has no bias towards "traditionalism." He is one of the extremer representatives of the new "Babylonian" school. Perhaps in the present case this may give his verdict more weight. At all events he assails the "presuppositions" of the Wellhausen theory one by one, and demolishes them. He rejects the "stages" of development of the critical theory —the "nomadic," the "agricultural," the "prophetic" and the "legal," and maintains that laws and the prophetic monotheistic conceptions were present from the beginning. He

denies that the Judaic legal system had its origin after the exile. These are sufficiently revolutionary declarations to come from the youngest critical school of all, and are fitted to abate the confidence of the Wellhausen critics that everything is permanently "settled" on their basis.

Winckler is, perhaps, more archaeologist and Orientalist than Old Testament critic, but, still more recently, a voice has been heard from within the critical camp itself equally significant. I refer to the new and striking work of Prof. B. Baentsch, of Jena, entitled *Altorientalischer und Israelitischer Monotheismus: Ein Wort zur Revision der entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Auffassung der Israelitischen Religionsgeschichte.* The book is a plea for a revision of the historical-development theory of Israel's religious history. Prof. Baentsch is best known by his work on the so-called "Law of Holiness," in which the usual critical lines are followed. He is a member of the Faculty of Theology of Jena—a university of pronouncedly rationalistic colour. His own views are rationalising, at least as regards the patriarchial history in Genesis. He thinks he sees proof of "artificial" construction in the taking of the forefathers of Israel first from Babylonia to Canaan, then from Canaan to Egypt, then the taking of Israel from Egypt back, through the wilderness again to Canaan (pp. 54-55). He thinks that Abraham is a Canaanitish figure (pp. 55-6). But as to the religion itself he takes up a position diametrically opposed to that of the Wellhausen school. It is impossible, he holds, to explain the monotheism of the prophets on the assumption that the God of Mosaic times was simply a local or tribal deity. He holds that in essence the Mosaic conception of Yahweh was that of the One true God, Maker of heaven and earth. I need not go into details, but may simply quote a sentence or two from the Preface. Baentsch there says that the facts he brings out, impartially considered, "signify a radical change of the hitherto accepted views of the course of the history of Israel's religion, and above all, yield a real explanation of the remarkable fact

that the Yahweh of Sinai became the sole God of heaven and of earth. The evolutionary-historical school, despite many and earnest labours, have failed to furnish a really satisfying explanation of this fact. No less a person than the master of this school, Julius Wellhausen, has, in his latest essay on the Israelitish-Judaic religion (in the *Kultur der Gegenwart*, Tl. I. Abtlg. iv. p. 15) acknowledged this clearly and frankly. He says there: 'Why, *e. g.*, did Chemosh of Moab not develop into a God of righteousness, and the Creator of heaven and of earth? A satisfactory answer to this question can no one give.' By this renunciation in principle of a satisfactory explanation this school points beyond itself to a new mode of consideration, which unites with the Yahweh of Moses a higher and more comprehensive conception than that of a simple national god, alongside of a dozen others." His own view, developed in his book, is that the Mosaic conception of Yahweh was not that of "a peculiarly mighty, or even the mightiest god," but was practically monotheistic (pp. 83-6, 104). He subjects the opposite or "evolutionary" view to a convincing criticism (pp. 105-8). Here is evidence of a turn of the tide of a very decisive kind.

When we turn to New Testament Criticism, the most important phenomenon, unquestionably, is Harnack's bold and unreserved break with the reigning school of criticism in regard to Luke's authorship of the Third Gospel and the Acts. In this noteworthy book, *Lucas der Artz, Der Verfasser des dritten Evangeliums und der Apostelgeschichte,* Harnack retains his freedom of criticism of the contents of the writings (here his subjectivity has play), but he builds up an argument which may be called demonstrative for the authorship of both books by Luke the companion of Paul. What is more remarkable, he severely attacks the methods by which the opposite opinion has been arrived at, and has been so long bolstered up. He scathes the critics for their refusal to hear arguments on the other side, and for their partisan obstinacy (p. 5). He declares

that the whole trend of recent research has been a vindication of tradition. It is further deserving of notice that, in adopting these views of the authorship of Luke, Prof. Harnack goes back on his own earlier opinions. Prof. Ramsay, in his book *Was Christ Born in Bethlehem?* (p. 44), groups Harnack with Prof. McGiffert as denying that the real Luke was the author. There are indications that it is largely owing to Prof. Ramsay's own labours that Harnack's view has been changed. Certainly Harnack's words on the critics sound almost like an echo of Prof. Ramsay's in 1898: "It is a more serious evil that a disposition is sometimes shown to terrorise the investigator by the array of learned opinion on the opposite side, and to treat it as the necessary mark of a reasonable scholar in this subject, that he should be always searching for and finding proofs of the late date, and inaccuracy, and composite character of Luke's history. . . . They set up an idol, and condemn as an impious iconoclast him that sees the idol's feet of clay, even while he reverences the image" (*ut supra,* pp. 38-9).

I cannot enter far into theology, or there are several books of outstanding merit which might receive attention. I must, however, refer to one book on the borderland between theology and science, which I should like earnestly to commend to attention. In the notes to my own volume on *God's Image in Man* I had occasion to quote freely from a series of articles on "Present-Day Darwinism and Theology" which appeared in the German *Theologische Rundschau* from 1902 to 1904. The writer was Rudolph Otto, who since has become Professor of Theology at Göttingen. The articles were surprisingly able, well-informed, fresh, and comprehensive, and attracted a good deal of notice. They were afterwards published as part of a volume entitled *Naturalistiche und Religiöse Weltansicht,* which deals with the whole range of questions raised by modern naturalistic science. It is a most able vindication of the idea of teleology in nature, and is specially valuable for its discussions of the present state of opinion on evolution and the origin of life.

Its exposition of the revolution which has been gradually taking place in the conception of the doctrine of "Descent," and of the practical break with Darwinism as a theory of evolution, will be a revelation to many. The book has now been translated by Prof. A. Thomson, of Aberdeen University, and Mrs. Thomson, under the heading *Naturalism and Religion,* as a volume of "The Crown Theological Library."

I refer to the work here because of its close bearing on the important subjects of the origin of man and the origin of sin. The abandonment of the Darwinian conception of development by slow graduation from the animal to the human stage, and substitution for this of rapid, or *per saltum,* changes, inwardly caused, and teleologically directed, furnish the basis for a view of man's origin, first condition, and of the origin of sin, free from those difficulties which undeniably attach to the Darwinian view, when regarded from the standpoint of Christianity. It is of the highest importance for Christian theology that a right conception of sin be upheld. The present tendency is too much to dilute and weaken the idea. As I write I see an article by Prof. Starbuck, Ph.D., in *The Homiletic Review* on "The Doctrine of Original Sin." The object of the article, as it turns out, is to give a psychological basis for the preaching of that doctrine; but it may be doubted whether the basis is a truly Christian one. It is futile, we are warned, to go "back to older religious notions"; we are to "listen to the whisperings of the Eternal as they are voiced through the unified life of humanity;" "the voice of the ages," it is said, "the voice of God is in it as it focalises in the individual in the sense of sin, and then in a belief in sin." We have such a sentence as this, which must jar sorely on every one who calls Christ Lord: "That there is some relation between the fullest spiritual attainment and struggle against imperfection and sin, will seem evident if one goes far into the lives of such heroes as Wesley, Augustine, and Christ, George Eliot, Tennyson and Browning, Angelo, Beethoven and Wagner"!! The view is taken that Jesus had no doctrine of original sin.

"The emphasis of Jesus was quite the contrary; He tried to make men feel that they were children of a loving Father. His faith in the divinity of little children, and not in their depravity as children of Adam is shown not only in His actions but in His words," etc. This is only a half truth. Jesus knew well the hidden evil of the heart—"Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts," etc.—and proclaimed for all the need of regeneration by the Spirit. But the singular thing is that what Jesus did not know, this teacher does. "The child starts in life with essentially the same instincts as those of the animal; he is selfish, self-willed, pugnacious," etc. Only this is derived as a corollary from a theory of evolution, and is not carried back to any voluntary departure of man from his true in-created ideal. Here is where the difference between a true and false doctrine of sin comes in, and the preacher will be well guided who attends to it.

Glasgow. JAMES ORR.

THE LAWS OF DEUTERONOMY AND THE ARGUMENTS FROM SILENCE.

A considerable portion of the case made by the higher critics against the authenticity of the laws of Deuteronomy rests on arguments from silence. It is the object of the present article to refute these, but in order to do so quite fairly it will be well to state them first in the words of some representative critical writer. To this end two passages of Dr. Driver's argument in his edition of Deuteronomy are subjoined.

"The 'Tent of Meeting,' with its appurtenances, which figures so largely in P (Ex. xxv-xxxi, xxxv-xl,—together with many allusions elsewhere); the distinction between the priests, the sons of Aaron, and the common "Levites", so often and emphatically insisted on in the same source; the Levitical cities, and the year of Jubile; the elaborately developed sacrificial system of P; the meal-offering,[1] the guilt-offering,[2] and especially the sin-offering[3]—all these are never mentioned in Deut.: the atoning efficacy of sacrifice, on which such stress is laid in the sacrificial laws of P, is alluded to once in Deut. (xxi, 8b), and that in a law for which there is in P no parallel; the great Day of Atonement (Lev. xvi), in which the Levitical system of sacrifice and purification (Lev. i-xv) culminates, is in Deut. passed by in silence."[4]

In a foot-note on the above passage Dr. Driver adds the following remarks:

"The Tent of Meeting is mentioned in Deut. xxxi. 14f., but in a passage belonging not to D, but to JE. Nor, even there, does it appear as the centre of a great sacrificial organization. The non-mention of the sin-offering beside the burnt- and peace-offering in xii. 6, 11 is very remarkable. . . . It is also singular that *korbān*, P's very common, and most general term for offering (including sacrifices), never occurs in Deut."

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[1] מנחה [2] אשם [3] חטאת

[4] Driver, *Deuteronomy*, p. xiii.

The second passage runs as follows:

"It is also undoubtedly true that the aim of Deut. is very different from that of P: the one is intended (chiefly) for the guidance of the priests, the other is addressed to the people; the one represents the priestly point of view, the other that of the prophets; the one lays down a complete code of ritual observances, which certainly does not fall within the scope of the other. Still if P were written by Moses,—or even compiled by another hand under his direction,—it is inconceivable that in recapitulating at the close of his life the laws which he desired the Israelites to observe, he should have thus held himself aloof from a body of law, in the compilation of which he had (*ex hyp.*) been so intimately concerned, ignoring institutions which he had represented as of central significance in his system, and contradicting regulations which he had declared to be invested with the highest sanctions. Not only does Deut. not contain (in any sense of the word) a *résumé* or "recapitulation" of the laws of P, but the author does not even do what, supposing him to have been interested in a great ceremonial system, would have been consonant with the general plan of his work, and at the same time of the utmost value to future generations of Israelites: he does not, even in general terms, refer to the system which (*ex. hyp.*) he had prescribed, for the purpose of summarizing its leading principles, or of defining the place which ceremonial institutions should hold in a spiritual religion. On the contrary, his attitude towards it shows that its most characteristic ideas are alien to his mind, and have no place in his scheme of religion."[5]

It is only fair to remember that these passages were written at a time when Dr. Driver believed that contradictions could be established between the laws of Deuteronomy and other portions of the Pentateuch.[6] Not unnaturally, therefore, they are coloured by this belief. Moreover, in estimating them we must also consider that Dr. Driver's mind was influenced by the old (and in my view quite untenable) idea that if Deuteronomy be genuine it is a recapitulation

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. xl-xli.

[6] See as to this *Studies in Biblical Law, passim* and the *Churchman*, July, 1906, pp. 422-430, and September 1906, pp. 548-555.

of the Law. But, even so, we must say that in view of other passages [7] in his book, Dr. Driver is not altogether self-consistent. Why complain, for instance, that "a manual addressed to the people and intended for popular use" which "does not embrace a complete *corpus* of either the civil or the ceremonial statutes that were in force when it was written"[8] makes no mention of the land laws,[9] or of such technical details as the meal-offering, the guilt-offering, the sin-offering, and the theory of sacrifice?

As, however, Dr. Driver's arguments rest on fundamental misconceptions of the character and objects of the Mosaic legislation, the best answer is to deal with the larger aspects of the question, explaining incidentally the particular points that give trouble. The issues between us are far wider than any question of the mention or non-mention of a particular law or sacrifice. In the view of the whole critical school the Pentateuch is at best an ordinary book, at worst a field for practising their quaint arithmetical exercises. In my view it is not primarily a piece of literature at all; it is a piece of statesmanship and must be judged as such.[10] While, therefore, I recognise that it is impossible for anybody now to dive into the mind of Moses so far as to be able to assign precise reasons for the position of each individual command in the whole complex body of legislation, I believe that attention to the considerations that must have been present to the law-giver's mind, aided by a careful study of many points that have hitherto escaped notice, will enable us not merely to answer Dr. Driver's arguments, but also to throw

[7] Pp. xxvi-xxvii, xxx.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. xxvi.

[9] There must have been some land laws in existence when the book was written on any hypothesis of its origin.

[10] It will be understood that in saying this I do not touch any question of inspiration. The Pentateuch being intended to influence the conduct of human beings, we are entitled to examine the means adopted to secure this end, and in doing so we are in no wise encroaching on the domain of theology. Moreover, when I speak of Moses as giving laws, I must not be taken as intending to express any doubt as to the inspiration he enjoyed.

new light on problems that have hitherto remained unsolved.

If we would understand the Pentateuch as a piece of statesmanship, we must first consider what object Moses had in view, and what were the circumstances that conditioned his work. About his ideal there can be no doubt. It was to make the children of Israel a nation holy to the Lord, their God. This was really a two-fold task. He had to make the Hebrew tribes a nation. He had also to make them a holy nation. The first part of that ideal and the means he took to accomplish it, I do not propose to develop here. It has not sufficient bearing on the subject of this paper; and its proper consideration would involve tracing the forces that had been at work for centuries to make the Israelites of the Mosaic age. But the latter part—the making of a holy nation—is the key of all the institutions that puzzle the critics. It meant not merely that the Israelites must be taught to worship the Lord as their God, and the One and Only God, but that rules must be laid down to make them "clean" and "holy" in accordance with the notions of that age.[11] Moreover, it was necessary to stamp the impress of the peculiar relationship between God and Israel on every portion of the legislation.

Turning next to the surrounding circumstances various limitations at once become noticeable. Nobody would expect to find in the Pentateuch rules that were utterly unsuited to the social and economic state of Israel in the days of Moses. That, then, is one limitation; there are others not less important. It is one thing to lay down laws, another to procure obedience to them. A law-giver, who enacts rules that run counter to the thoughts and wishes of his subjects, only makes it certain that his work will become a dead letter. "John Marshall has delivered his judgment, let him now enforce it if he can." So spoke President Jackson, of

[11] It was of course also necessary to provide a number of rules to deal with matters that arise in every society, such as theft, but as no question arises on these they may for our present purpose be left out of consideration.

the United States, of a decision of the Supreme Court, and less exalted individuals than heads of States have often reduced laws to impotence. A case in point may be quoted from the legislation of the Pentateuch. We know from Jeremiah that though the law commanding the manumission of Hebrew slaves six years after their purchase was observed for a short time after the re-discovery of the book of the Law, it was speedily broken again. A third limitation is to be found in the habits and ideas of the age. There is progress in legal ideas and devices as in other human thoughts and inventions. Thus a system of procedure that depends largely on writing will be unknown or impracticable in an age when writing is not in common use.[12] In such an age, too, there can have been no such thing as a law of forgery. But there are two points to which particular attention must be drawn, because a grasp of them is important to the proper appreciation of the Mosaic legislation. The first is that ancient law knows nothing of any remedy for apprehended wrong. If I have good ground for believing that my neighbour is about to trespass on my land, a mature system of law may in certain circumstances allow me to obtain—not merely damages for the injury his past trespasses may have caused, but also—an injunction, that is an order to prevent his doing so. If he disobeys that, he will be sent to prison.[13] The injunction is unknown to early law, and is alien to its ideas. The want of such a remedy is very obvious in the

[12] It is abundantly clear that writing was widely diffused in the Mosaic age, but it is not less clear that it was not in extensive use among the Israelites. In this respect their position in Egypt may not inappropriately be likened to that of the barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire in the midst of the Romanised natives of the various provinces. See *Studies in Biblical Law*, pp. 66-7.

[13] In criminal law there is machinery for preventing breaches of the peace, but it is sufficient for our present purpose merely to notice the more perfect civil remedy of the injunction, which is applicable in the case of certain civil wrongs. It will be understood that in my remarks the injunction must be taken as simply a type of possible machinery for preventing apprehended wrong irrespectively of whether that wrong would now be regarded as civil or criminal or both in any given modern community.

Mosaic legislation. A man ill-treats his servant or slave. If the injury is very bad a remedy is given. The slave is to go free. But in other less severe cases what is to be done? For lack of adequate machinery the courts can do nothing, and so we find merely appeals to the individual's religion or conscience, or to public opinion. Thus in the case of insolvent debtors who were *de facto* though not *de jure* slaves [14] we read "Thou shalt not rule over him with rigour, but shalt fear thy God." (Lev. xxv. 43). "He shall not rule with rigour over him in thy sight." (Lev. xxv. 53). This example also illustrates my second point, which is even more important. It is not only impossible adequately to safeguard for the future the slave who has been somewhat maltreated by his master; no satisfactory punishment is provided for the offence already committed. Why? Because there was no strong central government, no police, little or nothing of what we mean by "the state". Before Moses there had been no central government at all. After him the central government was either weak or in abeyance till the foundation of the kingdom. "In those days there was no king in Israel, every man did that which was right in his own eyes." Many consequences flowed from this. In ancient Israel as in all early societies, criminal law was the business of the private individual, not of the state. Theft was punished by such reparation in property as would overcome the feeling of vengeance which would otherwise have led to bloodshed. The punishment of a murderer was primarily the business of the avenger of the blood, and the most that law could hope to do was to step in and regulate the feud.[15] In other spheres, too, we see the absence of the central power. An excellent example is afforded by the sabbath year. The twenty-fifth chapter of Leviticus gives us the land laws and also the rules relating to the sabbath year. A modern legislature would have no difficulty about such an enactment. Punishments would be provided for all persons who should

[14] See *Studies in Biblical Law*, pp. 5-11.
[15] *Studies in Biblical Law*, chapter iv.

cultivate their land in the seventh year; an army of officials would watch over the execution of the law; and the man who dared break it would have to reckon with the courts. But in the Mosaic age the necessary machinery was not merely non-existent; it was impossible,—though, for people who had seen the Egyptian system of administration it was perhaps not quite inconceivable. The only substitute available was an appeal to religion, and accordingly the discourse in the next chapter contains threats of exemplary punishment by God in the event of non-observance of the law. The case is the more interesting because the discourse is silent about the jubilee laws which are also to be found in the preceding chapter. They—in contrast to the laws of the sabbath year—were jural laws, that is, laws which the courts were intended to enforce: and there would be powerful human motives and influences at work to secure their observance. Hence an appeal to religion was not so necessary.

A fourth limitation of a law-giver's power—the last I propose to notice—is to be found in the nature of the difficulties which may be experienced in procuring sufficient proof of an offence. Moses was desirous of preventing abuses of the incapacity of a blind man. But from the nature of the case there would be a difficulty about evidence. The blind man could not identify the offender. Hence here, too, we find appeals to religion. "Thou shalt not put a stumbling block before the blind, but shalt fear thy God."[16] "Cursed be he that maketh the blind to wander out of the way."[17]

[16] Lev. xix. 14. The first part of this verse, "thou shalt not curse the deaf," also illustrates the remarks in the text.

[17] Deut. xxvii. 18. Perhaps this principle is seen even more clearly in the first of the twelve curses, "Cursed be the man that maketh a graven or molten image . . . and setteth it up in secret." It could not be contended that the law-giver limited the curse to secret idols, because he had no objection to public images. But the latter could be dealt with under the ordinary law, while in the former the question of evidence made this difficult or impossible. In all the twelve curses there is some practical difficulty in the way of action by the courts. The

On the other hand, while the task of the legislator was rendered more difficult by all the limitations we have just considered, it was partly aided by a method that, so far as I know, is unique. Many peoples have had laws that they have attributed to some deity, but I am acquainted with no other instance in which laws are presented in the form of a sworn agreement of a peculiar type—called by the Hebrews a covenant—between the nation and a god. Now there are obvious differences between sworn agreements made with God and similar agreements made by men. Either of two men may break his oath, but in the covenants with God only the people could prove false to their word. Again, if two men enter into an agreement, they may call on One who is outside the agreement to enforce its observance by punishing whichever of the two may break his covenant: but in a covenant with God the only question of that nature that could arise would be, How will He reward obedience or punish its opposite? Hence in each of the great covenants with God, we find after the terms of the agreement a discourse intended to procure obedience setting forth the results of observance of the covenant and of the reverse. As this takes the place of a jurat in an ordinary oath, I have ventured to term it a quasi-jurat. An excellent instance of it may be found in the discourse of Lev. xxvi, to which reference has already been made. As an aid to the task of Moses to secure obedience we may suppose its effect to have been considerable.[18]

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difficulty of proof in the case of some of the offences is a common-place with lawyers even at the present day. The repeated commands not to wrong strangers, widows and orphans are due to a similar cause. It is evident that all three classes would experience difficulties in obtaining justice.

[18] See as to the covenants *Studies in Biblical Law,* chapter ii. I cannot refrain from noticing one of the other very characteristic instruments of persuasion employed by Moses—the appeal to history. It is used with great oratorical effect in its subtlest form in such a passage as Deut. xiii. 6. "And that prophet . . . shall be put to death: because he hath spoken rebellion against the LORD your God, which brought you out of the land of Egypt and redeemed thee out of the

We may now proceed to apply these preliminary observations to the legislation of the Pentateuch. It will be easiest at once to dismiss from consideration those decided cases in which some difficulty arose and was solved, as for instance, the question what was to be done where men were disqualified by ceremonial impurity from celebrating the Passover at the proper time. Such cases are sufficiently explained by their historical setting; and Englishmen and Americans are too familiar with the operation of a system under which law is made by the courts as cases arise for decision to require any lengthy discussion of this feature. The curses, too, have already been noticed. But with regard to the rest of the rules the position was more difficult. They were not all equally likely to find ready obedience. Some were from this point of view practically indifferent, if I may so express myself—that is, the people would obey and the courts could easily enforce any rule that was reasonably adapted to the requirements of the age.[19] For instance the land laws, the law of succession and most of the "dooms" contained in Ex. xxi. ff. would not be likely to meet with opposition. In many cases it is important to have some uniform rule, and the exact nature of the rule is less important. But in other instances Moses had to reckon with more or less potent human feelings which would be ranged against him. Thus the mitigation of the blood feud by the institution of cities of refuge would be likely to run counter to a strong desire either for vengeance or for compensation: and the rule that a Hebrew slave was to be manumitted after six years' service is in violent opposition to one of the most

house of bondage." Surely everybody must appreciate the appeal to the gratitude and the historic pride of the people—and of every individual member of that people—involved in these words, and their consequent power to dispose men to watch over the enforcement of the Law.

[19] Every law is occasionally broken, but there is a difference easily apprehended between a law which becomes a dead letter, and another law which, though habitually observed, is occasionally broken. Thus in this country the bulk of the inhabitants observe the law which forbids the unjustifiable taking of human life, but there are some murderers, and of these only a portion are successfully brought to justice.

abiding sentiments of human nature—the desire for gain. These considerations necessarily dominated the form of the legislation, which we may (with the exceptions already noted) arrange for convenience in four groups. These four groups consist of:—

(1) The terms of the covenant at Sinai contained in Ex. xix-xxiii, together with Ex. xxxiv. 10-26 (in which it was renewed after the episode of the golden calf) and Num. xxxv. 9-34 (containing the law of cities of refuge as foreshadowed in Ex. xxi. 13).

(2) Leviticus xxv-xxvi containing what may fairly be called the land covenant.

(3) The covenant of Deuteronomy.

(4) The rest of the legislation.

First as to the second group. It would seem that the land having been promised to Abraham in a covenant, the laws specifically relating to the land necessarily became terms of that covenant. Accordingly Lev. xxv and xxvi contain agricultural regulations, the law of land tenure (including the tenure in Levitical and other cities), closely related laws for the relief of distressed peasants, and rules designed for making the land a fitting abode for God's Sanctuary.[20] The arrangement and connection of thought are here obvious.

The other two covenants are equally easy to understand. The contents of Ex. xxi. ff. appear to be designed primarily for judges and heads of families to commit to memory. It is broadly true that these chapters contain the private law—including as above explained the criminal law—enacted in the Mosaic age, and in addition certain brief religious and

[20] When this is grasped Dr. Driver's point as to the non-mention of the jubilee and Levitical cities falls to the ground. Indeed, as the sabbath year is not mentioned in Deuteronomy, while it occurs in Exodus and Leviticus, we should on critical principles be jusitfied in arguing that Deuteronomy must be earlier than JE, and that it was not till after Deuteronomy that the sabbath year was introduced by literary forgers. A place for everything and everything in its place is a maxim by which no critic has ever dreamt of testing the Mosaic legislation.

other rules that it behoved every head of family to know by heart. The style is extraordinarily terse—as in other ancient codes that were committed to memory—and well suited for the purpose suggested. Deuteronomy, on the other hand, was intended for public reading to the people. It, too, was written in a style that was singularly well adapted to its purpose, and therefore very different from that of Ex. xxi. ff., since it is one thing to compose a speech which shall impress men's minds and mould their opinions by its argumentative and oratorical power, and quite another to frame legal rules in a form suited for memorising.

From this the following generalisation may be made. Taking the great body of jural law—*i. e.* laws for the courts as contrasted with moral precepts, sacrificial rules, etc.—and including the outlying provinces of jurisprudence, such as constitutional law, laws of war, administrative law—we find land laws in the land covenant, private law in Exodus, public law and those rules of private law which depended for their validity on the force of public opinion or were designed to mould that opinion in Deuteronomy.[21] To this generalisation there are—subject, of course, to what has been said about the decided cases—only two classes of exceptions. The first consists of repetitions or apparent repetitions. The second of a very few rules of jural law, which are found in Leviticus and Numbers. On examination, the apparent repetitions turn out to be due very largely to the anticipated difficulty of securing obedience to rules that were opposed to strong human feelings.[22] The other class of exceptions is trifling in bulk and consists of Num. xxx and a few verses in Lev. xviii, xix and xx. Without wishing to push our gen-

[21] This motive is very strikingly illustrated by such a passage as Deut. xxi. 18-21 (law of rebellious sons), where the thought of the influence of the proceedings on public opinion is actually expressed "and all Israel shall hear and fear" and also by the phrase "thus shalt thou put the evil from the midst of thee." In the latter, moreover, we see the idea of the unity of the people well brought out. See further *Studies in Biblical Law*, chapter v.

[22] *Op. cit.*, pp. 107-9.

eralisation too far, we may go some way towards understanding these instances even on the materials we have. Numbers xxx lays down the law relating to oaths and vows—methods of entering into business and other engagements that were more important in early societies than at the present day—and is significantly addressed to the "heads of the tribes of the children of Israel". We do not know enough of the constitution of the courts in early Israel to be certain what this meant. But the rules laid down in this chapter are far more detailed than most of the jural laws, and this, combined with the heading, suggests that the whole subject was outside the competence of the ordinary courts, or at any rate that the rules it contains were intended primarily for a more limited audience than that to which Ex. xxi. ff. was addressed. The passages in Leviticus will be considered later.

The remaining contents of Ex. xxi. ff. may be classified roughly under three heads as dealing with either sacred seasons or sacrifice or moral and religious duties. In every one of these cases it is true that we have a sort of *précis* (fitted for oral transmission) of the principal matters that every head of a household should know, but it is also true that every sort of detail is, so far as possible, omitted.[23] Everything that was too bulky—as for example the list of forbidden animals—was dealt with in one or more of three ways. Either it was relegated to Deuteronomy,[24] or it was included in what may fairly be called the priestly section of the Pentateuch, or finally it was placed in a chapter that appears to

[23] It is almost universally recognised now that Ex. xx. 24-6 deals with lay sacrifice, and hence it appears most appropriately in its present position. Deut. xvi. 21-2 deals with the same subject, and it is impossible to say with any certainty why it should not have been put in Exodus. It would be easy to hazard a conjecture, but, as already explained, it would not be possible to account exactly for the position of every individual precept; and unsupported conjectures on small points of detail would only have the effect of obscuring the broad outstanding principles that are obviously true.

[24] Here we may conveniently notice that Deuteronomy contains many commands concerning relatively small details, *e. g.* xxii. 5-12.

have been intended for public use—Lev. xix. It should be noticed that this chapter is specifically addressed to "all the congregation of the children of Israel" (cf. Ex. xii. 3) and that in form it largely recalls the characteristics of poetry.

We do not know enough of the customs and ways of thought of the Mosaic age to deal with these divisions of the subject with as much certainty and detail as the jural laws. Thus in Deuteronomy we find the rule "Thou shalt not sacrifice unto the LORD thy God an ox or a sheep wherein is a blemish, any evil-favouredness" (xvii. 1). We can see that it is thoroughly in accordance with what we know of the nature of Deuteronomy that a broad general principle should be enunciated there, leaving the details for the priestly teaching, but it would be pure guess-work to attempt to assign any reason for its presence in Deuteronomy rather than in Exodus. On the other hand, it will be easy when we have considered the characteristics of the fourth great group of the legislation to see by an example what means were employed by Moses to put forward the rules relating to particular subjects in the form best suited to secure obedience without laying too great a strain on the memory or capacity of the ordinary Israelite.

In examining the fourth group we see that here not less than in the other three cases certain great principles stand out. First, it is here that we must look for what in analytical jurisprudence would be termed occasional (as opposed to general) commands, or commands which are not laws at all. All transitory precepts—commands to do a thing once for all—are naturally omitted from the three covenants. Under this head fall the commands to consecrate a priesthood, to construct the dwelling with its appurtenances, to divide the land. It is clear that nothing would be gained by including such matters in one of the great covenants, while the insertion of what was transitory could only weaken the force and permanent value of those remarkable collec-

tions. But when we subtract the occasional commands, we find that we may conveniently arrange what remains under three heads: (1) regulations internal to the priestly tribe and the sanctuary; (2) sacrificial details, and particularly procedure; (3) matters so technical and complicated that they could not be put before the people without the teaching of some class specially trained for the purpose. These groups overlap. The part to be played by a priest in connection with some sacrifice might be viewed as a matter internal to the priestly tribe, or as a sacrificial detail, or as something too technical to be conveniently embodied in a book that was to be read to all; but that does not make it any the less useful to have some such general principles enunciated.

The first of our three heads causes no difficulty. Such subjects as the internal organisation of the priestly tribe, the national sacrifices commanded in Num. xviii. xxix., the details of the ritual to be observed by the priests would not naturally find a position in any collection intended for popular or judicial use.[25] But the second head brings us to a distinction which is quite unknown to Biblical criticism—the distinction between substantive law and procedure, which may best be made clear by examples. I have a right to the enjoyment of my property — that is substantive law; but if X interferes with that right, the particular steps I may take to obtain legal redress (as by issuing a writ and going through all the necessary subsequent stages of an action) are procedure. So, too, with sacrifice. The Israelite is to offer the first of the first-ripe fruits of his land at the house of the Lord. That is substantive law. But the details of treatment of the first-ripe fruits when presented are mere procedure. Two further points should be noted as being germane to the present discussion. There may often be a great difference between substantive law and procedure from the

[25] This disposes of Dr. Driver's argument from the silence of Deuteronomy as to the distinction between priests and Levites.

point of view of securing obedience. Thus, an Israelite might be tempted not to offer a particular offering; but if he decided to make the offering, he would have no motive for departing from the prescribed procedure.[26] Secondly, he would have very little choice in the matter. The priest would be there to see that he did the right thing. It is very striking that in the sacrificial code contained in Lev. i-vii all the rules about peace-offerings, burnt-offerings and meal-offerings are concerned with procedure. It is assumed that the offerings will be brought, and we are told what, on this assumption, is to be done with them,—how they are to be sacrificed, what dues must be paid and so forth. The basis of all these regulations is to be found in the words "when any man of you bringeth near a *corban* (offering regarded from the point of view of being presented at the religious centre) to the LORD." No information can be gleaned from these chapters as to when any one of the offerings in question was to be brought.[27] In Num. xv. 3ff. we are given rules for the offering of meal-offerings and drink-offerings with certain sacrifices. These rules are from one point of view something more than mere procedure; but it is clear that they have the same ancillary and subordinate character.

[26] We may also take a slightly more complicated example from the jural laws, one which has been the cause of some trouble to the critics. I am to let a purchased Hebrew slave go after six years of service. That is substantive law, and, moreover, law which I may be strongly tempted to evade or resist if opportunity offers, for it involves great loss for me. But assume a different state of affairs. Suppose that I am ready to let my slave go, but that he elects to stay with me for ever under the provisions of Ex. xxi. 5, 6. The steps to be taken under that law are mere procedure. Not only could there be no strong motive for attempting to evade its provisions, but there would be a natural desire on my part to have everything in order, so that I could prove my right to the possession of the slave if any question should subsequently be raised. Hence the observance of the substantive law is earnestly enjoined in Deut. xv. 12-18 (especially verse 18, "It shall not seem hard to thee," etc.), but the details of the procedure are not repeated.

[27] Lev. i. 2. A solitary exception to the generality of this statement should perhaps be made in view of the cakes and wafers of Lev. vii. 12-14, but these may not have been technically meal-offerings, since they do not go wholly to the priest like ordinary meal-offerings. Lev. ii. 3.

It is clear also that the priest would explain to the sacrificant the necessity of observing them and in the last resort compel obedience by refusing the sacrifice.[28] In point of fact the evidence of the other books would tend rather to make us believe that meal-offerings were offered long before the date to which the critics assign D.[29] But before I pass from procedure and similar ancillary matters I must make one remark. Lay sacrifice necessarily involved rules for lay procedure, and accordingly we find in Exodus and Deuteronomy a few very simple regulations which were obviously intended to govern lay practice (*e. g.*, Ex. xx. 24-6). I merely mention this to avoid the possibility of being misunderstood.

In striking contrast to the sacrifices of which we have spoken stand the sin-offering and guilt-offering. The Pentateuch instead of assuming that they will be brought, lays down the occasions on which they are to be brought (*e. g.* Lev. iv.). We have here substantive law as well as procedure. This inevitably suggests that these are new sacrifices which were unknown in Israel before the age of Moses. But they are also extremely technical and detailed, and it is probably for that reason that we find them wholly contained in portions of the Law which would reach the people only through the priests. But be that as it may, Dr. Driver's surprise that they are not mentioned in Deut. xii. is entirely unreasonable. The portion of that chapter to which he

[28] These considerations dispose of Dr. Driver's points with regard to the silence of Deuteronomy as to the sacrificial system and the meal-offering; also of the non-use of *corban* (a technical word which is only applicable to what is specifically brought near to the priest, and which would be thoroughly out of place in a popular collection), and of the general silence as to the theory of atonement by sacrifice. It should also be noticed that Deuteronomy is silent as to *bikkurim*, although they were admittedly older than this legislation. Ex. xxiii. 16, 19, xxxiv. 22, 26.

[29] See Amos iv. 5, v. 22, 25; 1 Ki. viii. 64; 2 Ki. xvi. 13, 15 (in both of which verses the drink-offering also appears, though that is not mentioned in Deuteronomy either); Judges xiii. 19, 23, and cf. note 28, p. —, as to *bikkurim*.

refers is devoted not to a catalogue of existing sacrifices,[30] but to a command that certain sacrifices were to be brought to the religious centre. In the case of the sin-offering and guilt-offering the command was unnecessary, since they could not by any possibility be offered without a priest. An ordinary animal sacrifice could be offered by a layman, at any rate in certain cases, but only a priest could make atonement for sin. The Pentateuch never contemplates any unlawful priesthood, and it never provides any check on the power of the priests, which was consequently abused. Hence —particularly if these were new sacrifices—no danger of their being offered anywhere but at the religious centre could reasonably be foreseen. It is the duty of a legislator to provide for anticipated evils, not to draft regulations which shall look symmetrical on paper.

The last of the three overlapping groups of the priestly legislation consists of technical matters and details. Of these the law of leprosy is an admirable example. It will be seen at a glance that the regulations are far too specialised and complicated to be administered by a chance elder. Again, matters relating to Nazirites, the rules as to jealousy, prohibited degrees of relationship and many other matters were too elaborate and technical to be enforced or even taught without the assistance of a special class. And this leads me to speak of the occasional rules of jural law which are to be found in Lev. xviii-xx. Chapter xviii contains but one verse which may be a jural law (verse 29). The penalty is expressed in the words "shall be cut off from among their people." In view of such passages as xx. 3, "I will cut him off from among his people", it is impossible to say with certainty whether this verse contains a direction to the courts or not. A perusal of the whole chapter shows that the power of the courts is not the force on which reliance is

[30] See note 29, p. —. Moreover, *bikkurim* and *reshith* (first-ripe fruits and first-fruits) are not mentioned here, although they certainly existed. See further Deut. xviii. 4, xxvi. 1-11.

primarily placed to secure obedience to the commandments embodied in it, but it is quite easy to understand how the secondary means of obtaining obedience came to be mentioned in a short exhortation to observe the commands there laid down. In the case of chapter xix. the exceptions to the principles enunciated above are merely formal, not real. In verses 5-8 we find rules relating to peace-offerings, and it is said that if one eat of a peace-offering at all on the third day "that soul shall be cut off from his people." This probably means that the death penalty is to be inflicted, but the context makes it clear that the passage is primarily a rule of sacrifice, and only incidentally a jural law. Similarly verse 20 requires, not that the courts shall take action in a specified case, but that they shall take no action; "they shall not be put to death . . . and he shall bring his guilt-offering." In so far as this is a rule prohibiting the courts from acting, it may be regarded as jural law, but obviously in the main it is a sacrificial law. Chapter xx. also contains some jural laws, but they are mixed up with commands to which no penalty is attached and with laws of God which are to be enforced by such sentences as "they shall die childless." A comparison of the jural laws with the provisions on the same topics contained in Exodus and Deuteronomy admirably illustrates the manner in which Exodus is confined to the tersest possible utterances, and how, where detailed rules were desirable, the priests were, if possible, used for their transmission. The legal contents of this chapter are entirely concerned with offences that stand in special relation to religion;—giving children to Molech, witchcraft, and sexual offences. A glance at the following table will bring out two points that I have endeavoured to emphasize; first, the extreme terseness of the Sinaitic covenant document and its suitability for memorising; and secondly, the tendency to put details that were connected with religion not in one of the covenants, but in portions of the Law that were to be taught by the priests.

Ex. xxi. 17 (a jural law)	5 words.	Lev. xx. 9.....	16 words.
Ex. xx. 14 (command)	2 "	Lev. xx. 10.....	15 "
Ex. xxii. 19(18) (jur. law)	6 "	Lev. xx. 15-16.....	27 "
Ex. xxii. 18(17) (comm'd)	3 "	Lev. xx. 27.....	16 "

With regard to the relation of this chapter to Deuteronomy it should be added that two passages in this chapter (verses 2-5 and 11) have parallels in that book (Deut. xviii. 10 and xxii. 30). In both cases the jural laws are to be found in Lev. xx., and Deuteronomy merely lays down commands which would influence public opinion. Further, some of the other jural laws contained in this chapter are directed against crimes that are also dealt with in the curses of Deuteronomy. The other offences mentioned are also kindred to those denounced in Deuteronomy and Exodus. So that altogether when this chapter is carefully examined, it affords an interesting illustration of what has already been said, viz:—that principles and matters intended to influence public opinion are found in one or other of the two covenants, while religious details are dealt with by the priestly teaching.

It will now be obvious why there is no occasion in Deuteronomy to mention the distinction between priests and Levites, and why it is not to this book that we must look for sacrificial details. One point, however, calls for special notice. Dr. Driver has obviously been struck by the fact that the Day of Atonement is not mentioned in Deuteronomy. I believe that the views held by the critics have in this instance been coloured very largely by their knowledge of modern Judaism. At present the Jewish year does culminate in the Day of Atonement; indeed, (and this curiously illustrates a point that I wish to make) that institution has such a grip of the Jew that it is the last observance that he throws off. The great Fast is kept by many a man who habitually neglects sabbaths, festivals, dietary laws, and all the other Jewish observances. But we must not allow ourselves to think that therefore it should be dwelt on repeatedly in the Pentateuch. On the contrary there was every reason

why it should be passed over lightly. It laid no particular strain on the people and required no great sacrifice of time, labour or property. It occurred only once a year; it was therefore not so likely to be broken as the weekly Sabbath. It called for no migration from home; and hence it was not as burdensome as any one of the three festivals. It involved no loss of property; and it was consequently far less onerous than the law of firstlings. Where, indeed, was the temptation to break it? To this must be added two further remarks. It is true that the Israelite was to rest and afflict his soul on that day; but it is noteworthy that he is not required to take other action of any kind either by bringing a sacrifice or by offering some special prayer or by making a pilgrimage. No doubt in Lev. xxiii. 27 we find the words "ye shall offer an offering made by fire unto the LORD," but the reference here would seem to be not to any offerings of individual Israelites, but to the public or general offering ordained in Num. xxix. 8. On the other hand a glance at Lev. xvi. shows that that chapter contains elaborate directions as to the ceremonial to be observed at the religious centre. Important as the Day of Atonement undoubtedly was, it is clear that it could not originally have played any great part in the life of the individual or required much from him. The other remark I wish to make goes to the root of many observations of the critics. They have assumed that Deut. xvi. contains a calendar.[81] Even on their

[81] Cf. Mr. Carpenter in the *Oxford Hexateuch* I, pp. 53-4, "The calendar of the annual feasts is repeated no less than four times. It is ordained in nearly parallel terms in the two collections of Covenant-words Ex. xxiii and xxxiv. It is enjoined with rich hortatory additions in Deut. xvi. It is elaborately expounded in Lev. xxiii, where two new items of high significance are added to the list."

With regard to Ex. xxxiv it will be seen that on the renewal of the covenant which had been avoided by the worship of the golden calf, certain ordinances of the Sinaitic covenant were recapitulated. The point to notice is that jural laws which would be enforced by the courts, and the Decalogue, which had been spoken by God, are omitted, while stress is laid on what may be called religious precepts in a narrow sense. So far as can be judged, it would seem that some of these were par-

own theories this is manifestly untrue, because no mention is made of either Sabbaths or New Moons in that chapter. Hence it would be impossible to draw any conclusion from the fact that the Day of Atonement is not mentioned. But an examination of the chapter shows that it is mainly directed to insuring three annual pilgrimages to the religious capital on the three great Festivals and to giving the necessary incidental directions, so that any mention of an occasion on which the Israelite was not to make a pilgrimage or bring an offering would be utterly out of place.[32]

In conclusion we may illustrate the practical application of what has been said by examining the distribution of the provisions relating to firstlings. First, the great historical event of the slaying of the first-born and consequent deliverance from Egypt is made the occasion of a command to the people to sacrifice all firstlings (Ex. xiii. 1ff.). It requires no great imagination to realise the effect of this appeal to the gratitude and the historical consciousness of the people. Then, when the people have proved false to their covenant with God, advantage is taken of the renewal of the compact to impress upon them the obligation once more (Ex. xxxiv. 19ff.). In the law of redemption we naturally find some provisions about the redemption of firstlings (Lev. xxvii. 26-7), and in Numbers we meet with enactments regulating the due payable to the priests (Num. v. 9-10), and its subsequent disposition (Num. xviii. 15-18). Lastly in the great popular book of Deuteronomy, which on the eve of the entry into Canaan lays stress on the law of the religious capital, we find commands to sacrifice the firstlings there and not

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ticularly burdensome—like the law of firstlings, the Sabbath and the pilgrimage Festivals—while there must have existed very considerable danger of others being broken owing to the circumstances of the age and the disposition of the people—*e. g.* the prohibition of idolatrous worship.

[32] With regard to Dr. Driver's argument as to the non-mention of the Tent of Meeting, I would point out that it was a Tent and not designed to be permanent, so that it would not naturally find a place in Deuteronomy by the side of the Ark and the priesthood.

locally (Deut. xii., xv. 19ff.).[33] It would be easy, did space permit, to take other examples and work them out similarly.

It may seem to some that I have wandered unnecessarily far from the subject with which I started, or, at any rate, that I have chosen the longest road. In such a criticism there would be a measure of truth; but yet it would be only a measure. It is impossible to read the works of the higher critics without seeing that most of their case rests on their exhaustive ignorance of legal matters. It is submitted that the true way of dispelling that ignorance is by bringing legal training and legal knowledge to bear on the manifold problems of the Mosaic legislation.

[33] See the *Churchman* for July, 1906, pp. 427-430.

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GERMAN INFLUENCE ON RELIGIOUS LIFE AND THOUGHT IN AMERICA DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD.

PART II.

The channels of intellectual intercourse between Germany and England during the eighteenth century have not been traced, as yet, with any great degree of thoroughness. Nevertheless enough facts have been brought to light[85] to show pretty clearly the path which German religious influence followed on its way to England. Like most other influences it came in the wake of commerce. While German traders were fixed in England from remote antiquity,[86] yet it was not until 1673 that a separate church, "little Trinity," was assigned to members of the Hanse corporation who was settled at their factory, known as the "Steelyard." From this time forward the German colony in London has enjoyed a service in its own language. To the bond of commercial intercourse must be added the influence flowing from dynastic alliances. The husband of Queen Anne, Prince George of Denmark, was a Lutheran, and it was during her reign that efforts were made to induce dissenters on the continent to found colonies on English territory in the New World. The first German settlement in America, that of the Mennonites at Germantown in 1683, was the direct result of Penn's visit to the continent. From Queen Anne's time forward, London became a colonizing center through which hundreds of German emigrants passed on

[85] Charles H. Herford's *Studies in the Literary Relations of England and Germany in the Sixteenth Century*, Cambridge (Eng.) 1886, has not been duplicated for the seventeenth and eighteenth. To the honor of American scholarship be it said that much light has been shed on the intellectual relations of Germany and England in Prof. Learned's *Americana Germanica* 1897 on.

[86] Cf. Mark Pattison *Essays*, Vol. I, pp. 41-50.

their way to America. Furthermore, the four Georges, as Kings of Hanover, were likewise members of the Lutheran Church. This fact not only brought the German and English churches in closer touch, but at the same time lent to the Lutheran Church in London whatever benefit the prestige of royal favor could confer. Signs of a mutual religious interest between the two countries are not slow in developing.

One of the most active of the Lutheran Court chaplains in London was Anton Wilhelm Boehm[87] (1673-1722), who studied in Halle in 1693 and seven years later became a "table-inspector" at Francke's Orphan-House. In 1701 Boehm went to England as a tutor and in 1705 was appointed Court Preacher to Prince George. This position he held until his death in 1722. It was through Boehm's intercession that Queen Anne provided a home in America for the exiled Palatinates and also endowed a free table in Francke's Orphan-House. But more important for the spread of German influence was Boehm's activity as a writer and translator. He not only produced many discourses and tracts in English which were distributed by the "Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge", but he translated from the German the *Reports* of the Orphan-House and other institutions at Halle, together with several of Francke's sermons. He published further a Latin as well as an English translation of Johann Arndt's *Wahres Christenthum* and added later an English translation of the same author's *Paradies-Gärtlein,* a book of prayers and rhymed petitions for private use. Eager also to be of service to his own fellow countrymen, he turned into German, Hopkin's doctrine of the second birth, Cudworth's treatise on the *Living Knowledge of God* and some of Barrow's sermons. The fact of Boehm's connection with the S. P. C. K. and that some of his translations are mentioned in the journals of both Wesley and Whitefield make it highly probable that his

[87] Cf. Jöchers *Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexikon,* I, p. 1169, and H. E. Jacobs, *Lutheran Church,* p. 143.

efforts to spread a more evangelical and practical type of religion were well known to the Oxford Methodists. His work thus becomes a factor in preparing the way for the rise of Wesleyanism. It was through Boehm also that that ancient American worthy, Cotton Mather, was brought into correspondence with A. H. Francke in Halle, thus forming the first connecting link between American Christianity and the "Pietas Hallensis". In tracing Boehm's influence in England, it will be necessary to dwell a little on one of his translations: Arndt's *True Christianity,* a book highly prized by George Whitefield.

Johann Arndt (1555-1621),[88] as the inscription on his tombstone in Celle tells us, was a "lover of the sincere Christianity of the heart". His pastoral activity fell in the period immediately preceding the Thirty Years' War, a time when the real issues of the Reformation were rapidly sinking out of sight and the dead orthodoxy of the letter was setting in. In his *Wahres Christenthum* he elucidates his idea of true Christianity, as religion founded on Scripture and developed in the individual through spiritual illumination and experience, through prayer, through the practice of Godliness, through following Christ's example and through a cordial love to God and one's neighbor. This book thus aimed to present Christianity in its totality. It insists on the mystical union of the soul with God, and at the same time shows the necessity of good works as a means of Christian growth. His work stood alone in its day as a protest against the one-sided doctrinaire separation of faith and living, of justification and sanctification, of religious knowing on the one hand and religious feeling and willing on the other. Although Arndt's lack of logical precision and his free use of such mystics as Thomas à Kempis, Tauler, Staupitz and Weigel led him into some disputes during his own lifetime, and after his death made his works subjects of constant criticism even down to the beginning

[88] Cf. *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie,* I, 548, and an article by Tholuck in Herzog's *Reallexikon,* I, 536.

of the eighteenth century, nevertheless no book has contributed so much to the preservation of that gentle, introspective, practical type of Christianity among the German people as Arndt's *Wahres Christenthum*. It has been reprinted almost every year down to the present, and in the extent of its influence easily stands first among German books of a devotional character.

That such a book would naturally find favor among the Pietists is easily foreseen. Both Spener and Francke were zealous followers of Arndt's teachings. The former delivered a series of sermons with Arndt's *Wahres Christenthum* as the text, and often declared that, next to the Bible and Luther's works, no book had so high a religious value as Arndt's *True Christianity*. That Boehm with his Pietistic training, attempting to enkindle religious enthusiasm and missionary zeal in rationalistic England, should want to translate it was likewise most natural, and finally that a book of this character with its mystical elements and practical suggestions should prove the very food for such men as Whitefield is not surprising. On his first journey to America the great revivalist tells us:[39] "I went between decks and sat down on the ground and read Arndt's *True Christianity*." Two months later he writes[40] more emphatically: "He (Captain M.) has read Arndt's *True Christianity* and is now reading Law's *Christian Perfection*, books worth their weight in gold, and which God has blessed to the conversion of many." In the record of his disbursements[41] while in Georgia we find a sum paid out for Arndt's *True Christianity* and Law's *Serious Call* and *Christian Perfection*. And it is worthy of note in passing that Arndt's work was popular enough among the Germans in Pennsylvania to warrant Franklin in publishing a German *edition de luxe* of this book in 1751.[42]

[39] Whitefield's *Journal*, Friday, Jan. 6th, 1738.

[40] *Ibid.* Sunday, March 26th, 1738.

[41] Tyerman, *Whitefield*, I, 107.

[42] Cf. Ludwig Viereck: *Zweijahrhunderte Deutschen Unterrichts in den Vereinigten Staaten*. Braunschweig, 1903, p. 9.

The second name Whitefield linked with Arndt's in the notice just quoted brings us to another current of German influence which directly affected both the Wesleys and Whitefield. William Law[43] (1686-1761) presents the remarkable spectacle of a mystic in a rationalistic age. Contrary to the conviction of most of his deistic contemporaries, Law believed in the impotence of human reason. He was, accordingly, a most thorough-going opponent of the dominant rationalism emanating from Locke, which in his view could lead only to infidelity. But in seeking an authority upon which to rest his faith, Law, although a high churchman, did not appeal to the church but to the "inner light." From the notices which his friend, John Byrom, the poet, has left us, it is clear that Law was acquainted with à Kempis, Tauler, Ruysbroek, and other mystical writers in the *Theologia Germanica.*[44] But in his early works, *Christian Perfection* (1726) and *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life* (1728), his aim is rather to emphasize the practical side of divinity. While the mystical element is present, it is not unduly prominent. From about 1734 on, a very pronounced mysticism is the dominant characteristic in his writings. Through Dr. George Cheyne, the celebrated London physician, he was introduced to the works of the famous Görlitzcobbler and mystic, Jacob Boehme. And as Law himself tells us, "he learnt high Dutch" in order to study the original words of the "blessed Jacob." It would be going too far to assert that Law was a disciple of Boehme, but that he adopted many ideas from that eccentric mystic is certain. It was this tendency to carry his mysticism to an extreme which ultimately alienated Wesley[45] from him. Nevertheless his *Christian Perfection* and *Serious Call* are powerful books. His style is clear, vivid

[43] Cf. Canon Overton, *William Law Non-juror and Mystic*, London, 1881. Also *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. XXXII.

[44] According to Tyerman, *Wesley*, II, 302, Law translated also the *Visions* of Hiel and Englebretel.

[45] Cf. Tyerman, *Whitefield*, II, 377, and Tyerman, *Wesley*, I, 399.

and pungent, and his controversial power was considered superior to that of any of his contemporaries except Bentley. Gibbon, the historian, to whom Law had acted as tutor, speaks of his *Serious Call* with the highest respect, and Samuel Johnson, who, like most of his contemporaries, was disposed to regard religious enthusiasm as the sign of a weak intellect, tells us that his religious convictions were due to a perusal of this same book.

In July 1732 John Wesley paid a visit to Law who was then at Putney, and a friendship began which lasted for several years. Immediately afterward we find Wesley[46] reading the *Theologia Germanica* and other mystic writings. That the effect of these mystic studies was soon apparent and its kinship with German Pietism at least suspected, is clear from an article in Fogg's[47] *Weekly Journal* (Dec. 1732) written in opposition to the Oxford Methodists: "These Methodists pretend to great refinements as well as to what regards the speculative as the practical part of religion and have a very near affinity to the Essenes among the Jews and the Pietists in Switzerland." The very next year Wesley composed two sermons[48] on a doctrine which in England, had been well-nigh forgotten—the absolute need of the influence of the Holy Ghost to convert the soul. And it was on Law's advice, too, that Wesley decided to go as missionary to Georgia in 1735. Whitefield also had been influenced by Law's two books.[49] Before he went to Oxford (1732) he had met with the *Serious Call* but had not money to purchase it. While at Pembroke College he did secure a copy and tells us: "God worked powerfully upon my soul, as He has since upon many others by that and his other excellent treatise upon *Christian Perfection.*

One of Wesley's biographers, Tyerman, has expressed a doubt whether Law's influence on Wesley was not rather

[46] Tyerman, *Wesley,* I, 83.
[47] *Ibid.* I, 85.
[48] Tyerman, *Wesley,* I, 88.
[49] Tyerman, *Whitefield,* I, 16, 59, 281.

detrimental than beneficial. In his view, the mysticism to which Wesley was introduced only tended to confuse a mind which at this period was not at all clear in regard to its own religious convictions or to its own mission. In proof of this Tyerman cites the fact that Wesley later felt compelled to break with Law,[50] when the latter was yielding more and more to the fantastic teachings of Jacob Boehme. That there is a certain degree of truth in this view, may be readily granted, and yet the fact must not be overlooked that such books as those of Arndt and Law, with all their tendency to mysticism, contained important truths, and truths to which English deistic Christianity was a stranger. They emphasized the subjective side of religion, they kept alive the idea that it was possible for the individual soul to come into direct communion with the divine, they inculcated the doctrine that the human soul was to grow in grace and holiness by the practice of good works. Overlaid, as they were, with much that was obscure and confusing, the ideas of conversion and regeneration were nevertheless kept alive until the time was ripe for their fruition. It was German mysticism which had never let these ideas go, it was German Pietism and Moravianism which had first revived and cultivated them, and it was directly under German influence that both Wesley and Whitefield assimilated these doctrines and made them the means for the revitalization of the Christian religion.

The first recorded direct contact of the Wesleys with the Moravians was on the memorable trip to Georgia between Oct. 14, 1735, and Feb. 5, 1736.[51] John Wesley was going out as chaplain to the colony and missionary to the Indians, Charles as secretary to Governor Oglethorpe. On board of the same vessel was David Nitschmann, the Moravian bishop, accompanied by some twenty-six of the Brethren. Two days after embarking John Wesley set himself to learn German, translated several hymns from that language

[50] Tyerman, *Wesley*, II, 266.

[51] Tyerman, *Wesley*, I, 119ff.; Winchester, *Wesley*, 41ff.

during the voyage and, on settling in Savannah, was able to minister in their native tongue to the German congregations near that city. Now, it must be remembered that, when Wesley started on this voyage, he was far from having attained peace of mind and settled religious convictions. As he tells us himself: "his chief motive [in going to Georgia] is the hope of saving his soul and the belief: 'that he cannot hope to attain the same degree of holiness here [in England] which he may there.'" Although he had strenuously fasted and prayed, had ministered to the forsaken and the outcast and had given most of his income to feed the poor, yet he was not convinced that he had been really converted and that his soul was saved. As his most recent biographer Winchester has well said: "What John Wesley still lacked was a subjective experience," the calm assurance that his soul rested in God. While his experience in Georgia was to prove a bitter disappointment and he was not to attain peace of mind, for some years to come, yet it was undoubtedly the example and teaching of these Moravians that convinced him of the possibility of an assured religious experience to which he was a stranger. Their calm and simple demeanor in worship, their complete self-possession and reliance on God during the raging storm, the very questions which August Gottlieb Spangenberg,[52] the famous missionary, put to him on his arrival: "Have you the witness within yourself? Does the Spirit of God bear witness with your spirit that you are a child of God? Do you know Jesus Christ? etc.," all convinced Wesley that there was something in religion which he did not possess and did not understand. And it took him more than two years to grasp the meaning of the new doctrines, for on his return to England, he writes: "By the most infallible of proofs, inward feeling, I am convinced of unbelief, having no such faith as will prevent my heart from being troubled, etc."[53]

[52] Another of Francke's pupils at Halle.

[53] Tyerman, *Wesley*, I, 167.

It was Charles Wesley[54] who first put Francke's treatise against *The Fear of Man*[55] into the hands of George Whitefield, at that time (1734) a student at Oxford. In his own *Short Account of God's Dealings with him from his Infancy to the time of his entering Holy Orders* Whitefield writes:[56] "For some considerable time, I had followed the example of Professor Francke and whenever I wanted any worldly assistance pleaded the Scripture promises for the things of this life, as well as that which is to come, in the name of Jesus Christ." This notice shows that Francke's writings were known to the Oxford Methodists quite early. But it was not until 1737 that the connection with the Moravians became intimate. In this year Charles Wesley, who had returned from Georgia, was introduced in London to Zinzendorf, just arrived from Germany, and had promised to call on the zealous but eccentric count every day. At Zinzendorf's Charles Wesley had met with Bishop Nitschmann and had attended a Moravian service. The impression German singing made upon him may be gathered from the remark "he thought himself in a choir of angels,"[57] And on Dec. 28, 1737, just a week before embarking for America, Whitefield and his friends had a prayer meeting at the house of James Hutton, the Moravian.[58] While in Georgia, the influence of the Pietists upon Whitefield becomes more apparent. "The condition of affairs in Georgia," he writes, "gave me an ocular demonstration of the great necessity of an orphan-house, which I now determined to set about in earnest. The Saltzburghers at Ebenezer had one and having heard and read of what Professor Francke had done in that way in Germany, I confidently hoped that something of the like nature might succeed in

[54] Tyerman, *Whitefield*, I, 16-17.

[55] Translated by Boehm according to Jöcher. In 1739 Wesley abridged this work under the title *"Nicodemus; or, a Treatise on the Fear of Man,"* and published it in Bristol. Tyerman, *Wesley*, I, 289.

[56] Tyerman, *Whitefield*, I, 36.

[57] Tyerman, *Whitefield*, I, 89.

[58] *Ibid.* I, 109. Hutton was afterwards Whitefield's publisher.

Georgia."[59] Furthermore Whitefield contracted an intimacy "with the worthy ministers of Ebenezer, Messrs. Grenaw (Grünau) and Boltzius" and their influence on his religious views is at once apparent. For on his return voyage to England (Oct. 2, 1738) he writes a letter to the Inhabitants of Savannah[60] in which he strongly insists on the "new birth in Christ Jesus—that ineffable change which must pass upon our heart before we can see God." 'The author of this blessed change,' he writes, "is the Holy Ghost, and the means to attain this Holy Spirit, you know and the way you know." Regeneration was always the chief theme of Whitefield's preaching; and we see this old doctrine revived in Whitefield here as it had been in Wesley after his interviews with Law and his reading of the *Theologia Germanica*. Nevertheless, neither Wesley nor Whitefield were to feel the full force of German influence until the following winter (1738-1739).

John Wesley returned from Georgia to England in February 1738. Whitefield, after his four months' sojourn, did not arrive in London until December 8, of the same year. During Whitefield's absence the two Wesley's had come into intimate relationship with the Moravians and had found peace with God through faith in Christ. When John Wesley came back to England he still believed himself unconverted.[61] "I have faith—a sort of faith," he writes,—"so have the devils—but still they are strangers to the covenants of promise." He still yearned for an inner exper-

[59] Gillie's *Life of Whitefield*, quoted by Tyerman, I, 142, 358, 392. If further proof of the connection between Whitefield's Orphan-School and the "Pietas Hallensis" be thought necessary, consult Tyerman, *Whitefield*, I, 309, 441, 443, 490; II, 20, 44, and 583.

In 1727 the publication of Boehm's account of the Halle Orphan-House, in Edinburgh, led to the establishment of an orphan-house there. Whitefield in collecting funds in Edinburgh in 1742 constantly refers to Francke in his printed appeal. See Kuno Francke, *Americana Germanica*, Vol. I, Art. 4.

[60] Tyerman, *Whitefield*, I, 143.

[61] Cf. Winchester, *Wesley*, pp. 53-70, and Tyerman, *Wesley*, I, 178ff., for an account of the Moravian influence.

ience, for a "faith which none can have without knowing that he hath it." The writings of the German mystics, which he had been reading during the last three years, and the example of the Moravians whose acquaintance he had made during his Georgia mission aroused his desire for their temper of calm assurance and contemplation. As Winchester concludes:[62] "It was an emotional experience he craved, a calmness and elevation of feeling rather than any mere intellectual conviction."

It was on February 7th that Wesley first met the man to whose influence he always ascribed his emergence from doubt and despondency. The young Moravian, Peter Böhler,[63] who had been sent by Zinzendorf as a missionary to the Carolinas, stopped on his way in London. He remained in England until May 4th and Wesley embraced every opportunity of sitting at the feet of the Godly German. What Böhler had to teach was a very old doctrine, but it was new to the London Moravians; and came as a "New Gospel" to Wesley as it did shortly afterwards to Whitefield. His teaching was simply justification by faith—faith which consisted not merely in an intellectual assent but in an experience also, a confident personal reliance upon divine goodness. Böhler further argued that true faith in Christ is inseparably connected with dominion over sin and constant peace arising from the sense of forgiveness; and that if this assurance is not present there is no real faith, for this assurance according to Böhler's view is the faith. Such a state of direct reliance on God, Böhler further taught, was not the result of good works, past, present, or to come, but was the immediate gift of God, given instantaneously; it was not the result of growth, it was a bestowment. And when Wesley did not at once accept but wished to investigate, Böhler's method of

[62] Page 54.

[63] Böhler was subsequently active in the Carolinas preaching in both German and English. He was also one of the founders of the Moravian school at Nazareth, Pa. Cf. J. T. Hamilton, *A History of the Moravian Church in the United States*, pp. 440-451, and Tyerman, *Whitefield*, I, 379, 382.

proof was wholly in keeping with this subjective conception of real religion. For he not only appealed to Scripture but he brought many living witnesses, who should bear testimony to the faith that was in them. And when finally Wesley did not appear to be entirely persuaded, Böhler counselled him to "preach faith" until he attained it. Wesley arduously followed this advice. By May 24, 1738, he believed that he had gained the sense of assurance. At any rate he was a changed man. The moody and disconsolate John Wesley of Georgia had become the confident and energetic English evangelist.

Wesley's three months' visit to Herrnhut, this same year, not only served to broaden and deepen his conception of personal religion and to strengthen the Moravian influence over him but put into his hands also the most effective instrument for rendering this new conception of religion effective. Church societies had existed for more than fifty years in England and both at Oxford and in Georgia Wesley had encouraged the union of religious persons in groups for mutual counsel and encouragement. But in May 1738, at Peter Böhler's suggestion, a little society of a somewhat different character was formed. This Moravian society, meeting in Fetter Lane, was destined to exert a very important influence on the future organization of Methodism. The conditions of membership, the plan of dividing its members into "bands" of not less than five or more than ten, each band meeting by itself twice a week and all together on Wednesday evening, its monthly love-feast, its insistence that the members should have no secrets from one another, even in personal matters, all these features were patterned closely after the Moravian usage at Herrnhut. While Wesley was soon to part company with the Moravians and the Methodist "classes" properly speaking were first formed in order to raise money for the support of the societies, nevertheless it was not long before they adopted all the essential points in the set of rules [64] which Wesley

[64] Tyerman, *Wesley*, I, 403.

had drawn up for the Moravian Society in Fetter Lane. It was in these class meetings that Wesley's class-leaders and lay-preachers were developed. It was here, too, that full emphasis could be laid on personal experience in religion. These classes likewise furnished convenient units for perfecting a strongly centralized organization; and at their meetings the gift of sacred song was earnestly cultivated, giving a wide acceptance to the new hymnody.

The very day George Whitefield returned to London from his first visit to America, Sunday, Dec. 8, 1738, he attended a love-feast[65] in Fetter Lane and was somewhat surprised to find both the Moravians and the Wesleys preaching salvation by an act of faith in Jesus Christ without regard to works, a doctrine new to Whitefield. But by Jan. 8, 1739, he had apparently embraced this same doctrine, for in his journal for this date we read: "Though I sat up all night yet God carried me through the work of the day with about an hour's sleep. Expounded in the evening and confuted a virulent opposer of the *doctrine of the new birth* and *justification by faith only.*" And up to the very time of his second embarkation for America, Whitefield lost no opportunity, when in London, of assisting in the services of the Moravians. He was really, if not nominally, one of the brotherhood. After such a winter of emotional experience we can readily understand why the good Dr. Doddridge in London, as well as the sage Jonathan Edwards in America, felt duty bound to warn Whitefield against the danger of delusion in trusting too much to religious "impressions."

The subsequent break of both Wesley[66] and Whitefield[67] with the Moravians need not delay us long. Some members of the Fetter Lane Society yielded more and more to quietistic tendencies. The insistence on the opinion that

[65] Tyerman, *Whitefield*, I, 148, 150. For other reference to these meetings with nights spent in fasting and prayer, accompanied by marvelous outpourings of the spirit, see further pp. 155, 156, 162, 172, 214 and 216.

[66] Tyerman, *Wesley*, I, 309, 336.

[67] *Ibid.*, 311.

there are no degrees of faith and that the way to obtain it was not to use the means of grace, but to wait for Christ and be still opened a wide door for the entrance of Antinomian[68] views as well as practices. Wesley, whose strength lay in his practical talent for organization, felt compelled to form societies of his own. Nevertheless, he never entertained any feelings of bitterness toward his former friends, and was always willing to acknowledge his indebtedness to their teachings. As late as 1742 we find him reading Jacob Boehme's[69] *Exposition of Genesis,* and in 1744 he published *An Extract of Count Zinzendorf's Discourses on the Redemption of Man by the Death in Christ.*[70] But the point we wish to emphasize here is that the conception of personal or "experimental" religion emphasized so persistently by both Wesley and Whitefield, the doctrine that conversion and regeneration were the work of the Holy Spirit, the doctrine of justification by faith, and that the convert should be able to give a satisfactory account of his own religious experience, they learned first from the German mystics, Pietists and Moravians. Furthermore, the models for their philanthropic enterprises, for the very organization which Wesley, at least, found the most effective for the propagation of Methodism, had already been perfected in Germany. These were the essential doctrines and means by which the new type of evangelical Christianity was to be spread abroad. These were the transforming forces which revitalized religion and fixed the character of Protestant Christianity for a century to come. Through George Whitefield chiefly, this new religious power was transmitted to the American people. Though he was no logical reasoner and was wont to carry his emotionalism to extremes, nevertheless, when harnessed by the profound teachings of Edwards it was this same religious emotional power which made Christianity the dominant force in American culture for a

[68] *Ibid.*, I, 481, II, 58, 96.
[69] Tyerman, *Wesley*, I, 396.
[70] *Ibid.*, I, 467.

full century to come. Individualistic this religious force undoubtedly was, at times individualistic to the point of eccentricity and fanaticism, but on the whole it was an individualism leavened by a profound consciousness of the divine in the human soul, an individualism tempered by the vivid sense of personal moral responsibility. In the days of political conflict and governmental experiment it was this individualistic, evangelical Christianity, as much certainly as any other factor, which taught the American people self-restraint and moral sanity, and kept the nation secure amid every political storm. And we members of a later generation, whether we still believe with the rationalistic Calvinists that the most profound psychology and metaphysics of the human mind but confirm the teachings of Christ and the doctrines of St. Paul, whether with the less profound but more practical Arminians we reject the doctrines of election, perseverance of the saints and reprobation, preach the need of conversion and plead alone the atoning blood of Christ as sufficient for all men, or whether with those like Matthew Arnold we believe that religious dogmas undergo a historical development and emphasize a national church organization and aesthetic form as the sheet anchor of religion, we cannot simply as Americans refuse to acknowledge the debt which American Christianity and American civilization owes to German Pietism, to German Moravianism, nay to German mysticism itself.

But the preaching of George Whitefield, though by far the most important, was not the only channel through which German religious influence reached America. Before either the Saltzburger Pietists or the Moravians turned their faces toward the New World the "Pietas Hallensis" was known in America and had been the occasion of at least one publication. In a former paragraph we dwelt upon A. W. Boehm and his services in spreading in England a knowledge of A. H. Francke's institutions at Halle. Through this same Lutheran chaplain, Cotton Mather, between the years 1709 and 1724, was enabled to carry on in Latin a correspondence

with Francke.[71] The first notice concerning it occurs in Mather's diary Dec. 9, 1709: " . . . I represent ye method of piety proposed in these Essays(*i. e.,* Mather's *The Heavenly Conversation* and *Dust and Ashes*) as being ye new American pietism. I shall also endeavor to send these things unto Dr. Franckius, in Saxony." On March 12, 13, 25 and Nov. 10, 1711, Mather mentions some of his tracts and "a present of Gold amounting to the value of four or five pounds to be sent as far as ye Lower Saxony, for ye use of ye University and ye Orphan-house there." By April 7, 1711, Mather had evidently received some answer, probably from Boehm in London, for he writes: "Having received a collection of good and great things doing of later years in Germany, I think I may not only glorify God, in ye praises of his people, but also animate ye like things among ourselves to publish it unto ye country." In Dec. 1714 Mather received a letter[72] written in Latin direct from Francke acknowledging the receipt of money and books "so unexpectedly sent to our Orphan-house from the remote Parts of the West Indies," etc. Francke continues with a detailed description of the various institutions established at Halle and of the methods pursued in maintaining them. This letter of Francke's furnished the inspiration and the materials for Mather's *Nuncia Bona e Terrâ longinqua,*[73] which is in "substance a recapitulation of Francke's account interspersed with sympathetic reflections and moral exhorta-

[71] For this correspondence as far as it has been preserved and notes from Mather's *Diary* concerning it, cf. Kuno Francke, *Cotton Mather and August Hermann Francke. Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature,* Vol. V, 1896; and for *"Further Documents concerning Cotton Mather and August Hermann Francke* (by the same editor), *Americana Germanica,* Vol. I, 1897. Here is likewise to be found a reprint of Mather's *Nuncia Bona e Terrâ longinqua.*

[72] This letter in an English translation was published by Boehm in his English *Pietas Hallensis,* Part III, London, 1716. Cf. Kuno Francke, above.

[73] The complete title runs: *Nuncia Bona E Terrâ longinquâ. A brief Account of some Good and Great Things Adoing for the Kingdom of God in the Midst of Europe.* Boston. Samuel Gerrish, 1715.

tions."[74] Mather's impression of Francke and his work may be gathered from some of his remarks: "Dr. Franckius is a person truly wonderful for his vast Erudition, but much more so for his most shining Piety; and yet more so for his most peerless Industry; and most of all so, for the Astonishing Blessing of God upon his undertakings to advance His Kingdom in the World" . . . "Of this Great Man, who lies forever in the Lowest Humility, and will know nothing but Self-abasements, a Gentleman (probably Boehm) writes me this brief and just Account: 'Professor Franck is the Wonder of Europe for the vast Projects he has laid for religion and Learning, and his success in Executing of them. Whoever considers what he has done in the compass of about Thirty years past, would compute it to be the Labour of One hundred and Fifty years, under a Succession of as able men as himself, etc.'" On Oct. 2, 1715, Mather writes again to Boehm and sends some of his little treatises, "engines of piety," as he calls them, with the added injunction to send them as fast and far as he can, even to "ye Malabarian Missionaries."

In the notice of April 27, 1716, we meet with a book already mentioned among Boehm's translations: "I will make a present unto our poor College (Harvard) of certain Books that are of great improvement and influence in ye famous Frederician University (Halle) and of a Tendency to correct ye present wretched methods of education there; as ye works of Arndt (*De vero Christianismo*) and Franckius and Langins (Joachim Lange) and Boehm (Edition of *Pietas Hallensis*). On June 6, 1716, Mather rejoices to learn that his *Magnalia Christi Americani* has fallen into Boehm's hands; he verily believes "ye American puritanism to be so much of a piece with ye Frederician pietism, that if it were possible for ye book to be transferred unto our Friends in ye Lower Saxony, it would be . . . a little serviceable to their religious Institutions." And finally, on Oct. 25, 1718, a name is mentioned by Mather which is held

[74] Kuno Francke, *ibid.*

in reverence by all Princeton men. "For my Remittance to ye Orphan-house at Glaucha, I gathered eight pounds of our money for which Mr. Belcher generously furnishes me with a Bill of Ten pounds Sterling." In all probability this was the same Jonathan Belcher who in 1730 became governor of Massachusetts and afterwards of New Jersey. If this identification be correct, then one of the first benefactors and patrons of the College of New Jersey had likewise been a benefactor to Francke's Pietas Hallensis and had some knowledge of that famous institution long before Princeton College was founded as a seat of evangelical Christianity. While this correspondence of Cotton Mather with one of the founders of German Pietism contains, as Kuno Francke observes, "the earliest expression of sustained interest on the part of Americans in German affairs," yet a direct permanent result cannot be traced. However much Mather sympathized with this type of Christianity and its missionary efforts, nevertheless he stood in opposition to the prevailing religious tendency in New England, and it is questionable whether Puritanism in its dominant form, and Pietism were so closely akin as Mather thought. Nevertheless it was an earnest of what was to come a decade or more later, and is a sign that the times were growing ripe in America for a revival of practical religion.[75]

Another point of contact between German Pietism and American Presbyterianism before the Great Awakening was more productive of results. This was the relation which existed between Gilbert Tennent, then pastor in New Brunswick, and Theodore Jacobus Frelinghuysen, Dutch Reformed Pastor at Raritan. Leonard Woolsey Bacon[76] has gone so far as to assert that the latter "by the fervor of his preaching was to win the signal glory of bringing in the Great Awakening." Whether this state-

[75] The correspondence was carried on by the sons of the two men mentioned, Samuel Mather and Gotthilf A. Francke. In 1733 the former published in Boston a *Vita B. Augusti Hermanni Franckii*, the manuscript of which had been sent to the younger Francke.

[76] *History of American Christianity*, pp. 81 and 141.

ment be literally true or not, there can be little doubt that the Dutch Calvinist exerted a decided influence upon Gilbert Tennent. Frelinghuysen[77] had come from Holland to America in 1720. In his native land he had come under the influence of Pietism, which had spread from Germany to the Dutch Reformed Church. The chief points in his preaching were his clear and discriminating views in regard to the nature and necessity of the religion of the heart. He treated of the nature of personal conversion, he earnestly advocated the doctrines of regeneration, repentance, faith and holiness, and by his life showed that he had experienced real religion. He firmly and earnestly insisted on the necessity of regeneration to a profitable participation in the Lord's Supper, and in every instance before acknowledging any one to be a Christian required a consistent account of his or her religious experience. In his view conviction of sin and a sense of guilt always preceded faith and comfort in Christ. Now this was not only, for the most part, identical with what Wesley and Whitefield were later to imbibe from the Moravians and Pietists, but it was all in striking contrast to what the people of New Jersey had been accustomed to hear. That Frelinghuysen met with opposition is not surprising. He was spoken against[78] in high places and was called an enthusiast because he insisted on the necessity of a change of heart. But though, like Edwards, Frelinghuysen got into disputes, he none the less persisted in his course.

Gilbert Tennent became pastor of the Presbyterian

[77] Cf. Rev. Abraham Messler in Sprague's *Annals*, Vol. IX. Frelinghuysen's works were all written in Dutch. They are at present in the possession of the New York Historical Society. In 1856 his sermons were translated into English and published together with a sketch of his life.

[78] William Tennent (the younger), pastor at Freehold, in a letter to Wm. Prince, of Boston, written Oct. 11, 1744, says: "Mr. T. J. Frelinghuysen, a low Dutch minister [was] being made common game of. For preaching the doctrine of the new birth both preachers and professors were called in derision 'new born' and looked upon as holders forth of some new and false doctrines." Quoted in Alexander's *Log College*.

Church of New Brunswick in 1727. Here he came into contact with Frelinghuysen. The details of their intercourse is, of course, lost. Exactly what doctrines Tennent acquired from Frelinghuysen it is difficult to determine, but that the Presbyterian pastor received a powerful spiritual inpulse from the Dutch Pietist can hardly be doubted. For Gilbert Tennent himself in a letter[79] says: "The labours of the Rev. Mr. Frelinghuysen, a Dutch Calvinist minister, were much blessed to the people of New Brunswick and places adjacent, especially about the time of his coming among them, which was about twenty-four years ago. When I came there, which was about seven years after, I had the pleasure of seeing much of the fruits of his ministry, divers of his hearers with whom I had the opportunity of conversing appeared to be converted persons, by their soundness in principle, Christian experience and pious practice; and these persons declared, that the ministrations of the aforesaid gentleman were the means thereof. This, together with a kind letter which he sent me respecting dividing the Word aright, and giving to every man his portion in due season, through the divine blessing, excited me to great earnestness in ministerial labors. I began to be much distressed about my want of success; for I know not for half a year or more after I came to New Brunswick that any one was converted by my labours, although several persons were at times affected transiently." In commenting on the relation between Frelinghuysen and Tennent, Leonard Woolsey Bacon has remarked:[80] "Whatever debate there may be over the question of an official and tactual succession in the Church, the existence of a vital and spiritual succession binding the generations each to each need not be disputed by any. Sometimes, as here, the succession is distinctly traceable. Gilbert Tennent was own son in the

[79] Written Aug. 24, 1744, to Rev. Mr. Prince, of Boston, published in Prince's *Christian History* and quoted in Alexander's *Log College*, pp. 99-100.

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 142.

ministry to Theodore Frelinghuysen as truly as Timothy was to Paul, because he became spiritual father to a great multitude."

In the light of what Gilbert Tennent himself has written, this broad statement must be somewhat modified. In dealing with the spiritual relationships of men with one another, particularly at a time when the written evidence is at best meagre, too much care cannot be exercised in ascribing influences to their real sources. We know, for example, that vital Christianity was not entirely extinct either in England or America about 1740. It lived on in obscure places among obscure people, ready to burst forth into a flame when the time should be ripe. How eagerly Cotton Mather sympathized with German Pietism we have seen from his correspondence with Francke. That Jonathan Edwards, the greatest intellect of his time, was inspired by evangelical religion, independent of any outside influence, is certain. That the elder Tennent on the Neshaminy tried to inculcate an evangelical spirit, there can be no doubt. What is claimed for German influence is that personal, experimental religion was cultivated and organized first by the German Pietists and that the two men, Wesley and Whitefield, who were to do more for its spread than all others put together, derived their power and a good part of their method from German sources. Gilbert Tennent unquestionably received a great spiritual impulse from Dominie Frelinghuysen, but whether he owed his conception of religion to his friend is a question which cannot be definitely settled from any evidence that we now possess. We are certain, however, that through Frelinghuysen another current of German Pietistic influence reached America and contributed its share in bringing about the Great Awakening.

Among the things which John Wesley learned from the Moravians not the least was the value of hymns as a means of furthering the social intention of the Gospel. The modern hymn serves not only as the index of a joyous faith, as the most spontaneous vehicle of worship, but nowhere

so much as in the singing of sacred song is the whole visible church a unit. Here, at least, differences of creed sink out of sight. In our modern collections of sacred lyrics authors of all denominations live in harmony with one another. Here the whole communion of worshippers rises to a mystical union with the divine, and no means, perhaps, has been so potent in keeping alive a vivid sense of the spiritual in the human soul as the modern hymn.

Psalm-singing had its rise in Germany at the time of the Reformation. It was introduced into England under the direct influence of the circle of Luther and Melanchthon. The "Gospellers" of the Reformation translated German hymns. The forty-one *Goostly Psalms and Spiritual Songs* of Miles Coverdale (1487-1569) have all except five been identified with German originals.[81] But English lyric poetry at this time was destined to follow the example of Petrarch and the Italians, not that of the Germans. There is no evidence to show that Coverdale's hymns ever became an integral part of the religious life of the people. During the seventeenth century[82] several hymns were written in England which are still to be found in modern collections, but none of them were at that time incorporated into the church services. The real founder of English hymnody was Isaac Watts,[83] and this new species of religious poetry was brought to a rapid climax by such hymnodists as Charles Wesley, who came directly under German influence again. The first collection of German hymns in the eighteenth century was the *Psalmodia Germanica* or *German Psalmody*,[84]

[81] Cf. Chas. H. Herford, *Studies in the Literary Relations of England and Germany in the Sixteenth Century*. Cambridge, 1886. Pp. 8-20 contain an account of Coverdale with a complete provenience of his hymns.

[82] Cf. W. Garrett Horder, *The Hymn-Lover*, London, chaps. vii and viii.

[83] *Ibid.*, chaps. ix and x.

[84] Cf. John Louis Haney, *German Literature in England before 1790. Americana Germanica*, IV, 1902. Of which German edition this *German Psalmody* was a translation I am unable to state. Between 1517 and 1754 no fewer than fifty-one different rimed Psalters appeared in

which appeared in England probably before 1725. These hymns were used by Methodists and other dissenters. Whether A. W. Boehm had anything to do with the translation of these hymns is not certain, but they appeared about the time of his activity in London and were probably one of the results of his efforts. Like most of the German Psalters, it was, in all probability, a collection of hymns based upon the Psalms by authors from Luther on. For in Germany the hymn has been cultivated uninterruptedly ever since the days of the Reformation. That the Wesleys were acquainted with this work is probable, but there is no evidence to show direct influence. It was not until his voyage to America (Oct. 1735-Feb. 1736) that John Wesley busied himself seriously with German hymns. On this voyage he learned German, took part in the Moravian services, and, as has been recently brought to light,[85] compiled the first hymn book ever prepared for use in the Church of England. It is a fact not generally known that to America belongs the honor of having produced this first edition of an English church hymnal. This little book was printed and published by Lewis Timothy at Charlestown (S. C.) in 1737, and marks a new era in the history of English hymnody. The name of the compiler is not mentioned, but the book contains seventy hymns, thirty-one by Watts, six by George Herbert, ten by members of the Wesley family and five translations from the German. After his return to England, Wesley published successive editions of this hymnal in 1738, 1739, 1740 and 1742. The number of translations grew from five to twenty-nine. These hymns of German origin are still used to-day, not only throughout the wide circle of Methodist adherents, but Prof. Hatfield has found

Germany. None bear the specific title, *Psalmodia Germanica.* See John Julian, *A Dictionary of Hymnology,* New York, 1892, p. 1542.

[85] Compare James Taft Hatfield, *John Wesley's Translation of German Hymns* in the *Publications of the Modern Language Association,* Vol. XI (1896), pp. 171-200. A complete provenience of all the hymns contained in the first five editions of *Wesley's Hymn Book* is given, with a criticism of Wesley's work as a translator.

them in no fewer than one hundred other important collections also, including all phases of religious confession, with the exception of the Roman Catholic.

A glance at the authors of these hymns lead us at once to the German Pietists. Wesley had found the originals in the *Herrnhuter Gesangbuch* (Moravian hymn-book), and Zinzendorf, the compiler of the same, had drawn very largely from the Pietists. From Paul Gerhardt there were three, from C. F. Richter two, from J. A. Frelinghausen two, and one each from Dessler, Gotter, Ernest Lange, Joachim Lange, Rothe, Winckler and Gmelin. The Pietist of the Reformed Church, Teerstegen, furnished two, and the Roman Catholic Pietist, Scheffler (Angelus Silesius) three. The Moravians proper were represented by Spangenberg (one), Anna Dober (one) and Zinzendorf (six). If we pause for a moment to consider the character of these hymns, we notice at once that the aggressive spirit of the Reformation has been lost. Luther's hymns were battle-songs of the church militant. The productions of the Pietists are the pious outpourings of individual souls, longing for a mystic union with the divine. They are songs of thanksgiving for help in times of trouble, prayers and petitions for divine assistance, and all pervaded with an unwavering optimism as to the goodness and wisdom of an overruling Providence. Nowhere is the mystical element in religion more beautifully expressed nor more permanently embodied than in the best of these German hymns.

What Charles Wesley, probably the greatest of all English hymn-writers, owed to German mysticism has long been recognized by hymnologists. W. Garrett Horder remarks:[86] "It is well known that both the Wesleys were at first deeply affected by the writings of William Law, the mystic; and though in after years they threw aside his particular doctrines, yet his influence is discernible, more or less, in all their hymns. If William Law had not taught, Charles Wesley would not have sung as well as he did. A touch of

[86] *The Hymn-Lover*, p. 113.

mysticism, indeed, is necessary to hymns of the most spiritual and inspiring kind. Another influence may be found in his association with the Moravians, by whom both he and his brother were deeply impressed. Mr. Beecher, in the preface to his hymn book, says: 'His (Charles Wesley's) hymns are only Moravian hymns resung. Not alone are the favorite expressions used, and the epithets they love, but like them, he beholds all Christian truths through the medium of confiding love. The love element of this school has never been surpassed.' " It is a rather touching conjecture of H. E. Jacobs,[87] that the inspiration as well as the occasion of Charles Wesley's wonderful hymn, "Jesus Lover of My Soul," was the sight of the Moravians in the memorable storm [88] calmly singing their hymns and relying implicitly upon God in things temporal as well as spiritual. Be this as it may, the debt which modern English hymnody owes to the German is a lasting and permanent one.

What a part the modern hymn has played in public worship and what a powerful means for cultivating a religion of the heart it has proved to be are recognized by all. In 1754 John Wesley published his large collection of *Hymns and Spiritual Songs,* intended for the use of real Christians of all denominations. The year following the Moravians in London published two volumes of almost four hundred pages each, with the title *A Collection of Hymns for the Children of God of all Ages from the beginning until now.*[89] It was John Ceunick,[90] successor to Whitefield in the Tabernacle, Moorfields, who introduced, about 1742, into some of the Societies "choirs" or classes for singing psalms, hymns and spiritual songs after the manner of the Moravians.[91] And Whitefield himself, who objected to some of the Arminianisms in Wesley's hymns, published in 1753

[87] *History of the Lutherans.*

[88] During the voyage to Georgia in 1736.

[89] Tyerman, *Whitefield,* II, 295.

[90] Himself author of the well-known hymn, "Children of the Heavenly King."

[91] Tyerman, *Whitefield,* II, 148.

a collection of one hundred and seventy from various sources, entitled, *Hymns for Social Worship*. Besides a large number of hymns from Watts and the Wesleys, this hymnal contained several by Cennick, Seagreave, Hammond and Humphreys, all men belonging to Whitefield's circle who had been influenced by the Moravians. Whitefield's hymnal went through thirty-six editions between 1753 and 1790. Long before any of the great revivalists had passed away, they had ushered in a new era of church hymnody inspired by German Pietism and patterned after German originals.

There can be little doubt that the active religious intercourse between England and Germany which was begun by Boehm and continued by Wesley and the Moravians, paved the way for the introduction of contemporary German literature into England. It will be recalled that both Pietism and Wesleyanism appealed chiefly to the middle class in society. About the middle of the eighteenth century there arose in both England and Germany a sentimental, moralizing, didactic tendency in literature which appealed especially to this middle class. This sentimentalism was intimately associated with the new religious emotionalism. How closely they went in hand is apparent from a glance at the German literary works which from about 1750 on begin to appear in English versions. The first German book of a literary character to appear in English[92] was Gellert's *History of the Swedish Countess G——*,in 1752. Gellert, the celebrated Leipzig professor, was the first literary spokesman of the middle class in Germany. His whole religious nature was tinged with Pietism, and in his one novel, he has produced a sentimental didactic romance full of impossible characters in impossible situations, but with a pronounced moral aim. Two subsequent translations of this book appeared in England as late as 1776. The next trans-

[92] Cf. John Louis Haney: *German Literature in England before 1790. Americana Germanica*, IV, 1902.

lation, Gessner's *Death of Abel,*[93] begun by Mrs. Collyer and finished by her husband, appeared in 1761. This play, in what was called poetic prose, dressed the simple Bible narrative up in artificial pastoral trappings.[94] It gained a popularity all over Europe, however, and was translated into French. In 1763 Collyer's translation of Klopstock's *Messias* appeared, to be followed four years later by Bodmer's *Noah,* another Biblical epic of a very watery character. The moralizing didactic poem *Usong* (1772) of the celebrated Swiss physiologist and puritan, Baron Haller, was done into English in 1772, together with his *Letters to his daughter on the truths of the Christian Religion* in 1780. And finally we find another Biblical drama, *The Trial of Abraham,* by Wieland, in the year 1790.

When we consider the subjects of these works and the purpose of the authors in writing them, it would seem to be a fair inference that the new religious movement not only gave a stimulus to Biblical subjects in literature, but also to works with a didactic moral aim. The best known and most read of all these books, Gessner's *Death of Abel,* was most popular among the middle classes. This is proved by the number of times it was reprinted[95] in small towns. Although Gessner's pastoral play with its affected sentimentality and turgid style proves a very unreadable book to-day, nevertheless there was a time in England when there was scarcely a home where it was not known. Sir Walter Scott in his autobiography tells us that he read this poem, when a child, with his mother on Sundays, along with *Pilgrim's Progress* and the Bible. Byron read it at eight and Wordsworth refers to its author in the same sentence with Shakes-

[93] Cf. Bertha Reed: *The Influence of Solomon Gessner upon English Literature. Americana Germanica Press,* 1905.

[94] In Nov., 1762, John Wesley read this work. In his journal he characteristically observes: "That manner of writing, in prose run mad, I cordially dislike; yet, with all that disadvantage, it is excellent in its kind, as much above most modern poems as it is below "Paradise Lost." Tyerman, *Wesley,* II, 450.

[95] Up to 1782 eighteen different editions of this work appeared in England.

pere and Ossian. Although the English translation was poor, it, nevertheless, set the style for the Biblical play. Miss Reed has traced in great detail the influence of this work on Cowper, Coleridge, Wordsworth and Byron. With all his shortcomings, Gessner deserves the honor of having first introduced the love of inanimate nature, the love for animal and for child life into English literature. Though he lacked the descriptive power of Thomson and his work does not display the fiery eloquence and the rancorous revolutionary spirit of a Rousseau, nevertheless he too was a co-worker of these men in the effort to "return to nature."

In America, which in Colonial days simply followed the literary taste of England, no fewer than seventeen reprints of Gessner's *Death of Abel* between 1762 and 1820 have been discovered by Wilkens.[96] If our ancestors were doing nothing, at this time, toward the production of literature, they, at least, felt the strong religious undertone and the "affecting simplicity and sentimentality" of the new movement in poetry. Wilkens sees the chief literary significance of the *Death of Abel* in the fact that it popularized Klopstock's style of religious poetry among English-speaking peoples. At any rate, the translator of the *Messiah* was the same (Joseph Collyer) as the translator of the *Abel* and advertises the former as being "in the manner of the *Death of Abel*." Klopstock aspired to the rank of a German Milton and represents the poetic climax of Pietism. Three American editions of the *Messiah*[97] proves that there was considerable demand for this religious epic, a fact which is likewise to be accounted for by the new religious spirit. The reading of sacred poetry as a means of cultivating personal religion was one of the practices early inculcated by both Wesley and Whitefield. Along the same religious line we might mention the first American reprint of Hallers *Letters to his Daughter on the Truths of the Christian Religion*

[96] Frederick H. Wilkens: *Early Influence of German Literature in America. Americana Germanica*, III, p. 108.

[97] Elisabeth, N. J., 1788; New York, 1795, and Boston, 1811.

LITHUANIA AND ITS ANCIENT CALVINISTIC CHURCHES.[1]

The home of the Lithuanians to-day is in the western part of Russia and the eastern part of Germany, adjoining the Baltic Sea. The governments of Kovno, Vilna, and Suwalki, are inhabited principally by Lithuanians, although their settlements extend into the governments of Grodno, Minsk, Vitebsk, and Courland. Under the Russian sway there are now about five million Lithuanians.[2] In Germany, along the river Niemen, there are not less than two hundred and fifty thousand. Outside of Russia and Germany, the greater number of Lithuanian emigrants live in England (30.000), the United States of America (350.000), in the Transvaal (10.000), and in many other countries. The Letts also belong to the same race, and number a little over two millions.[3] They occupy the governments of Courland and Livland, with colonies besides to the eastward (Pskov, Novgorod); and their emigrants to England and the United States amount to 25.000.[4]

[1] The substance of this article was delivered as an address in Miller Chapel, Princeton, N. J., April 3, 1906.

[2] The Russians, Poles, and Germans reduce the number of the Lithuanians by excluding those who are able to speak foreign languages, and therefore their statistics are unreliable.

[3] A Lettish authority, K. Graudins, gives the number of the Letts as 2.050.000. According to their religion there are 400.000 Roman Catholics, 50.000 Greek Orthodox, 5.000 Baptists, 1.000 adherents of other sects, and the rest are Lutherans (*Latviu Tauta*, F 1900, p. 270).

[4] Wm. Guthrie in his *New System of Modern Geography*, London, 1780, gives the following statistics:

	Square Miles.	*Length.*	*Breadth.*
Lithuania	64,800	333	310
Podolia	29,000	360	120
Volhynia	25,000	305	150
Polesia	14,000	186	97
Samogetia	8,000	155	98
Prussia Royal	6,400	118	104
Polachia	4,000	133	42
Courland	4,414	174	80
Total	155,614		

This Lithu-Lett race is one of the oldest inhabiting Europe; I even dare to say, the oldest among the white people of Europe.[5] The Lithuanians claim to be the descendants of the Pelasgians, and also of the old forgotten Hittites or Kheta, whose monuments were discovered only in recent years, throughout Asia Minor. In different epochs we find branches of the race flourishing and attaining a high level of civilization. Who to-day is ignorant of the ancient Trojans who waged a bitter war with the Greeks and form the subject of Homer's epic? Or who has not

DIVISIONS OF POLAND.

Red Russia	25,000	232	185
Great Poland	19,200	208	180
Little Poland	18,000	230	130
Masovia	8,400	152	90
Total	70,600		

Guthrie says further: "The great diet (of Poland) consists of the king, the senators, and the deputies from provinces and towns, viz., 178 from Poland and Lithuania, and 70 for Prussia; and it meets twice at Warsaw and once at Grodno, by turns, for the convenience of the Lithuanians, who made it one of the articles of their union with Poland." "The ten great officers of state in Poland, who are senators, are: the two great marshals, one of Poland, the other of Lithuania; the chancellor of the kingdom, and the chancellor of the duchy; the vice-chancellor of the kingdom and the vice-chancellor of the duchy; the treasurer of the kingdom, and the treasurer of the duchy; the sub-marshal, or marshal of the court of the kingdom, and the sub-marshal of the court of the duchy." He says also that "Poland can raise 100.000, and Lithuania 70.000 cavalry, and that with ease; but it must be understood that servants are included. . . . As to the ordinary army of the Poles, it consists of 36.000 men in Poland, and 12.000 in Lithuania, cantoned in the crown lands."

[5] Although Kotzebue, Kraszevski, Gisevius and many others have directed the attention of historians to the antiquity of the Lithuanians and their relation to the Getae, Thracians, etc., it is due to the work of Dr. John Bassanowicz, who settled in Bulgaria and made the question the study of his life, that many doubts were removed in this direction. Folk-lore, ethnology, anthropology, linguistic skill, and history are ingeniously combined in his hands, and his arguments have not been controverted. Besides erudite articles in such Lithuanian papers as Auszra, Varpas, and Vienybe, the reader who is interested should peruse his essays such as *Zirgas ir Vaikas, Etnologiszkos smulkmenos, Isz trakiszku studiju*, etc. See these questions touched upon in *'Lietuvis Tauta*, Vol. I, and in *Prateviai Lietuviu Masojoje Asijoje*, by John Szlupas, M. D.

read the history of Lydia with its great kings who fought successfully against the Scythian invaders? Or of king Croesus whose wealth became a proverb? Or of the Lycians with their undeciphered monuments? The Bithynians and Mysians form a direct link with the European Thracians, Getae, and Dacians who, unable to unite in one mighty kingdom, were at last, although with great effort and difficulty, subdued by the Roman emperors. The Lithuanian tribes,—the Heruli, Scyri,[6] etc,—play a not unimportant rôle in the great subsequent migration of nations, and king Odoacer proved a wise organizer and ruler of an empire. When, at last, the nations had become settled, we find the Lithuanians extending over the plains from the Black Sea to the Baltic. There they were compelled to make a stand against the Slavic tribes which came into prominence after the Huns had given birth to the Slavs[7] so well known today. From the fifth to the tenth century the boundaries of the Lithu-Lett race suffered such encroachments that remnants only of their widespread race were left, in several branches, viz., the Jadzvingi, the Prussians, the Lithuanians, the Samogetians, and the Letts. The rest were either exterminated by the Poles, Russians, Bulgarians, etc., or were assimilated and absorbed by the conquerors.

At last, when the Poles called upon the Teutonic Knights to subdue the Prussians, and when the German order of the Knights of the Sword had firmly established themselves on the Vistula and the Duna, the Lithuanians were aware of their peril, and the great duchy of Lithuania came into prominence;—all the more so because the Russian states were overrun by the Tartars. Lithuania's greatest splendor was then developed under the guidance of energetic and far-seeing grand-dukes, such as Gedimin, Olgerd, Kynstut.

[6] See Jordanis, *de Gothorum origine et rebus gestis.* Ed. 1866, p. 183.

[7] An extensive Russian historical literature gives testimony to the statement that the Huns gave birth to the Slavs. See especially D. Ilovaisky in his *History of Russia and Researches on the Origin of the Russians.* See also *'The Lithuanian Nation'*, Vol. I, pp. 187-204. (*Lietuvių Tauta,* Plymouth, Pa., 1904) by John Szlupas, M. D.

and Vitovt, who not only aggrandized their country and encircled their names with glory, but delivered the Russians of the west and south from the Tartar yoke. In 1252 king Mendog embraced the Roman Catholic faith but soon renounced it. Although a heathen people until 1387, the Lithuanians gave protection to Christians of the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic communions, and religious tolerance was firmly established in Lithuania at a time when the Holy Inquisition and the persecution of the Jews were playing havoc in Europe. Lithuanians kept the Tartars in check and saved Europe from their ravages. It was a Lithuanian prince, Vitovt, who broke the power of the Teutonic Knights and so prepared the soil for the Reformation by thus extinguishing the most formidable armed support of the papacy. I am sure that to-day there are few people who are aware how much Europe owes to this obscure, almost forgotten people.

When Jagello married Hedwig, the heiress of the Polish throne, Lithuania as an independent state began to decline. With the introdution of Roman Catholicism Polish influence began to dominate, and in 1569 the Lithuanian magnates had to acquiesce in the Union of Lubin, by which Lithuania's independence was sacrificed. Catholicism, obscurantism, and the Polish type of civilization with its extravagances prevailed, and the common people were bound in the chains of servitude. A few bright moments burst upon the Lithuanians when the light of Protestantism began to dawn, and there were prospects of attaining independence under the house of Radziwill, when the Jesuits, taking hold of the educational institutions, secured control of the spiritual and political destinies of the nation. Instead of salvation, the Jesuits brought to the Lithuanians dependence, bondage, and political annihilation. In 1773, 1793, and 1795, Lithuania and Poland were wiped off the map of Europe. Neither the reforms which came too late, nor the insurrection of Kosciuszko (who was a Lithuanian, not a Pole) could reëstablish independence. At the time when the United States of

America celebrated its birthday, Lithuania succumbed to the blows of the Russian bear, and up to the present has had to suffer the system of progressive Russianization. This went so far as to prohibit the printing of Lithuanian in 1864. Only after a forty years' struggle did the Lithuanians compel the Czar in 1904 to sign a rescript removing this restriction, and now, at last, books and newspapers can circulate freely among the people. So with the twentieth century there begins to dawn a new era for the Lithuanians as well as for other down trodden nationalities in Russia. The great revolution in Russia may end in a decentralization of the government, thus giving autonomy to the Lithuanians and Letts among others, and making possible a government in Vilna or Riga.

There were many factors which prepared the way for the Reformation in Lithuania. Sigismund Korybut[8] had undertaken an expedition to Bohemia in 1424, and John Huss' teachings had found a considerable following among the Lithuanians. The Szlachta[9] (nobles) had acquired many privileges in 1496, and their agricultural affairs brought them into contact with foreign countries, particularly Germany. The gentry were fond of traveling abroad, and of squandering their wealth; their children frequently attended schools and colleges in Europe (Leipsic, Wittenberg, etc.), until Sigismund I (1541) promulgated an edict forbidding the youth under severe penalties to imbibe the foreign spirit. Many wealthy families employed foreign

[8] Sigismundus Korybut, or more correctly, Kaributis, († 1435) was the son of Demetrius Korybut († 1404), the son of Olgerd († 1377), a direct descendant of the Lithuanian grand-duke.

[9] Some terms used in this paper may here be explained. The Szlachta, a word used by Morfill, denotes the *ordo equestris*, the nobles who held no office. Palatines were governors of palatinates or provinces, and castellans, governors of a district. They held office for life. Criminal affairs were under the cognizance of the Starosta, who were nobles holding an estate of the Crown. The Hetman was the commander-in-chief of the army. The Tribunal, an appellate court for the Szlachta, was created in Lithuania in 1581. It met in Vilna, Novogrodek, and Minsk. Its decisions were final.

teachers in their homes. Foreign merchants often visited the country, and the Szlachta eagerly listened to their narratives about the spiritual innovations which were making a commotion in the West.

The Reformation had been introduced into Prussia by Albert in 1525, who in 1544 established the University of Königsberg, where Lithuanians, such as S. Repelagen and Abraham Kulva, taught and scholarships for eight Lithuanian students of theology were established. Prussia, and especially the University of Königsberg, influenced the progress of Protestantism in Lithuania through literature purposely sent broadcast over that country.

The teachings of Knoepken, Bugenhagen, and Hoffman in Livonia also exerted some influence, since many of their pupils settled in the towns of Lithuania and preached the Gospel. Many Scotchmen also visited the country as merchants, and some families settling there and becoming assimilated with the local population helped the Reformation. Even Moscow furnished a few missionaries, among whom we should mention Artemius, Theodosius, and Thomas, who had been working in the eastern cities, especially in Polotsk and Vitebsk. When Polotsk was taken in 1563, by Ivan Vasilyevich, Thomas was captured and thrust into the Duna river through a hole in the ice. Besides all this, in 1544 Sigismund Augustus came to live in Vilna. From his boyhood he favored anti-Catholic views, and surrounded himself with men who advocated reformation or who at least were suspected of Protestantism. From his court religious innovations spread without hindrance; from his library the writings of Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin and others were circulated among the inhabitants. His chaplains Kozminczyk and Discordia of Praszniz openly preached the teachings of Protestantism. In vain did the Catholic bishops condemn them as heretics; Sigismund Augustus protected them by his influence. When Sigsmund I died, the progress of Protestantism in Lithuania became very easy, especially because the Lithuanian magnates were

dissatisfied with the union of their country with Poland and its consequent loss of independence. They hoped to regain their liberties by embracing Protestantism.

Lutheranism was not favorably received by the Lithuanians, as it was too nearly like Roman Catholicism. It spread principally in the towns among the German settlers. Only a small part of the Szlachta embraced Lutheranism, and their churches were few, as in Vilna, Kovno, and on the estate of the Radziwills and a few other magnates. Calvinism was received with greater favor, and since the destinies of the Calvinistic church were intimately connected with the house of Radziwill, we shall briefly present the history of this church in the light of its relation to this house.

Nicholas Radziwill, "the Black", duke of Olyka and Nesvezh, the palatine of Vilna, chancellor of Lithuania, together with his wife Elizabeth Szydloviecka, and his children, embraced the teachings of Zwingli and Calvin in 1553, and soon began to propagate Calvinism throughout his large estates. He invited to his court the first ministers from Poland, among whom were L. Kryszkovski, [10] T. Falconius,[11] Wendrychovski, and M. Czechowicz (who in 1561

[10] Laurentius Kryszkovski, a Lithuanian by birth, was converted to the teachings of the Bohemian Brethren and corresponded with George Israel, the first senior of this denomination in Great Poland. Nicholas Radziwill, the Black, called him to Nesvezh in 1558 or 1559. Here he became an adherent of Arianism, and influenced many inhabitants in this vicinity by his example, especially the brothers Kavieczynski. Later he was a superintendent of the Anabaptists. Of his writings we mention: 1. A Colloquy of Four Waldensian Brethren (1558). 2. A Dialogue of the Holy Justin, Philosopher and Martyr, with Trypho, the Jew, (1564).

[11] Thomas Falconius (Sakalauskas), a native Lithuanian, was a pastor at the cathedral of Lublin. He was imprisoned by the ecclesiastical authorities for apostasy. He was one of the first Protestants in the country. When liberated from prison, he became the court-preacher of Nicholas Radziwill, the Black, and as such participated in the synod at Mordy, 1563. Blandratha soon converted him to the teachings of the Socinians. His preaching was very trenchant. After the death of Nicholas Radziwill, the Black, he continued to fill the office of a Calvinistic minister at Klezk, until the fall of that church. He was a

was sent to Geneva). Radziwill was very successful in his "pious war" against Roman Catholicism, and the Szlachta and burghers followed him by thousands;—even former Catholic priests threw aside their celibacy, and Calvinism established itself in White Russia, Samogetia, and Polesia. New churches sprang up, or Catholic churches were transformed.[12] George Petkievicz, the bishop of Samogetia, was himself indifferent in religious matters, and at his death only seven Catholic pastors remained in Samogetia, with a small following among the villagers. Almost all the magnates went over to Calvinism.[13] Accordingly, as early as 1557, the Calvinists were enabled to hold their first synod in Vilna. In order to strengthen the new church Radziwill sent delegates to the synod at Ksionzh in 1560, to effect a union with those of Little Poland and the Bohemian Brethren of Great Poland[14] and to withstand and to condemn the heretical teachings of Stancar, Blandratha, and Gonesius[15]

learned man and left several writings: 1. The Life and Teachings of Jesus Christ, (1566). 2. The Acts of the Apostles, with brief annotations. 3. The Question of Baptism. 4. He also composed several Hymns.

His brother, John Falconius, minister at Mordy, is said by Wengierski to have written a history of the Lithuanian churches, which must have been lost.

[12] Among the first churches were those in Vilna, Klezk, Nesvezh, Dzevaltovo, Orsza, Ikazn, Iva, Szilenai, Rykontai, etc.

[13] Among the most prominent were: Kiszka, Chodkiewicz, Hlebowicz, Sapiega, Woina, Pac, Wolowicz, Oginski, Puzyna, Gruzevski, and others.

[14] Poland was divided into Great Poland (Wielkopolska), containing the palatinates of Poznan, Kalisz, Sieradz, Lenczyca, Brzesc-Kujavski, Inovroslav, Plozk, Rava, Masovia, Chelm, Malborg, and Pomorska; and Little Poland (Malopolska), containing Cracow, Sandomir, Lublin, Little Russia, Bielsk, Podolia, Podlasia, Volhynia, Braclaw, Kijow, and Czernichow. Lithuania consisted of the palatinates of Vilna, Troki, Samogetia, Novogrodek, Brzesc-Litewski, Minsk, Polotsk, Mscislav, Smolensk, and Livonia. This was after the Union of Lublin. Prior to 1569, Podolia, Volhynia, Kijow, and Czernichow belonged to Lithuania.

[15] Peter Gonesius was born about 1525 in a farmer's family at Goniondz, a borough of Radziwill's in Podlasia. He studied at the academy of Cracow, and as a prospective pillar of the Church, he was sent abroad by the bishop of Samogetia. In Italy he lectured on sophistry at the

on the Holy Trinity. Always solicitous for the welfare of the Calvinistic Church, Radziwill gave orders for the translation of the Bible, and spent ten thousand florins for its publication in Brest 1563. But soon afterwards he died in Vilna in 1565. His ambition had been to become king of Poland after Sigismund Augustus; but a premature death prevented his ascending the throne.

The leadership in the affairs of the Reformation now passed over to his successor in the palatinate of Vilna, Nicholas Radziwill Rufus, "the Red", duke of Birzei and Dubinki. He also erected churches in his estates and provided them with funds.[16] Unfortunately, adherents of Arianism which had been propagated in Poland by the brothers Laelius and Faustus Socinus now arrived.[17] The a synod at Brest in 1558, where Peter Gonesius eloquently defended the new doctrines, strongly condemning the bap- adherents of the Helvetic Confession (the Calvinists) called

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University of Padua, but in Switzerland the writings of Servetus converted him to a new conception of the Trinity. While in Wittenberg, he was willing to dispute publicly with the Lutherans on the Trinity, but Melanchthon compelled him to depart. He returned to his country in 1555, and soon participated in a synod of dissenters at Secymin, professing that he adhered to the doctrine of Servetus and Frank Davidis concerning the Trinity. He was also at the Calvinistic synod at Pinczovo. He became a Calvinistic minister at Vengrovo where he converted John Kiszka, the owner of the town. The teachings of his pulpit and pen brought on a schism in the Calvinistic Church. At the synod of Brest he attracted to his teachings Hieronymus Piekarski, a canonicus, later a Calvinistic minister at Bialy, also many others. He taught that a Christian should adhere to no government, and wear no weapon at his side (he himself wore a wooden sword). In his old age he had the sorrow of seeing his pupils, — Martin Czechovicz, John Niemojovski, etc.,—abandon him and join the Socinians. Among his writings were: 1. On the Son of God (1570). 2. On Christian Baptism. 3. De tribus, id est, de Deo, de Filio ejus, et Spiritu Sancto, adversus Trinitatem Sabellianorum. 4. Doctrina pura et clara de praecipuis Christianae religionis capitibus, (1562), etc.

[16] *E. g.*, in Birzei, Dubinki, Keidany, Koidanovo, etc.

[17] This innovation came into Lithuania through Blandratha, Lizmanin, Czechovicz, Stancar of Königsberg, and Kryszkovski; and it had a following principally in the palatinates of Novogrodek and Brest. They found a mighty protector in the starosta of Samogetia, John Kiszka, of Ciechanovice.

tism of little children and the Calvinistic doctrines concerning the Son of God; and he also contended that it was a crime to serve one's country with arms, in the council, or through the influence of office. The fire was spreading and the schism grew wider daily, so that Radziwill could find no other means of checking the heresy than by commanding his ministers at Nesvezh and Klezk, L. Kryszkovski and S. Budny,[18] to remain faithful to the Helvetic Confession and avoid disturbing the peace of the church. In this he was sustained by John Chodkiewicz and Simon Zacius, the first superintendent of the Vilna district, who were opposed to Arianism. But in Vilna Czechovicz was preaching against the baptism of infants, and soon Arianism had taken root in so many parts of the country that its adherents could hold synods at Brzezia in 1564 and at Vengrovo in 1565, where 48 ministers and 14 laymen came as delegates. At the latter synod the baptism of infants was condemned and rejected, although the Calvinistic delegates, M. Vendrygovski and A. Cygner, made a strong plea in its behalf. The Calvinistic ministers in 1566 unanimously condemned the Arian teachings and the decrees of the synod in an open letter, contending that a turmoil in the Republic

[18] Simon Budny, alumnus of the Cracow academy, was installed as pastor at Klezk by Nicholas Radziwill, the Black, in 1552, but was soon converted by George Blandratha to Arianism. When admonished by Radziwill for his apostasy, Budny went to Losk, an estate of John Kiszka of Ciechanovice, and propagated the doctrine of Frank Davidis, that it is improper to worship Christ as God. At the synod of Luclavice in 1582 he was deposed from ministerial functions. He was an educated man, well versed in the Greek language, but as a deist, and probably a materialist, he was disliked by all denominations. During the war of Stephen Batory with Moscow, he was barbarously treated by the king's army for his supposed atheism. He published the following: 1. The Bible, translated by him into Polish, 1574. 2. The New Testament with annotations. 3. Refutation of the teachings of Martin Czechovicz. 4. On two natures in Christ. 5. On the principal articles of the Christian religion. 6. The Sword used by the Church of Christ. 7. Brevis demonstratio quod Christus non sit ipse Deus, qui est Pater, et cur in sacris litteris appellatus fuerit et porro Deus sit. These and other writings of Budny excited a long and lively controversy not only among Catholics, but also in the sect of the Socinians.

would follow and that soon the Church of God would fall. In order to avoid identification with the Arians, the Calvinists were now compelled to repeat the formula: *Hi tres sunt unum, et hi tres sunt unus.* But John Kiszka was busily engaged in erecting new churches.[19] He succeeded in transferring some Calvinistic churches to the Socinians;[20] he established a printing house, spent money lavishly for the production of religious books for his denomination and allured many influential families into renouncing Calvinism.[21]

The Roman Catholic clergy, weakened by the apostasy of their flocks, and set aside by the magnates, found no relief from the edict of Parczovo (1564) which was now extended also to Lithuania. Even the Dominican order was unable to cope with the growing heresy. Cardinal Hosius therefore advised V. Protaszevicz, the bishop of Vilna, to secure the aid of the Jesuits. A few of these from Olomunec, taking precautions, soon arrived in safety at Vilna, without interference from the dissenters. The bishop assigned to them St. John's Church, which the priest, Peter Roisius, was unwilling to surrender to their order. Roisius, however, died soon afterwards, and the Jesuits opened a school in 1570. There were now thirty members of the order under the direction of Stanislaus Warszewicki. The bishop urged the people to send their children to the new school, but the inhabitants did not obey. But though the Jesuits did not lose heart, the dissenters began to realize how dangerous was the enemy now established in their midst. The Jesuits arranged public debates which were attended by masses of the dissenters, and in the absence of the ministers, their order was victorious in the eyes of uneducated people. Warszewicki found various pretexts for visiting the homes of the Szlachta and of the magnates, and by his erudition, eloquence and elegance captivated many dissenters.[22] Both Lutherans and Calvinists were aroused.

[19] *E. g.*, at Brest, Bialy, Mordy, etc.
[20] *E. g.*, at Losk.
[21] Kavieczynski, etc.
[22] Such as Ulrich Hosius, John Karol Chodkiewicz, etc.

Wolan with others began to make preparations for a political combination of the dissenters. Soon both denominations met at Vilna, made an agreement concerning the sacraments, and elected delegates to the synod to be held at Sandomir (1570), and later at Cracow (1573), in order to fraternize with the Polish dissenters.

When Sigismund Augustus died in 1572, the dissenters opposed the election of Henry of Valois, the persecutor of the Huguenots, and formed the confederation of Warsaw. After the election, the dissenters insisted through their envoys, duke Albert Prunski and Zborovski, that the new king, before coming to Poland should confirm with an oath their privileges and liberties. Soon the Polish throne passed to Stephen Batory. During a war with Moscow, the army set fire to the churches of the dissenters and maltreated their ministers.[28] The monarch favored the Jesuits, with the expectation that through their schools they would instil into the unruly Szlachta the spirit of order and obedience to law; and the Jesuits knew very well how to keep up the king's delusions. He elevated their school in Vilna to an academy, and E. Wollowicz refused in vain to affix the state seal to the charter. Batory then erected Jesuit academies at Polotsk (1579), Riga (1581), Dorpat (1583), and Grodno.

Krysztof Radziwill, "the Orphan" (Sierotka), who established an academy at Nesvezh (1584), followed in the king's footsteps. Peter Skarga induced also the younger brothers of Krysztof (George, Albert, and Stanley) to embrace Catholicism, thus delivering a hard blow indeed to the Calvinists. The Calvinistic ministers had to flee from Nesvezh, Olyka, Klezk, etc., and the printing house at Brest came into the possession of the Catholics. In 1575 some 67 dissenters were converted. The Jesuits assembled their best men, Skarga, Stanislaus Grodzicki, J. Brand, V. Fabricius, F. Kvadratyn, M. Smigielski, Em. Vega, etc., —all distinguished for eloquence and possessed of talent for invective—for the purpose of humiliating the dissenters in

[28] S. Budny.

forbade the dissenters to convey a corpse past St. John's every possible way. A clash soon came. In 1581 the bishop Church; and when the dissenters paid no attention to this order and were returning from the cemetery, the Jesuit students, with the help of a mob, maltreated the ministers present, stoning them almost to death. True, Batory, on their complaint, sternly commanded the Catholics from the camp at Pskov to keep the peace and not to disturb the dissenters. But soon consternation ensued again among dissenters and joy among Catholics. Nicholas Radziwill died in 1584 in Vilna. He was the man who had sheltered exiled ministers, favored erudite men,[24] encouraged some to work,[25] elevated others to positions of dignity by his influence,[26] and by his armed bodyguard kept the Jesuits at bay.

Although Krysztof, son of Nicholas Radziwill, inherited the office of palatine, yet the Nesvezh line of the family overshadowed him—*e. g.*, Nicholas "the Orphan" and Cardinal George Radziwill. The cardinal took forcible possession of the printing offices in Vilna and burned in public all the so-called heretical books he could lay hands on. When D. Lencicius continued to publish Calvinistic books, the Jesuits induced a faithless servant to steal his type. In the pulpit and elsewhere outside the church, at the country fairs and in various meetings, the Catholics endeavored to make a laughing stock of the dissenters. They declared Wolan to be a drunkard. They insinuated that Sudrovius had been an executioner and a thief in Lemberg.[27] They derided the

[24] Such as Wolan.

[25] Such as Radwan.

[26] Such as Abrahamowicz.

[27] In ages of passionate strife, opponents oftentimes attack a man's character, not his teachings; and this was what happened to Stanislaus Sudrovius (Sudrovski), one of the most learned and honorable among the Calvinists of Lithuania. The Jesuits of Vilna spread a rumor that in his youth in Lvov he had committed some theft for which the magistrate of the city had condemned him to the gallows; and that he escaped punishment only by accepting the office of an executioner. Jurgiewicz, a canonicus of Vilna, repeating the story, added that Sudrovius had stolen a silver saucer in Lvov. It is certain that Sudrovius had never been in Lvov. The incredible story of Jurgiewicz

synods. The mob began to show hatred toward the dissenters, and their ministers were in no higher esteem than the worst of rowdies. Under such circumstances, the Calvinists tried again to effect a union with the Lutherans and to strengthen their position. But their convention in Vilna (1585) was without any manifest result and the Jesuits properly declared afterwards, that among the dissenters there were as many opinions as there were heads and nowhere order or unanimity. Before Stephen Batory died in 1586, the houses of Pac, Wollowicz, Leo Sapiega, and Radziwill of Nesvezh had renounced Calvinism. The forces of the dissenters were fast declining.

During the interregnum the dissenters resolved to confirm their rights at the diet of convocation and election, and to weaken the influence of the Jesuits, whom Nicholas Monvid Dorohostaiski had in the meantime expelled from Polotsk. But their candidate, Maximilian, archduke of

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was repeated by Reszka, who added that he had heard that Sudrovius had been an executioner for several years. After him, Borkovski, Vargocki, and Golubski declared that Sudrovius had been an executioner without the least doubt. Moreover, Jurgiewicz and others sought to heap reproach upon Sudrovius, by asserting that in his old age he became enamored of Sophie, daughter of Andrew Wolan, and that this unbecoming affection inspired many with horror so that they, like John Pac, the palatine of Minsk, returned to Catholicism. Further, Cichocki made the accusation that Sudrovius, being a widower, when asked by a young man to woo a certain girl for him, married her himself. Others affirmed him to be an ignorant man who knew not even his grammar. All these inventions of the Jesuits prove how heartily Sudrovius was hated by them for his devotion to his denomination. Sudrovski was born in Ostrolenka, Masovia, and received his education probably in Cracow and abroad. As an evangelical minister he early migrated to Lithuania and for many years was minister in the Church of Vilna, until at last he was elevated to the office of senior of the Vilna district. The Calvinists entrusted to him the formation of a union with the dissenters of Poland, and made him delegate to the synod of Cracow for this purpose in 1573. He died probably in 1599. He left the following works: 1. Confirmation of a Christian (1580). 2. Explanation of the Lord's Prayer (1580). 3. Idolatriae Loiolistarum oppugnatio (1594). This book attracted much attention, and angered the Jesuits so much that they requested the king's permission to burn both the author and his book at the same stake. 4. The Catechism.

Austria, was defeated at Byczyna, and Sigismund III (1587-1632), a pupil of the Jesuits, ascended the throne. When he came in 1589 to Vilna, the Jesuits received him with unprecedented pomp and ovation, so that even faithful dissenters asked themselves why their ministers were not able to make a similar display. Sigismund III had conceived a plan to exterminate the dissenters, and naturally his best friends in this work were, among others, Skarga, Golynski, Laterna and Kvadratyn. When a dissenter died, his office was given to a Catholic, a friend of the Jesuit order. Others were converted through intimidation. The colleges of the Jesuits were now flourishing everywhere, and the number of their pupils reached ten thousand. The monarch encouraged apostasy by remunerating with offices and favors those who renounced Protestantism. In order to counteract the pernicious influence of the Jesuit academy, the Calvinists resolved to advance their school in Vilna to the rank of an academy and were at that time engaging teachers in Poland and Germany. But they were prevented from doing this by the Jesuits, on whose advice Sigismund III in a rescript forbade the Calvinists to open higher schools.

Besides the dissenters, there was in the country a still more powerful enemy of the Jesuits,—people of the orthodox Greek Church—whom the Jesuits, not being able to convert, had resolved to combine with the Romish Church. At Horodlo in 1413, Jagello decreed them unfit for the offices and privileges of the Szlachta. At Florence in 1438, a union of both churches—the eastern and the western—was effected, but in Lithuania the union made very slow progress, although the grandduke Alexander, the Dominicans, and the metropolitan Joseph Soltan had made great efforts in its interest. Ivan, "the Terrible", pressed by Batory, made overtures to the Pope, who at once sent a diplomat, Antony Possevini. But Ivan, having gained time to recover himself, acted with duplicity. The Jesuits now began to argue with the followers of Photius, commencing with Possevini's

"Capita quibus Graeci et Rutheni a Latinis in rebus fidei dissenserunt" (1582) and Basilius Amaski's "Interrogationes et responsiones de processione Spiritus Sancti a Patre et Filio" (1581). They attracted the youth of the Dis-Uniates into their schools, or even forced some converted Calvinists into that party, *e. g.*, the metropolitan Joseph Velamin Rucki, who reconstructed the Basylian order and their schools in conformity with the plan of the Jesuit colleges. Then Michael Rahoza, metropolitan of Kief, called a synod of the Ruthenian clergy at Brest (1590) and another in 1594, where, without regard to the opposition of some of the magnates and of the Szlachta, the Greek clergy consented to a union with the Catholic Church. The synod sent the bishops Pociey and Terlecki to Sigismund III and to the Pope with the joyful news. The third synod at Brest ratified the union, although, influenced by Krysztof Radziwill and other dissenters, the bishops Gedeon Balaban and Michael Kopystenski seceded, together with Constantine Ostrogski, the palatine of Kief, who advised the Dis-Uniates to invite the help of the Muscovites. But the union had become an accomplished fact, and the dissenting bishops were excommunicated. A persecution of the Dis-Uniates followed, with removals from office, confiscation of churches, imprisonments and fines. But Ostrogski did not remain idle. He established a high school at Ostrog, and made Erasmus Smotrycki principal. He also founded a printing house where a Slavonic Bible was published. He opened another school at Kief, and built many churches and monasteries. He subsidized Latosz, a physician of Cracow, who supported the Dis-Uniates by his writings; and he did the same for many others. Ostrogski also entered into closer relations with the chiefs of other dissenters,—especially with duke Krysztof Radziwill, palatine of Vilna, his son-in-law, and John Abrahamowicz, palatine of Smolensk.

In the mean time the Jesuits were not idle. Through their colleges and their thorough organization they weakened the lines of the dissenters; for the Szlachta, in order

to escape their persecutions and chicanery, joined the Catholics by thousands,—some after intermarriage with Catholics, others being allured by profit or office,—some through the persuasion and eloquence of the Jesuits, or affected by the derision of the Protestant ceremonies. If a Protestant minister married, they wrote an *epithalamium,* or if he died—the worse for him—they published letters from hell to his colleagues, as in the case of Burchard who died in 1623 after an accidental fall from a ladder. In order to protect themselves, the dissenters of Lithuania and Poland called a synod at Thorn, in 1595, to which Ostrogski also sent delegates. After letters from prominent men had been read, the synod discussed at length the doctrine concerning the Holy Trinity, and denounced the persecutions which had recently become very frequent; they also elected general seniors who were to receive communications concerning the sufferings inflicted by Catholics. The synod also addressed a letter to the king, asking for protection.

The Catholic Church had strengthened itself by the union at Brest. But the Dis-Uniates made trouble, and stirred up the Cossacks to defend Greek Orthodoxy. Hetman Zolkievski defeated them at Lubniany, and their leader Nalevaiko was killed. Then Ostrogski resolved to combine the Dis-Uniates with the dissenters. A conference was to be held and, if possible, uniformity as to their confessions agreed upon and assistance given in case of assault upon their religion. Nuntii would be sent to the king and the diet with protests; and they would publish to the world their sufferings from oppression.

The proposed conference was held in Vilna in 1599, with the participation of prominent men.[28] The only result of this conference was a superficial union between the Dis-

[28] On one side: Radziwill, A. Leszczynski, Abrahamovicz, Zenowicz, and the ministers, Turnovski, Gr. Zarnovski, Janicki, Gracianus, D. Mikolajevski, and the Lutheran senior E. Gliczner from Poland. On the other: Ostrogski, Sanguszko, the metropolitan Lucas, and archdeacon Gedeon. Lutherans of Lithuania were represented by Talvosz and the minister Andrew.

Uniates and the dissenters. The Greek priests would not even listen to the suggestion of a religious union. In order to profit by such a multitude of dissenters in Vilna, the Jesuits proposed to the dissenters a public debate in the castle of the palatine, where four thousand spectators were assembled. The Protestants, being obliged against their will to participate, put forward their ministers, Mikolajevski, M. Janicki, and M. Gracianus, to discuss the theme: "The priority and superiority of the bishop of Rome". Martin Smiglecki, who had been successful in his debate with the Socinians, was the mainstay of the Jesuits. The debate could only do harm to the dissenters, who had not so many organs as the Jesuits to spread the news of their victory. So they left Vilna, under the protection of George Radziwill's bodyguard, suffering insults from the Jesuit students and the city rowdies.

Besides this, a disagreement arose in the congregation of Vilna, where Popovski and Daniel began to insult and deride the ministers, and to lure pupils from the dissenters into the Jesuit schools. In this they were assisted by the minister Chrzonstovski. Moreover the Jesuit colleges were growing,[29] literature in opposition to the dissenters was increasing (*e. g.*, Skarga's "Admonition to unity of the saving church" 1611, Szirvid's Sermons 1629, etc.), and the multitudes were eager to witness religious spectacles.[30] The union of the eastern and the western churches grew stronger every day. Calvinistic senators, the chief support of their church, died one after another, and their offices, as after the death of Krysztof Radziwill (1603), were given by Sigismund III to Catholics. Soon Nicholas Naruszewicz, the castellan of Samogetia, John Abrahamowicz, the palatine of Smolensk, Krysztof Zienowicz, palatine of Brest (1615), duke Albert Prunski (1595), and Michael Dorohostaiski (1597), passed away. The best educated men

[29] *E. g.*, in Orsza, Vitebsk and Smolensk in 1610; Krozhe in 1616; Novogrodek, Holovnia, Brest, Pinsk, etc.

[30] Theatrum S. Casimiri, 1604.

who could withstand the Jesuits in eloquence and logic, like Wolan,[31] Lasicki, Sudrovius, etc., also passed away, without leaving equally worthy successors.

After the death of Radziwill, his dignities were conferred upon John Karol Chodkiewicz; whereupon his son, Janusz Radziwill, joined the revolt of Zebrzydovski, and by his example induced many Lithuanian dissenters to participate

[31] Wolan came of a noble family in Silesia. He studied at Frankfort on the Oder. Kwilecki, administrator of the estates of Queen Bona Sforzia, called him to Lithuania, and recommended him to Nicholas Radziwill of Dubinki and Birzei, as private secretary. He left the duke and continued his studies at Königsberg for three years. Then he again returned to Radziwill, who remunerated his labors liberally with estates, his services having been rendered in war and in the diet. He was Radziwill's confidential messenger to King Augustus in secret affairs; and the king admitted him to the Lithuanian *ordo equestris*. The senate also sent him as an envoy to the Emperor Maximilian, when Henry of Valois fled from Poland. When Quincunx Orzechovski began through his writings to insult Lithuania and Radziwill "the Black", Wolan was asked by this magnate to write an answer, which was published anonymously, and made a stir in the country. His next work was a translation of the life of Scanderbeg. Although he did not enter into a public dispute with the Jesuits, yet in his writings he contended with P. Skarga, A. Jurgiewicz, A. Possevini, Vega, Reszka, Faustus Socinus, etc. He used his talent and erudition for the benefit of his co-religionists. He conceived the idea of a union between the Lithuanian Calvinists and Lutherans in order to withstand the onslaught of the Jesuits, and he participated in their conventions of 1570 and 1585, as well as in Vilna in 1599, where the dissenters tried to unite with the eastern Church. The synod of Vilna in 1590 made him a censor of Calvinistic books. He lived in friendship with all influential and educated dissenters, like J. Abramovicz, J. Lasicki, Stanislaus Sudrovius, S. T. Turnovski, A. Chrzonstovski, V. Kryszkovski, A. Dudycz and many others. Even Milesius Rotundus, an ardent Catholic, held him in high esteem. His benevolence extended to all without respect to difference of religion. He died in his own village, Biyutiszki near Vilna, January 6, 1610, being eighty years of age. Among his writings we mention: 1. De libertate politica (1572). 2. Defensionis sententiae veteris ecclesiae de S. Coena contra transubstantionis dogma libri iii adversum Petrum Scargam et Franc. Turianum (1586). 3. Apologia ad calumnias et convitia sectae se falso Jesuitas vocantis (1587). 4. Ad scurilem et famosum libellum Jesuiticae scholae Vilnensis et potissimum maledici conviciatoris Andreae Jurgievitii sacrificuli et canonici Vilnensis (1589). 5. De principe et propriis ejus virtutibus. 6. Caecitas et poena ecclesiae (1608), and many others.

in it. But the defeat at Guzovo gave the Jesuits a good opportunity for persecuting the dissenters. It happened that a young Italian, Francus di Franco, who had been imprisoned in Italy on suspicion of heresy, was zealous in the cause of Protestantism. After hearing a sermon of A. Chrzonstowski, he met in the market place a Catholic procession with Bishop Voina at its head, and mounting a shrine reproached the Catholics for their pagan rites. He was arrested and tortured, but even then he asserted that he had acted voluntarily, on his own responsibility, and that he had no intention to kill either the bishop or the king. For his blasphemy he was torn to pieces, July 1, 1611, after his tongue had been torn out from his mouth.

On the day following the execution of Franco the Jesuit students attacked the Helvetic (Calvinist) congregation, entered the dwelling of the ministers, threw Balzar Krosniewicz out of the second story, beat Martin Tertullian almost to death, and tried to cremate I. Wendland. Part of the library was burned, the rest stolen. Then a torch was applied to the church, which together with the schoolhouse and the minister's dwelling was converted into a heap of ashes. The Jesuits at once published a pamphlet, justifying the act of their students and contending that the dissenters were worse enemies of the Catholic Church than the Jews and the Tartars—an assertion made also by John Argent in "De rebus Societatis Jesu in regno Poloniae". When Sigismund III came to Vilna, the layman senior John Szveikovski entered a complaint for violence and contempt inflicted upon those of the Helvetic confession. The king did nothing to punish the culprits, but the Calvinists were not prohibited from building a new church, school, and dwelling house for their ministers and teachers. But their situation grew worse every day, and the synod of Vilna in 1614 had to forbid the employment of Catholic teachers or of such as had pursued their studies with Jesuits or Socinians. In 1606 an old minister, Laszkovski in Gorki, Podlesia, was purposely run over by a nobleman and killed,

without the least effort subsequently to punish the criminal. The Jesuits with the help of their students—whom Kojalowicz calls *merito frenum haereticorum*—or of a frenzied mob, endangered the lives of the dissenting ministers and even the diet paid no attention to the protests of the sufferers. In those days it required great strength of character to be a minister. Many churches by that time had no pastors, and the remaining pastors had to hold services in several neighboring parishes. Through this falling off in the number of the Calvinist ministers it happened that uneducated persons were admitted into that vocation, who were unable to distinguish between the Calvinist and other denominations. Hence the synod of Vilna in 1617 recommended for dogmatic or liturgical use, certain prescribed books, *e. g.*, the Brest Bible, the New Testament, Postilla by Gregory of Zarnoviec, Postilla by Krysztof Krainski, and the Catechism by Gilovski.[32] At the same time their polemic literature became scarce. The printing houses of Radziwill, Lencicius, etc., were now printing Catholic books. The Jesuits unceremoniously broke into the Protestant churches and demanded that the ministers debate with them—as happened in 1616 in Novogrodek, where the minister John Zygrovius answered the Jesuit Benjamin Brivilias of Nesvezh.

Besides the Jesuits, in the reign of Sigismund III, there appeared on the scene many new Catholic orders, viz., the regular Canonici, the barefooted Carmelites, the Franciscans, the Bernardines, etc., and the number of the Catholic parishes increased rapidly. Leo Sapiega himself erected twenty-four Catholic, beside many Uniate churches, and robbed the Calvinists of their churches in Ikaznia and Orsza. The Uniates also helped in this apostolic work,—especially the archbishop of Polotsk, Josephat Kuncewicz (born in 1580 and murdered in 1623), who converted many dis-

[32] Postilla, by Nicholas Rey, had been translated into Lithuanian by Jacob Morkunas and printed in 1600 at Vilna (in three parts in folio). A hymn-book and a prayer-book had been published at Keidany.

senters and Dis-Uniates.[33] Numbers of Calvinistic churches were forcibly restored to the Catholics under cover of the decree of the tribunal in 1588 prohibiting the alienation of church property; *e. g.*, the church in Keidany in 1627.

To the consolation of the Calvinists, duke Janusz Radziwill married the last heiress of the dukes of Sluzk and of Kopyl, the daughter of John Simon Olelkowicz. New churches soon adorned his vast possessions, and Sluzk got a school of higher grade. But the castellan of Vilna died in 1620. After the death of Ostrogski in 1608 the political union with the Dis-Uniates was almost forgotten, and the dissenters contented themselves with inciting the Dis-Uniates against the Catholics. In 1609 a Calvinist in Vilna, meeting the metropolitan Pociey in the market place, slashed his head with a sabre and cut off two of his fingers with the bishop's ring. The Lithuanian dissenters were also the secret instigators[34] in the murder of Kuncewicz, and Smotrycki, the chief agent in the murder, was in constant communication with them. With Kuncewicz' death the party of the Dis-Uniates was completely broken up in Lithuania, and their leaders were severely punished. The Dis-Uniates lost their churches in Vitebsk, Polotsk, Orsza, Mohilev, etc., and Meletius Smotrycki, a learned man, joined the Uniates in order to escape deserved punishment, and turned his pen against the Dis-Uniates whose weaknesses were not secrets from him.

There remained nothing for the Calvinists but to direct their attention to their internal affairs.[35] The synod of

[33] *E. g.*, Soltan, Th. Skumin, Tyszkiewicz, Sokolinski, Soroka, etc.

[34] Dzieje kosciolow wyznania helweckiego w Litwie przez Jozefa Lukaszewicza, Poznan 1842, p. 161-166." A very reliable authority.

[35] The administration of Helvetian churches in Lithuania was in the hand of the synods, which were held every year with the participation of the ministers, the Szlachta and the prominent burghers. The synods were competent to transact the following business: The framing of by-laws for the schools and for the ministry; the relaxation or restriction of church discipline; the printing of liturgical books; the disposal of church funds; the selection of deputies to political or religious conventions, with their instructions; the settlement of disputes between

Vilna in 1621 resolved to reprint the Agenda and the Catechisms, and advised their co-religionists to keep away from the Jesuit schools. In 1625 the Calvinists endeavored to found a Seminary at Vilna, and to advance their schools at Sluzk and Keidany to a higher standard. Then they resolved to renew their connection with the Calvinists of Little Poland and with the Bohemian Brethren in Great Poland, and in 1627 and 1628, to print the Bible with the corrections made by D. Mikolajevski. They also adopted the school statute proposed by Andrew Dobrzanski, senior of Novogrodek, and decided to raise money for the publication of their liturgical books and for aiding exiles in Bohemia and elsewhere. In short, the Calvinists tried to consolidate their own forces. In this they were assisted by Krysztof Radziwill, the Lithuanian Hetman, and by their minister Labencki of Vilna. Radziwill subsidized the school at Keidany, upheld their relations with the Polish Calvinists, published the "Meditations of John Gerhard" (translated by J. Romanovski), and presented the complaints of the dissenters to the diet in 1627. The diet decreed that decisions of the Tribunal which *vim legis sapiunt* should not be enforced; but since the previous decrees were not set aside by this act, the Tribunal as soon as 1630 at Lublin, as if for spite, decreed that the dissenters should not hold their services in the buildings of the palatinessa of Volhynia.

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ministers; the appointment of pastors for the churches; the election of seniors and conseniors, etc. The synod of Vilna in 1627 adopted rules for conducting synods and established a committee for the trial of cases (synedrium) during the sessions of synods, who adjudicated matters of lesser importance.

From the beginning of the sixteenth century the Helvetian churches of Lithuania had their plenipotentiaries, called *actores,* who represented their interests before the king, in the diets, tribunals and other conventions. After the close of the seventeenth century, these *actores* were employed as envoys to foreign courts and they often visited Berlin, Königsberg, St. Petersburg, etc. Concerning the method of their procedure in the interest of their denomination, they communicated with the seniors, to whom as well as to the synods they made reports of their activity.

In 1629, Sigismund III forbade the Dis-Uniates to build a church in Vilna; and he was active until his last breath in the conversion of the Dis-Uniates and dissenters to Catholicism. He died in 1632, convinced that he had accomplished his ideal, that he had cleared the country of heresy. When he came to the throne, he found in the Lithuanian senate only two Catholics; when he died, he left there no Dis-Uniates or dissenters. At least one-half of the Szlachta had returned to Catholicism. Many Calvinistic churches either disappered or fell into the hands of Catholics. The eastern (Greek) church also had lost its higher clergy and the following of thousands of the Szlachta and peasants. In the cities and towns the dissenters were ejected from office. Sigismund III had sowed the seeds of hatred and contempt, encouraged the worst monastical schools in the world, aggravated internal disorders under the cloak of religious zeal, and thereby compelled the dissenters to look for help abroad.

During the interregnum which followed the king's death, the dissenters thought the opportune moment had come to recover their rights. They flocked in masses to Warsaw, to the diet of convocation, and through bribery managed to elect duke Krysztof Radziwill to the chair of marshal of the nuntii, although the primate Wenzyk, the bishops, and George Ossolinski vehemently objected. The dissenters demanded that before the election of the king, their liberties and rights should be secured by annihilating the Tribunal's decrees of 1627, 1629, and 1630; that freedom of conscience should be guaranteed; that criminals should be punished according to law; that churches which had been alienated during the late reign should be restored; that permission should be granted to build new churches in places where a Catholic Church existed; that assailants of ministers should be legally punished; that the king should swear to the formal oath—"Sine discrimine religionis dignos et bene meritos ad honores, dignitates et beneficia Rei-publicae admittam, recipiam vel promovebo"; that the Jesuit colleges should be transferred from Vilna and Lublin for public safety, etc. The

Dis-Uniates also presented similar stipulations. These demands were strenuously opposed by the archbishop, the bishops, and some senators.[36] The dissenters had a considerable armed escort with them and were able to enforce their stipulations. Only through the intervention of Vladislav was bloodshed averted and concessions to the dissenters and Dis-Uniates agreed to, although the Catholic bishops added to their signatures the ominous clause: "Salvis juribus sanctae Ecclesiae Romanae". The remaining complaints were to be settled in the electoral diet. The elections to this diet were turbulent, the Szlachta were on the verge of sabring each other, and many protests followed in the towns, especially in Brest, where bishop A. Grochovski, with Leo Sapiega, Alexander Louis Radziwill, A. Massalski, etc., entered a vigorous protest against harmonizing with the dissenters. The electoral diet met in Warsaw in 1632, and Krysztof Radziwill with the palatine Leszczynski arrived with five thousand well drilled soldiers. The dissenters demanded that the concessions of the diet of convocation should be made more extensive. The intervention of Vladislav was again salutary, and the concessions were affirmed after many altercations, although the "Salvae" remained intact. Vladislav gave the dissenters assurances in writing. To insure liberty for themselves the dissenters resolved to hold conventions every year; and accordingly one was held in Orla (Podlasia) in 1633 and another in Vlodava in 1634. They agreed to have uniform Agenda in all the churches of Lithuania and of Little and Great Poland, and created for each province a superintendent, whose term in Lithuania was to last for one year only. In 1636 the synod of Vilna elected Balzer Labencki to be the sixth senior of a new district.[37] In 1637 they agreed to pay two thous-

[36] *E. g.*, Leo Sapiega, George Ossolinski, Albert Radziwill, etc.

[37] The churches of the Helvetic Confession in Lithuania were divided into six districts, viz., the districts of Vilna, Novogrodek, Zavileika, Podlasia, Samogetia, and White Russia. Each of these districts in the sixteenth century, and at the beginning of the seventeenth, contained a score of churches, not including in this number many chapels which

and florins a year for the school in Keidany and appropriated a sum for the publication of a "Postilla" by Abraham Scultetus.

But after all the situation did not change much in the reign of the circumspect Vladislav IV. The Jesuits declared void all concessions to the dissenters, and soon found occasion to inflict a severe blow upon them. During a baptismal celebration in the house of the minister Jurski in Vilna, some intoxicated guests shot arrows at the statue of St. Michael on the Franciscan Church, which stood opposite to the Helvetic (Calvinistic) Church. The Jesuit students and an infuriated mob soon beleaguered the buildings of the Calvinistic Church, but were repelled by the Hetman's soldiery with the loss of a few lives. The mob then attacked the dwelling-house of George Hartlib, rector of the Helvetic school, and were making preparations to drown its owner, when the Hetman's footsoldiers arrived on the scene, saved the victim from certain death, and dispersed the rowdies. The bishop reported the matter to the king, and demanded a judicial investigation. The king asked the interested parties to settle the affair amicably among themselves. The bishop insisted on a severe punishment of the heretics; and a commission was appointed for investigation, consisting of bishop Ben. Voina, palatine Krysztof Radziwill, Sapiega, M. Tryzna, castellan Kiszka, Rajecki and palatine Janusz Tyszkiewicz. Since there were only two Calvinists on this commission, Radziwill and Rajecki, the Calvinists entered a protest against its constitution. The commission subpoenaed witnesses, and prepared a report for the next diet. The Catholic clergy published circulars for the popu-

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were on the estates of the wealthier Szlachta. The churches were mostly built of wood, with the exception of those of Vilna, (after 1640 this was also of wood) Dubinki, Keidany, (which had two brick churches), Dzievaltovo, Grezhei, Lebiedzevo, and several others. In some of the churches the services were held in the Polish language—in Vilna also in German; at Keidany in Polish and Lithuanian, as also at Naujamestis, Serijai, Popilis, Kurtavenai, etc. Services were conducted in the Russian and Polish language in some churches of White Russia, as in Polotsk, Vitebsk, etc. (J. Lukaszewicz).

lace about the sacrilege, with unjust and partly fabricated accusations of the Calvinists, and the popular fury was further increased at this time by the following incident. A heretic, Przypkovski, had died, and his funeral was personally conducted to the grave by the palatine of Vilna with trumpets, music and drums, and several hundered soldiers. Stones were hurled from some Catholic houses upon the procession, and near the Dominican Church it almost came to bloodshed. The Dominicans entered a protest at Troki, and the bishop complained to the king of the undertakings of the heretics. Nuns acted as witnesses against the Calvinists. In the following diet the Dominicans made their complaints against the Calvinists, and foolishly demanded the dismissal of Janusz Radziwill. Radziwill once more tried to conciliate the nuns, but in vain. On May 21, 1640, the diet tried the case of the nuns against the Church of Vilna, and the contents of the verdict are as follows: 1. Freedom for the Helvetic (Calvinistic) services within the walls of the city is forever forfeited. 2. Services can be transferred to a building outside the city, at the cemetery. 3. Permission for schools and all hospitals is totally cancelled. 4. As soon as the mother-superior of the cloister with seven nuns shall swear to the prescribed oath, the persons who are guilty shall be punished with death. 5. If the latter should be apprehended, execution must follow within six weeks; if they escape they shall be in eternal infamy and their property shall be confiscated. 6. Whoever assists the guilty persons with advice or money shall be punished with infamy. 7. If the city officials should be derelict in executing justice, they shall be fined accordingly, as the law prescribes for derelict officers.

The following formula of an oath was prescribed for the nuns: "We N. N. swear to the Lord, One in the Holy Trinity, that arrows were shot from the (Calvinistic) Church, on the Church of St. Michael, and the pictures on top of it, with the knowledge and connivance of the ministers, predicants, and housekeepers living there, to the insult of the

Holy Catholic church, viz., John Jurski, who at that time was celebrating the baptism of his son, also Balzer Labencki, the senior minister of that church, who reside there constantly, who know best the names of those who fired the shots, and are acquainted with them, and whom we know to be the principals; that we swear rightfully, so help us God and this holy Evangel." The formula of this oath is inconsistent with the complaint of the nuns, who had accused the Calvinists of Vilna, beside other excesses such as blasphemy against the Catholic Church and contempt of the nuns, of having maliciously shot arrows from a bow toward St. Michael's Church, so that the arrows, entering the church had almost killed the nuns at prayer, and had killed some beggars in the churchyard, etc.; but the nuns did not swear to those facts, which evidently shows that this affair was adjudicated not only illegally and informally but even without conscientiousness. And the nuns themselves—whatever the cause—objected to this ominous oath for a long time, until on the last day of the prescribed date, July 21, under the bishop's threat of excommunication, they agreed to it.

The excitement which this injustice aroused among the Calvinists of Vilna, and the whole of Lithuania, can hardly be imagined; but neither the protests entered in the cities, nor the open disapproval of the injustice, nor even the public threats of the dissenters, kept the enemy from the most careful execution of the diet's verdict. The Church was closed at once, and the persons convicted by the nuns' oath—the senior Labencki, the minister Jurski, and Hartlib,[88] the dean

[88] Hartlib's fate, after his flight from Lithuania is not known to the writer. It would be interesting to learn whether there was a relationship between him and Samuel Hartlib († 1670), a friend of Milton, who was born toward the close of the sixteenth century, probably in Elbing. His father was a Polish merchant (of a family originally settled in Lithuania) who was a Protestant and emigrated to Prussia to escape the persecution of the Jesuits. In 1644 Milton addressed to him his treatise on education; the pamphlet is full of praise of Hartlib. The following famous sentence is from his essay: "I shall detain you now no longer in the demonstration of what we should not do, but straight conduct you to a hillside, where I will point you out the right

of the school—did not wait until the Tribunal would stretch out its hand for their heads, but fled to the elector of Brandenburg with letters of recommendation and a subsidy from Radziwill. Krysztof Radziwill became despondent and sick, and died September 19, 1640, and with him died the last hope of the dissenters, for the palatinate of Vilna was now conferred upon a Catholic, Tyszkiewicz.

Soon after, in 1641, the minister, Jacob Chelchonski, when returning from a visit to a sick woman in the city, was attacked by the Jesuit students and beaten almost into insensibility. Niegovicki, who escorted him and tried to interfere, was also assaulted. Then the students complained to their dean of the unwelcome presence of the minister in their city; and the good dean granted them permission if they should meet a minister again, to strip him of his clothing.

It soon happened that the ministers Gedarla and Chelchonski visited Janusz Radziwill in his castle, and were on their way to the church. The students surrounded them, stripped and beat them into insensibility, and threw them over a fence into a neighboring garden. Sosnowski and Golimont entered a protest in the city and made an inquest. Janusz Radziwill demanded satisfaction from the bishop, and as this was not forthcoming, he asked king Vladislav IV to punish the culprits. The bishop now promised to find out and punish the perpetrators, but when the people quieted down nothing was done. Similarly Jacob Stulichius, a minister of Jamna, when on a visit at Brest, was mercilessly beaten by the Jesuit students. Churches in some places were set on fire, and their property was stolen and appropriated with impunity. Even their fellow-citizens began to dispute the right of the dissenters to hold office. When K. Gosievski, the palatine of Smolensk, had nominated John

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path of a virtuous and noble education; laborious indeed at the first ascent, but else so smooth, so green, so full of goodly prospects, and melodious sounds on every side, that the harp of Orpheus was not more charming."

Poplonski, a Calvinist, to the office of judge, his fellow-citizens refused to recognize his nomination.

King Vladislav IV, in order to put an end to these internal discords, conceived the idea of tranquillizing the parties through a friendly colloquy ("Colloquium Charitativum") of the theologians (with the exception of the Socinians), with a view to keeping the dissenters from seeking help abroad, especially in Moscow. In his rescript the king invited the Lithuanian and Polish dissenters to come to Thorn in 1644. The dissenters, though distrustful, were unwilling to insult the king, and promised to come. After holding provincial synods, they called a general convention to Orla (Podlasia), which was presided over by Janusz Radziwill. In a letter directed to the king, the synod mentioned the tolerance of the Jagellon family, but doubted the success of the proposed colloquy. "Your Majesty proposes as mediators the Right Reverend Lithuanian and Polish bishops, men of influence at home and distinguished by merit. But we submit to your Majesty's consideration whether the oath which they swore to the Roman See, and in which neither you, nor the fatherland nor the rights of the Republic have even been mentioned, should not become an obstacle to this affair? Moreover, your Majesty nominates as chairman of this colloquy a man eminent for episcopal and senatorial offices, as well as for purity of character. But although each side is to have its own chairman, where is the third chairman, to reconcile their differences, especially in a friendly colloquy, when, if certain rules for deciding questions should not be adopted, the whole affair will depend on the theologians of both sides? It is no secret to your Majesty how demands and wishes of much less weight are received at Rome. Your Majesty also knows that even in smaller matters, as the tithes, prescriptions or ecclesiastical transfers, even your Majesty, together with the bishops, archbishop, and the primate of the kingdom, through your own dignity cannot reach any settlement with the Catholics for the best interests of the Church, nor any decisions. . . .

But some one may say that we, the Evangelicals, subjects of your Majesty, are wilfully placing obstacles in the way of your Majesty's holy aims, in order to avoid a public report of our Confession. But your Majesty's letter was preceded by a call, to which were added slanders,[89] especially from Vilna, and in the letter of invitation there was a contemptuous allusion to our yoke of slavery, deviating from the custom of our fatherland and of our free people, so that this would be a proper instance of a just excuse on our part for not participating in the colloquy."

After the general convention at Orla, the Lithuanian Calvinists held a synod in Vilna in 1645, where they discussed the proposed friendly colloquy at Thorn, and elected the following delegates: M. Vysocki, senior of the Podlasia district, Andrew Musonius, senior of the Novogrodek district, and Reinhold Adami, the court preacher of Janusz Radziwill. These were sent to Thorn with full powers, and instructions as to what they should say and do. The friendly colloquy of Thorn, however, instead of accomplishing the results desired by the king, made hotter the friction between the religious denominations. With bleeding hearts, and with many protests in their hands, the dissenters returned home. The Lithuanian delegates made a report to the synod of Vilna in 1646, and the synod acted favorably on all the steps they had taken. But Vladislav IV, not deterred by his ill success, purposed to renew the colloquy at Sandomir; he also endeavored to reconcile the Uniates with Dis-Uniates, but died before accomplishing it.

In the reign of John Casimir (1648-1668), the Calvinists at first enjoyed peace, although in 1647 Janusz Radziwill had implicated himself in the disagreeable affair of tearing down a cross. The public mind was occupied with the re-

[89] This is an allusion to the call which Abraham Voina, bishop of Vilna, had nailed on the door of the Calvinistic Church, where among other things we read: Quomodo illi (the Calvinists) animas diversarum nationum et regnorum falsis suis ac perversis dogmatibus a vera sancta catholica Romana ecclesia abducunt, etc. The Calvinists entered a protest in the city records against this proclamation of the bishop.

volt of Chmielnicki, whose blood-thirsty army had reached the heart of Lithuania; and the Jesuits were afraid that, during the civil war, Janusz and Boguslav Radziwill, possessors of vast estates and castles, would severely punish every excess on their part. The dissenters used this time of security for strengthening their organization at home. The synods at Vilna in 1647, 1650, 1653, 1654, and 1655, decreed and effected the restoration of the schools at Keidany, renewed the Sandomir Consensus with Little Poland, made a uniform ritual for all their churches, and established a seminary with a library at Zabludovo. But in 1656, when the Swedes had occupied Poland and also overrun Lithuania, the Hetman, Janusz Radziwill, and his cousin, Boguslav Radziwill, submitted themselves to the protection of King Charles Gustavus, and persisting in treason, fought against their own country, while the Catholics turned to its support. Janusz Radziwill, besieged at Tykocin by the national army, died and escaped deserved punishment. Boguslav fell into the hands of the Poles but, liberated again by the Swedes, was subservient to foreign interests until his death. In this war many Calvinists were slain by the hand of their fellow-citizens and many churches were burned down. Divine services and all the synods were abandoned, the schools were closed, and the Szlachta and the ministers sought shelter at Königsberg. The treaty of Oliva (1660) gave no relief to Lithuania, since the Muscovites held the country in their possession and especially vexed the Uniates and dissenters. Although Lithuania was cleared of the enemy by the perseverence of John Casimir, the Calvinists in this war lost more churches than ever before;—in Vitebsk, Polotsk, Minsk, Szazk, Holovczyna, Sokolin, etc. In 1667, when the synod ordered Krysztof of Zarnoviec, the consenior of the district of White Russia, to regain possession of them and to appoint ministers, he encountered the greatest difficulties and even his life was in danger more than once. Another painful loss to the Calvinists was the death of Janusz Radziwill, the last dissenting senator of Lithu-

ania, who left an only daughter, Maria Anna. After her father's death, she was educated at the court of the duchess of Courland. Fortunately she was espoused by Boguslav Radziwill, the grandregent of East Prussia, not only on account of her personal beauty, but especially in view of the religious interests involved. This marriage assured the dissenters not only of protection, but also of peace for some years. Several churches were restored, liturgical books were printed in the Polish and Lithuanian languages, and a translation of the Lithuanian Bible was prepared. But funds were lacking, and the synod of Vilna in 1663 resolved to send abroad the ministers Krainski and Nicholas Monvid, the former to make collections in England and Scotland, the latter to supervise the printing of the Bible in London.

When King John Casimir abdicated the Polish throne in 1668, the situation of the Calvinists in Lithuania was deplorable. In Vilna, Vitebsk, Polotsk, Minsk, etc., a Calvinist was seldom met among the inhabitants, and those remaining were excluded from city or country offices and dignities. The Catholic consistories robbed them of their churches in accordance with the law of 1588.[40] They were prosecuted before the consistories and tribunals for blasphemy of the Holy Virgin or other saints. Their ministers were not permitted to hold synods, to baptize, to perform marriage ceremonies, or to bury their deceased co-religionists. Oftentimes their dead were taken out of the graves, maltreated, and mutilated. Churches were torn down or set on fire, and their dwelling-houses assaulted and robbed. They were forbidden to print their religious books, etc. To all this were added the horrors of the wars with Moscow, the Cossacks, and the Swedes, the pestilence following in their path, the destruction of half the population, the survivors being plunged in misery and destitution. Such was the condition of the dissenters in Lithuania in 1668.

The Calvinists sent three deputies to the diet of election, to secure a statute insuring for the dissenters civil equality

[40] E. g., at Sniady, Wyzainis, Szventazeris, and Serijai.

and peace at home. A convention at Keidany in 1669 tried to renew intimate relations with the Lithuanian Lutherans on the basis of the Sandomir Consensus of 1570, but the Lutherans turned a deaf ear to their overtures. In the midst of these endeavors, the grandregent of Prussia, Boguslav Radziwill, died in 1670, leaving one daughter, Carolina Louisa, as heiress of his immense estates in Lithuania, Samogetia, White Russia and Polesia. He was the last dissenting descendant of the Radziwill line at Birzei, Dubinki, Sluzk, and Kopyl, and the last dissenting magnate of great influence. The state of the dissenting Church at this time was tersely stated by Nicholas Dziakowicz, senior of the Vilna district, in 1674: "Messis quantulacunque, operarii pauci, quin imo breve, si nos labori succubuerimus, futuri nulli." Besides, the Calvinists were afraid that Carolina Louisa would wed a Catholic and the churches in her estates in this event would cease to exist. But, thanks to her wealth, she was espoused by Louis, son of the elector of Brandenburg, and the joy of the Calvinists was great indeed. They expressed their congratulations through the minister Monvid, and in return the bridegroom in 1682 donated a fund to the German academies at Königsberg, Frankfort on the Oder, and Berlin, for twelve Lithuanian students who should devote themselves to the study of theology. Besides, Carolina Louisa paid the expenses of some Lithuanian students at Oxford (*e. g.*, Lutomirski). In 1681 she ordered a Lithuanian catechism to be printed and distributed gratuitously to the villagers.

In 1682, the dean of the academy in Vilna incited his students to destroy the church of the Calvinists. At once the ministers' dwelling-houses were robbed, the church archives plundered, and the church razed to the ground; graves were opened, and the putrifying bodies torn to pieces or burned. Some ministers managed to escape unnoticed by the mob, such as Krysztof Trzebicki Taubman. Others, such as Michael Trzebicki Taubman and Gaspar Pokucki, hid themselves in the tombs which contained cof-

fins. In the mean time Michael Puzyna arrived with his armed servants and escorted the ministers to the Franciscan cloister, which they left under cover of night for a safer shelter. This was on the second day of April, 1682. On the following day the mob continued the work of destruction with the connivance of the palatine, Michael Pac, who had left the city early in the morning, but died on the road in the evening. Casimir John Sapiega arrived in the city with a detachment from the army, seized some few malefactors and stopped the riot.

The Calvinists became terror-stricken. Where could they find protection and justice? They wrote complaints to Carolina Louisa, and asked her to interest the Protestant courts abroad. She replied that their procedure was unwise and urged them to seek redress at home, at the court of a king who loved peace and justice. She also sent some money to the ministers, and permitted them to hold services and to live in her castle at Vilna. John III Sobieski appointed a commission of investigation, consisting of Alexander Kotovicz, Casimir John Sapiega, Benedict Paul Sapiega, Joseph Sluzka, Czyz, and Paul Boncza Sienicki, the plenipotentiary of Carolina Louisa. The Commission cited before its tribunal the chief instigators,—the Jesuits—and the magistrate of Vilna, and was in fact about to punish the culprits, when the Jesuits helped them to escape. The verdict was nevertheless promulgated, the magistrate was admonished to take better care for the maintenance of peace, and the Calvinists were permitted to rebuild their Church and other structures, while the leader of the riot was placed on the proscription list.

After all this the Calvinistic churches continued to suffer damage at the hand of fanatics; the erection of new churches was prohibited; and any denunciation was sufficient to call forth citation of the Calvinists before a tribunal—as when Pacewicz, administrator of the estates of Carolina Louisa, was cited before the bishop to answer the charge of exhorting his wife to abjure Catholicism; or, as another illustra-

tion of persecution, when in Naujamestis and in the village of Boyñarovo, the property of Carolina Louisa, some vestiges of idolatry were found, the Catholics used force in the conversion of the people to their faith and added them to their parishes.

During these persecutions, Louis, the son of the elector of Brandenburg, husband of Carolina Louisa, died in 1687. Soon afterwards Carolina Louisa married the pfalzgraf, Charles of Neuburg. Although by this act she had forfeited her estates from the house of Sobieski,—for she had promised her hand to Jacob, the son of king Sobieski—yet, through bribery of the senators and nuntii, she escaped the just confiscation of her possessions; and in this difficulty she was valiantly supported by the Lithuanian Calvinists. The Calvinists were now taking care of their affairs in other respects. The synod at Bielica in 1686, imposed the task upon the superintendent Nicholas Monvid, with Michael Taubman Trzebicki, of revising and compiling the archives at Birzei. The synod of Bielica in 1689 entrusted to the ministers Paterson, Jordan, Samuel Lutomirski, and Daniel Mikolajevski, the translation of the Belgian Bible with annotations into Polish. The synod at Keidany in 1691, decided to hold synods every year, alternating in each district—at Zuprany in the district of Vilna, at Bielica in the district of Novogrodek, at Zabludovo in the district of Podlasia, at Keidany in Samogetia, at Koydonovo in White Russia, and at Birzei in the district of Zavileika. At Bielica in 1694 it was decreed that the ministers should keep a record of facts concerning their churches and their flocks and present these records to the synods and the archives. These records constitute very important material for the history of the Reformation in Lithuania, if they should ever be published. This same synod resolved to spend fifteen thousand florins, which Baron Henry Putkamer had donated, in buying the estate of Szydlovo as the common property of all the Calvinistic churches. In 1687, Carolina Louisa bestowed free scholarships upon four students, ministers' sons,

to pursue their studies at the University of Königsberg. In 1695 the duchess of Neuburg died, after a short but useful life. She had cared for the churches and schools of her denomination on her estates. She had ordered at her expense that liturgical books be printed in the Polish and Lithuanian languages, and even in the year of her death she assigned the sum of five thousand florins for the printing of the New Testament.[41] She donated her printing establishment at Sluzk to the Lithuanian churches. Her biography was written by Krysztof Bythner. I do not know whether it has ever been published, although it might make interesting reading. She was the last heiress of the Radziwills at Birzei of the Helvetic Confession. Her estates, which bore one million florins yearly,—Birzei, Kopyl, Sluzk, Zabludovo, Keidany, Siebiez, etc.—were inherited by the daughter of her second marriage, Elizabeth, who married a Catholic. But Serijai and Tworki had been assigned by Carolina

[41] Inasmuch as Krainskis' Bible (erroneously called Chylinskis'), a Lithuanian translation, through lack of funds, remained in London unfinished, a new translation was prepared, but unfortunately during a fire in 1681 at Birzei the manuscript was lost. Thereupon Samuel Bythner translated the New Testament, which was approved by the synod at Bielica in 1697 and printed at the expense of the late Carolina Louisa.

Speaking in general, the Protestants were the creators of Lithuanian literature, and the Lutherans were its pioneers, especially Mosvidius of Ragaine, Bartholemew Villentas, and John Bretkunas of Labguva († 1602) who was probably the first to translate the Bible into Lithuanian. The Calvinists continued the work begun by Lutherans, and by their publications stimulated the Roman Catholic clergy to similar work. The Calvinists published in 1653 the "Book of Devotion," and tried to publish the Bible in London in 1663, but S. B. Chylinski, who was sent abroad to collect funds, squandered in England what he had collected; and his place was taken by J. K. Krainski († 1685). But the Bible was printed only as far as the fortieth Psalm. Its translation was made by George Skrodzki († 1683) and John Bazymauskas, senior of Samogetia († 1671), and some few other ministers, who are unknown. The only known copy of this Bible was donated in 1805 to the library of the University of Vilna, and in 1842 it became the property of the Roman Catholic Academy of St. Petersburg. Extracts from this Bible were published in 1887 by E. A. Volter, and they are very interesting from a linguistic standpoint. The bibliography of S. Baltramaitis mentions many Lithuanian publications.

Louisa to the house of Brandenburg, and thereby the existence of the Calvinistic churches was secured. Soon king John Sobieski also died (1696). At the end of his reign there were yet in Lithuania 48 Calvinistic Churches, 4 higher schools, 47 ministers, and a considerable number of noble families who accepted this Confession, such as Putkamer, Grabowski, Zablocki, Mackiewicz, Gintovt, Czyz, Estko, etc. In the towns (*e. g.*, Keidany, Zabludovo, Vengrovo, etc.), there lived many Scottish families faithful to their creed. But many churches had disappeared.[42] Among the magnates there were families that either became extinct or abjured Calvinism (*e. g.*, Potocki of Sidra, Puzyna, Szczuk, Szvykovski, etc)

At the present time the position of the Calvinistic Church in Lithuania has been improved, comparatively speaking. The Russian government, though persecuting the Roman Catholics, has been more lenient to Calvinism, although the Lithuanian Calvinists were not able to escape the prohibitions which affect the Lithuanians as a nation. The Calvinistic books, and even the Bible, were until recently on the index of prohibited books. The Catholic Lithuanians themselves, educated in the spirit of Jesuitism, which still smoulders, shun them as heretics, and call them "bambizas", the slang term for Calvinists or for Protestants in general. But the Calvinists in Lithuania occupy a higher standing in intellectual development than their Catholic neighbors and in general are doing better as farmers. Liberty of conscience and of the press, which will certainly be the result of the present revolution in Russia, ought to bring the Calvinists to the front in the life of the Lithuanian nation. With greater effort and new devotion to the cause of Protestantism, which may well be inspired by present conditions,

[42] In the Vilna district, at Rykontai, Balberiszkis, Ovanta, Vyzainis, Szventazeris, etc.; in Samogetia, at Zeimei, Gelava, etc.; in the Novogrodek district, at Sielubin, etc.; in White Russia, at Ivienia, Zaslav, Minsk, Szazk, Kuchcice, Servecz, Smycz, Holovczyn, Vitebsk, Polotzk, Sokolin, Derevnia, Dory, Uzda, Novy Bychov, Rogaczev, Szklov, Taimanovo, Kovalevszczyzna, Rakov, etc.

the Calvinists may again occupy the place of which they have been deprived during the last three hundred years. But a helping hand should be extended to them by their co-religionists of other lands to lighten their struggle and inspire them with greater energy.

Philadelphia, Pa. JOHN SZLUPAS.

HISTORICAL NOTE.

THE THEORY OF ANCESTOR WORSHIP AMONG THE HEBREWS.

The question of ancestor-worship in Israel first emerged in connection with the animistic theory of the origin of religion. Edward B. Tylor in his *Primitive Culture* (1871) and Herbert Spencer in his *Sociology* (1876) discuss the question only on the basis of the philosophy of religion. In Spencer's view all religion is an expansion and application of ancestor-worship, and originated in the anxious dreams of hungry or overfed savages, who in their troubled sleep saw deceased ancestors, and endeavored to find means of avoiding these unpleasant experiences in the future. "Jahweh was first worshiped as an ancestor" is the assumption which his theory compels him to make. "Spencer has faced the question that his philosophy required him to face, that of accounting for religion by natural causes; but to show that the origin of religion may be as he describes it, does not furnish proof that such is its origin." To prove his theory he should have shown that when homage was first paid to ancestors, no homage was paid to gods, so that it might be clear that ancestor-worship does not presuppose a belief in gods. He should have shown that filial piety is worship such as is paid to the gods: that a belief in regard to the continued existence of ancestors is an ancestor-cult.

Spencer's theory touches the question of ancestor-worship in Israel only in the assertion that the Jews worshiped an ancestor in Jehovah. Julius Lippert (*Der Seelencult in seinen Beziehungen zur althebräischen Religion,* 1881) applies the Tylor-Spencer theory specifically to Israel. He attempts to show that the worship of the souls or spirits of the departed had a prominent place in the religious life of ancient Israel; and although he does not say in so many words that Jehovah is one of Moses' ancestors, and that Jehovism originated in this worship of ancestors, he seemingly finds such a supposition not unbelievable. "At any rate ancestor-worship long maintained itself against the will of the reforming Jehovists,

and has left unmistakable traces in the people." A similar, but far more scholarly, application of this general theory to Rome and Greece was made by Fustel de Coulanges in his *La Cité Antique* (1872).

H. Oort (Doodenvereering by de Israëlieten, *Theol. Tijdschrift,* XV, 1881, pp. 350ff.) is the first to remove the question from the general sphere of the philosophy of religion to that of comparative religion, inasmuch as he endeavors by a critical examination of the data found in the Old Testament, Apocrypha, and Talmudic literature, to establish his thesis that ancestors were worshiped in Israel. His investigation attaches itself to the results of the criticism conducted by the school of Graf-Wellhausen, and so his conclusions depend in many respects on the truth of the reconstructed history. He examines the Hebrew conception of the soul, etc., and of Sheol; he offers an explanation of Hebrew mourning-customs, and of offerings to the dead. He does not find the origin of Jehovism in ancestor-worship, but traces a conflict between the two through the whole history. Thus from being the origin of Israel's religion as with Lippert, ancestor-worship becomes a rival religion to Jehovism; and the attempt is not made to find a general explanation of all religious phenomena. Stade follows Oort in that he also frees himself from the Spencerian theory of the origin of religion, and correlates Jehovism and ancestor-worship as contending in Israel for supremacy, with the victory ever more unmistakably falling to the side of Jehovism. (G. V. I.[2] 1889, and also his *Biblical Theology,* 1905.) Schwally, Stade's disciple, states the views of those who hold the theory of ancestor-worship in Israel *in extenso,* and defends them ably and soberly. (*Das Leben nach dem Tode,* 1892.) Important is his admission that ancestor-worship was already conquered in essentials when Israel first appears on the horizon of history. He also admits that the attempt to find ancestor-worship is a matter of exegesis, there being no unequivocal statement in extant Jewish literature which proves its existence as a *Nebenkult.*

Johannes Frey (*Tod, Seelenglaube u. Seelenkult im alten Israel,* 1898) under the influence of F. Max Müller's view (*Gifford Lectures,* 1891) attempts to prove that ancestor-worship never existed in Israel; not even in Mosaic times, when

according to him Jehovism already flourished. He does not deny its practice among the heathen, but Israel was monotheistic. "Hier ist aus dem Seelenglauben zu keiner Zeit ein Seelenkult erwachsen, sondern Israel's Kult hat allezeit kein anderes Objekt gehabt als die machtvol über Natur und Menschen waltende Gottheit," and with this theology ancestor-worship was incompatible. It is true that the worship of ancestors did come in through heathen influence; but even then it lost its distinctive character, because it was absorbed into the worship of Jehovah. Frey maintains that Jehovism existed before Moses' time; and even allows for the possibility of a primitive revelation; although, as is natural, he makes no use of such a belief in his argument. He meets the advocates of ancestor-worship on their own ground; and in the main he shows clearly that their explanation of the passages involved is, if not absolutely wrong, at least not the only possible one. And in his concluding section he comes very near to leaving the field of comparative religion as such entirely, and to considering Israel's religion to have been on a higher, *i. e.*, supernatural, plane from its origin.

R. H. Charles (*Eschatology,* 1899, pp. 19ff.) assumes the truth of the Stade-Schwally hypothesis, and on that basis constructs an elaborate theory, philosophical rather than critical, which in many respects hangs in the air. His construction is self-consistent and skilful; but it lacks convincing power, because he does not deign to give proof for many of the assertions on which it rests. His first thesis, that "the ancestors or their images, the household gods, were honored with sacrifices, and the right of offering these sacrifices was restricted to a son of the departed," resolves itself on examination into a series of assumptions and misstatements of facts.

Carl Grüneisen is the latest to write exhaustively on the subject (*Der Ahnenkultus und die Urreligion Israels,* 1900), and since his book appeared the matter has received only incidental mention in periodicals or general works (J. C. Matthes, Th. Tijds. XXXIV, 1900, pp. 97, 193; XXXV, 1901, pp. 320, 464; Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible, II, 200[b] 445[b] IV, 718[b] V, 614[a]; J. Wellhausen, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung,* 1900, No. 20). Grüneisen undertakes a thorough sifting of all the work that has gone before, and in many respects his treatise

may be considered final. Still, he denies ancestor-worship, only to give to ancient Israel a yet lower animistic conception of religion, closely allied to that advocated by Kautzsch in Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible. His work as reviewer and compiler is in large measure nullified by his own theory of the eschatological conceptions of the Hebrews—a theory in which his critic, Matthes, points out many inconsistencies. Matthes himself presents the theory of ancestor-worship in Israel in its most thoroughgoing form, asserting that the dead were worshiped in Israel unrebuked by Jehovism until the time of the origin of the Priestly Code; not even D entirely condemns it.

All the writers mentioned, with the possible exception of Frey as indicated above, are controlled by a naturalistic bias. In their discussions they include Israel's religion with the other ethnic religions, and assume that religion must have had the same origin and development in Israel as it had in other nations. This position is not taken after a comparison and as the result of a comparison, but on the basis of a deduction: all other religions, especially in their primitive stages, show ancestor-worship as a principal element, or the principal element; therefore it must also have been an element of Israel's religion. Thus they argue; and thereby their investigations become in reality a search for ancestor-worship rather than a studious consideration of the data which the literature gives. This ignoring of the possible supernatural character of Israel's religion in its inception and in its progress is perfectly legitimate for purposes of scientific inquiry, and even necessary; but to assume at the outset that Israel's history is a natural development, and to use this assumption as a determining factor in the argument, is not legitimate in view of the fact that Israel's religion claims to be different from other religions. The right method is to view the data *per se (voraussetzungslos)*, and not to exclude at the outset the possibility of the supernatural in Jehovism. It may be that ancestor-worship will be found side by side with Jehovism, and the conclusion may be inevitable that the claims made by and for the religion of Israel are false; this conclusion, however, cannot be a postulate for scientific investigation, but only a result of it. Of course, if the results claimed by current modern criticism are

to be accepted without reserve, then the question of ancestor-worship becomes only a subordinate factor in the discussion of religious development in Israel; but if ancestor-worship is to be examined by itself, the question of the supernaturalness of Israel's religion must be left open until the results that such an examination yields have been given their proper weight. What must be done, then, is to examine the data that have a possible bearing on ancestor-worship, not on the basis of a theory of comparative religions which assumes that Israel's religion must be the same as other religions, but with the possibility left open that Israel's religion was due to more than purely natural causes. Supernaturalism must not be assumed, but neither must its possibility be denied. If after such an investigation ancestor-worship is found in Israel, one of two conclusions follows. Either it is sporadic and imported from heathen sources, or else it is a constituent element of Israel's faith. It may be found that both these results are true, since they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. One group of data may show that ancestor-worship was not inherent, but adopted; while another set of facts may show that an ancestor-worship of a different complexion was fundamental to the beliefs of the people. If this last conclusion is reached by an impartial examination of the data, it may become necessary to determine whether, after all a particular belief in regard to ancestors and certain rites observed in their honor necessarily lead to a worship of, a cult for, the dead; in other words, whether an Israelitish belief in regard to ancestors, similar to the belief of other nations—which in their religious history developed into ancestor-worship—must of necessity also have developed into ancestor-worship in the course of Israel's history. If this question confronts the investigator after his study, his view of the supernatural will determine whether he finds ancestor-worship in Israel or not. The supernaturalist will maintain that the belief, which without revelation grew into a cult, in Israel under the influence of revelation was checked and, in a state of what might be called arrested development, was subordinated to Jehovism. Here again is the ever-recurring antithesis of revelation and evolution. The results of an investigation which leads only to this, can be used by neither side as a support for their respective views. Schwal-

ly's admission that there is no direct evidence and Frey's attempt to distinguish between *Seelenglaube* and *Seelenkult* seem to indicate that the question of ancestor-worship in Israel must be left in this condition. The supernaturalist, however, can admit, if the evidence points this way, that Israel's primitive beliefs did result in ancient days in ancestor-worship as did those of other peoples, and still maintain the unique character of Hebrew religion; for Jehovism could have absorbed parts of such a cult into itself in remote times, and emptied rites and conceptions of their original meaning. When, however, it is maintained that a long conflict was waged between Jehovism and ancestor-worship, which waxed fiercer and fiercer as their irreconcilability became more and more apparent, the supernaturalist must enter his protest; for this savors too much of the Wellhausian reconstruction, which presupposes a growing clearness in Israel's appreciation of the real content of its religion. Even here the uniqueness of Jehovism might be rescued by distinguishing between its official teachers and that popular faith, which did not penetrate to the inherent incompatibility of the worship of ancesters with the worship of Jehovah. Even legislative regulation may be found to be not inconsistent with the idea of an accommodation to an ignorance possible in a perfection that does not involve completeness. All these suggested interpretations of a possible trace of ancestor-worship in Israel, which an impartial investigation may discover, surely show that the question has no direct bearing on the "Problem of the Old Testament" which confronts this generation. It is an archaeological question pure and simple, and should be investigated, in a spirit free from dogmatic prejudice on the one hand, and philosophical presuppositions as to the origin of religion on the other. Whatever the result, the traditionalist's faith in the supernatural need not be weakened by it; nor can the evolutionist's position be strengthened by it.

The general trend of the discussion in regard to ancestor-worship in Israel and the character of the data to be considered may easily be gathered from the main subdivisions of Grüniesen's treatise. They are the following:

I. Belief of the ancient Israelites in regard to the soul and the condition after death.

II. Worship of the dead in Israel.
   1. Mourning-customs.
   2. Burial and offerings to the dead.
   3. Exorcism in Israel.

III. Ancestor-worship.
   1. Honoring of ancestors.
   2. Household cult.
   3. The Hebrew family and ancestor-worship.
   4. The tribe and ancestor-worship.

Princeton. SIDNEY ZANDSTRA.

REVIEWS OF
RECENT LITERATURE

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

Some Dogmas of Religion. By John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart, Doctor in Letters, Fellow and Lecturer of Trinity College in Cambridge, Author of *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, and *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*. London: Edward Arnold. 1906. 8vo.; pp. xx. 299.

Dr. McTaggart presents us in this volume with a reasoned plea for atheism. His atheism is based neither upon materialism nor upon a complete scepticism, but upon an idealistic metaphysic. The particular form of idealism to which he holds is that which (as he supposes) underlay the systems of Fichte, Hegel and Lotze; and which conceives reality as ultimately consisting of a harmonious system of self-existent selves: it may perhaps be designated idealistic pluralism. He does not in this volume set forth the grounds on which he holds to this metaphysic. It is not its purpose to establish his metaphysical basis. It is its purpose to examine the evidence for the great trilogy of natural religion,—God, Freedom, Immortality,—with a view to determining whether this evidence is adequate. The method of the reasoning is, therefore, critical, and its trend is negative. Dr. McTaggart holds, indeed, that there exist arguments of sufficient strength to justify a belief in human immortality. But these are not the arguments which are commonly relied upon, but reduce to those which establish the idealistic theory of the fundamental nature of reality. And as it is not the purpose of this volume to determine the fundamental characteristics of reality these arguments are not adduced. All that is done is, by a critical examination of the arguments ordinarily relied upon in disproof of immortality, to remove objections out of the way, and then to suggest that, as the really telling arguments for immortality are metaphysical rather than moral, they tend to commend to us a doctrine of eternity rather than of immortality—a doctrine of preëxistence as truly as of post-existence, for human beings,—Dr. McTaggart himself being inclined to construe this eternity of existence in terms of transmigration. With his fundamental conception of reality as a system of selves, freedom presents no necessary inconsistency, provided this freedom be not construed out of relation to the law of causality. Accordingly, if we understand him aright, Dr. McTaggart argues for the doctrine of human freedom ordinarily called the freedom of self-determination,

but called by him, in accordance with a distribution of theories of his own, the freedom of self-direction; although it is possible that he may push his determinism to a mechanical extreme. This chapter is chiefly notable for its clear and convincing refutation of the theory of indeterminism. It is in its examination of theism, however, that the interest of the volume culminates. There is no suggestion of a God inherent in Dr. McTaggart's fundamental metaphysic: and he finds no reason to believe in a God in the lines of argument usually relied on to prove His existence. He feels quite certain that there is no such God as the higher theism demands—an omnipotent Creator and Director of all. To him all existent reality is eternal and ultimate (p. 234)—and there is therefore no place for a Creator, and the Divine Being, if such exists, is limited by the coëxistence of the rest of existing reality. He might find a place for a non-omnipotent, non-creative God,—if there was only valid evidence of His existence. But he discovers none. "There seems to me," he says, "only one reason why we should not believe in his existence—namely, that there is no reason why we should believe in it" (p. 260). The issue of the whole discussion is therefore that the slate is clean: we have no guidance on these great subjects of God, freedom, immortality except the implications of our metaphysical theory. And as in Dr. McTaggart's view a true metaphysic conceives reality as an eternal self-existent system of selves, a true religion, founded on this metaphysic, will do without a God, but will allow a self-determined freedom and an immortality construed as eternity *a parte ante* as well as *a parte post*. Meanwhile all non-metaphysicians are warned off of the religious terrain. No man is justified in holding opinions on these great subjects save as the result of metaphysical study. Religion is therefore for the metaphysician alone. "And thus we are driven to the conclusion that, whether any religion is true or not, most people have no right to accept any religion as true" (p. 293). We may regret this, but we may in part console ourselves with the reflection (among others) "that the man who has no religion cannot have a bad one" (p. 294).

As Dr. McTaggart's purpose in this volume is not to establish conclusions but to clear away conclusions illegitimately established, we should perhaps attend more to his critical method than to what we may incidentally learn of his positive opinions. The progress of his discussion is as follows. He first undertakes to demonstrate the importance of dogma, or rather its indispensableness to religion. Next he endeavors to show that the customary arguments relied on for the establishment of religious dogma are illegitimate. Taking up then the three great dogmas, he examines in turn the ordinary basis for belief in Immortality, Freedom and God, and finds it in all cases inadequate; indicating, however, as he goes on that there exists nevertheless good reason in his metaphysical assumption for belief in immortality and freedom, defined in accordance with its requirements, but not for belief in God. Summing up, finally, he contends that there remains nothing but our metaphysical determinations to rely upon for the establishment

of dogma. The dialectic employed by Dr. McTaggart in his destructive reasoning is very sharp and clear-cut, but not seldom also very formal, descending at times into purely verbal reasoning and even to something not far removed from what has been not very euphoniously called "chop-logic". Great reliance is placed upon definition and the verbal analysis of definition; and it would go hard with any logician if he could not put into his definition precisely what he purposed subsequently to bring out of it by analysis. Dr. McTaggart's logical sense is very acute, and with much of his reasoning the reader will be carried convincingly along: but it not seldom fails to convince because it fails in content. We cannot take space here to illustrate either its excellences or its defects. These may, however, be sufficiently suggested by some desultory remarks on one or two points of primary importance to Dr. McTaggart's argument.

Dr. McTaggart considers "that no man is justified in a religious attitude except as a result of metaphysical study" (p. 292). This judgment rests, however, ultimately on Dr. McTaggart's definition of religion. If religion be so defined as to make it rest on metaphysical conclusions, it should require less than an octavo volume to determine it to be unjustifiable in one who has made no metaphysical study. According to Dr. McTaggart, religion is that "state of mind" which "may be best described as an emotion resting on a conviction of a harmony between ourselves and the universe at large" (p. 3). If this be true, it is clear that no one is entitled to possess a religion until he has contemplated "the universe at large", and has attained a conviction that he himself is in "harmony" with it. Yet it is notorious, (and Dr. McTaggart is at once compelled to admit it), that men are religious who have no conception whatever of a "universe at large"; and that others are religious whose most fundamental conviction is that they are out of harmony with the universe as they conceive it. Why make so long and devious a circuit to get at a fundamental trait of human nature? Why not recognize at once that religion is simply the reaction of the human spirit in the presence of (add the qualification, "real or imagined" if you will) higher powers, perceived as such? Here is a perfectly simple definition which covers all the instances. It may indeed be argued—and successfully argued—that these "higher powers" must be personal since nothing less than personal can be higher than persons; and indeed that they must be one, since the involved attributes are singular; in a word that religion can come to its rights only in Theism, which is in and of its very nature Monotheism. But religion may exist without coming fully to its rights: else it could not exist at all as a "state of mind" of creatures like us. And we need only to recognize that systems like Buddhism which are formally atheistic, and thinkers like Spinoza and Hegel, who think of the higher power in relation to which they perceive themselves as standing, as impersonal, conceive this higher power imperfectly and are absorbed in the contemplation of this or that aspect of it, as *e. g.*, its immensity, its all-inclusiveness, its universal operation,—to understand that their response to its perception may be essentially religious. Re-

ligions thus differ from religions as the conceptions entertained by their subjects of the nature of the higher powers which are their objects differ, and as the conceptions entertained by their subjects of their own relations to these higher powers differ. When these higher powers are conceived as persons, as they are explicitly almost invariably and, one may say, implicitly always (and that seems the significance of Mr. Dickinson's remark quoted on p. 10 that religious emotion is dependent on the universe being "greatly and imaginatively conceived"), then the sense of dependence which lies at the root of all religion (because it grows out of the perception of powers as "higher") is completed by a sense of responsibility (because these powers are perceived as "personal", *i. e.*, as moral agents); and the response of human nature, will take form from the moral judgment which the subjects of religion pass upon themselves. Religions become thus fundamentally religions of fear or religions of hope; and the conceptions, emotions and usages developed by them take form as one or the other of these emotions preponderates in them. Religion is not, therefore, so much "that particular happiness which comes from the belief that we are in harmony with the universe" (p. 9), as rather that particular state of mind which grows out of the conviction that there are higher powers upon our relations with whom our happiness depends. Happiness does not lie, therefore, at the root of religion, as is contended by both Dr. McTaggart and Mr. Dickinson, to whom no attitude towards the "universe" is religious unless it brings with it "rest and peace and happiness"; but is rather the end sought in religion—by various means according to the place of each religion in the scale of religions. Religion therefore is not based on a precedent conviction of a harmony already existing, but rests on a desire for harmony earnestly sought after. And above all, it is not based on a conviction of harmony existent between us "and the universe at large", but on a desire to secure harmony between us and "the higher powers", however conceived. The attempt to substitute the "universe" for "God" in the conception of religion, which characterizes both Dr. McTaggart's and Mr. Dickinson's definitions, is simply an outgrowth of their own philosophy and contradicts the entire phenomenology of religion. It is not "the universe" perceived as over against himself which is the source of man's religious ideas, emotions, actions. It is distinctly "the higher power", contemplated ordinarily distinctly as personal, and one may believe always obscurely so conceived or else the religious reaction does not follow. This broad fact of human religion becomes thus itself a witness to God. Resting on no metaphysical reasoning it presupposes no "metaphysical study." It is the immediate reaction of the human spirit to a part of its environment, and it becomes thus a guide to metaphysical reasoning rather than waits upon its results. It is only if we shut our eyes to what is and embody in our definitions our metaphysical theories that we can draw out of those definitions conclusions inconsisttent with a valid religious experience and a sound religious conviction quite independent of metaphysical study.

It is perhaps especially in his argument against the validity of Theism that Dr. McTaggart's vice of purely verbal argumentation becomes

most glaring. The hinge of his argument here, it is not too much to say, is his doctrine of omnipotence. Omnipotence, he would have us understand, means a power to which, and to the exercise of which, no limitation of any sort whatever can be conceived. "An omnipotent person", he says, "is one who can do anything" (p. 202): "there is nothing that an omnipotent being cannot do" (p. 166). It is scarcely credible, but Dr. McTaggart does wish us to believe that this implies that an omnipotent being must be conceived as able to make the sum of two and two five or a thing to be and not be at the same time! And on the basis of this absurdity he gravely reasons that an omnipotent being could not be a person and could not have the benefit of the ordinary theodicy in view of the evil in the world—or indeed, even of the teleogical argument for His existence, because forsooth the employment of means is in and of itself inconsistent with omnipotence! "There is nothing", says he, "that an omnipotent being cannot do. . . . A really omnipotent being cannot be bound by the law of Contradiction. If it seems to us absurd to suggest that the law of Contradiction is dependent on the will of any person, we must be prepared to say that no person is really omnipotent" (p. 166). "If He is bound by" the law of Identity, or "by the law of Contradiction and the law of Excluded Middle", "He is not omnipotent" (p. 203). Of such a God it may not be supposed that He has permitted sin to exist, in order that a greater good may be attained; for "any good result which might follow from the sin and its punishment could be obtained by such a God in virtue of His omnipotence, without the sin and its punishment" (p. 165). Nay, such a God cannot be supposed to use means at all, for, *ex hypothesi,* means have no worth in themselves, but owe their entire value to their supposed necessity in attaining a valuable end. But an omnipotent God can not require means to attain any end: "and therefore it would be inconsistent with His wisdom to use them, since they are of no value except to get an end which He could get as well without them" (p. 201). Not only then can He have the benefit of no theodicy which turns on a doctrine of means: but the teleological argument if valid in the discovery of means is His refutation—if means have been used, it is no omnipotent God who has used them. Now, all this, we say, is quite astonishing. When we affirm omnipotence we affirm unlimited power it is true, but we affirm only unlimited power. The omnipotent person is a person whose power has no limits. He can do all that He wills. But certainly this unlimited power imposes no limits upon His other attributes—His wisdom, say, or His goodness. It is not necessary in order to be omnipotent to be an idiot or a devil. By virtue of His omnipotence such a being can accomplish all He will: all that is the object of power is in his power. But it does not follow that He may therefore will the foolish or the wicked: foolishness and wickedness raise no question of power but of wisdom and of goodness. The law of Contradiction, for instance, does not belong within the sphere of power: its place is in the sphere of wisdom; and it is no limitation of the omnipotent God's power to say that He is incapable of folly. It is not a limitation of His

power which renders it impossible for Him to make the sum of two and two five: it is the perfection of His reason. One might as well talk of a steam engine being made strong enough to draw an inference, as of omnipotence possessing such might as to transcend the law of Excluded Middle. These things are things which are unrelated to power: and concerning which power has no function. And the same is true of the employment of means in order to secure ends. There is here no question of power but of wisdom. If the ends are more wisely secured by means than by power, then it is the part of wise omnipotence so to secure them. If the ends are outside the ends of power, then no omnipotence can make the first step towards securing them. The plausibility of Dr. McTaggart's argument here seems to depend entirely on its generality and abstractness. Some ends are objects of power, and it may seem strange that an omnipotent being should reach them by means rather than by immediate act. There may be reasons why he should: but these reasons lie outside the ends themselves. Other ends, however, are obviously unattainable by power, because they are not objects of power. And it happens that the specific ends sought in the creation of the universe and in its government are not only supposed by the framers of theodicies, but also are in themselves intrinsically of this last sort. It is not within the power of omnipotence for example to secure a manifestation of the Divine justice and grace without objects of such kind that upon them justice and grace may be secured. These things do not belong in the sphere of "power". The reason why God is supposed not to attain that better thing which is attained by the presence of sin in the universe, without sin, is not, then, because He is supposed to lack in power, but because the attainment of this end in itself requires sin as its condition. We may accord with Dr. McTaggart in his criticism of special theories which have been advanced. We agree with him that the attempt to make the presence of sin the inevitable result of the creation of free agents or the inevitable result of government by general laws, and so justifiable in God's universe, is a failure. But it does not follow that the very idea of a theodicy derived from the use of sin as a means to a glorious end otherwise unobtainable is inconsistent with the conception of an omnipotent God, because forsooth omnipotence can have no need of means. Omnipotence has the same need of means for the attainment of ends not themselves the direct product of force as impotence itself has: and omnipotence abnegates none of its prerogatives when it subjects itself to the government of wisdom, goodness and truth. To affirm that God is omnipotent is not to assimilate Him to the hurricane or the volcano which blindly acts in all its power on all occasions; but to affirm that infinite righteousness, holiness, goodness, and love is served by equally infinite power—that whatever God wills, He can execute, and that therefore the infinite holy, righteous and good Will will work its ends and that in its own time and way, according to what is the absolute Best.

From these specimens the quality of Dr. McTaggart's reasoning may be not unfairly judged. Let it suffice to say farther merely that the

charm of his style carries the reader over many a doubtful argument. With his criticism upon the current reasoning by which Immortality is established or supposed to be established, we find ourselves very much in sympathy. Only, as our metaphysical presuppositions differ fundamentally from his, we differ substantially with him in the relative estimate we put upon the several varieties of reasoning which are employed. To the metaphysical reasoning we attach little value: to the moral, more: but we should not be greatly disturbed were all of it pronounced inconclusive. "We have a more sure word of prophecy"; and it is Jesus Christ who has "brought life and immortality to light". No doubt it may seem below the dignity of metaphysics to consider facts of experience in determining a question like this. But plain men often find the empirical establishment of facts very great aids to belief. Thinking as we do of souls as manufactured articles, and of the ultimate nature of reality as something very different from a "joint stock company", we have no tendency to construe immortality in terms of eternity *a parte ante* as well as *a parte post*—the less so, that it is precisely upon the metaphysical arguments for immortality that we lay the least stress. With respect to Freedom, we go very fully with Dr. McTaggart, if we correctly understand him, although there are some of his arguments which do not appeal to us, and we consider him more successful in refuting indeterminism than in meeting the objections to determinism—because, chiefly, of the intrusion of his peculiar metaphysical views into this portion of the discussion. So soon as he enters formally upon the discussion of Theism, we part company with him *in toto*. Here everything seems to us unreal and deformed by verbal subtleties; and the conclusion arrived at impresses us as already given in the metaphysical presupposition rather than as derived from the critical process. The discussion may be recommended to students, however, as a good whet-stone for their wits.

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CHRISTIAN THEISM AND A SPIRITUAL MONISM. God, Freedom and Immortality, in view of Monistic Evolution. By the Rev. W. L. WALKER, author of *The Spirit and the Incarnation, The Cross and the Kingdom,* etc. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. New York. 1906. 8vo; pp. viii., 484. Price $3.00 net.

One of the profoundest and most difficult problems which human thought can propose to itself is that of reconciling the dualism which is persistently obvious in our world with the kind of monism which a sound Christian theism involves. The distinction between Spirit and Matter is, at least, to the average, unreflecting man on the street, simple, fundamental and final; and yet if God alone is self-existent and eternal, and if God is Spirit, then monism in some sort must be the only ultimate faith. The dualism of our naïve thinking must be reducible to the simpler term of which monism is the name. This simpler term, than

which none can be more simple, must be the absolute finality. On the way to this irreducible absolute, however, are many difficulties to be reckoned with and many objections to be answered. To some thinkers these seem insurmountable. There have been those who stoutly held to the doctrine of an Eternal Dualism. Zoroastrianism is commonly credited with this dogma, though deeper study reveals the fact that that hoary creed traced its Good and Evil back to an Anterior Good, its Light and Darkness back to the One Eternal Light. But to show the faith of Zoroaster dualistic is only to bring the modern indictment of both logical and ethical inconsistency against the old Persian's faith. Mr. John Stuart Mill came very near to teaching an Eternal Dualism; and the late Professor Huxley, if it is fair to saddle upon him the logical implications of his positivistic science and of his agnostic epistemology, refused to trace the origin of things about him back to an Eternal One.

It is trite to say that monism is having its innings in recent philosophical thought. Spinoza gave it a distinct impetus, if not almost its new birth, in his stiff reaction from the bald dualism of Des Cartes. It has been preached and pressed in many different forms and by many mutually differing advocates. Blatant atheists and devout Christians, disagreeing in all that comes after, have agreed in postulating the fundamental plank of a common monism. To be sure, it may be either Materialistic or Spiritualistic. Büchner of Tübingen and Haeckel of Jena stand for a "Scientific Monism" which is Materialism, *alias* Atheism. Dr. Paul Carus, the late Professor Romanes and Professor Lloyd Morgan all stand for Monism, minus its materialistic implications. Our author, who to our mind is throughout too appreciative of Mr. Spencer's service to Christian Theism, rightly includes the Synthetic Philosophy amongst the Monistic systems, seeing that its "Persistence of Force" is but the phenomenal manifestation of the one unknowable Reality. Modern libraries have teemed with books and pamphlets of every name and grade, all directly or indirectly pressing home the Monistic principle; some from the standpoint of ontological metaphysics, some from that of phenomensligical science and many from that of religious interest. But it cannot be said that the propaganda has succeeded in banishing all the difficulties or in silencing all the objections. Indeed, the implied assumption of the Monistic idea often constitutes a serious barrier in the way of the acceptance of much that is urged in the interest of Christian theism. Monism stands as security for Evolution in all its protean forms, for Evolution itself has to face indictments upon which not a few refuse to sign the verdict of "Not guilty". It is admitted that the "breaks" in the continuity of the evolutionary process have not all been eliminated from the side of inductive study; and when it comes to the introduction of life, of consciousness, and of conscience, many hesitate to go beyond the Scotch verdict, "Not proven"; while again from the viewpoint of Evangelicalism concerning the cataclysmal irruptions of sin, of the Incarnation and of the gracious arrest of the individual sinner, the skepticism of many refuses to down at the evolution-

ist's bidding. Whether Monism helps Evolution or *vice versa*, depends upon the point of view. In this book Evolution is quietly assumed: and while the purpose of the author is not to establish Monism, but rather "to show how the great Christian pre-suppositions—God, Freedom, Immortality—in their specifically Christian character (including the reality of the Divine Incarnation in Christ and of Grace) can be established on the basis of such a Monistic conception of the world as the facts of science demand and as Philosophy is seeking after" (p. v.), thus indeed assuming Monism also; yet in establishing the desired agreement, it is found most expedient that the author, himself a Presbyterian minister writing for a Christian public, should focus his energies in strengthening the weak places in Monism in order to fit it for the harmony.

The author's former work, *The Spirit and the Incarnation*, which was the subject of a notice by the present writer (*Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, January, 1901, p. 163) carried the idea of Immanence so far as to prepare the reader for a later book from the same pen, exploiting Monism. It is easy to believe that the writing of that able and suggestive book left in the mind of the writer certain questions and difficulties of which his readers also could not have been wholly unaware, and that accordingly this book has a psychological interpretation as being a further and fuller attempt to vindicate the position taken in the former one. Mr. Walker holds himself strictly to the inductively scientific point of view. We believe he is entirely safe in saying that "Monism must be in some form accepted—that is, from the explanation of the world that science deals with and that we know as an experience; while, of course, the distinction between God in Himself and the world, and the reality of a spiritual world remain unaffected" (p. v.). His conception of Monism is comprehensive. Any system that explains the phenomena of the universe by referring them all to a single principle is monistic. To such a statement of Monism what Christian thinker can take exception, from the standpoint of either a biblical theology or a cosmical genealogy? "In the beginning, God." What is this but Monism? Indeed, in the scriptural view, does not Monoism spell mono-theism? But that is Monism as to origins, whereas Monism, as commonly considered, refers to the essential oneness of the world as it exists to-day. And is not this a more serious question? Are Spirit and Matter, Good and Evil, Sin and Holiness, Suffering and Happiness, all reducible to a common denominator? The question which we understand Monism to discuss is not "Are they all from one?" but "Are they all one?" If so, then is this One matter or Spirit? Christian Monism, of course, affirms that it is Spirit. "Scientific Monism affirms the working in the Universe of a single Power, which is revealed in the two aspects of Mind and Matter. It ought, therefore, to give, at least, equal value to the two sides or aspects. It is only in their union that we can have a real Monism" (p. 179). Spinoza taught that the *Una et Unica Substantia* had an infinite number of attributes, only two of which are knowable, namely, Thought and Extension.

Haeckel's Substance has three attributes, namely, Matter, Energy and Sensation. They agree in postulating the one only substance and, indeed, in this all Monists must and do agree. Dr. Edward Caird pronounced Haeckel's Monism "The Grave of Philosophy", and with Materialistic Monism our author, correctly enough, thinks it worth while to have little to say.

Modern science is in some respects that are very important, not only hospitable to a Monistic interpretation of the world, but distinctly tributary to it. Matter, *per se,* is persistently elusive. The atom, even though it has signs of being "a manufactured article", is for the uses of science scarcely more than a scientific fiction; and so far as the searchlight of artificially aided human vision is concerned is as if absolutely invisible. Nearly all the different modern theories of the real nature of matter, elaborate and ingenius as they are, run back into the region of an inductive idealism,—or, at best, to an idealism which is inductively arrived at. Matter spells force and what strange thing can we have in mind when we speak of a physical—a material force? Spencer goes back to the Inscrutable, where of course he must stop: but he insists that his agnosticism is as true of the atom as it is of God. Science being judge, matter is a manifestation, a symbol, of Spirit: the material is only "the instrument, the expression" of the Spiritual. Büchner is entirely right in saying that the human reason or intelligence is but "a mirror that reflects the whole"; but this mind of man fits into the universal law and order just because Reason is the *prius* of the all-inclusive whole. Inductively, we find man's Reason fitting in with the Reason that is manifested in his surrounding world; but is not the inference irresistible that an antecedent Reason is before them both? Hence the mental, because the Rational, origin of things. But it is not the "origin" we are seeking; still, nothing exists for the mind which, when cognized, that mind cannot think. If our mind can think it when it is cognized, then some other mind must have thought it before we cognized it. Nothing can exist to a cognizing intelligence which does not presuppose intelligence. The author makes some departures, with criticisms, from the common statement of this principle, but we are not quite sure that we see the necessity for doing so. To picture "the dance of the atoms" is simply to juggle with a mental abacadabra unless there is some sort of order or system in their dancing. To picture a fortuitous coming together of atoms to form a world is impossible for either or both of two reasons; first, we cannot form a picture in the mind which is absolutely amorphous, utterly without form, and second, if the atoms are coming together "to form a world" they are acting with a most definite purpose and according to a most complete and elaborate order. Only that which has intelligence before it and in it, is intelligible. The intelligibility of a world, or of an atom or of a dance of atoms, presupposes intelligence. It is not the priority of our thought but of some one's thought that is presupposed and discovered. And here is the premise for the Monistic inference.

But if we escape the scylla of Materialism, we must also look out for the Charybdis of pantheism. The author somewhere charges Haeckel

with "atheistic pantheism" and the charge is not too strong or misapplied. The Berkeleyan Subjective idealism gives doubtful relief because it is hard to deny that the consciousness, changes in the state of which are the only things we can know, is any proof of or step to an eternal world at all. Christian Monism can go no further than to say that our consciousness is not God's, but is originated by it. Body is only a mode of manifestation of mind. They are not two, but one. Dr. Tyndall was a bald dualist when he declared that there is "no passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness." He was in error when he spoke of any passage whatever to be made. They are one. This seems essentially Spinozistic and yet it must be saved from the Spinozistic erroneous inferences. Spiritualistic Monism is in a sense dualistic after all. Its dualism is only phenomenological, and its deeper Monism is ontological. Its modes of manifestation are twofold, but the thing that is manifested is one. This is substantial Monism, and Dualism as to its appearance or manifestation. The pantheism of Spinoza gives way to the Spiritualistic Monism of to-day. Monism claims to differentiate the creature from the Creator in a very real and substantial way. But is not that differentiation modal after all? And, if we mistake not, the *crux* of Mr. Walker's argument, as of every argument, is in the very question whether or not the modal differences which he concedes are a sufficient and satisfactory equivalent for the substantial differences which the man in the street thoroughly believes that he perceives. Mr. Walker tells us that he has written for this man in the street, but we cannot but doubt whether he has satisfied him. He has said some things that may have shocked him a trifle. When he reads that it can hardly be said that God creates matter, seeing that "Matter seems to be too essential for the manifestation of spirit in its operation in the world to be regarded in such a way" (p. 186), the average man will be likely to recall the first words in his Bible and in his embarrassment will inquire whether, if matter be essential to the manifestation of spirit, we are to believe that matter is co-eternal with Spirit or that before the origination of matter God was wholly inoperative and unmanifested. And when he reads that "God Himself as the infinite, all-perfect Being, while Omnipotent Spirit, cannot possibly be personally in the finite world" (p. 248), will he not be likely to inquire how God can be truly said to be in the world at all if he be not in it as God, and moreover, if God "Conditioned", as we see Him in the world, be not still God, how we are to escape the darkness and condemnation of Agnosticism. This last is one of the obvious embarrassments of the Christian Monist in dealing with the exegencies of his position; and we confess that while Mr. Walker carries us with him in many parts of his argument, he does not by any means remove all the difficulties in the way. Shall we conclude that they are inherent in the very profound nature of the subject itself?

Mr. Walker's discussion of Freedom is not characterized by anything especially calling for remark. Here, of course, is the crucial test of Monism. Determinism effectually clears up the field, but Determinism

is harder to accept than the errors which it would fain avoid or avert. Accordingly, an extended discussion of Mr. Mallock's position ensues, considering first his Determinism of Psychology and second his Determinism of Matter. He quotes in full Kant's famous and familiar remark affirming the predictableness of any man's choice at any given time if only every motive within and every circumstance without were foreseen, whereupon he says: "Of course, if we could know everything that would affect a man, and all about how he should hold himself in relation to it—if we could know every one of the motives, even the slightest, which determine his soul from within—we could know certainly how he would act. But this knowledge would not make his action the less free. What is that determination of the soul from within, if not determination from the man's own self or soul? Therefore, when Kant says there is no such thing as a principle of freedom to be found in a man's character, we may well answer, after the manner of Liebnitz, 'Except the man's character itself,'—that is, the man himself as a free agent, while, of course, he stands under the necessary limitations of a finite embodied being, in a law-governed Universe. But he can, in his freedom, will and act by means of and in harmony with these same laws" (p. 344). The doctrine of the Conservation of Energy is held to be no bar to the doctrine of freedom, because there is no fresh creation of energy; it is all stored up in the twofold "empirical me". This, to be sure, brings the will itself under the sway of that evolutionary principle, namely, "All that is is implicit in all that was." Mr. Mallock's deterministic objections to the doctrine of Free Will, and especially his arguments against the theological interpretations of the subject, are ably stated and met by Mr. Walker, and yet the reader is apt to come to the conclusion of the treatment of Freedom with the feeling that not very much has been said which throws light upon the hackneyed mysteries of this most difficult subject.

More fresh and suggestive is the third part of the book, on Immortality. A hint of this doctrine is given as being but one aspect of the evolutionary principle of the Survival of the Fittest, but this is not pressed; for, from the theological side, there would be some embarrassment in the light of Scripture teaching and of the consciousness of the Church, in advocating any doctrine of a partial or selected immortality. It is not the soul but the self, that is immortal, and this self is soul and body. Function precedes organ and not organ function; and this, of course, entails a necessary acceptance of the primacy of mind. But matter is force, power, energy, and the material manifestation of the soul is but one phase of the putting forth by the soul of its inherent, dynamic qualities. Monism furnishes no necessity or reason for doubting the continued existence of the composite self, after the disintegration of the present body. Mr. Walker is skeptical of the value of the inductively gathered evidences of immortality from the sphere of psychical research: and yet he does tell us in a footnote that his wife, who had been deeply interested with him in this subject, and who had passed out of this life after his manuscript had been sent to the

publishers, had promised him that, if possible, she would manifest her presence to him; and he adds, "He feels bound to say that he believes she has done so" (p. 443). The author is inclined to place emphasis upon Renan's suggestion that by and by the consciousness of the world, embracing the myriads of little or individual consciousnesses, will be awakened, and that this will be the absolute consciousness of the Cosmos. This, he thinks, is in keeping with the doctrine of Divine Immanence and with the too much neglected New Testament passages which teach the Parousia of Christ with the Palingenesia of the Cosmos.

The book is a strong and valuable one. If it fails to solve all problems, it does not fail to bring out into clear relief the elements that enter into them. We are inclined to accept the author's contention that philosophy and science alike tend toward some sort of Monism. To the man on the street Dualism is very real; and if we urge him too strongly toward Monism, he may throw off his faith in the Unseen while we are telling him that it is both the Source and the Essence of the seen. Certainly, we cannot long remain Esoteric Monists and Exoteric Dualists. The way to the solution is not so much along the line of inductive science as that of a clear and correct metaphysic. Even this essay, purporting to be exclusively a treatment of the subject upon its inductive side, has for some of its best and richest pages those on which the metaphysic of the subject is under consideration. God is Spirit. God alone is Eternal. Monism is the only possible Bible view of the world if by Monism we mean a philosophy of the things that are simple and final, ultimate and eternal. But if we are to apply our language to the phenomena with which the man on the street is in constant and very real contact, must we not explain our Monism to his untutored mind in a way that will satisfy his absolutely ineradicable conviction of the dual nature of the world within him and without? Teach him what you mean by Substance. Explain the nature of attributes, manifestations, phenomena to him if you can, and tell him that in the realm of these he may be a Dualist, while yet, if he only knew it, he is the true kind of a Monist. Do all this and you have darkened his mind and confused his thoughts; or if not, you have transformed him from "the man in the street" to an exceptionally lucid, trained metaphysician. Even then it will be only by a constant and conscious self-constraint that he will be able to avoid the plain speech of the plain man, born of his plain experience, speaking what seems to him to be the plain truth—which is Dualism. Nevertheless, with ripe reflection and deeper insight, he will undoubtedly be led to some sort of Monism; and in showing the way to it and of what sort it will be, this book is a fair, reverent, scholarly and illuminating study.

Trenton. HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

SCIENTIFIC CONFIRMATIONS OF OLD TESTAMENT HISTORY. By G. FREDERICK WRIGHT. Illustrated. Oberlin, Ohio: Bibliotheca Sacra Company. 1906. pp. xviii, 432. 12mo.

In the year 1895 there was published a small book on the *Tradition of the Flood* by Joseph Prestwich; to which the present book may be

regarded as the natural sequel. Prestwich showed, that, so far as Western Europe and the Mediterranean region are concerned, the Flood, or at least a Flood such as tradition speaks of, was an actual occurrence; that its date was within the human period; and that it was the occasion of a sudden and enormous destruction of animal life. We believe that Prestwich's booklet was the chief cause of the cessation of a petty system of nagging the Book of Genesis; and recently we have observed the attacks petering out into small talk anent the nature and magnitude of an assumed 'errancy', and spreading into generalia which reveal the animus of the critics rather than concern the historicity of the books of Moses.

Prestwich's work was, unfortunately, left unfinished, and he was compelled to drop the subject just where it became most interesting. He did not carry his argument into the lands of the Bible, though it was not difficult to forecast how the search was likely to go. It was disappointing, however, to have the work dropped just there; and it is a cause of thankfulness that an American College and an American Geologist have taken up, and carried fairly to its issue, the question which had been started and opened by the Englishman. Wright's work involved a large outlay of time and toil and skill and determined enthusiasm, with an eye wide open to different sides of a complicated case. The Trustees of Oberlin did their share, and their Professor of the Harmony of Science and Revelation proved himself worthy of their trust, and was well helped by his son and his wife, who had their part in the exploration. Thanks to the Princeton Theological Seminary, we had a foretaste and an aftermath of his work, by his Stone Lectures; and now a wider circle have the opportunity of going over under his careful guidance the whole of his work. He is very happy in his style of telling us what he has seen, and why he interpreted it as he does, and what is the bearing of his work on the Bible.

This volume bids fair to be recognized as the Standard work on the important subject of Pentateuchal physics: just as explorations of the ruins of Chaldea, Assyria, and Egypt have enlightened us as to Old Testament historicity. It is noteworthy that all these researches illustrate the excellent style which was begun in the interests of unbelief. Men went on exploring expeditions, in the hope of cursing the Bible; but as in Balaam's case, the ultimate results are blessings.

Oven central and northern Asia Wright came to see evidences of submersion under the sea during the human period; and he discusses this evidence, correlating it with facts in Europe and America, with which his experience as a Geologist have made him familiar. He also considers it relatively to the Chronology of Science, and cognate discussions about the Bible; and he summarizes and endorses Dr. Green's proof that the genealogical tables of the Bible do not teach a definite chronology, but only lines of descent, with some of the links omitted (p. 191). On the other hand, arguing from evidence in North America, and from the condition of Lake Baikal, and other features of Asia, and the Caspian region, he estimates the probable antiquity of man, especially as related to the glacial phenomena of different countries.

The phenomena of the Ice-age in North America are thus presented:

(1) As having robbed the ocean of water which had been converted into continental mountains of ice; thus in Europe and North America.

(2) As causing the ice-crowned land, being overloaded, to sink below the ocean level; thus causing depression in America and Europe.

(3) As causing other lands to rise, not absolutely, but relatively to the sea, whose level had been lowered; thus in Western and Central Asia.

The above was the condition in Glacial times.

At the close of the Glacial age all these phenomena were reversed; not immediately but by a series of devastating floods, and oscillations, which have left their marks everywhere. The Great American Lakes, and the Ohio River are our most familiar vestiges of these changes. Ice-mountains melted, and sent off their waters to the Ocean, scooping their course; the unburdened land emerged and was elevated; and the swelling ocean encroached on its borders which appeared to subside. Scripture speaks of this under the picturesque terms that the "fountains of the deep were opened". This resulted in a see-saw change between the great continents; as America rose from the waters, Asia subsided, at least seemingly through the encroaching ocean. Whilst this broad correlation is of special interest to us in America, it is of still greater general interest, because of the evidence of a deluge in Asia, and of Antediluvian man, which Wright found very widely spread over the lands which he visited.

He finds that the Bible in describing such events is simple, straightforward, often picturesque in style, yet free from gross exaggerations; and that it never departs from its rule of regarding all as the work of God, whilst it readily recognizes the ministry of second causes. The narratives of the Book of Genesis are compared by him with the cuneiform tablets, and are described as in all probability the work of eyewitnesses. He refers to a portion of the Flood-narrative as being probably extracts from Noah's Log-book (p. 183); it states in brief sailorlike style how many days it was after Noah's going aboard till the ark began to float, how long the rain continued, the sending out of the birds and so on.

His approximate estimate as to chronology, judged from the scientific evidence, gives "not more than 10-12,000 years since the close of the glacial epoch, and since the origin of man". He reinforces this by inferring from the condition of Lake Baikal, that "the time which has since elapsed may be measured in thousands or tens of thousands, rather than in hundreds of thousands of years".

Rather an odd feature of such a book is that the author finds it necessary, or at least wise, to protect himself from a charge of naturalism. The passage of Israel through the Red Sea is explained by him as aided by the probable lie of the land in that day, and by the force of the wind, which raised the water as a wall on the right and the left; and again the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah is co-ordinated with similar disasters in modern times at the oil-wells of Baku on the

Caspian Sea, and in Texas and the West Indies. Formerly the miraculous element was so dominant in the Old Testament that men challenged it as incredible; now we are come to a stage where the miracles, considered relatively to the state of the lands, are both possible and probable; and it is in people's power to argue that no miracles were needed, but only a coincidence. Dr. Wright shows that the circumstances of the recorded events were such as to prove the very presence of the miracle-working God. The argument *credo quia impossibile* is no longer applicable, but we find ourselves confronted with the plea of the children calling, "We have piped unto you and ye have not danced; we have mourned unto you, and ye have not lamented." If there were no miracles at all in the Old Testament, the character of its teaching, and especially of its proclamation of Divine Mercy to fallen man would set it apart as inspired; and this part of it is the greatest miracle of all.

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EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

The Bross Prize . . . 1905. THE PROBLEM OF THE OLD TESTAMENT CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO RECENT CRITICISM. By JAMES ORR, D.D., Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology, United Free Church College, Glasgow. *Nubecula est, quae cito evanescet.* Charles Scribner's Sons: New York. 1906. 16mo.; pp. lii., 562.

Dr. Orr has attained to recognition as a scholar in the field of church history and apologetics. It is a splendid thing, gratifying as well as important, that a Christian scholar, other than a specialist in Old Testament literature, has brought a mind trained in philosophical studies to the task of examining the problem of the Old Testament which is interesting the church of the present day and which in important aspects is historical and philosophical.

Dr. Orr's argument in briefest outline is as follows:

He proposes at the outset to show that quite different results are obtainable from the same critical principles, results that are adequate to the Christian faith. Accepting provisionally the ordinary critical dating of the documents and the analysis of the Hexateuch (pp. 23, 55), he believes that there is nothing to lead to the revolutionary conclusions so commonly drawn. "Even on this basis, the essential outlines of the patriarchal and Mosaic history (Chaps. iii., iv.), and the outstanding facts of the religion and institutions of the Old Testament (Chaps. v., vi.), are not sensibly affected,— . . . they are not, and cannot be, overturned" (p. 23). According to the theory most widely held by modern critics the J and E narratives were committed to writing about eight or nine centuries, or from 850 to 750, before Christ and thus antedate written prophecy. Hence, Dr. Orr argues, 1. The unity of the Old Testament is not shattered. The teleogical element in the history, the dominating idea of purpose, and that a purpose of redemptive grace, which is so conspicuous in the completed Scriptures, belongs equally to

the J and E narratives. Therefore this characteristic feature is not a manipulation of the tradition, a reading back into it of higher prophetic conceptions which, we are told, first entered with Amos and Hosea, toward the close of the eighth century. "It was part of the tradition as early as the ninth century, when at least one of these narratives took written shape" (pp. 67-69). 2. The credibility of the history as recorded in the Old Testament is not destroyed; for the narrative is assuredly ancient, since the tradition had developed some time previously to its reduction to writing and had already assumed a settled form. How early had this occurred? The critic is brought well back toward the time of the division of the kingdom in the reign of Rehoboam by this dating of the J and E documents. The oral tradition substantially in its present shape must antedate the schism, and belong to the age of Solomon, David, and Samuel. "Only thus can we account for its being found in practically the same form in both North and South, and for the absence of all allusions to the division." But not orally only. There is critical support among the earlier and now among recent critics again for assigning as early a date as this to the written narratives J and E (pp. 73, 74). Moreover J and E may even rest on older written material, and not on oral tradition. They represent the golden age of the language, a recognized fact which implies that letters had been long cultivated. Much splendid literature did exist much earlier than the time of the division of the kingdom, according to current critical opinion. Thus "we have the language nearly in its prime carried back to the thirteenth century B. C., with a long cultivation necessarily preceding,—are brought, in short, almost to the verge of the Exodus". Were there only fugitive writings and stories of isolated events in existence? Was nothing done to produce some record of the people's wonderful past? Did oral tradition only exist? For ourselves in discussing this matter in print and public lecture we have been in the habit of carrying the argument a step farther at this point than Dr. Orr does. We regard it as significant and important that the several forms of literature ascribed to Moses and his successors, poems, itineraries, description of victories, brief histories, codes of law, had already become familiar to the peoples contemporary with Moses and were in full vogue. The ideals were present, the stimulus was there; and the appearance of such literature among the Hebrews was from the standpoint of evolution to be expected. It was timely.

Continuing the subject of the credibility of the biblical narrative, Professor Orr next, in chapters iv., v., and vi., considers a number of theories which contradict the Hebrew record and yet have been more or less widely adopted, and he subjects the argument on which these theories rest to a dispassionate review. By appeal to J and E and other literature of admittedly early date and without disputing the thesis that Deuteronomy originated in the time of Josiah he shows, that, contrary to assertions by critics of repute, in pre-exilic and even pre-prophetic literature Abraham and the patriarchs that came after him are familiar personages; that Moses is known as the legislator for Israel and the sons

of Aaron as the officiating priests; that ethical monotheism is in evidence; and that a sacrificial system and priestly ritual were in vogue and regarded as having divine sanction. And further in regard to these several matters, and also to the tabernacle, ark, image-worship and the like, he relentlessly exposes the cases where the argument rests upon a mere speculation or an arbitrary interpretation or the convenient assumption of an interpolation or an insufficient induction. We believe that he is justified in pronouncing some of these theories groundless and in concluding over against others that the biblical view is still valid. Among these topics Professor Orr considers the unity of the sanctuary to be the "subject of cardinal importance—probably the one of most importance—in the discussion". The question is whether the idea of a central sanctuary, at which alone sacrifices were lawful, existed in the earlier history or first grew up about the time of King Josiah. He begins the investigation by examining 1. The fundamental law of the altar, contained in Ex. 20: 24. It does not contradict the Deuteronomic law; for Deuteronomy itself likewise allows of exceptional sacrifices, as witnessed by the command to build an altar and offer sacrifices at Mount Ebal. He detects 2. The principle of the unity of the sanctuary involved in the system from the beginning. The Book of the Covenant presents the same ideal in speaking only of "the house" of God. The circumstances connected with the altar Ed testify to it, as do also the tabernacle at Shiloh and other phenomena. 3. Even Deuteronomy anticipates that the idea of a central sanctuary will not be realized until the people have conquered and occupied Canaan, dwell at peace and have rest from their enemies. The settled state spoken of did not exist until the times of David. 4 and 5. Irregularities occurred, of course, in times of declension. The argument is capable of development at this point. It contains, in our judgment, the germs of an adequate explanation (*Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, 1902, pp. 197-200).

In view of the facts enumerated Professor Orr reaches the conclusion on this subject of the unity of worship that "'the history is consistent with itself, provided we accept its own premises, and do not insist on forcing on it an alien theory of religious development. The reformations of Hezekiah and Josiah then fall into their proper places, without the necessity of assuming the invention of *ad hoc* 'programmes'" (p. 180).

Having found that the stupendous results claimed by the newer school do not follow from their own critical analysis of the Hexateuch nor from their own dating of Old Testament literature nor from the phenomena involved, but that the essential outlines of the patriarchal and Mosaic history, and the outstanding facts of the religion and institutions of the Old Testament, are not sensibly affected, he next proceeds to an examination of the fundamental positions of that school. A distinct section of the book opens. In Chap. vii. the question is discussed whether J and E were originally two documents or one narrative. He shows that there are leading critics who assign both documents to a writer of the northern kingdom; and then he proceeds to make clear by citation that the alleged different sectional preferences of North and

South relied upon to prove the diverse nationality of the writers do not exist, but that each document is pervaded by interest in the whole country. In the manner in which the documents mutually supplement each other and are together needed to yield a continuous narrative, and in their resemblances of style, language, and mode of representation, there is evidence of original unity. He recognizes with many critics of all schools that the divine names Elohim and Jehovah are used with discrimination, but he does not think that this discriminating use is always evident. The vicissitudes of the text in transmission account for some of these exceptions perhaps, as critics are forced to admit. Still he regards Klostermann's theory that the work circulated in different recensions—a Jehovistic and an Elohistic—as the best explanation of the residuum of the cases. With evidence that J and E were originally one, it is clear, as appeared from the previous discussion, that "the bulk of the JE narrative may well go back to Mosaic or immediately post-Mosaic times" (p. 371). So far as Genesis and the opening chapters of Exodus are concerned, P is palpably the framework of JE, and P may be the long sought editor.

In chapter viii. the problem of Deuteronomy is taken up. "It cannot be too constantly borne in mind . . . that, with the majority of the Graf-Wellhausen school, the really determining grounds for the late dating of Deuteronomy lie outside the region of properly critical discussion altogether, viz., in the completely altered view taken of the age of Moses, and of the subsequent course of the religious history of Israel" (p. 271). The date of Deuteronomy is "the pivot of the Pentateuchal question". "If Deuteronomy, in its present form, be even substantially Mosaic,—if it conveys to us with fidelity the purport of discourses and laws actually delivered by Moses to the people of Israel before his death,—then we must go a great deal further." Evidence is not wanting of the genuineness of the discourses in Deuteronomy, substantially in their present form. 1. They admittedly show unity of thought, language and style. The diminution in the purity of the style of the Deuteronomic revisers as their distance from the Mosaic age increases points to the early origin of Deuteronomy (p. 255). 2. The book was regarded as the genuine discovery of an old lost book, and that book the book of the law of Moses. It is admitted by critics generally that it was taken for a genuinely Mosaic book. It is relegated to a slightly earlier date by certain critics in order to escape several implications. This relegation leaves no reason, when reasons are examined, why it should not be dated still earlier (p. 261). 3. The testimony of the book itself. It professes to have been spoken by Moses and written by Moses. 4 and 5. Its Mosaic standpoint, its lack of allusion to the division of the kingdom (p. 283), its unsuitability to the times of Josiah. The centralization of worship, the fundamental pillar of the critical hypothesis, is not the dominant note of the book, nor even the dominant motive of Josiah's reform, which was a crusade against idolatry, including that of the central sanctuary. Furthermore, the Deuteronomic code in its structure and scope is incongruous with the supposed occasion of its origin (p. 268).

The acceptance of the discourses in Deuteronomy as genuine, substantially in their present form, involves much more. These discourses rest on the code of laws called the Book of the Covenant, Ex. xx.-xiii., and thus attest the existence of that code which independently itself professes to have been written by Moses (pp. 271, 371). The addresses are founded also in some degree on the JE history embodied in the Pentateuch, and they imply its existence in substance and in part in written form (370), and attest the antiquity of that history. Deuteronomy involves also a large measure of priestly legislation (pp. 311-315). "The effect of an acceptance of an early date for Deuteronomy, therefore, is to throw all these writings back practically into the Mosaic age, whatever the time when they were finally put together" (p. 271).

In regard to "the P writing" Professor Orr finds himself "compelled to reject the post-exilian date assigned to the laws in this writing" by the school of Wellhausen. He is driven to this position by moral and historical considerations, and by positive proof of the early, pre-exilian, existence of priestly legislation and distinctive institutions. The "main stronghold" of the Graf-Wellhausen theory "is the argument from silence; but that silence is neither so complete as is alleged, nor are the inferences drawn from it warranted" (p. 326). But "equally (here in agreement with the Wellhausen school)" Professor Orr is obliged to reject "the mediating view of those who regard the Code as a private document originating in priestly circles under the monarchy. There remains as the only alternative to the post-exilian date the view—which was also that of the older scholars—of the substantially Mosaic origin of the laws. . . . If, however, the laws are early, there can be no good reason for doubting the antiquity of the history with which they are connected, for it was simply the assumption of the late date of the laws which led, for consistency's sake, to the putting of the history late" (p. 372).

It will be seen at once by all who are familiar with the subject that here is the conservative argument. There is nothing novel. There is at times in minor points divergence from the views of other students whose general conclusions are yet the same. There is much admirable statement; and the results of the patient labor of many scholars have been gathered together as far as possible in a unit and presented so that they may be surveyed as a whole, although of necessity greatly condensed. One is gladdened by the insight displayed and by the accurate statement of the questions and opinions involved. There is a place for just this book. And such a book is doubly welcome from a Free Churchman, from Scotland, and from Glasgow, where Professor Robertson of the Established Church has already spoken so well on this theme.

The work has been awarded the Bross Prize. It is interesting to note who the judges were that made the award. They were the Reverend George Trumbull Ladd, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, Yale University; Alexander Thomas Ormond, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University, and the Reverend George Fred-

erick Wright, D.D., LL.D., Professor of the Harmony of Science and Revelation, Oberlin College (p. xi.). Here are names prominent in philosophy and science, men accustomed to debate large questions, to think profoundly, and to demand logical precision and accurate methods. That such men deemed the essay worthy of the Bross Prize is splendid testimony to the scientific character of the conservative argument. And it affords further confirmation of our belief, acquired by ample experience with men who are willing fully to investigate all sides of the question, that the sober thought of Christian scholars in various fields of research will finally reject the current arguments of the reconstructionists as being arbitrary and largely subjective and evidently determined by a preconceived theory, and will adopt the fundamental conclusions of the conservative school of criticism.

On the basis of the critical results Dr. Orr gives, but refrains from fully developing, a theory of the literary history of the Pentateuch. The book was not written by Moses himself "in the precise shape or extent in which we now possess it" (p. 369). But Moses delivered "the Deuteronomic discourses, substantially in the form in which we have them". These discourses attest "the existence and Mosaic character of the Book of the Covenant", which professes not only to have come from Moses, but also to have been written by him; and they involve "at least the presence of a measure of Levitical legislation." These discourses also found "upon the JE history"; and "the bulk of the JE narrative may well go back to Mosaic or immediately post-Mosaic times" (p. 371). The writer known as P furnishes the framework of the JE narrative in Genesis, and never intended to do anything else; while in the Mosaic period he "appears rather as co-ordinate with JE, and even, in the legislative parts, as an inserted content" (pp. 340, 345, 354). The Pentateuch accordingly comes essentially from Moses and is relatively ancient. The plan of the book was laid down early, by one mind or different minds working together, while the memory of the great patriarchal traditions was yet fresh and the impressions of the deliverance from Egypt were yet recent and vivid. Moses by his own compositions, according to constant tradition, lent the initial impulse. Many hands and many minds may have co-operated, and may have continued to co-operate after the master-mind was removed (p. 369). This is Dr. Orr's account of the origin of the Pentateuch. But he shows reasons early in his book, and with the assent of modern critics, for denying that the JE narrative is continued in the book of Joshua and for regarding, with Cornill, the book of Joshua as an appendix to the Pentateuch (p. 213). If the justness of this contention is confirmed by future critical research, one might, we think, quite consistently with Dr. Orr's conclusions go somewhat farther than he does, and hold that Moses wrote the Pentateuch practically as we have it, being the author of the Deuteronomic discourses and of the codes and poems expressly ascribed to him, using the JE narrative and being the writer P who supplemented it.

Almost contemporaneously with the appearance of Dr. Orr's book the Pontificial commission, appointed by Pope Pius X. to make an

investigation and show the correct attitude of the Roman Catholic Church toward the higher criticism of the Pentateuch, made a partial report. The religious press announced the findings thus: "The report declares that 'Moses in his works used sources—that is, written documents or oral traditions—from which, to suit his special purpose and under the influence of divine inspiration, he selected some things and inserted them in his own work, either verbally or in substance, summarized and amplified.' Again it is said that it need not be 'absolutely held that Moses wrote with his own hand or dictated to amanuenses all and everything contained in it.' Further on the report says it is 'possible to admit the hypothesis of those who think that Moses conceived the work under the influence of divine inspiration, and then intrusted the writing of it to some other person or persons, but in such a manner that they faithfully rendered his meaning, wrote nothing contrary to his will, and omitted nothing; and that the work thus formed, approved by Moses as the principal and inspired author, was made public under his name.' The report declares, in closing, that due regard being paid to the judgment of the Church, 'it may be admitted that in the long course of ages some modifications have been introduced into it, such as additions after the death of Moses, either inserted by an inspired author or attached to the text as glosses or interpretations; words and forms translated from the ancient language to more recent language; and, finally, faulty readings to be ascribed to the error of amanuenses concerning which it is lawful to investigate and judge according to the laws of criticism."

A rather close agreement is noticeable between the findings of the Pontificial commission, as reported, and the conclusions of Dr. Orr.

Princeton. JOHN D. DAVIS.

THE PROBLEM OF THE PENTATEUCH: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM. By RANDOLPH H. MCKIM, D.D., LL.D., Rector of the Church of the Epiphany, Washington, D. C. With a Foreword by the Dean of Canterbury. *Οὐ γὰρ σεσοφισμένοις μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες* Longmans, Green & Co., 91 and 93 Fifth Avenue, New York; London and Bombay. 1906. Pp. xvii., 136. Price $1.00 net.

The author of this valuable little book writes under the limitations of space and form imposed by the shortness of the series of lectures and by their being addressed ultimately to a jury of laymen rather than to the specialist; and he recognizes also that it is sufficient to test the strength of the main supports of a structure, be it a building or a doctrine. Accordingly, he confines himself to an investigation of the fundamental propositions of the dominant criticism and their implications. He inquires into the "consensus of scholarship" which is claimed for the school of Wellhausen, and of course readily shows that in certain essential matters it does not exist. He correctly states the determinative doctrines of the school and with clear insight points out to what extent and for what reason they are false and untenable.

The author believes that substantial results have been obtained by the higher criticism of the Old Testament, but he is compelled to reject

some of the methods employed and certain of the conclusions reached by the type of criticism that is at present dominant. He writes with calmness of tone and courteously, though sometimes with bluntness of statement (p. 81). The book is readable, without technical words or discussion of minute matters. It is strong in its argument, which is confessedly largely drawn from able critics of the conservative school, such as Dr. Green of Princeton and Professors Robertson and Orr of Glasgow. Prominent churchmen of his own communion are quoted, particularly the Dean of Canterbury and also Dean Milman, whose argument advanced thirty years and more ago against certain contentions of the school of Ewald are timely against the same positions of its successor. A number of German scholars have also been levied upon for good material. Extremely little of the argumentation can be set aside as being of doubtful cogency. The book is helpful, and deserves wide reading.

It lacks, indeed, perfection of form; for it is diffuse and also repetitious, especially when read in connection with the introduction. Proper names have occasionally suffered in the printing, appearing as Von Ovelli (p. 11), Kautsch (pp. 42, 58), Cornhill (p. 42), Bôle (p. 46), Chederlaomer (p. 59). Everywhere C. H. H. Wright is allowed but two initials. The typographical error of Chron. for Deut. is curiously found in a discussion of the date of Deuteronomy (p. 130). We miss the important argument based on the temporary legitimacy of sacrifices on high places.

Princeton. JOHN D. DAVIS.

THE PROPHETS AND THE PROMISE being for substance the Lectures for 1902-1903 on the L. P. Stone Foundation in the Princeton Theological Seminary. By the REV. WILLIS JUDSON BEECHER, D.D., Professor of the Hebrew Language and Literature in the Theological Seminary of Auburn in the State of New York. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., Publishers. [October, 1905.] 8vo.; pp. xiv., 427. $2.00 net, postage 20 cents.

Dr. Beecher is a master of English, and his present work is admirable for simplicity and elegance of statement. Yet the book is not easy to read. It is difficult (1) because of its constant repetition, the effect of which on some readers is to daze the mind, although the restatement is made in the laudable purpose to recall the landmarks in order that the reader may not lose his way, but ever be aware of the stage of his journey at which he has arrived; (2) difficult also and hazy because of a frequent studied vagueness of statement due to an evident desire for a broad presentation of the thought in order to comprehend under it the greatest possible number of divergent opinions; (3) difficult and bewildering at times by reason of the necessity at certain points in the argument of a rapid exegetical examination of passage after passage of Scripture; (4) difficult and demanding an adjustment on the part of the unprepared mind because in discussing such matters as "the Servant" and "the King" a method of individualization unavoidably obtrudes

itself which is habitual to Hebrew thinking but is foreign to our mode of thought, although Dr. Beecher is able to cite certain analogies which serve as helpful illustrations. But the book abundantly repays the effort required for thoughtful reading. Dr. Beecher has done all that it seems possible to do to simplify the intricate, to render the thought clear, and to enable the reader to keep the threads of the argument well in hand. When mastered, its power and beauty are discerned and gladly confessed.

As is indicated by the title, Dr. Beecher devotes the former part of his work to the presentation of a true conception of the prophet. Early in his pages he seeks to remove as far as possible from men those false ideas regarding the Hebrew seers so widely prevalent and so strongly intrenched in art, whereby the prophets are invested with an air of mystery and unearthliness and represented as separated from their fellow-men by peculiarities of dress and life. Dr. Beecher would persuade men that the Hebrew prophets were men among men, were manly and respected citizens, in dress and habits and mode of thought like their fellow-countrymen. And he proves his point. He delineates the character of the prophet with sympathy, fine appreciation, and firm hand. And we know that we are looking at the faithful likeness of the men of God, and we are irresistably drawn to them with a feeling of admiration akin to veneration. Veneration would be yet more profound did not Dr. Beecher, in his zeal to correct popular misconceptions, neglect to give due prominence to the prayerful life of these men, their spiritual mindedness, and their intimate fellowship with God. He has these facts in mind and touches upon them in a few lines, but he drops his brush too soon.

There are many good things along the way. Such are the remarks on the transformation of angels by art (p. 67); and the exposition is especially interesting in view of the recent hilarity and professed enlightenment on the part of certain clergymen of the metropolis when their attention was drawn to the sex of the angels which Mr. Borglum had designed for the cathedral of St. John the Divine. The brief paragraph on the uniqueness of the Hebrew prophet among the prophets of other religions (p. 72) is another good thing. So also is the account of the origin of the canon, though given under another name, in the last chapter. In fact the first part of the book steadily advances in impressiveness until it culminates in the last chapter in the conception of the Torah.

Having been introduced to the goodly fellowship of the prophets and looking upon men of manliness, moral earnestness, and accredited authority, yet approachable and companionable withal, we are made to hear from them a great message—the promise to Abraham. The second part of the book takes up this promise and traces it through the Scriptures. We cannot overcome the impression that the author has marshalled too much material, both in the first and in this second part of his work, in support of his theory. In other words, the exegetical argument is not always convincing to us. Moreover in his effort to

avoid raising debate he stops sometimes short of defining the meaning of an important prophecy, and contents himself with generalities. But without possibility of denial the author has the grasp and the outlook of the modern exegete combined with the instinct of the historian. And his main contention stands. He makes clear, as no other writer has so systematically done, that the promise to Abraham as conceived by God is eternally fulfilling; that it was seen by the prophets and apostles to be a living force in the world through God's performance of it; that the knowledge of this discernment on the part of these authoritative teachers of old makes our understanding of their prophecies, both as uttered and as cited, easier and unifies prophecy itself; and that in tracing the fulfillment of the promise we are following through the centuries a great historical movement of which the end is not yet. The author has the intuition of unity to a marked degree. "The Promise" is not indeed the only philosophic view of the unfolding history which the prophets take; it is not always the dominating thought which unifies a historian's narrative and elevates the writing of an ancient Hebrew seer to a high position among philosophical histories; in the opinion of some scholars a more comprehensive conception unifies revelation as a whole. Still the promise to Abraham is prominent and influential, and in the apologetics of prophecy the author has shown it to be most important.

The second part, like the first part, reaches its culmination in a surprise for the reader, and yet in chapters so logically in place that the surprise ceases. The description of "The Prophets" passes into an exposition of the conception, authority, nature, and growth of the prophetic Torah or in other words the canon. The discussion of "The Promise" concludes with a contribution to the method of apologetics, of which the specialist cannot afford to be ignorant.

Princeton. JOHN D. DAVIS.

OLD TESTAMENT INTRODUCTION GENERAL AND SPECIAL. By JOHN HOWARD RAVEN, D.D., Professor of Old Testament Languages and Exegesis, Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in America, at New Brunswick, N. J. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1906. 8vo., pp. 362. Cloth, net $2.00.

The author has compressed a general introduction to the Old Testament and special introduction to its constituent books within the space of three hundred and fifty octavo pages. And with good success. The book is written from the conservative standpoint, and in general maintains a high order of excellence. It evinces adequate knowledge and accurate scholarship; it contains sufficient material for the purposes which it is intended to serve, presenting in an argumentative outline an essentially complete view of the main questions involved; and it is clear, simple, and concise in statement.

The discussion of critical theories is, of course, not the sole aim of the book. The volume is intended to be an introduction to a fuller and better acquaintance with the contents of the ancient scriptures of God's

people; and this practical purpose is accomplished by a statement of the theme of each book and an analysis of its matter. Then too, where feasible, a sketch of contemporaneous history is given, sufficient to furnish a background to the biblical picture of the times or to make clear the situation out of which great predictions were born. The poetical books are appropriately prefaced by a chapter on the prophet and his functions; and the books of the third division of the canon are preceded by several paragraphs on the subject of Hebrew poetry.

The author's argument is necessarily brief and condensed, but notwithstanding these enforced limitations is often weighty. There is power in his discussion of the question of a second Isaiah, for instance (p. 187). Sometimes, however, he is brief to the point of important omissions. He says, for example, that "there are two ways of meeting this testimony of Christ on the part of those who deny the Pentateuch to Moses"; and he mentions as the two a form of the accommodation theory and the Kenotic theory, neglecting altogether the theories of the untrustworthiness of the gospel record and especially the method of exegeting out of the words of Christ all assertion of Mosaic authorship. In this connection it may be said by way of parenthesis that the author's exegesis of the words of Christ on various subjects is not always as rigid as one could wish. Again, in discussing the titles of the Psalms, he refers to but two of the possibilities in the interpretation of the *lamed*, namely dedication and authorship, leaving unmentioned that important explanation which regards the preposition as indicating the collection or hymn-book to which the psalm previously belonged.

Occasional infelicities of statement occur. In the usage of the author the terms "the critics" and "modern criticism" regularly denote radical critics and their work. The author thus excludes conservative scholars, himself included, from the ranks of critics. One is surprised to be told that the "name Janoah is unknown" outside of the stele of Meneptah (p. 141); and that "from the time of Moses to Samuel the voice of prophecy was silent" (p. 180). It is said that "a few older critics have considered the book [the Song of Solomon] a collection of love songs" (p. 290), as though the theory had been abandoned and no longer had defenders. The random citation of a writer as the advocate of a theory, even when not its representative promulgator, and the citation of writers who have less authority than others to speak in favor of the view, is rather common. The author employs the antiquated work of the chronologers of two centuries and a half ago, but with a wise word of caution. In dwelling so largely on things in which, in our judgment, the book falls below its own high standard of excellence, we are in danger of drawing undue attention to moats and specks; for the matters alluded to concern details, it will be seen, and are for the most part of slight importance except for niceness of finish.

Princeton. JOHN D. DAVIS.

College Series of Greek Authors, edited under the supervision of John Williams White and Thomas Day Seymour, editors; Charles Burton Gulick, Associate Editor. SELECTIONS FROM THE SEPTUAGINT, ac-

cording to the Text of Swete. By F. C. Conybeare, M.A., Ex-Fellow of University College, Oxford, and St. George Stock, M.A., Oxon., Pembroke College, Oxford. Ginn & Co.; Boston, New York, Chicago, London, [1905]. Sq. 8vo.; pp. vi., 313.

A good, useable introduction to the study of the Greek of the Septuagint has long been a desideratum. It is excellently supplied by this admirably conceived and executed volume.

There is a side to it which is likely and ought to curtail its usefulness greatly, and this we desire to make mention of at once, that we may get it out of the way and be free to speak of the value of the volume with the appreciation it otherwise deserves. We refer to the employment of the opportunity afforded by the publication of "Selections from the Septuagint" for the exploitation of rationalistic theories with respect to the composition and historicity of the Old Testament narrative. There was no sort of need for this. The editors are repeatedly remarking that "the historical aspect" of this story or that must be left to others; they are themselves concerned with it only as a piece of literature; and they might have truthfully added only as a piece of derived literature—a translation. Nevertheless they never lose an opportunity to attack the historicity of the stories they excerpt from the Septuagint, to suggest their origin in combinations of discordant traditions, to assimilate them to heathen myths and legends. The very extensive learning of the editors, and their light literary touch, enable them thus to poison the minds of the ingenuous youth who may chance to use their book, instilling into them every possible doubt and hesitation with regard to the Hebrew narratives. This zeal for using the philological task they have undertaken as an opportunity to advance a pet scheme in destructive Biblical criticism, we cannot look upon as becoming.

If we abstract this injurious element from the book—if abstract it we can—the volume seems to us altogether admirable. It consists of several parts. First, there is a brightly written Introduction, in which the student is told all he needs to know of the Septuagint version, its origin, history, form, language. In this Introduction, Deissmann's dismissal of "Biblical Greek" from existence is incidentally controverted. Hellenistic Greek is regarded as the genus, of which Alexandrian Greek is a species, of which in turn the Greek of the Septuagint and New Testament is a very peculiar variety—a variety which may well bear the old name of Hebraistic Greek. Next, (pp. 25-100) is an admirable little "Grammar of Septuagint Greek", with which every reader of the Septuagint should certainly make himself familiar. The eyes of many readers of the New Testament might be opened by simply reading over these useful seventy-five pages,—*e. g.*, the articles on πᾶς (§ 63), and the prepositions εἰς (§ 90) and ἐν (§91). The body of the book is now reached, and is found to consist of seven passages from the Septuagint, printed in fine, open type, prefaced brightly with introductions, and accompanied by a sufficient body of excellent notes, to which there is appended an index of Greek words. The resources of a wide and exact scholarship are drawn upon for these notes; they explain the

things really requiring explanation; they never dodge difficulties and do not shun either the niceties of philology or the archaeological details. Perhaps the passages selected have a little too much sameness about them. They are all historical incidents, chosen apparently largely for the story they present: the story of Joseph, the story of the Exodus, the story of Balaam and Balak, the story of Samson, the story of David and Goliath, the story of Elijah, the story of Hezekiah and Sennacherib. Thus only one form of composition is brought to the attention of the reader. We should suppose a greater variety would have been desirable: some of the Psalms, some of the great passages from the Prophets, some of the orations of Job, some of the wisdom of the Solomonic books. By thus widening the selections, the resources of the student would have been drawn upon more than is done by the simple historic narratives; and from them he would have learned more about the peculiarities of Septuagint Greek. Perhaps, however, this is only the first of two Septuagint readers, and the second is yet in store for us. We hope so: and we hope that, in that second reader, the authors will eschew excursions into the region of Biblical Criticism in which they are not good guides, and confine themselves to helping their readers to read and understand Septuagint Greek for which they have shown an admirable competency.

Princeton. B. B. Warfield.

The Birth and Infancy of Jesus Christ according to the Gospel Narratives. By the Rev. Louis Matthews Sweet, M.A. With an Introduction by James Stevenson Riggs, D.D., Professor of New Testament Literature in the Auburn Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1906. pp. 365.

Mr. Sweet's book is a very welcome addition to the discussion of the narratives of the Nativity. Starting, as he tells us in the preface, "with a bias rather unfavorable to the doctrine of the miraculous birth", the author has through his investigations been led to an assured belief in the historicity of the narratives; and of the earnestness and conscientiousness of these investigations the present treatise affords convincing proof. The table of contents includes: I. Statement of the Problem; II. Influence of the Old Testament Prophecies in the Formation of the Infancy Story; III. The Theory of Late Jewish-Christian Interpolation; IV. The Theory of Late Composite Origin; V. The Theory of Early Mytho-Theological Origin; VI. The Theory of Heathen Influence; VII. The Exegetical Construction of the Sections; VIII. The Uniqueness of Chirst in Its Bearing upon the Question of His Birth; IX. The Doctrinal Construction of the Historic Fact; Author's Notes.

The book is perhaps stronger in the fields of philosophy and of theology (in which fields, to a far greater extent than might be supposed, the objections to the narratives lie) and in the field of comparative religion, than in that of literary criticism. Thus the elaborate attempts of Hillmann, Harnack, and Weinel to eliminate the mention of the Virgin Birth from Lk. i. 5-ii. 52 should not have been ignored.

In this omission, however, the author has been guilty of slurring over an objection not against the historicity of the narrative, but rather against the recent attempts to explain the genesis of the narratives, supposing them not to be true to the facts. Lk. i. 5-ii. 52 is clearly Jewish in character, but according to most modern opponents of the historicity of the narrative, the genesis of the idea of the Virgin Birth cannot be explained without recourse to Gentile influences. The problem therefore becomes acute: How did a heathen idea come to be embodied in just the most strikingly Jewish narrative in the New Testament? The only possible solution seems to be that it was done by interpolation; the popularity of the interpolation theory, therefore, it due not to accident but to the necessities of the case. At any rate, its popularity is certainly not due to its inherent merits, as a piece of literary criticism; for a fair examination leads inevitably to the conclusion that there is absolutely no ground in the text itself for eliminating the mention of the Virgin Birth from the original form of Lk. i. 5-ii. 52. There is hardly any more serious line of criticism of the theories of heathen origin of the idea of the Virgin Birth than that which exhibits (1) the necessity, if those theories be correct, of supposing an interpolation in the infancy narrative of Luke, and (2) the absolute groundlessness of such a supposition. This line of argument the author has not entirely ignored (see p. 150), but he has not given it that prominence to which its importance both intrinsically, and in the minds of recent opponents of the historicity of the narratives, would entitle it.

The one theory of heathen origin for the idea of the Virgin Birth, which is not exposed to the objection we have just mentioned, is that of Gunkel and Cheyne, who maintain that the idea had its roots in the heathen religions of the East, but had, in essence, already passed into Judaism before our canonical narratives were written. This theory avoids the purely literary objection only to expose itself to others still more serious, which are well stated by Mr. Sweet.

To the bibliography should be added Conrady, *Die Quelle der kanonischen Kindheitsgeschichte Jesus'*; and important articles by Hilgenfeld, Zimmermann, Corssen, Harnack, Bardenhewer, Weinel, Box and others in various foreign journals. The author has almost consistently omitted from the bibliography articles in other than English and American journals,—certainly an artificial limitation since foreign books and monographs are included. The bibliography is marred by errors in spelling or printing; on p. 216, footnote (2), read Vol. II. for Vol. I.

Princeton. J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

DAS BERUFSBEWUSSTSEIN JESU mit Berücksichtigung geschichtlicher Analogien untersucht. Von Lic. theol. VOLKMAR FRITZSCHE, Oberlehrer am Königlishen Realgymnasium Zittau. Leipzig: Kommissionsverlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1905. 8vo. pp. 57.

"Volkmar Fritzsche!" The combination of names is certainly very striking, and leads one to anticipate something very choice in a bro-

chure bearing it upon its front. Nor is this expectation disappointed. The radicalism associated with the one name is here indeed happily conspicuous by its absence; as is also the chill air of too exclusive science that hangs around the other. Licentiate Volkmar Fritzsche is sanely conservative and lives in an atmosphere of warm devotion. He is not untouched by the modern spirit, it is true. He begins by setting aside John's narrative as a source of information as to Jesus' consciousness of His vocation, though he does this in language which may leave the way open to the conjecture that he may, after all, attach some historical value to it. "As records of the life of Jesus," he remarks, "the Synoptic Gospels stand in the front rank: of higher value as sources than the Johannine relation they are with respect to their contents presupposed in the writings of the Apostolos" (3, note 3). And again, when speaking of "the highest of Jesus' self-expressions," that great declaration recorded in Matt. xi. 27 and its parallel in Luke, he remarks that the "Johannine tone in which the entire saying is cast, may have passed into both the Johannine and the Synoptic relations out of the oldest tradition, and forms at the same time the indestructible link between the two" (p. 33). On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that the Synoptic record itself is looked upon by him as of something less than uniform trustworthiness. Not only does he suppose it to present certain of the sayings of our Lord in wrong connections, and to have coloured others with the reflection of the later age in which they were recorded, but to have presented the whole in a wrong perspective and to have read into the mass a less spiritual eschalogical element than our Lord's own. With this mistrust of the record, he finds himself compelled to validate one by one the originality of the sayings of Jesus on which he bases his study of the nature of His consciousness of His vocation. This work is performed exceedingly well and in it Lic Volkmar Fritzsche exhibits a clear, sane and sober judgment which gives his readers confidence in him and in the results of his work. But neither can the reader conceal from himself the element of subjectiveness which enters into all such work. He is perfectly aware all along that what he is asked to do is to trust Lic Volkmar Fritzsche's judgment rather than that of the Evangelists and rather than that of other workers in the same field, say Bousset's, or Pfleiderer's, or Wrede's: and he is perfectly well aware that the judgment of each of these is not only affected by his general subjectivity—the total content of his mind and his habitual way of looking at things—but is ultimately determined in a case of this kind by his world-view. He perfectly well understands, therefore, that if Lic Volkmar Fritzsche had come to the study of the Synoptic narrative imbued with the naturalism of the "Religionsgeschichtlers," to whom he sets himself here in opposition, he would have selected as "trustworthy" just those elements of the Synoptic record which, say, Bousset or Oscar Holtzmann recognizes as such; and if he had come with precisely the same presuppositions as the Evangelists themselves, he would have found nothing to alter in their record. And he perfectly understands that the arguments which Lic Volkmar Fritzsche presents for the

essential trustworthiness of the Synoptic record and the entire trustworthiness of the series of sayings of our Lord on which he bases his study of His office-consciousness, strike him as sound and convincing only because and only so far as he shares the general point of view of Lic Volkmar Fritzsche. So soon as we cut loose from the objective evidence of the trustworthiness of the record and begin to choose out from it for ourselves a trustworthy kernel, determined by intrinsic evidence alone, we open the doors to a subjectivity which always creeps in sufficiently to mar and usually rushes in to overwhelm the objectivity of the results. This is why works like Prof. Denney's *Death of Christ,* in which criticism and exposition are mingled together, leave so deep an impression of unreality on the mind of the reader: he is perfectly well aware that the exposition and criticism react on one another, and that the critical conclusions are controlled by the exegetical result and have, therefore, no independent value. That the feeling of unreality is less in the case of Lic Volkmar Fritzsche's pamphlet than in that of Dr. Denney's book is due solely to the relatively smaller place that criticism takes in it. And the reader feels strongly that it would have been well if it had been given even less prominence than it has. In any event, let criticism and exposition be separated. Lic Volkmar Fritzsche begins by telling us the sources on which he proposes to depend. That was the place to tell us how far he trusts the sources and to defend in detail his use of them. The attempt to justify the use he makes of them as he goes along, not only conveys the impression to the reader that he judges them trustworthy whenever they fall in with his mood and rejects them when they reject him, but tends to betray the writer himself into such subjective dealing with them.

Once over this "modernism" in his attitude to the sources, we are practically over with serious objection to Lic Volkmar Fritzsche's pamphlet. His actual position as to the trustworthiness of the Synoptic record of Jesus' sayings is very conservative for a "modern": he finds good reasons for accepting as genuine practically the entire series of declarations attributed to our Lord. And his exposition of this series of sayings from the point of view of our Lord's office-consciousness is penetrating, exhaustive, and rich. As the material is arranged in an ascending order, the booklet becomes a striking demonstration of the deity of our Lord from His own self-revelation, in the expression of His consciousness of the office He bore and the function He came into the world to perform. The argument, if we can call so close and careful an exposition by that name, is conducted by means of such compressed exegesis that it is difficult to present it in abstract. We shall merely attempt, then, to give a notion of it by indicating its outlines.

It begins by calling attention to our Lord's prophetic consciousness, and noting in connection with this the odd fact that our Lord never designates Himself προφήτης, a fact explicable not on the ground that He doubted whether He was all a prophet is, but only on the ground that He knew Himself to be vastly more. "Throughout, in distinction from all declarations by science, but also from all other religious modes of

conception, His speech is always just the most direct and purest expression of what He feels and experiences in His inmost being, in the highest sense the witness of the Divine that lives in Himself, of Himself" (p. 5). "He was conscious, not like the prophets, of proclaiming truths but of being the Truth" (p. 6). There was no other characterization provided by the history of revelation up to Him, in which His self-consciousness could express itself, except that of Messiahship: and it is quite clear that "Jesus Himself conceived the peculiarity of His office-consciousness under the category of Messiah" (p. 6). This is exhibited in the attitude of sovereignty which He took towards all previous revelations, setting His regal "But I say unto you" over against them all, erecting Himself above Jonah and Solomon, and above the holiest thing in Israel, the Temple, and even above John the Baptist whom He Himself declared more than a prophet (p. 8): and in the assurance with which He represents Himself as Him in connection with whom all the Scriptures stand, who as their center and core was the object of longing for milleniums, who ushers in the promised day of salvation, gives the adequate revelation of God, and pledges His abiding gracious presence. Warning frequently of false prophets and messiahs, He never suggests that one greater than Himself was yet to come. Setting His own Person in the center of His work, He demands for Himself, as no mere man, not even a prophet, ever demanded, the faith and love of men,—thus appropriating to indicate the relation which should exist between men and Him religious terms in which is expressed the behavior which men owe to God (p. 9). Even in that Kingdom of God for which all were looking as the culmination of the Divine goodness, and the advent of which He made it His life-task to proclaim, He gave His own Person the central place. Accordingly He accepted the ascription of Messiahship to Him on Peter's confession, and afterwards openly claimed it for Himself. But it must not be supposed that, knowing Himself to be the Messiah, He shared the conception of the Messiah current at the time. His own conception of the Messianic office is best expressed by the term "salvation," and His conception of "salvation" was purely religio-ethical: the spirituality of His whole point of view, including the idea even of the suffering Messiah—an idea entirely alien to the thought of His time,—sets Him in entire disaccord with the Messianic expectations that reigned around Him. In these circumstances, He could only with the utmost care and circumspection proclaim Himself to be the Messiah; and therefore did it only on favorable occasions and after long preparation, and in the use of an unwonted designation—that, to wit, of The Son of Man (p. 17). It cannot be doubted that Jesus employed this term to describe Himself and that as the Messiah: nor is it easy to doubt that it was wholly unknown as a Messianic title to the circles in which he moved (pp. 19, 20). No, Jesus did not derive it from Dan. vii. 13—though He may have afterwards connected it with that prophecy. He took it out of the current Aramaic use and gave it a poignant application to Himself, until it came to mean, "The Son who belongs to mankind and is sent by God to

it." When we examine Jesus' use of the title, we perceive that He set it in relation to His Messianic vocation, filled it with the content of His office-consciousness and thus elevated it into the Messianic sphere (p. 24). In one set of passages He calls Himself "Son of Man," with His thought playing around His offering of His life in love; in another, around His coming again for the final consummation of His work and for judgment of the world. It is probable that He did not employ it until near the close of His life (pp. 25, 26). It fell on His hearers' ears with no implication of the false Messianic notions then current, and obtained for them a particular, pregnant sense, only through the peculiar, always emphatic, manner in which Jesus applied it to Himself: as so used, however, it was well calculated to lead hearers to an understanding of His special Messianic-idea and to win them from their coarser Messianic-ideals; "for it could awake in them the reverential recognition that He who employed it was not a man like other men, who also were so called, but a special Man with a special vocation distinguishing Him from all others, the Messiah, and that in a sense essentially different from that they had cherished" (p. 26). In this designation there is thus emphasized and especially in its use in connection with the return to judgment, predicates of exaltation and majesty which raise Jesus as the Son of Man above all human analogy. What is implied in these claims is given expression in its greatest clearness, perhaps, in the highest of His self-expressions, Mt. xi. 27. For here He derives from the unique relation in which He is conscious of standing to God, the right to be recognized as the sole adequate revelation of God, and executor of the divine counsel of salvation, the sole mediator of saving grace, on whose mediation all saving knowledge of God for time and eternity depends (pp. 28-29). This unique relation in which He stands to God He expresses by the terms "Father" and "Son", into which He infuses unparalleled pregnancy of meaning, at the same time inexpressibly exalting the idea of God. God to Him becomes thus the realization of perfection itself, and in His Sonship to God Jesus expresses the consciousness of realizing in life the perfection which corresponds to this conception of God (p. 31). Thus Jesus speaks of Himself out of a complete consciousness of religious-ethical absoluteness which separates Him off from every other being which has inhabited the earth. It is precisely to the noblest and purest, to the men who stand highest in the ethical point of view, elsewhere, that Jesus sets Himself in contrast with this total absence from Him of all sense of personal shortcoming; and this calm representation of Himself as unlike other men in their daily need of forgiveness. He is rather the physician who brings them their cure. In the perfection of His relation to God, Jesus passes indeed out of the sphere of humanity altogether. "The inner conditions of His Son-consciousness, in which His office-consciousness is rooted, compel us to recognize His personality as the directly Divinely given self-revelation, as the living, personal manifestation, of the Eternal God: for its divine life-content is explicable, not by considering it as a sinless link in the sinful chain of humanity, but

only by looking upon it as standing already in its origin in mysterious connection with God and receiving its life from Him directly" (p. 41). "If, however, the office-consciousness of Jesus is not explicable out of natural life-conditions, and is therefore an absolute entity, then the revelation bound up indissolubly with His person is separated from the natural course of evolution, and is not merely a, even the highest, stage in the evolution of revelation, but in spite of certain necessary connections with this, extratemporal and thoroughly original. By this, however, is the claim of the religion which has entered history with the person of Jesus to be in an especial manner supernaturally grounded and thus to be essentially different from other religions, proved. It would fail of this only if the basis on which it rests were destroyed, that is, if Jesus' consciousness of Human and Divine Sonship were robbed of its reality and truth" (p. 42). This, however, cannot happen. Jesus is, no doubt, portrayed to us in the Synoptic narrative as a man; but certainly not in such a sort as to render His religio-ethical uniqueness incredible. We may talk of Him as a mere personification; or, if an actual existence, subject to error like other men; or we may trace His developing consciousness through stages, or impute to Him a sudden revelation of consciousness similar to a "conversion." But this is not the way the records portray Him; and no support for these essays at explaining Him can be derived from the records. "The Synoptic representation is simply this: Jesus recognizes in the testimony of the Baptist to Him as Messiah, the will of the Father that the period of patient waiting is for Him over and that for public ministry has come. Therefore He emerges at about thirty years old from obscurity, as an inwardly completely instructed, thoroughly independent, self-conscious and determined personality, whose consciousness is a completed one on all sides and whose determining ideas remain unchanged until death" (p. 46). Nothing else can we get from the sources. His life and death and their fruits bear Him witness. We may not understand Him altogether: the person of Jesus remains a mystery before which we can only bow in prayerful awe. But against His person every attempt to derive it in its origin and form exclusively from the circle of the earthly life is shattered. "Under the weight of the direct impression of the holy, sinless personality of Jesus in its life, death and resurrection we believe and know that this is the Christ the Son of the living God" (p. 54).

Of course there are elements in this argument which will awaken the critical faculty in the reader's mind. Perhaps the explanation of the origin and significance of the Messianic title "Son of Man" will most of all arouse dissent. Perhaps it remains doubtful precisely to what goal we are led: and the reader may legitimately question whether justice is done to the true ("metaphysical" we now call it) deity of Christ. But we think no one will read the pamphlet through without acquiring the conviction that the Jesus depicted by the Synoptic gospels was not only understood by their writers to be, but was, conscious of standing in so unique a relation to God, and of being charged with so divine a work, and of actually accomplishing this work with such divine perfection and

effect, as to be inexplicable out of the conditions in which He appeared and worked, and to require for His explanation the assumption of that divine interposition which He claimed Himself not merely to represent but to be. When we find this accomplished by a little pamphlet of half-a hundred pages we gladly forego criticism of details open to criticism, and offer the author simply our thanks.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

DIE REDEN UNSERES HERRN NACH JOHANNES IM GRUNDTEXT ausgelegt von D. SIEGFRIED GOEBEL, Professor und Konsistorialrat in Bonn. Erste Hälfte, Kap 1-11. Gütersloh 1906, E. Bertelsmann. Pp. 573.

The appearance of Prof. Goebel's commentary, though the author professes not to write with any apologetic purpose (p. 6), stands nevertheless, as the title of the book suggests and the introductory chapter indicates, in connection with the recent attacks that have been made on the genuineness of the Gospel by prominent New Testament scholars of the critical school of his own country. Our Lord's Discourses have been one of the main causes for the uncompromising rejection of the Gospel on the part of critics.

Prof. Goebel prefaces his commentary on the Discourses with an introductory chapter on the interest of interpretation. He points out that the critics who regard the Gospel as a Logosromance in which its unknown author gives the evolution of his own speculative idea, will take no interest in making a separate interpretative study of the Discourses. On the other hand, scholars who admit the Johannine authorship, and consider the Discourses as free reproductions of the original words of Jesus and as merging at times into the reflections of the Disciple, but whose interest in the Discourses is merely *literargeschichtlich*, will never be able to determine the original form of the Discourses along the lines of historical criticism. The results will be wanting in objective proof.

A third class of scholars, to whom the author professes to belong, take a position not opposed to the preceding one but rather supplementing it. The Holy Scriptures, they believe, are not the work of man alone, nor the result of a literary or historical process, but the work of God wrought through the instrumentality of man. The form in which the Gospel contains the Discourses is the form in which God willed the Church should have them. And as theologians of the Church they feel it as incumbent upon them to aid the Church to a clearer, deeper understanding of the Discourses.

This standpoint of the author, extremely conservative though it be, implies however an important concession which, it is true, mediating theologians, as *e. g.*, Bernhard Weiss, have made, but others, as, *e. g.*, Godet, have never granted. Our author duly recognizes the human factor in the Discourses and does not consider this recognition as endangering inspiration properly understood. This view reminds one of that taken by such theologians as Dr. A. Kuyper (Cf. *Encyclopedia of Theology*). The position of our author is a sympathetic one, yet the

problem which the Discourses present is not solved in this way. It would have been eminently in place had the author taken up the various sides of the problem in the introductory chapter, the more so since we meet occasionally with a refutation of views of the adherents of the fiction theory and of other theories in the commentary itself. (Cf. pp. 89, 85, 389.)

This volume covers the Discourses of Jesus up to the passion week. Dr. Goebel gives an exposition of the briefest utterances of Jesus, *e. g.*, "Follow me", addressed to Philip (p. 43), as well as of the longer Discourses. Nor does he confine himself to the words of Jesus only. Those of His interlocutors, the *dialogi* as a whole are interpreted; likewise the passages which contain the occasion, place, or time of the Discourses. The title of the book, accordingly, does not quite indicate the comprehensiveness of the contents. We have to a large extent a commentary of the Fourth Gospel.

Dr. Goebel's commentary possesses high merits. It has the advantage over many commentaries on the New Testament in that it is a readable book. The chapters into which the commentary is divided are carefully paragraphed. The style is clear, some passages eloquent. Throughout the commentary the pious, believing heart of the expositor is discernible. The closing paragraphs of some chapters are even of a practical, edifying nature. There are no footnotes, and not that constant reference to interpretations of other commentators. The text-critical comments are embodied in the text of the commentary. But the chief merit of the book lies in the absence of dogmatic prepossessions on the part of the author in approaching the text, in the eye he has for seeing its real difficulties and the problems, and the clear and masterly way in which he deals with them.

We meet in the commentary with not a few departures from generally accepted interpretations and with elaborate elucidation of some difficult terms and passages. At the end of his commentary on John (I. 51) there is an excellent excursus on the term ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Goebel denies that the title is borrowed from the Book of Enoch or Dan (VII. 13). As a self designation of Jesus it is original with Him. Its meaning can be determined only by the analysis of the term itself. The proposal of τί ἐμοὶ ἢ σοί in John II. 4 by Prof. Blass on the basis of Nonnus' Paraphrase is not discussed. Nor does Dr. Goebel generally take notice of the proposals of that critic. According to Goebel Nicodemus understands Jesus when He says, "Except one be born anew, he cannot see the Kingdom of God". This view leads Goebel to look upon vs. 4b as merely a plastic expression. In rendering τὸ πνεῦμα in III. 8 by "the Spirit" the author, it is true, does not stand alone (Cf. Drummond, *Authorship and Character of the Fourth Gospel*), but his reasons for doing so are not altogether cogent. Among other things he says that τὸ πνεῦμα κ. τ. λ. vs. 8 is "eine majestätische Aussage die in ihrer Bedeutung einschrumpfen würde", if it were translated by "the wind, etc.". Another example of somewhat questionable logic appears on page 103. John iii. 19-21 are not the Disciple's own reflections but the

words of Jesus freely reproduced. He differs here from Zahn and Sandays both. It is certainly a view more probable than that of Zahn when Goebel makes John stay with Jesus while the disciples go into the city to beg food, John iv. 8. The rendering of *τὴν βρῶσιν τὴν μένουσαν εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον* VI. 27 by *"Dauerspeise für ewiges Leben"* is new and philosophically hardly defensible. The multiplying of the bread, chapter VI, p. 199, and the healing of the blind man, chapter IX, p. 424, are effected through the instrumentality of angels. The pericope of the woman taken in adultery is to be eliminated "an dieser Stelle". The author does not declare it downright spurious, and what he says about it hardly warrants him to leave it uninterpreted.

Corrigenda appear on page 56, 73, 165.

Prof. Goebel's book will stand the most favourable comparison with the best commentaries on the Fourth Gospel. It deserves an English translation and a place in the library of both the pastor and the New Testament scholar.

Glasgow. R. JANSSEN.

THE TESTIMONY OF ST. PAUL TO CHRIST VIEWED IN SOME OF ITS ASPECTS. By R. J. KNOWLING, D.D., Canon of Durham and Professor of Divinity in the University of Durham; Fellow of King's College, London. Boyle Lectures 1903-1905. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1905. Pp. vi., 533. $3.00 net.

The somewhat indefinite title of this work is in keeping with the somewhat undefined character of its contents. What Dr. Dowling gives us is by no means confined to the data that may be collected from the Pauline epistles concerning the so-called "historical Jesus". It is not St. Paul's testimony to Jesus, but St. Paul's testimony to Christ, that the author reviews, and this choice of name in the title strikingly suits the nature of his book. Not merely the Apostle's knowledge of the Gospel-story is inquired into, but equally much his conception of the exalted Christ, and the transcendent place he ascribes to the Saviour generally. And even this scarcely covers what the author has brought together under his title. If the word "Christ" must be broadly understood, so likewise the term "testimony". Evidently Dr. Dowling takes "testimony" in a wider sense than "teaching" or even "preaching", for all the Apostle's life and activity, viewed from an apologetic standpoint as a witness to the supernatural character of Christianity, are considered germane to the subject. In anything else but a lecture-course, such an absence of definite boundaries to the subject would be a serious disadvantage, because inevitably it must sometimes leave the reader at a loss about the precise trend or scope of the discussion. In an extended series of lectures, covering, as in the present case, three years, a certain freedom of movement must be allowed. Certainly a great deal of most useful material has here been collected and made more conveniently accessible in the present one volume, than if it had been distributed over three separate books.

The ground traversed is not much different from that covered by the author's valuable work *The Witness of the Epistles* published in

1892. But the method of treatment and the point of view differ so considerably, that we can hardly speak of repetition. A mere glance at the table of contents of both books will suffice to perceive the difference. *The Witness of the Epistles* deals with our Lord's history in large cross-sections following the chronological order of events, first his life and teaching, then his death and burial, the rescurrection, the ascension and the return being discussed. In the present work we have three great divisions. The first of these is devoted to a vindication of the genuineness of all the epistles, which in the N. T. claim Paul as their author, and of the genuineness of the Acts of the Apostles as a writing of Luke. The author here turns to excellent advantage the movement, which has become so perceptible during these latter years, of a return in the consensus of critical opinion towards the old traditional position. With reference to 2 Thessalonians and Ephesians and even with reference to the Pastoral Epistles, he is able to appeal with much greater confidence to the admissions from the other side than was possible when *The Witness to the Epistles* was published. On the other hand a renewed criticism of the most radical views expressed by the Dutch school and by Steck was called for, since, through the *Encyclopedia Biblica,* these views have been introduced to the English public, and in Germany have begun to be popularized among the laity by such writers as Kalthoff, not to speak of their advocacy by Prof. Smith in this country. Dr. Dowling very skillfully shows how utterly untenable Van Manen's position is, especially in view of the external evidence, which compels him to assert, that clear quotations from a Pauline epistle, do not prove the existence of this epistle at the time of quoting but of some imaginary fragment or fragments out of which later the present epistles were composed. He also brings out how implausible is the same critic's distinction between three Pauls, one the real Paul, a mere missionary-preacher like Peter, without any literary activity or theological importance, the second a symbolic Paul, who figured in the consciousness of a later generation as the representative of the movement towards a law-free gospel, the patron-hero of the sect called Christians, who had to lend his name to the cause in order that it might seem to have a root in the past; the third Paul the Paul drawn by the writer of Acts, after the strife of the stage to which the second Paul belonged had lost its importance, a Paul made more or less to resemble Peter, as Peter is made to resemble Paul, in order that by these two names the Catholic Church might be shown to have its founders in the apostolic age. To quote Dr. Dowling's own words: "The old Catholic tradition of the Church is wrong, but so is also the Tübingen interpretation of that early church history. There was strife between Peter and Paul, but not between the actual bearers of these names. They lived and worked in company with others as "disciples" and "sons" of Jesus, and no dogmatic differences divided them; only after their departure was Paulinism born and thrown as an apple of discord amongst those who should have lived as brethren." This purely conjectural structure is

overthrown by the simple observation, that there was nothing in the first or original Paul, which marked him out for the high distinction which it is affirmed was conferred upon him in the second and third stage of the development. But, while thus exhibiting the absurdity of this hypothesis, Dr. Dowling turns to excellent account Steck's and Van Manen's contention to the effect that the writer or writers of the Pauline Epistles made use of written gospels, in so far as this implies *à fortiori* that they must have been acquainted with much of the gospel-traditions whether written or not. In regard to the Book of Acts the case made out has since the time of publication been greatly strengthened by Harnack's careful inquiry into the style and language of the we-sections as compared with the remainder of the book and his conclusion that the author of both is the same, viz., Luke. Dr. Dowling has here in advance urged the same fact with great cogency and it must be great satisfaction to him as well as to others, who had made the observation before, to find themselves supported by so eminent an authority as Harnack. Let us hope that similar surprises from this quarter may yet be in store for us as to other controverted questions of New Testament criticism.

In the second division of the book, after a lecture on the conversion of St. Paul, the several Pauline epistles are taken up, and the testimony of each in turn, as to the facts of Jesus' life and his teaching is heard. In the introductory lecture the distinction between a vision technically so-called and an appearance of Christ is lucidly discussed over against Schmiedel a. o. An excellent point is also made against those, who like von Dobschütz, would represent the resurrection-appearances to which Paul refers in 1 Cor. 15, 5-8, as an indefinitely continued series, from the ἔσχατον in vs. 8, which clearly marks the list as in the Apostle's view definitely closed. In looking for quotations and reminiscences of sayings of Jesus in the epistles, Dr. Dowling is duly cautious lest by overeagerness in the pursuit and overcredulousness in discovery he should blunt the edge of his argument. With great candor he frequently, where others have found a dependence, makes the admission that the resemblance may be due to commonly current forms of speech. The argument is not made to rest so much on the number of the incontestable cases of dependence, but rather on their hortatory, incidental character, which compels us to believe, that Paul, had other occasions required it, could have introduced much more of similar historical material. No candid reader of this part of Dr. Dowling's book will be able to deny that the current conception, as if Paul had no interest in the earthly life of Jesus, is a gross error. It is true, here also the author is not the first to point out, that it becomes utterly impossible to form a concrete view of the Apostle's missionary activity without assuming that the facts of the life and ministry of Jesus as well as his death and resurrection, must have played a considerable rôle in his message and teaching.

In the third section of the work the several missionary journeys of the Apostle are reviewed and their apologetic witness is vividly brought

before the reader. Four lectures on St. Paul and Personal Devotion, St. Paul and Social Life, St. Paul and Missionary Work, and on Recent Literature complete this series. In the three first of these last-mentioned four, the tone and spirit of the discussion are characterized by great warmth of religious feeling, such as in the earlier lectures occasionally reveals itself, but here becomes pervasive and makes the perusal of the pages edyfying as well as instructive.

Throughout the book Dr. Dowling strongly emphasizes the unique value of the Pauline testimony to the facts and teaching of the Gospels on account of its chronological nearness to the events. It is the testimony of one who was, if not an eye-witness, yet a cotemporary of the Lord. For any serious transformation of the facts there scarcely was time between the history and St. Paul's account of it, which, it must not be forgotten, as an oral missionary-account, antedates the written references in the epistles. Even if in the Gospels we did not have the early and direct testimony, which the Church has always believed and still believes it has in them, the word of Paul would go far to supply the deficiency. And this is especially important in regard to the supernatural element in the Gospel-history. Paul bears witness to this not merely in his recital of the facts, but equally much in his own consciousness of being able to do miracles as a servant of Christ, a consciousness which undoubtedly presupposes his acquaintance by tradition with the miraculous element in the ministry of Jesus. And the same chronological nearness of the Apostle to the Lord is of the utmost value in estimating the significance of the transcendent place Paul gives to the Saviour in his own teaching Christologically and soteriologically. Here again there is no sufficient interval to account for the genesis of the Pauline gospel by any myth-forming process, a fact, which in his day even the philosopher Schopenhauer recognized. The only way in which those who are opposed to supernaturalism in every form can attempt to meet this difficulty would be either to postulate, after the example of Brückner, a much more advanced prae-Christian Jewish Christology, than has hitherto been accepted, or to follow our countryman William Benjamin Smith in his hypothesis of a "prae-Christian Jesus", although the latter writer would hardly deem this peculiar exploitation of his views necessary, since he himself with Van Manen places the Pauline epistles in the second century. We, for our part, believe that nothing but the recognition of a substantial supernaturalism in the life of Jesus, followed by a substantial supernaturalism in the shaping of Paul's teaching, will solve the problem, and Dr. Dowling has done well to remind us once more of this fact.

We have found very little in the good-sized volume to which exception can be taken. On p. 502 it is argued from the Apostle's statement that Andronicus and Junias were before him "in Christ", that the peculiar conception expressed by the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ must antedate the Apostle's conversion. This seems to us an undue pressing of the words. Paul could so refer to his conversion, even though the peculiar mode of referring to it, was the product of a later doctrinal

development. It is quite possible, or even probable, that the phrase is older, but Rom. 16, 7 scarcely proves it. We also feel somewhat hesitant about the author's interpretation of "holy" in Lk. 1, 35 as "sinless". This is used in arguing that Paul must have known of the Virgin-birth, because the sinlessness of Jesus preached by Paul was thus affirmed in "the Pauline Gospel, the Gospel of St. Luke" (p. 314). But the verb used in connection with "holy", viz., "shall be called", seems to point rather to an official Messianic than to an ethical qualification. We confess to not liking the phrase "consecrated imperialism", in connection with the propaganda of Christianity, well-meant and carefully qualified though it may be on the author's part. On p. 354 Jerusalem is a misprint for Damascus, on p. 409 Rome for Jerusalem.

Princeton. GEERHARDUS VOS.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

BALTHASAR HÜBMAIER, the Leader of the Anabaptists. By HENRY C. VEDDER, Professor of Church History in Crozer Theological Seminary. Crown 8vo. pp. xxiv, 333. New York. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1905.

The Anabaptists have certainly been a sect much spoken against. No one can wonder that Dr. Vedder has seized the opportunity which this volume of the "Heroes of the Reformation" offered him, to present a brief for them. As is customary in such cases he seems, however, somewhat to overdo the matter. Not content with showing that the Anabaptists were not all fanatics like Hans Hut and Jacob Widemann, much less firebrands like Thomas Münzer, but for the most part just simple men seeking the Christian salvation, professing an evangelical faith and adorning this faith with consistent lives; he is moved to represent them as the only consistent Christians of the time, whose only fault was that they were consistently Christians. That this may appear, the main lines of the reforming movement are represented, in contrast, as half hearted when not lacking in complete sincerity or stained by self-seeking. The doctrines of the Anabaptists "were too Scriptural, too spiritual, too incompatible with those that in many places were being forced on unwilling people, in the name of reform, by irreligious rulers obviously actuated by ambition and greed" (p. 19)—for them to be tolerated. The Swiss and German reformers had indeed begun by proclaiming the Scriptures the sole rule of faith and practice; but soon is was "shown that the reformers were unwilling to follow this principle to all lengths," and "it was their ultimate refusal to do this; their partial surrender again to the tradition they had so vigorously repudiated, that led to the division of the reforming party and developed the minority radical group, to whom the name 'Anabaptist' was generally given" (p. 92). In point of fact, these 'Anabaptists' were the advance-guard of the Reformation—those in which the formative principles of evangelical religion found their purest expression; and their leaders

were at least the peers of those whose names have come down to us clothed with more glory merely because the accidents of the time gave them more success. Hübmaier, for example, "in learning, in character, in eloquence, was not less fitted for leadership than Luther or Zwingli; and had opportunity been offered him, there can be little doubt that he would have accomplished that which would have left his name by the side of the greatest preachers and reformers of the age" (p. 153). That there is exaggeration here is obvious. The whole view suggested is in fact unhistorical, as (to go no further) the issues of history have demonstrated. The Anabaptists were the vanguard of the Reformation only in the sense that in many respects they represent the surf-line along which the great waves of reform broke on the solid bank of the populace. Their leaders were, as popular leaders often are, eager, earnest men of the second and third rank, manifesting their inferiority, at the worst in fierce and ignorant fanaticisms, at the best in that lack of balance and proportion in judgment which led to their tithing of mint and anise and cummin to the neglect of the weightier matters of the law. Without the Anabaptists the Reformation might have failed for lack of a sufficiently wide-spread popular impression: they largely represent the effect of the reforming movement on the populace. With the Anabaptists only, the Reformation would have failed for lack of a sufficiently solid grounding: it would have been but as a fire in the straw which flares up into a blaze and quickly dies away.

That this was the actual state of the case becomes sufficiently evident, indeed, to the reader of Dr. Vedder's carefully written and instructive volume. Though under the general dominance of an exaggerated estimate of the significance of the Anabaptist movement and of the greatness of its leaders, Dr. Vedder is too thorough a student and too conscientious a historian to fail to set down in his pages a sufficiently accurate portrait of the personality of the man he is depicting and of the times in which he lived. And the reader rises from a perusal of the volume with a tolerably clear impression that he has been observing the life-history of a man of fine gifts and high qualities, indeed, of whom the world was not worthy, who wrought a good work in his generation, but whose labors were expended on the fringe rather than at the core of the reforming movement. No, Balthasar Hübmaier, these very pages being witness, was not a Luther nor a Zwingli nor a Calvin,—and it is well for the modern Christian world that these men and their chief helpers were not Balthasar Hübmaiers—but a volatile genius of noble impulses and limited powers, who fought his fight and won his crown and bears a clear title to the affectionate admiration of all who have eyes to see good work accomplished in the face of great difficulties. It does not appear that Bullinger's characterization of him as a man of undoubted eloquence and sufficient learning, but nevertheless of an unstable disposition, in accordance with which he floundered about somewhat (*wohl beredet und ziemlich belesen gewesen aber eines unstäten Gemüts, mit dem er hin und her fiel*) is not exact. He is the type of the best class of popular agitators; but the best type of popular

agitators is after all not the highest type of world-movers. Nor does there seem to have been any power of origination in the man. It was not he, nor the like of him that made the Reformation; but the Reformation that made him and that great body of likeminded men who partook of the blessings it brought. For all that appears, had not the breath of life blown on him from without, he would have remained Eck's satellite until the end of the chapter. The praise that belongs to him is that when the breath of life came to him he recognized it and took it to himself and gave his all with enthusiasm to it. This is much to say of any man: but there are some of which much more has to be said; and with men of this higher class he cannot be ranged.

Dr. Vedder begins his book with an appreciatively written general chapter on the Anabaptists of the Reformation era which forms the background of his story. He then follows the fortunes of his hero from his cradling in the Universities of Freiburg and Ingolstadt under the tutelage of John Eck, through his brief evangelical stage and his short life-work as an Anabaptist leader to his grave in the martyr-fires at Vienna. A chapter inserted near the end sums up with care Hübmaier's doctrinal teaching. The volume closes with a chapter outlining the subsequent history of the Moravian Anabaptists. Though he exaggerates the greatness of his hero, Dr. Vedder does not glose his personal weaknesses: and the general portrait he draws has a vivisimilitude which makes it convincing. The chief flaw which Dr. Vedder finds in Hübmaier's character is lack of fortitude,—a virtue which, as he truly remarks, is not given to all good men, and the presence or absence of which it little becomes those who are never called upon to exercise it, to make the article of a standing or falling character. But Hübmaier lacked some other things besides fortitude. He lacked, for example, thoroughness of understanding and consequently clearness and firmness of conviction of the evangelical system. The plain fact seems to be that he never was a well-instructed and completely convinced evangelical, but remained till the end of his life only partially "reformed" in the elements of his thought. This it is which seems to underlie the facility with which he "recanted" at Vienna. It seems impossible to read this document (pp. 230-231) without perceiving that his thought in all the deep things of the Gospel still ran in mediæval moulds—the best type of mediæval moulds, no doubt, but nevertheless moulds belonging to the old rather than the new order. Inflamed with the evangelical sentiment, he had preached the Gospel from the borders of Switzerland to Moravia; and in preaching it, he had, after the fashion of fervid men of his type, given it here and there a startlingly clear and poignant expression; but deep down in his heart of hearts the article of a standing or falling Church was with him not the election of grace (which was the real hinge of the Reformation as it is of all stable evangelicalism) nor justification by faith (which is the center of the evangelical consciousness) but the purity of the Church. This it was which made him an Anabaptist; for Dr. Vedder is undoubtedly right in pointing (p. 102) to the puritan theory of the Church as the theoretical root out of which Anabaptism grew. And

this it was which made it difficult for him to grasp clearly or to hold firmly the fundamental principles which underlie evangelical religion.

It is of the essence of evangelical religion that salvation comes to man from without; it is the objective elements in the saving work on which in it thought is focussed, as trust and hope are suspended. Hübmaier was absorbed rather in the contemplation of the subjective elements in the religious life: and exclusive occupation with these has its dangers which he did not wholly escape. Dr. Vedder calls attention to the small place the doctrines of the election of grace and of justification by faith (pp. 185, 201) seem to have occupied in Hübmaier's thought. It would be unfair to infer that he did not in a general way believe these doctrines, without which there can be no evangelicalism. The place which faith occupies in his system implies some assimilation to the Reformation doctrine of justification; and he tells us that "faith alone justifies", although adding the very proper remark (which, however, is not properly guarded by him) that "faith does not save by itself". And he incidentally discusses aspects of the doctrine of election at some length on more than one occasion. But it is quite obvious that he embraces neither doctrine in its purity, nor indeed thoroughly understands either. He flounders painfully, for example, as he discusses the familiar distinction between the "secret" and "revealed" will of God, and in one passage at least seems inclined to identify the one with the divine power, the other with the divine intention. He has thought on the subject: but his thought has not had force enough to go through it. What he his in mind is to preserve for man an unevangelical measure of autonomy. His particular scheme exhibits traces at once of the old scholastic Pelagianism which would fain retain for humanity a power to obey God, and of the old sectarian Manichæism which discovered the true seat of human sin in the body: a combination common enough among the Anabaptists of the day. Man to him consists of three elements, body, soul, and spirit, which have been decreasingly affected by the fall: only the body is indeed completely fallen. Thus he secures for himself in the spirit the seat of a real freedom, by which he is enabled to develop as true a synergism in salvation as Aquinas himself or Melanchthon. The root of his difficulty is that he is not able to give all the glory to God in salvation: he does not see with Augustine that central truth, "Our power, O God, Thou Thyself art", and he seeks ever to discover a power making for salvation in man himself. In one word, the core of evangelism escapes him. His zeal is to find some fulcrum in man for the lever of the Word; his fatal error is that he seeks this fulcrum in man as he is by nature not as he is made by grace. No doubt he now and again emits sentences of the purest evangelical import: no doubt much of his preaching bore this tone: it is the only preaching which from the beginning of the world up to to-day has had the power which his had. But herein the genius of the orator expressed itself, which like the inspiration of the poet carries him oftentimes beyond himself. There was lacking beneath, a thoroughly thought out, clearly conceived, and firmly held conviction. Hence the instability

of the man: hence the difference which divides him and his fellow Anabaptists from the leaders of the Reformation. They were evangelicals in principle: it was part of the content of their deepest religious consciousness that the grace of God alone was the beginning and middle and end of salvation. To fall away from this would be to fall away from themselves. He was in principle a synergist, the question of questions to whom was ever "whether we will or not." Though he might speak in the fervor of his religious feeling with a truly evangelical ring in his voice, therefore, yet he could easily drop back into a greater or less infusion of "works" into salvation.

We cannot agree with Dr. Vedder when he suggests that no greater clarity in the article of Predestination could have been expected of Hübmaier, because his work fell in the earlier years of the Reforming movement, before the Institutes of Calvin had enabled the Reformation theology to become clear and consistent on this matter. We have no wish to underestimate the services of Calvin in this or any other matter. But the Reformation movement did not wait for Calvin to teach it the doctrine of Predestination, which is rather the theological implicate of its very heart. The Reformation movement was rather the product of this doctrine and all it stands for, than this doctrine the product of that movement. Zwingli taught it with a point and sharpness which surpasses even Calvin: Luther asserted it with a dogmatic uncompromisingness which Calvin could not equal. It was Melanchthon, not Calvin, who first gave it a formal place in a Protestant system. It was Bucer who taught it to Calvin, not Calvin who ingrafted it into the Reformation theology. It was in a word Augustine, the true father of the Reformation on its doctrinal side, who planted it in the heart of the Reformation consciousness; and that Hübmaier fumbles and wavers where the whole body of great Reformers were clear and firm, is only an indication that he had not drunk deeply at the fountain whence they had derived their inspiration,—that, in a sense not intended to be offensive, he was in the Reformation movement while not wholly of it,—swept along by it and lending his strength to it, but not an element in the great creative forces which made it. The instinct of the Reformation leaders did not lead them essentially astray when they saw in the Anabaptist movement a movement of different origin, informed by a different spirit and tending to a different issue from that which they had inaugurated: and Balthasar Hübmaier stands before us as a fair representation of this different movement at its best. There was much in it to command our admiration and compel our affection: but it was not the Reformation, certainly not the Reformation at its height, leading the way to a completeness of the reforming process from which the official leaders of the movement shrank: and its leaders, while often men of high character and deep piety who have earned our admiration and pity by their self-denying labors and cruel sufferings for righteousness' sake, have no real claim to a place by the side of those greater men to whom in the grace of God it was given to recreate the world.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

JEAN CALVIN: LES HOMMES ET LES CHOSES DE SON TEMPS. Par E. DOUMERGUE, Professeur a la Faculté de Théologie de Montauban. Tome Troisième: LA VILLE, LA MAISON ET LA RUE DE CALVIN. Ouvrage orné de la reproduction de 99 estampes anciennes, autographes, etc.; et de 124 dessins originaux, par H. Armand Delille. Ouvrage couronné par l'Academie française. (Prix Guizot.) Lausanne: Georges Bridel et Cie, Editeurs. 1905. 4to. pp. ix. 722.

The first volume of Professor Doumergue's great work on Calvin, appearing in 1899, was reviewed in THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW for October 1900 (xi. 713); and the second volume, bearing on its title page the date of 1902, was reviewed in THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW for April 1904 (ii. 344). The third volume is now in our hands and carries the encyclopædic work one stage nearer to its completion; but does not yet reach the heart of the matter. The first volume was confined to the youth of Calvin, leaving him at Bâle about to enter upon his reformatory work: these were his years of growth, the years of preparation and study. The second volume gives us an account of the opening reformatory work, closing with Calvin's return to Geneva in 1541: these were the years of training, when he was learning by actual experience the nature of the work which was before him. The third volume, beginning with Calvin at Geneva, pauses to make known to us in full detail the Geneva which was to be the scene of his work. If the first two volumes present us with a detailed portrait of the man, the third lays before us a minute picture of the material upon which he was to work. The work itself which this man wrought on this material lies still before us. It is to be given in two subsequent volumes, the first of which will present "the program," and the second, "the conflict and the victory."

From this general outline of his treatise it may seem that Professor Doumergue is thinking of Calvin, predominantly, as the Reformer of Geneva. In so far as this is true, it is of course only from a standpoint from which to estimate the character and achievement of this world-moving genius. From it, however, Professor Doumergue appears to derive his apology for the prevailingly ecclesiastical interests of the present volume. "Calvin," he remarks in the preface, "a été avant tout un homme d'Église." Before coming to the problem with which Professor Doumergue has actually dealt, let us undertake a description of the work as it is in fact." And at the end he adds: "How shall we ever know what Geneva was before Calvin? And if ignorance of what Geneva was before Calvin, how should we estimate what Calvin did for it?" From this standpoint, however, a detailed study of the city in which Calvin did his work, and from the conviction that it was from it that the world must be justified,—that city which Professor Doumergue thinks was the center, the heart and as it were the sanctuary of the Calvinistic Reformation" even as Calvin's home is to him "the center and, as it were, the sanctuary" of it. Many readers will feel, as doubtless Professor Doumergue himself does, the ecclesiastical bias of the work. But the volume is not wholly given over to ecclesiastical matters.

might mislead us into expecting: "The Town, the House and the Street of Calvin." Not only is it crowded with the most illuminating portraits of Calvin's conetmporaries, but it all leads up to and is continually impinging directly upon the portrait of Calvin himself; and the reader rises from the perusal of the volume with a much fuller appreciation of the personality of the great Reformer than could easily be conveyed to him by another method. Thus for example, in the chapter devoted to the hostelries of Calvin's day— a chapter in itself full of side lights on Calvin's life,—we not only learn that Calvin had no fork and ate with his fingers—that "the Reformers Zwingli, Oecolampadius, Bullinger, Myconius—and Calvin and Farel and Viret—ate with their fingers without a fork, and even on occasion invoked the assistance of their knives" (a fact which Professor Doumergue hints may stand for us as the type of the civilization and barbarism of Calvin's day)—but a great deal very much to the point as to the measures Calvin took for reforming the abounding evils of the tavern-life of the time, and their relation to past measures of the same kind. Similarly, when speaking of the pest in Geneva, occasion is taken to describe Calvin's personal conduct in presence of the pest; and when the Genevan House is under discussion the whole subject of the sumptuary laws, the regulations for the moral life, and the general features of the religious life in Geneva is most carefully studied.

Moreover the heavily archæological portion of the volume really ends with the first book, which bears the sub-title of "The Town of Calvin." The second book, under the caption of "The House of Calvin" is really a treatise on Calvin's private life. And a most carefully studied and illuminating treatise it is. It is divided into two chapters, entitled respectively, "Calvin's Salary" and "Calvin at Home"; and the former chapter treats in turn of "Calvin's Five Hundred Florins", "Salary and Perquisites", "Calvin's Disinterestedness", while the latter touches in turn on his "Austerity", his "Illnesses", his "Charm", his "Heart." It might seem at first sight that there remains little room for discussion of Calvin's salary, since it is clearly set down in the decree of the Council as five hundred florins, along with about twelve hundred weight of flour and two measures of wine. But when the value of these five hundred florins comes to be estimated proportionately to modern conditions, the historians go as widely apart as 250 francs are separated from 7500. The question arises whether, on his salary of five hundred florins, Calvin was a poor man or a moderately rich one; and calumny has taken the matter up and given occasion for the defence which Professor Doumergue here makes of Calvin's disinterestedness. Professor Doumergue's own estimate is that Calvin's salary amounted to about what 3500 francs would mean to a modern Genevan: which the flour and wine would raise to a value of about 4000 francs, that is, to about $800. A house was added, and some small accidental sources of revenue existed. A man in modern Geneva living on $800 and a house could scarcely be esteemed affluent. Calvin's salary exceeded that of his fellow preachers, it is true; but it was less than that of many of his fellow teachers, (*e.*

g., Hotman, professor of law). He was not rich but he was not poor. "He practiced, not indeed evangelical poverty in the sense which Kampschulte intends, that is to say Catholic poverty with its evil asceticism,—evil even when it commands our admiration, with its pretended merits and habitual vices. But it was a true model of evangelical poverty in the sense which the Gospel intends, which consists in detachment from riches, knowing how to want and how to abound, without particular preöccupation: true type of a great disinterested man" (p. 490). The austerity of his life was the austerity of a devoted, not of a narrow or a fanatical, soul.

The picture which Professor Doumergue draws of the excessive labors of Calvin is distressing enough. But even more distressing is the picture he draws of his illnesses: the first attempt, he tells us, to write a pathological biography of the Reformer. "This extraordinary labor," he writes, "resulted in an extraordinary series of maladies. It would be easier to recount the diseases Calvin did not have than those of which he became successively the prey. He passed a life of simplicity and labor in the Rue de Chanoines: but he passed there especially a life of suffering—suffering, the continuity and intensity of which is absolutely exceptional, startling, prodigious" (p. 509). The following is the way in which a Genevan physician of note, Dr. Léon Gautier, sums up the pathological history of Calvin:—

"Calvin was a good type of the arthritic. The series of manifestations of this morbid predisposition was in his case almost complete; migraine, dyspepsia, hemorrhoids, gravel, gout. . . . It almost seems as if we were reading through Bouchard's treatise on the diseases of malnutrition. . . . Two superadded episodes cast spots on this picture of otherwise uniform tint: the intermittent fever and the pulmonary accidents. Intermittent fever is now very rare in Geneva. It was probably much more frequent when the town was surrounded by muddy fosses. . . . As to the pulmonary accidents, I think we may unhesitatingly say with Blauer that Calvin was 'a complete consumptive'. But Calvin was arthritic; he was even gouty. And the arthritic, especially if he be actually gouty, presents a bad soil for tuberculosis. The phthisis therefore developed slowly with the Reformer. It was shut up to producing from time to time some blood-spitting or an attack of suffocating bronchitis. I do not believe that Calvin succumbed to the advance of phthisis. It is more probable that he was carried away by infection of the urinary tract, following upon gravel. Arthritism lies therefore at the root of almost all of Calvin's illnesses: but on the other hand Calvin fully fed this morbid predisposition. His sedentary habits, his devouring cerebral activity, his daily cares for his work and for the church, were the elements of a deplorable hygiene. Could he have consulted a modern physician, he would have been advised to seek rest, freedom from care, life in the open air in the country and a diet almost exclusively lacto-vegetarian. Calvin followed the contrary course, happily for his work, unhappily for the length and comfort of his life. But if this temperament filled the Reformer's life with almost uninterrupted suffering, there is another side of the question which should not be passed over. If arthritism has its inconveniences, it has also its advantages. In fact, it is the nervous arthritics who leave behind them traces of their sojourn on earth. Their faculties are more developed, their will more firm, their energy more intense, than in the case of men

of a different constitution, or less highly tempered fibre. If the son of the cooper of Noyon had been born lymphatic or scrofulous, there probably would have been no occasion for writing a life of John Calvin" (p. 524).

We are told that this overwrought, ill man was sometimes—under strong provocation—irritable, and even violent in his language and harsh in his judgments. What we wonder at, says Professor Doumergue, justly, is that he was not infinitely more so. For what sort of a man was this Calvin, after all, in his personal intercourse, and his personal relations? A man of remarkable sweetness and of the intensest of affections, who bound his intimates to him with ties of steel. The historians may dwell on the acerbity of his disposition: those who lived with him thought of the depth of his love. In the sections in which this view of Calvin's character is presented and demonstrated the interest of the volume culminates. There are sections on the softer side of Calvin's life,—his pleasure in his garden, his enjoyment of nature, his delight in recreation, his love of the country, his social gifts and enjoyment of pleasantries, his "hilarity", and all that assemblage of qualities which turned his dwelling into a house of friendship, a centre of intercommunication, an intelligence office, a veritable matrimonial agency for a great company of friends, in his familiar intercourse with whom his wonderful charm ("seduction", Professor Doumergue calls it) had full scope. Professor Doumergue is conscious enough of the cries of derision which will in some quarters greet the application of such terms to Calvin. But what will you have? he asks in effect. Here is a man who exercised a prodigious personal influence in the most varied quarters. Must he not have had the qualities which alone give great personal influence? Genius, labor, energy, doctrine, eloquence—these will explain much, but not all. "One does not seduce, one does not take men, nations (any more than flies) captive with vinegar and gall: we must needs have honey." Certainly Calvin must have had the qualities demanded by his achievement. "Of course, no more here than elsewhere do we deny the faults of Calvin,—that side or face of his character which was austere and severe. We recognize that he was nervous, irritable, very irritable; and that this natural irritability was ceaselessly increased by the enervation of his illness and by the still more annoying enervation of an opposition which was often wicked. Nor do we deny that a man of his energy, of his will, of his clearness of conception, of his confidence in the truth as he saw it, had a very natural tendency to exercise the domination of which he was capable, which was offered to him by circumstances, and which was indispensable for the success of his mission and of his work. But when all these concessions have been made, it remains none the less incontestable that Calvin's character was one of seduction, of charm" (p. 48). And then Professor Doumergue proceeds to prove this thesis by abundant citation of examples. So we come at last to the crowning sections in which the great rôle played by the heart in Calvin's life and work is outlined. "You know," he writes to Viret, "how very tender my heart is,

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or, I should better say, soft." And Viret replies: "Yes, I know how tender a heart you have." He writes to Bucer, "If on any points I do not make response as you hoped, you know I am in your power: reprove, rebuke, do all that a father can to a son." And Bucer, a year later, responds by addressing him as "My heart! my soul!" It used to be the fashion to deny to Calvin, throughout his life, these traits of a profoundly affectionate nature. This fashion has passed away. Everybody now admits that in his early life his was a peculiarly merry and sympathetic disposition. Men now wish to distinguish times, and to contrast with his joyous youth his soured age, with the abounding affections of the one, the stern harshness of the other. It is precisely to this last resort of the calumny that Professor Doumergue addresses himself. The historians may not be able "to feel Calvin's heart-beat", he rejoins; everybody about him did, and something surely must be the matter with a history which sees a personage in an entirely different light from that in which he stood out to his contemporaries. If he had no heart, no charm, how did he so seduce his contemporaries? And not content with advancing an overwhelming body of proof from Calvin's, not companions and friends only, but his mere acquaintances, that it was precisely the heart which made the man, he passes on to show further that it was also precisely the heart that made the theologian. "The heart in the theology of Calvin" is the title of the last section of the discussion; and in it is shown beyond dispute that it was not to the bare intellect but to the heart that Calvin addressed himself throughout his system: and, adds Professor Doumergue, "in his theology, the rôle played by the heart does not decrease as time goes on,—it increases; notably in the *Institutes* from edition to edition" (p. 563).

The last Book in the volume, entitled "The Street of Calvin," gives an account of a number of Calvin's neighbors and friends, from his brother Anthony to that remarkable Italian the Marquis of Vico. We shall not dwell on these brief biographies here. But perhaps it will be well before closing to call attention to the two appendices (v and vi) in which the legend of Whitingham's marriage with a sister of Calvin, already known to be erroneous, is finally exploded.

The volume, like its predecessors, is elegantly printed and illustrated in the most sumptuous manner.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

PRIMITIVE CHRISTIAN EDUCATION. By GERALDINE HODGSON, B.A. (Trin. Coll., Dublin), Sometime Cobden Scholar of Newnham College, Cambridge, Mistress of Method and Lecturer on the History of Education at University College, Bristol. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1906. 8vo. pp. viii, 287. (Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.)

This is a popular presentation of the salient facts in regard to the education of the early Christians, their methods of instruction, their attitude, in general, toward the culture of their day. The book is thoroughly readable; but its confessedly apologetic aim, as well as its

charm, is impaired by the introduction of altogether too much irrelevant material both from the realm of objective history and from the subjective domain of the musings and moralizings of the authoress. The chapters could, moreover, have been more satisfactorily organized and adjusted to one another as well as to the work as a whole. None the less the abundant information here presented merits a careful reading.

Princeton. FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

THE REFORMATION. By GEORGE PARK FISHER, D.D., LL.D., Emeritus Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale University. New and Revised Edition. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906. 8vo. pp. xxx, 525. Price, $2.50.

Dr. Fisher's work on the Reformation has been so widely known and so highly appreciated by a whole generation of students of history that we may here content ourselves with a purely formal notice of this "new and revised edition." Reduced in the text by about ninety pages, but practically unaltered in method or content, with the elaborate bibliographies brought up to date, the book will no doubt enter upon a further career of deserved popularity, as a sketch of the Reformation which is both compact and comprehensive, scholarly in method and graphic in style, equally felicitous in arranging biographical detail and in grasping the deepest significance of the great events, thoroughly Protestant in spirit yet perfectly candid and just with respect to the merits and defects of the papal church. It gives us pleasure to welcome in its new form this admirable manual on the Reformation.

Princeton. FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

A HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION. By THOMAS M. LINDSAY, M.A., D.D., Principal of the United Free Church College, Glasgow. Vol. I, The Reformation in Germany from its Beginning to the Religous Peace of Augsburg. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906. 8vo. pp. xvi, 528.

As was to have been expected, Prof. Lindsay has admirably discharged his obligation to the editors of the *International Theological Library* in this initial volume on the Reformation. He here reveals the same abundant learning, the same clear discernment of the religious, social, and political problems of the period, the same candor and moderation, the same skill in generalization and realistic description which we had learned to prize in his previous works on Luther and early Protestantism. We cannot but express the hope that the second and concluding volume, which is to deal with the Reformation beyond Germany and the Counter-Reformation, will be equally successful in plan and execution.

Certainly the most distinctive, and perhaps also the most valuable, portion of the work under consideration is that comprised in Book I, which, bearing the caption On the Eve of the Reformation, discusses in six preliminary chapters the complex conditions of Europe at the close of the Middle Ages. In harmony with the best present-day tendencies of German scholarship in this field, Dr. Lindsay has taken special

pains to trace the religious movement of the 16th century in as direct and natural a manner as possible to "its roots in the simple evangelical piety which had never entirely disappeared in the Mediæval Church. Without detracting in the least from the importance, as a formative influence, of the intellectual awakening that culminated in the ecclesiastically conservative, predominantly ethical humanism of the Erasmian type, with a thoroughly up-to-date presentation of the economic or social questions of that age, and with ample recognition of the political factors that shaped the destinies of the evangelical cause, the author has succeeded in reproducing, with more life-like reality than any other writer in English with whom we are acquainted, the diverse and often discordant elements in the popular religious life of the closing decades of the 15th century. Much of the material utilized for this purpose has been made accessible only within the last twenty years; and even where the data discussed in this connection are not of recent discovery, Dr. Lindsay's interpretation of the facts gives a more adequate explanation, than that commonly given, of the manifold upward tendencies in the religious life of the period, especially those centering in the non-ecclesiastical religious confraternities. In this respect, indeed, the work before us has much of the merit of von Bezold's or Karl Müller's treatment of the genesis of the Reformation: the atmosphere of the book is surcharged with the very odor of the soil that could and of necessity did produce a Martin Luther. Worthy of special commendation, too, among these introductory chapters, is the sympathetic yet critical treatment of Erasmus, though we are of the opinion that a little more might have been justly said in behalf of his religious ideals, as distinguished from his more ethical and practical interests.

Book II begins with a detailed study of Luther's religious development and his growth as a reformer, these chapters being essentially an adaptation of the author's contribution to the *Cambridge Modern History,* Vol. II. The formative influences here at work are carefully traced to their sources and critically estimated. But the subsequent chapters, dealing with the external fortunes of Protestantism in Germany (and the Scandinavian lands) up to 1555, are somewhat too broadly conceived and too meagre in detail to come up to the high standard maintained in the strongest portions of the volume. Especially unsatisfactory is the last chapter on The Religious Principles Inspiring the Reformation. Within the compass of 60 pages Prof. Lindsay tries to set forth the views of the reformers on such subjects as the universal priesthood of believers, justification by faith, Holy Scripture, the person of Christ, and the Church. Not only, however, does the extreme brevity of the treatment make the author yield too frequently to the temptation of using general terms, such as "all the reformers", when his statements, strictly speaking, can retain their full face value with respect to only some of the theological leaders, but, what is far more serious, there is an unwarranted reading of Ritschlian principles into the writings of these 16th century divines. Outcroppings of this tendency greet us as early as the paragraphs on Colet

(pp. 162-171), who, we are informed, taught "what no mediæval theologian had been able to perceive, that the Bible is a personal, not a dogmatic revelation": an oft-repeated anthithesis (cf. pp. 453, 459) which is about as misleading as another ascribed to the reformers (p. 460) that the chief function of Scripture is "not doctrine, but promise . . . ; not display of God's thoughts, but of God Himself as my God." There is altogether too much modernity in phrases of this kind to permit our finding in them a faithful transcript from the thought of that age. Did Luther, *e. g.*, really think that faith "is neither helped nor hindered by a doctrine of the Person of Christ" (p. 446)? Then why did he, like Athanasius, find "his salvation in the Deity of Christ" (p. 473)? "Back to Luther" is a good battle-cry for these days of weak-voiced evangelicalism, but it is to be hoped that thorough historical investigation of the origin of the great religious awakening of the 16th century is going to yield a richer return than a misguided substitution of Ritschlianism for the more previous and fruitful principles of sound Protestantism. We regret that the present work is marred by the same defects, in the sphere of the construction of Christian doctrine, as those which to a large extent characterized the first of the historical series in this *International Theological Library* we refer to Dr. Rainy's volume, *The Ancient Catholic Church.*

In conclusion,—for, in view of the many excellencies of this book, we prefer to end as we began—attention may be directed to the carefully wrought out Index, to the valuable 22-page Chronological Summary of Events, and to the brief but thoroughly satisfactory bibliographies in the foot-notes.

Princeton. FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

BEITRÄGE ZUR FÖRDERUNG CHRISTLICHER THEOLOGIE. Herausgegeben von D. A. SCHLATTER, Prof. in Tübingen, und D. W. LÜTGERT, Prof. in Halle a. S. Neunter Jahrgang. 1905. Heft 5. DIE CHRISTOLOGIE DER BEKENNTNISSE, UND DIE MODERNE THEOLOGIE. Zwei Vorträge von Prof. D. ERICH SCHÄDER. ATHEISTISCHE METHODEN IN DER THEOLOGIE von Prof. D. A. SCHLATTER. 8vo. pp. 465-560. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann. 1905.

Neunter Jahrgang. 1905. Heft 6. DIE BEDEUTUNG DES ÄSTHETISCHEN IN DER EVANGELISCHEN RELIGION, von G. GROSS. NOCH EIN WORT ÜBER DEN CHRISTLICHEN DIENST, von Prof. D. A. SCHLATTER. 8vo. pp. 551-643. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann. 1905.

These are the closing parts for 1905 of the *Contributions to Christian Theology* edited by Drs. Schlatter and Lütgert. They present us with four very interesting studies. Prof. Schlatter's *Additional Word on Christian Service* finds its occasion in a criticism lately passed by Prof. Nösgen upon his paper on *The Service of the Christian in the old Dogmatics* which was published in the opening number of these "Con-

tributions" nine years go. It becomes very much a study of sanctification. The other paper by him—*Atheistic Methods in Theology*—has its origin in the amazing deliverance of Paul Jäger in the *Christliche Welt* (1905, No. 25), to the effect that because theology is a science it must (like all sciences) be prosecuted wholly without thought of God! "We would fain explain the world from the world"; "we would fain explain it from the forces lying in the world-process, without calling in the help of any idea of God." Religion itself, as a world-phenomenon, is thus to be atheistically explained to the reason. "As theologians, religion explains itself to us from the world; as religious men it presents itself as a relation to God: we have as theologians to prove what as Christians we must deny, as men of piety to affirm what as theologians we oppose." Here Schlatter's task is too easy for his paper to take any form but that of a manifesto. Dean Gross writes with some vigor on *The Significance of Æsthetics in the Evangelical Religion*. "The essence of æesthetics," he says, "is its appeal to the spiritual taste; the essence of religion is not a matter of our pleasure, of our taste, but of our duty to God,—what attitude is due from us to God, what we owe Him. Accordingly the two spheres are incommensurable. The improper importation of the æsthetic into religion may easily corrupt it, and every attempt to determine the essence of religion from human value-judgments, may lead to the erroneous notion that what 'religion' concerns itself with is just spiritual preference, and that religion is therefore only a sort of æstheticism. Such a misunderstanding is just now very widespread; but it rests on a fundamental confusion of earnestness and play. He who conceives religion merely æsthetically, makes out of its emotions a play with ideas and feelings, and has never understood what the meaning is of the Divine idea that God is the great reality which man is not æsthetically to enjoy, but is to subject himself to in his real concrete life, that God makes ethical demands upon man. The religion of the æsthete plays itself out in fantasy, that of the really religious man works itself out in reality; and there is no better means of destroying the earnestness of the real religious life than to permit what is religious to pass over into what is æsthetic."

What has interested us most in these issues, however, is Prof. Schaeder's admirable lectures on *The Christology of our Confessions and the Modern Theology*. The specific question which he raises is whether the Christology of our Confessions requires readjustment or reconstruction in the light of modern theology. Prof. Schaeder's answer is that it does: and this answer is an indication of how far it has gone, even in the most conservative circles, in the way of a revolt from the old Christology embodied in the historic creeds of Christendom, and drawn, as we still make bold to affirm, from the Scriptures. Prof. Schaeder does not think that the old doctrine of "the two natures" can be maintained. For it he wishes to substitute a doctrine of "the presence of God in Jesus (das Sein Gottes in Jesus)" which, as far as we can understand it from the very brief exposition of it given here, is very much Gess's form of the Kenosis theory. The Son is God of God,

in the sense of the old doctrine of "eternal generation." "This ego, with its thinking, its self-consciousness, and its will proceeds eternally, eternally out of God. Now God, the Father, lets it, lets this Son proceed out of Himself as Man, and thus enter into history. This the Son also wills. Had He not His existence eternally through the Father, this transformation, this change through the Father would not have been possible. But seeing that He is the life-expression, the Word of the Father, the Son,—the Father can let Him who formerly proceeded from Him as divine ego, now proceed from Him as man. This is God's act on His Son. What is in question is an almighty transformation of the mode of existence of the Logos by God. God now speaks His Word into history, into humanity. He speaks it as a man. His Son becomes man" (p. 220).

With this very large concession to the "modern theology" of fifty years ago—a concession the seriousness of which Prof. Schaeder does not appreciate although the difficulty he finds in retaining anything substantial in his new notion might have enlightened him,—Prof. Schaeder wishes to stop short. He sets himself against the evaporation of the conception of the God-man which the modern theology of to-day is engaged in. He wishes us to divide the "modern theology" sharply into its two types: one, "the new-faith men" and the other "the reconstructed old-faith men." The "new-faith men" are, briefly, the "comparative-religion school"—so far as these are not Ritschlites, for Ritschlism, too, is no longer "modern"—such men as Wernle and Bousset. The "reconstructed old-faith men" are such as Seeberg, Theodor Kaftan and their companions. The "new-faith men" simply have no Christology at all—and no need of any. With them Christ is not even the object of faith, but only an outstanding subject of the faith all men of religion have. "He is a religious genius or religious hero. His new religion is, in its root, faith in God as Father." With many of the adherents of the school, Jesus is openly treated as weak and erring like other men: who confessed Himself "not good" and prayed along with His disciples for forgiveness. Over against this school, what is to be done is to recover for Jesus His divinity. This Schaeder does by showing that in the Synoptic narrative itself Jesus is presented, in a manner which is convincing, as the Lord of spirits and the world,—the sin-forgiver, the law-propounder, the judge of the world, the all-seeing one, the governor of nature: and that this *κυριότης* spells just God. Proceeding in the second lecture to take up the controversy with those who would hold to the old faith but in an attenuated form, he shows that the deity of our Lord thus evinced, implies the virgin-birth, and the preëxistence of Jesus. This Lord of the world cannot by any possibility be of the world. "It is nonsense to suggest that the world itself can produce its Lord. The world can produce only its like, not Him who stands over it" (p. 201). Yet, since this Lord of the world was a Jew and with all the peculiarities of the Jew, He must have a rooting in the race:—"For the sake of the concrete Jewish peculiarity of the man Jesus, we accept His birth from the Virgin Mary. Otherwise

this would remain inexplicable. Because the Son of God, the Lord of the world, was a real Jew, we hold this element in His supernatural origin fast. God has not here simply in a creative manner produced a Jew out of nothing. Accordingly since Jesus did not come, in the way of the world, by marriage, only birth from a virgin remains" (p. 205). And His lordship carries also preëxistence with it. "If He was not eternal, then He was created, is a creation. *Tertium non datur.* Either eternal existence, or creaturehood. If we allow now that Jesus, the Lord, was created— *ποιηθείς* as the Nicene Creed expresses it— He cannot be Lord of the world. He who is created stands in the same rank with the other personal creatures. He is judged: He is dependent on God's grace. Then He must be eternal. And on this conclusion hangs for us the decision as to the preëxistence of Jesus" (p. 206). Jesus, the Lord of the world, then, is the preëxistent God, for His preëxistent state has and must have a purely divine character.

This in brief is Schaeder's argument. He sets it forth with great clearness and force, and we can only regret that he is himself so far affected by the modern theology that he does not go on and show that the becoming of flesh of this eternal deity involves also "the two natures." It assuredly does.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

BEITRÄGE ZUR FÖRDERUNG CHRISTLICHER THEOLOGIE. Herausgeber: Prof. D. A. Schlatter, Tübingen. Prof. D. W. Lütgert, Halle a. S. Zehnter Jahrgang; Zweites Heft; 1906. *Glaube, Liebe und gute Werke.* Von Dr. phil. Oskar Bensow, Lic. theol., Dozent der Theologie an der Universität Upsala. *Das Problem der Willensfreiheit in der vorchristlichen Synagoge.* Von Prof. D. W. Lütgert, Halle. Gütersloh; C. Bertelsmann. pp. 88.

Dr. Bensow, the author of the first of these *Beiträge,* is known to the readers of this Review by his books—*Zur Frage nach der menschlichen Willensfreiheit in Beziehung zur Sünde u. zur Gnade,* 1900; *Die Lehre von der Kenose,* 1903; *Die Lehre von der Versöhnung,* 1904. In the first of the above mentioned *Beiträge* he discusses the question of the relation between faith, love, and good works. After setting forth briefly the doctrine of the Lutheran confessions on this subject, Dr. Bensow gives us in three successive sections his conception of the nature of faith, love, and good works respectively. This is followed by a biblico-theological discussion of the question of the nature of these three ideas and their mutual relations. In the two concluding sections the author states his own view of the relation of these concepts.

In the main the discussion is sufficiently clear, being in this respect an improvement on his book on the Atonement. At certain points, however, there is some ambiguity. Thus, for example, in discriminating what he calls "theoretical faith" from "practical faith" (pp. 10-17) Dr. Bensow seems at one time to make the distinction consist in a difference of value and certainty in the grounds of faith, and at another time to consist in the psychological character of the two kinds of faith,

"theoretical faith" being more uncertain in its psychological nature. But different kinds of faith are to be distinguished neither psychologically by varying degrees of certainty nor by the adequacy of their grounds. In these respects what Dr. Bensow calls theoretic faith may be quite as certain subjectively and may rest upon quite as adequate grounds as the faith which he terms practical. No doubt a purely "theoretic faith" is to be distinguished from saving faith as regards its psychological character, its ultimate grounds, and its source. But a little reflection will show that the degree of certitude is not the point of discrimination.

There is also a want of clearness in the very brief remarks touching the question of the *ordo salutis* (pp. 45-47). We are told that regeneration (*Wiedergeburt*), though simultaneous with justification, is logically posterior to it. Of course if by the term *Wiedergeburt* is meant the whole process of inward renewal, this statement need not be objected to, provided the initial act of regeneration or making alive be acknowledged to be the very first step in the *ordo salutis*. But if the term *Wiedergeburt* is used of this first moment of the process of renewal,—and Dr. Bensow seems to imply this use in describing it as the "creation of a new heart"—then it cannot be said to be logically posterior to justification. For if justification presupposes faith and if faith is a spiritual exercise which can only be performed by one made spiritually alive, it would seem that regeneration must be the logical and actual prius of the whole process. This difficulty, of course, is not peculiar to Dr. Bensow. It grows out of his Lutheranism. It simply illustrates the fact that the *ordo salutis* of the Reformed Theology is the only logically consistent, as well as, we believe, the only Scriptural one.

In the second of these *Beiträge* Prof. Lütgert discusses, with an evident knowledge of his sources, the problem of the freedom of the Will in the pre-Christian Synagogue. He takes up for discussion Jesus Sirach, the Psalter of Solomon, Henoch and 4th Esra. Then come the views of the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes as given by Josephus, as well as the views of Josephus himself. This is followed by an exposition of the rabbinical conception רשות or ἐξουσία as rendered by the Greeks. The expository part closes with the views of the Aristeas letter and with those of Philo. In a concluding section Prof. Lütgert gives a brief summary of the results of his preceding exposition, and seeks very briefly to indicate the relation of these ideas to those of the New Testament writers.

Princeton. C. W. HODGE.

MODERN MYSTICISM, OR THE COVENANTS OF THE SPIRIT, THEIR SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS. Davidson College Divinity Lectures; Otts Foundation. Third Series. 1905. By REV. J. B. SHEARER, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Instruction, Davidson College, N. C. Presbyterian Committee of Publication, Richmond, Va. pp. 116.

Dr. Shearer has given us an admirable little volume setting forth very concisely the work of the Holy Spirit, and refuting the various

tenets of Mysticism. After stating the doctrine of the Trinity and classifying the various modes of the Divine activity, the author proceeds to the main subject of the book, viz., the discussion of the work of the Holy Spirit in three spheres of His activity, viz., "the Redemption processes", such for example as regeneration and sanctification; in Inspiration; and in Miracles. The question is, "Are these three coeval and coextensive with the administration of grace? or are some of them limited and temporary?" Dr. Shearer shows that revelation, inspiration, and "miraculous attestation" are limited by their nature, purpose, by "the very terms of their delivery"; and that they constitute no part of the "redemptive process" in the soul. Having discussed this distinction, and having shown the fundamental defect of Mysticism in its failure to do justice to it, Dr. Shearer proceeds to exhibit the weakness of Mysticism in its supposed exegetical basis in Scripture, and concludes by subjecting to criticism such mystical tenets as "personal infallibility," "enduement with power," "infilling with the Spirit," "second blessing," "immediate sanctification," "revelation of truth in the Christian consciousness," "faith cure," and other related doctrines.

Dr. Shearer's whole discussion is marked by sanity and reverence, which are characteristics often wanting in some of the literature containing the views which he is opposing. We commend the book heartily as a brief introduction to the study of the great subject of the office and work of the Holy Spirit.

Princeton. C. W. Hodge.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

Expositions of Holy Scriptures. By the Rev. Alexander Maclaren, D.D., Litt.D. A. C. Armstrong & Company, New York City. First Series, 6 volumes. $1.25 net each. Sold only in complete series.

These volumes have been most cordially welcomed by the Christian public, both of Great Britain and of America. They form the first series of a work which will be completed in some thirty volumes, and which will contain the substance of the expository labors of Dr. Alexander Maclaren, during his long ministry of nearly sixty years. Many of Dr. Maclaren's sermons are already in print, and his reputation as an expository preacher has for years been world-wide. The publication of his collected writings, therefore, has been awaited with intense interest, and this first series of his "Expositions of Holy Scripture" is a gratification to his countless friends. For the preparation of these volumes, all the manuscripts prepared by Dr. Maclaren for pulpit use have been placed at the disposal of the distinguished editor, Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll, LL.D. The greater part of the discourses appear for the first time in book form, and the entire work is being carefully revised by the author. This publication will prove to be of inestimable value to all who are interested in a better understanding of the content of the inspired Word. The Christian ministry will find in the composi-

tion of these sermons a model for imitation, and in their substance a rich treasury of homiletical material; while every reader of the Bible will find a safe, and helpful, and spiritual guide. Of course these are not volumes of exegesis, nor is any space allotted to critical discussions; they are popular sermons, yet they are based upon a careful interpretation of the original texts, and suggest an adequate acquaintance with critical questions. We do not expect to find here a treatment of every text, or even of every chapter of Scripture. We could perhaps wish that the author had favored us more frequently with continuous expositions of larger sections of the Bible, instead of the usual method of dwelling upon isolated texts; yet every verse upon which Dr. Maclaren touches is made vivid, significant, and of immediate application to faith and life. It is to be remembered that these are not commentaries in the usual sense of the term, but are collections of sermons arranged, not according to the time of their composition, but according to the Scriptural order of the texts. While, therefore, many chapters are passed unnoticed, it is remarkable to observe how large a portion of Scripture is illumined by this exhaustive work. A new series of six volumes is promised each year, and when the set of thirty volumes is complete we shall be in possession of a series of Scripture expositions of unequaled value and extent.

The appearance and mechanical workmanship of the volumes is quite worthy of their content. They are tastefully bound in red buckram. They are printed in large clear type, on English feather-weight paper; so that while they are of full octavo size, they are not in the least unwieldy. The separate sermons are not numbered, except in the cases where two or three are upon the same text. They are marked by bold headlines, and beneath these captions in very fine print follows the text of the passage to be explained. The discourse which follows is in each instance most clearly outlined. The truth is expressed in pure and forceful English, and is a model of clearness and conciseness. Dr. Maclaren's method has been already described as including these four elements:

"1. Unreserved and unqualified personal submission on the preacher's part, of mind and of heart to the authority of the the Bible, and therefore of the particular text.

2. Exhaustive study of the text to learn its true meaning.

3. Painstaking care to cast this true meaning into a new, original, mold of expression; and not seldom into more than one such;

4. Announcement of the heads or divisions under which the discussion will be conducted."

It is not surprising that such a method has resulted in the production of sermons characterized by deep moral earnestness, by fervent piety, by spiritual vision, by unquestioning faith. Those included in these six volumes form an illuminating and helpful series of practical discourses.

The first volume contains expositions of the more familiar portions of the Book of Genesis. It contains most practical reviews of the lives of the great heroes of faith, Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac,

Jacob, and Joseph. Among the most striking are the sermons upon "Abraham's Trial of Faith," the sermons on "Selling the Birthright," and the summary of Jacob's life in the great scenes at Bethel and Peniel. It can be truly said that we find here; "Not a forcing of Christian meanings on to old stories; but a discerning of that prophetic and spiritual element which God has impressed upon these histories of the past." The volume contains some fifty different sermons, each one of which gives some new and suggestive lessons, in connection with the most familiar of Bible characters and scenes. As we begin the series with this volume, we are made the more eager to see the completion of a work, which will thus treat each successive book of the sacred Scriptures.

The next two volumes in the present series, those upon Isaiah and Jeremiah, are, however, distinctly less satisfying. This is due in very large measure to the author's treatment of isolated texts, instead of the larger and more comprehensive views suggested in the volume on Genesis. There are admirable discussions of Isaiah i, vi, liii, lv; but aside from these chapters, the sermons are largely discussions of very brief sentences of Scripture. Chapters ii, iii, and iv, are passed without comment, excepting the treatment of iv: 5. So too, chapters xi-xxv, inclusive, are omitted excepting the treatment of xii: 3 and xvii: 10. This disappointment is still more keenly felt in the treatment of the prophecy of Jeremiah. Thirty-three chapters out of the fifty-two which comprise the Book, are passed by in absolute silence. If we omit what is said of chapters xxxvii, xxxix, and lii, only twenty-eight verses of the entire prophecy of Jeremiah are given the least explanation. We have an actual average of only one verse in every second chapter, under consideration. Then too, these detached verses which form the theme of the discourse are treated with little historic illumination, but are used rather as vivid symbols for conveying evangelical and spiritual truth. It must be confessed, that after a careful reading of the volume on Isaiah, one has received but little light upon the great work of the prophet, and when further completing the volume on Isaiah and Jeremiah, one longs for some comprehensive view of the life of the prophets, of the dramatic situations, and stirring appeals which these prophecies suggest. The spiritualising method which is followed, and the fragmentary treatment of texts, make it impossible to gain any conception of the grand sweep and purpose of these superb prophetic books. There are, as has been indicated, exceptions to this rule. The treatment of the first, and sixth, and fifty-third and fifty-fifth chapters of Isaiah is most admirable, and no matter what verse supplies the text, whether in Isaiah or Jeremiah, the discourse which follows is always characterised by its true evangelical spirit, its vivid illustrations, and by its loyalty to the inspired Word. Christ is the sum and center of each discourse, and the reader can imagine the effect which must have been produced upon the original hearers of these sermons, as they plead continually for righteousness, for justice, for faith, for fellowship with God, and above all, for the need of accepting the atoning work and salvation of Christ.

The three volumes on Matthew form a most valuable commentary on the Gospel, and they suggest to us the ground on which Dr. Maclaren has been crowned as the "Prince of expository speakers." Because of the larger space allotted, the discussions are more truly expository in their character, and are marked by a truer continuity and comprehensiveness. It is in fact quite remarkable to note how few passages of the entire gospel are omitted from review. It will possibly be of interest to mention these, merely to emphasize the completeness of these volumes. The omitted passages are as follows: "The Feeding of the Four Thousand" (15: 32-"9). "The Conversation with the Pharisees" (16: 1-12). "The Discussion on Divorce" (19: 1-15). The Parable of "The Labourers in the Vineyard" (20: 1-16). "The Cleansing of the Temple." "The Barren Fig Tree." "The Question of Authority" (21: 12-32). "The Questions as to the Tribute and as to the Resurrection" (22 ch.). "The Condemnation of the Pharisees" (23: 1-26). "The Prophetic Discourse" (24: 1-41).

It will at once be evident that with these few omissions, we shall have practically a complete commentary upon the Gospel. The writer clearly establishes the characteristic feature of the Gospel, in the title which he continually assigns to Christ as "The King," showing us that Matthew—in contradiction to many modern expositors—is peculiarly the Gospel of the "King" and the Gospel of the "Kingdom." Among the significant discourses connected with this theme, we may mention the following: "The Herald of the King," "The Ministers of the King," "The Victory of the King," "The King's Charge to his Embassadors," "The King's Highway," "The King in his Beauty," "The Requirements of the King," "The King's Farewell," "Watching for the King," "The Coming of the King," "The King on his Judgment Throne."

Of the first volume, exactly two-thirds is devoted to a treatment of the "Sermon on the Mount," and more than one-half of this large section is given up to expositions of the "Beatitudes" and "The Lord's Prayer." The sermons on the "Beatitudes," have a special merit, their unity and logical sequence, showing these verses to be,—"Jewels, not thrown down in a heap, but formed into a chain which whoever wears shall have an ornament of grace about his neck."

The series of discourses on "The Lord's Prayer" while familiar in substance, are intensely practical in their teaching, and they fully attain the evident aim of the author to show the comprehensive meaning of this model prayer, and they are full of inspiration, of guidance and of comfort.

The entire section allotted to "The Sermon on the Mount," may not be adjudged in all points equal to the admirable exposition given by the Rev. Oswald Dykes, in his "Manifesto of the King." It may perhaps be characterized by less unity of treatment, less convincing exegesis, less comprehensiveness of view; but it is marked by its clearness of presentation, by its correlation of the great sermon to the sum of Christian truth, by its direct application to life; by its searching appeal to the heart.

The last two volumes are composed of sermons on the more familiar texts, and more striking and significant scenes in the life of our Lord. Among the most helpful, the following might be named: "The Call of Matthew," "Crumbs and Bread," "Christ, Confessed and Denied," "The King in His Beauty," "What Christ Taught about His Death," "Gethsemane," "See Thou to That," "The Veil Rent," and last of all the superb sermon which brings us to Christ "On the Mount," and makes us more fully realize "His Great Claim" and "His Great Commission" and "His Great Promise." All of these sermons are in Dr. Maclaren's most forceful and felicitous style. They are full of spiritual wisdom, of sound exegesis, and of illuminating illustrations. They suggest on every page the deepest reverence for the inspired Word, an unquestioning faith in the supernatural elements of the Christian religion, an ardent devotion to Christ, and a deep appreciation of His divine person and atoning work. It is certain that the Christian world will await with eagerness, the appearance of each succeeding series of these admirable "Expositions of Scripture."

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

THE GOSPEL OF MATTHEW IN ESPERANTO.—La Evangelio Sankta Mateo lau Dro. Martin Luther tradukita en la lingvon internacian esperanto de W. B. Mielck kaj Fr. Stephan, kun Antauparolo de Lic. Dr. Alfred Jeremias pastro de la lutheran-preghejo kaj docento de la Universitato en Leipzig. Leipzig, 1906. J. C. Hinrichs. pp. vii, 66.

The newly invented language consists essentially of two elements: the simplifying of the Grammar, so that it can be mastered in half an hour, and the selection and organization of the vocabulary, so that every European or American finds that he already knows five-sixths of the words. No irregularities of spelling, or of grammar or of word-building are tolerated; and the whole affair becomes so obvious and easy that one wonders why its discovery was never made until the latter part of the nineteenth century.

When we began to master its few rules we felt rather puzzled by the nonsense sentences with which its textbooks are filled, apparently after the model of the schoolbooks for beginning French or Latin. The now famous Krestomatio of its author, Dr. Zamenhof, rather increased the perplexity, by following the nonsense exercises with fables and legends, especially one long story of an unfortunate mermaid who fell in love with a prince whose life she had saved only to be disappointed. The first sentence that revealed to us the inner character of the author was when one of the nonsense exercises closed with the sentence "Preghu al la Sankta Virgulino," which means, being translated "pray to the Holy Virgin". Although that is not our way of revealing our religion,

we were gratified to learn by it that Zamenhof was a Christian, a lesson which we afterwards found confirmed by some of his hymns; though certainly he does not wear his religion on his sleeve. Another flash was thrown on the case by one of the Esperanto Keys, which are sold for a little more than a cent, and really contain sufficiency of grammar and dictionary to suffice a student in his initial work. The edition of the key which we got from France had an advertisement recommending Esperanto to Catholic Missionaries, who being of different nations have endeavoured to communicate with each other by writing Latin, and are advised hereafter to write and speak to each other in Esperanto.*

* The keys and textbooks can be gotten from the American Esperanto Society, Boston, Mass.

It occurred to us that a portion of the Scripture in Esperanto would be an excellent introduction to the new language; as the Scriptures are usually present in the vernacular of each nation. In order to test their use we have published a first lesson in Esperanto, which after giving a few directions as to alphabet and pronunciation and grammar follows it up with the second chapter of Matthew in that language. The effect of this is that most people after reading through the explanations, and knowing the general sense of the narrative are able to read the chapter to the end, and thus to get over the introductory stage.

Having been informed of Mielck and Stephan's Esperanto Translation of the Gospel of Matthew, we secured a few copies in the hope that we might do something towards introducing it to the notice of clergymen and especially of missionaries. Our leisure hours have been devoted for some months to the comparison of this booklet with the English *Revised Version*, and with Westcott & Hort's *Greek Testament*, and to making such revisions as are called for. The Leipzig book is as a whole beautiful in its style of Esperanto, showing that the new language is rich and elegant; and the translators deserve honor for producing the first really useful book, and that a portion of the Word of God, which this language thus far possesses. We are glad to learn that some French priests are now engaged in preparing an Esperanto Version of the Gospel of Mark.

The system of making the Leipzig book follow Luther's German translation of Matthew is bad; and it is made worse by errors for which Luther is no way responsible. We have an impression that the translators are better in their knowledge of Esperanto than in their grasp of the meaning of the work on which they were engaged. We have found a very large number of small matters on which we would prefer a different rendering from what they give, and also several important errors; so that we cannot recommend the book for general use, unless and until it is thoroughly revised.

Some of what to us appear to be its errors are curious and instructive. We note a few:—

(1) The rendering of the Greek word for "repent" has, so far as English-speaking races are concerned, endorsed the Roman Catholic

dogma of penance. Luther's rendering "thut Busse" like Jerome's "penitentiam agite" is capable of an evangelical interpretation, and we observe that French and German Dictionaries give the two interpretations, leaving the reader to take his choice. The same is done for the Esperanto rendering given by Mielck and Stephen, "Pentofaru," by Beaufront's Esperanto-French Dictionary, "Faire penitence". But Motteau's Esperanto-English Dictionary, and the English-Esperanto Dictionary of O'Connor and Hayes, give "Do penance" as the only rendering. Thus Luther's work has been appropriated by our Roman Catholic friends, and we are compelled to go back to the Greek and adopt a term like *pentegu*, or *pentigu vin*, if we wish to retain the correct translation. This one error, however caused, excludes the book from use among evangelical Christians. The translation 'do penance' never pretended to be a rendering, but rather an emendation of what the evangelist wrote. (See the note in the *Rhemish Testament*, on Mt. iii. 2)

(2) Luther's erroneous use of the word for school instead of synagogue is here adopted by Mielck & Stephen. Wherever the word occurs we should substitute the Esperanto word *sinagogo* (accent always on the penult).

(3) Their term for scribes is too long for us, though probably a German can manage its seventeen letters; we substitute the word *skribistoj*, (oj to be sounded nearly as in "boy").

(4) The Greek word for nations is translated *idolators*, or rather its Esperanto equivalent. We prefer "nacioj" (nations).

(5) In most cases the plural form *vi* (you), is applied to single persons addressed, and to the Divine Being in prayer. We prefer *ci, cin, cia* (thou, thee, thy), wherever the original Greek is singular.

(6) The terms *pastro* and *chefpastro* are used to signify 'priest,' and 'chief-, or 'high-priest'. This word *pastro* must be reserved for the 'pastors' of Eph. iv. 11; and a new term, which we offer, *pretro*, and *chefpretro*, (from the French *prêtre*) used for the sacrificing priests of the Jews.

(7) The word *Parable* (Greek *parabole*) is incorrectly rendered by *alegorio*. An allegory is false in form; the parables are formally true. We propose to use the Greek root, making the word *parablo*, whilst we leave the longer term *parabolo* to mathematics.

(8) The question "by whom do your sons cast them (demons) out?" is inverted to signify its opposite. Luther's rendering was indefinite, because his German made no difference between the nominative and the accusative cases. Now Esperanto is a precise language, and the translators gave a precise meaning, but the opposite of the Greek; and also turn the 'sons' into 'infants'; giving us "by whom do the demons cast out your infants?", a second massacre of infants for which neither Matthew nor Esperanto is responsible.

(9) Many passages are mistranslated because through some bungling they cannot be translated correctly from Greek into Esperanto. These are such expressions as "all these things", and allied words; we think half a hundred of these mistranslations in Matthew. In English we

can say "after all this"; but we cannot pluralise 'this' without adding the noun, giving "after all these things"; so in Esperanto we have the singulars *io, tio, chio, kio* (any, this or that, every, what), whose plurals are not used (probably because not required for the modern European languages); when the nouns are added another form is used. The Greek by using the terms autonomously (without nouns) in the plural as well as the singular has puzzled the translators. In Zamenhof's *Krestomatio,* part of Homer's Iliad is translated, incorrectly, because the translator was afraid to pluralise these words in the usual way. The method adopted was to use the singular, since there was no plural. So also Mielck and Stephen translate Matthew's clause "after these" as if it were "after this", and carry out this inaccuracy throughout their work. That course is as unnecessary as it is indefensible. The plurals *ioj, tioj, chioj, kioj,* ought to be recognized as orthodox, although rarely required for modern usage.

(10) An embarrassing infelicity is the usage of Russianised consonants, where for six of the consonants, an additional set is made by supersigns, representing the letter *h.* These sursignate h's give a repulsive aspect to the print—make it difficult to write and to read, and impossible to print in common printing offices. We think that the favor shown by editors to the marked letters is probably due to this last consideration. The specialist offices have it all to themselves; not a 'monopoly', but an 'oligopoly', if we may coin the term. Zamenhof, the inventor, recommends replacing the surscript *h,* by adscript *h,* when more inconvenient; but we observe the *British Esperantist* and the American correspondent of the Paris *Revuo* are disposed to criticize those who act on Zamenhof's liberal suggestion.

Our own revised Esperanto Gospel is made out according to the changes above pleaded for; but perhaps it may be better to withhold publication till the next Esperanto Congress shall have considered the points at issue.

There can be no reason to doubt but Esperanto has come to stay. Even now, if it were not for its odd letters, we should find it over the country. Some of the leading French Esperantists estimate that about a fifteenth of the trouble involved in learning an ordinary language is required for the new 'lingvo'.

With the translation corrected, and the type reformed, the Gospel in Esperanto promises to become most serviceable in its twofold function of propagating the international language, and spreading a knowledge of salvation. It will bring into harmony and mutual interest many who are now unable to know each other because of diversity of language. The day seems very near when in every land every man of fair education shall be able to talk to his neighbours all around in this little world of ours and to write and speak in the go-between *internacia.* This is the "idea" of Zamenhof, whose Esperanto hymns are proclaiming the era of brotherly love and peace between the nations which have been longtime severed by inability to comprehend each other.

Princeton. G. MACLOSKIE.

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THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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AUGUSTINE'S DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE AND AUTHORITY.

Augustine marks almost as great an epoch in the history of philosophy as in the history of theology. It was with him that the immediate assurance of consciousness first took its place as the source and warrant of truth. No doubt there had been a long preparation for the revolution which was wrought by his announcement of the principle of "self-assured subjectivity", as Windelband calls it, and his establishment of it in "the controlling central position of philosophic thought". But the whole preceding development will not account for the act of genius by which he actually shifted the basis of philosophy, and in so doing became "the true teacher of the middle ages", no doubt, but above and beyond that "one of the founders of modern thought".[1] He may himself be said to have come out of Plato, or Plotinus; but in even a truer sense out of him came Descartes and his successors.[2] When he urged men to cease seeking truth without them, and to turn within, since the home of truth

[1] Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, E. T., pp. 276, 264, 270.

[2] Leder, *Augustins Erkenntnistheorie*, p. 76: "If we must see in Plotinus the father of Augustine's Platonism, we may yet recognize it as an especially original service of the Church-Father, that he established over against all scepticism the first point of all certitude in self-consciousness. He found in Plotinus no guidance for this: rather by an act of genius he anticipated in it the line of thought which Descartes (1640) made in his *Meditationes* the starting point of his expositions."

is inside of man, he already placed them upon the firm footing which Descartes sought with his *cogito ergo sum.*[3]

If Augustine can be said to have had a philosophical master before he fell under the influence of the Neoplatonists, that master must be discerned in Cicero. And from Cicero he derived rather a burning zeal in the pursuit of truth than a definite body of philosophical tenets or even a philosophical point of view. It is a mistake to think of him as ever surrendering himself to the scepticism of the New Academy. He does indeed tell us that, in his disillusionment with Manichaeism and his increasing despair of attaining the truth, the notion sprang up within him that the so-called Academics might after all prove the best philosophers, contending as they did that everything hangs in doubt and truth cannot be comprehended by men.[4] It is not strange that at such moments his thoughts surged in great waves towards their teachings.[5] But he tells us also that he could not commit himself to them; not only because he was repelled by their heathenism,[6] but also because he was shocked by their scepticism.[7] His difficulty at the time lay, in fact, in another quarter. He found no obstacle in the attainment of certitude: but nothing but apodeictic certitude satisfied him. He entertained no doubt, for example, that seven and three

[3] *De vera religione,* 39: Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas.

[4] *Conff.* v. 10. 19.

[5] *De utilitate credendi,* viii. 20: Saepe mihi videbatur [verum] non posse inveniri, magnique fluctus cogitationum mearum in Academicorum suffragium ferebantur. He proceeds to say that so often as he was thus tempted, he reacted on considering the vivacity, sagacity, perspicacity of the human mind; he could not believe this mind so much incapable of truth as ignorant as yet of the right way of going about its discovery: thus he was led to meditate on the problem of authority. *De beata vita,* I. 4: at ubi discussos eos [Manichaeos] evasi maximo trajecto isto mari diu gubernacula mea repugnantia omnibus ventis in mediis fluctibus Academici tenuerunt.

[6] *Conff.* v. 14. 20: "I utterly refused to commit the healing of my soul to these philosophers, because they knew not the saving name of Christ."

[7] *Conff.* vi. 4. 6: "I was not so insane as to fancy that not even this"—mathematical truth—"could be comprehended."

make ten; what he demanded was the same kind and degree of certainty he had here, for everything else. In other words, he would not commit himself to any truth for which he did not have ready at hand complete demonstration.

Augustine's point of departure was therefore the precise contradictory of that of the Academics. They asserted that we can never get beyond suspense because we lack all criterion of truth. The best we can do is to say that this or that looks like truth; that it is *verisimile* or *probabile:* we can never affirm that it is truth, *verum;* though, of course, we can as little affirm that it is not truth. Lacking all *signum* we are left in utter and hopeless uncertainty. Augustine, on the contrary, in the apodeictic certainty of, say, mathematical formulas, was in possession of a sure criterion on the basis of which he could confidently assert truth. His difficulty was that he wished to apply this *signum* mechanically to every sphere of truth alike, and could content himself with no other kind of certitude. He was tempted to declare that nothing resting on less cogent grounds is known, or can be known, at all. What he needed yet was to learn that so far from the possession of apodeictic certitude for some things throwing into the shadow of doubt all for which it cannot be adduced, it provides a basis for valid assurance with respect to them too. On the basis of this *signum* we may obtain in every sphere at least the *verisimile,* the *probabile*—a sufficient approach to truth to serve all practical purposes; or rather truth itself though not truth in its purity, free from all admixture of error. In other words, in every department of investigation there is attainable real and clear, if somewhat roughly measured, knowledge. What we currently call a yard of muslin, for example, though shown by the application of a micrometer not to be an exact yard, is yet by the self-same test just as truly shown to be a yard for all the practical ends for which muslin is used. The possession of a criterion gives validity to the *verisimile;* for who can declare that anything is like the truth unless he has the truth itself in mind with which to compare it and by which to judge it?

It was by a line of reasoning something like this that Augustine overthrew the Academics when, in his retirement at Cassiciacum, in the interval between his conversion and his baptism, he undertook to lay the foundations of a positive Christian philosophy. It is absurd to talk of a *verisimile,* he urged, unless the standard, the *verum,* is in our possession. And not only is this standard, this *verum,* certainly in the possession of every man and instinctively employed by him; but no one can by any means rid himself of it. Do what we will, we cannot help knowing that the world is either one or not one;[8] that three times three are nine;[9] and the like; that is to say the principles which underlie, say for example, logic and mathematics. And in knowing these things, we know them not only to be true, but to be eternally and immutably true, quite independently of our thinking minds,—so that they would be equally true if no human minds had ever existed, and would remain true though the whole human race should perish.[10] With this indefectible certainty of necessary truth the mind unavoidably knows, therefore, the laws of the true, the beautiful and the good,[11] according to which, as its criterion, it judges all of the true, beautiful and good which is brought into observation in the experience of life. Nor can doubt be thrown upon these things by calling in question the reality of the very mind itself by which they are known, and therefore the validity of its convictions. Rather, the reality of the mind is given in the very act of knowledge: for what is not cannot act. Say even that this act is an act of doubt. If the mind did not exist, it could not even doubt.[12] The act of doubt itself becomes, thus, the credential of certitude. It is impossible even to doubt unless we are, and remember, and understand, and will, and think,

[8] *Cont. Acad.* iii. 10. 23.

[9] *Cont. Acad.* iii. 11. 25.

[10] *Cont. Acad.* iii. 11. 25: necesse est, vel genere humano sterbente, sit verum. Cf. *De lib. arbitr.* ii. 9. 21; *De Trinitate,* ix. 6.

[11] *De lib. arbit.* ii. 8, 9, 10, 15, 16: *De Trinitate* ix. 6; viii. 3; xiv. 15.

[12] *De lib. arbit.* ii. 3, 7.

and know, and judge: so that he that doubts must not and cannot doubt of these things, seeing that even if he doubts he does them.[13] Even he who says 'I do not know', thereby evinces not only that he exists and that he knows that he exists, but also that he knows what knowing is and that he knows that he knows it.[14] It is impossible to be ignorant that we are; and as this is certain, many other things are certain along with it, and the confident denial of this is only another way of demonstrating it.

What Augustine is doing in this reasoning, it will be observed, is wathdrawing attention from the external world and focussing it upon the inner consciousness. There, there alone, he asserts, can truth be found. Those who seek it without, never attain to it;[15] it is in the inner man that it makes its home, and it can be discovered, therefore, only by those who look within.[16] His polemic is turned upon that Sensationalism in philosophy which had long reigned supreme in the schools, and the dominion of which he was the first to break. In this polemic, he considered himself to be building upon the New Academy, whose mordant criticism of knowledge he persuaded himself was only the negative side of a defence of an essential Platonism which they kept, in its positive side, meanwhile in reserve. In this judgment of fact he was certainly mistaken; the Academy had itself fallen into the prevalent Sensationalism and was itself, therefore, as truly as the Epicurean and Stoic schools of the time the object of his confutation.[17] But to the Sensationalistic maxim that 'there is nothing in the intellect which was not beforehand in the senses', by whomsoever taught and in whatsoever forms, he opposes the direct contradiction that truth is to be sought, in the first instance, in the intellect alone. As Robert Browning phrases it, "to

[13] *De Trinitate*, x. 10. 14.

[14] *De Trinitate*, x. 1. 3.

[15] *De vera religione*, 49: . . . veritas, ad quam nullo modo perveniunt qui foris eam quaerunt.

[16] *De vera religione*, 39: noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas. Cf. *Retract.* i. 8.

[17] Cf. Leder, *Augustins Erkenntnistheorie*, p. 35.

know rather consists in opening out a way whence the imprisoned splendor may escape, than in effecting entry for a light supposed to be without". In other words, Augustine came forward as a flaming Rationalist in the philosophical sense of that term; in the sense, that is, in which it describes those thinkers who hold that the "reason" is the fundamental source of knowledge; and, in opposition alike to Sensationalism and Empiricism which teach respectively that our knowledge is derived exclusively from sensation or experience (that is, sensation and reflection), contend rather that it is the "reason", acting under laws of its own, which supplies the forms of thought without which no knowledge can be obtained either by sensation or by experience.

Arnobius, his fellow African of a hundred years before, on the basis of the popular Stoicism was as flaming a Sensationalist as Augustine was a Rationalist, and it is interesting to contrast the strong expressions which the two give, each to his own point of view. Arnobius calls to the aid of his exposition the imaginary case of a man secluded from infancy to maturity in a dark cavern, guarded from every possible commerce with the external world. Such an one, he contends, would remain mentally empty; and, if confronted, not with some complicated problem, but with even the simple twice two are four, "would stand like a stock or the Marpesian rock, as the saying is, dumb and speechless", understanding nothing.[18] In staring contrast with Arnobius, Augustine sometimes speaks as if contact with the external world and the intrusion of sensible images into the mind were a positive hindrance to the acquisition of knowledge; and as if the mind would do its essential work better if it could do it free from what, in that case, would be conceived as the distractions of sense; as if, in a word, something like the condition in which Laura Bridgman or Helen Keller were found were the most favorable for the development of human intelligence. This exaggeration, however, is no part of his system; and its occasional sug-

[18] Arnobius, *Adv. Gent.* ii. 20 (American ed. of *Ante-Nicene Library*, VI. 442).

gestion serves only to throw into a high light the strength and seriousness of his Rationalism.

This Rationalism, however, it may be observed, is never pressed to the extreme of conceiving the reason as the creator of its own object. That is to say, it never passes into the Idealism which in more modern times has lain so frequently in its pathway. To Augustine the world of observation was far from being merely a "psychological phenomenon". Indeed, not only does he recognize the objectivity of the world of sense, but, with all the vigor of his contention that we must look within for truth, he insists equally on the objectivity of even the intelligible world. Man no more creates the world of ideas he perceives within him, that the world of sense he perceives without him. In his assertion that the objects of sensible and intellectual perception alike have indubitable objectivity lies, indeed, one of the main features of Augustine's philosophy.[19] Perhaps we may best catch his general idea, in the distinction he made between the two modes of knowledge—sense perception and intellection—corresponding to the two worlds, sensible and intelligible—if we represent him as thinking of the human soul as existing in a double environment, with both of which it is connected by appropriate organs of perception. On the one hand, it is connected with the sensible world by the external senses; on the other hand, with the intelligible world by the *sensus intimus* which is the intellect.[20] Au-

[19] Cf. Nourrison, *La phil.*, Vol. II, p. 295: "To affirm the certitude of consciousness is, for him, to affirm in the same act the certitude of the external world. . . . It is well to take note of the sagacity with which he distinguishes the phenomenon from the being and thus exonerates the senses from the errors which are commonly attributed to them. Organs and witnesses of what passes, and not of what does not pass, of the phenomenal and not the real, they are not the judges of truth—*judicium veritatis non esse in sensibus.* It is the intellect that knows or the intellect that deceives itself. Its knowledge is certitude. No Scotchman of our day could express it better."

[20] *Cont. Acad.* iii. 17. 37: Platonem sensisse duos esse mundos, unum intelligibilem, in quo ipsa veritas habitaret, istum autem sensibilem, quem manifestum esse nos visu tactuque sentire. Itaque illum verum, hunc verisimilem.

gustine's notion is, essentially, that the soul, by these two modes of contact with its double environment, is enabled to read off the facts of each. His mode of statement commonly takes the form that as the sensible world impresses itself upon us through the external senses, so the intelligible world impresses itself upon us through the intellect: but we must not press the passivity of the soul to its several impressions which might seem to be implied in this mode of statement. If, now, these two worlds, the sensible and the intelligible, stood contradictorily over against each other, the soul of man lying between them and invaded by impressions from each, would be in parlous case. Such, however, is not Augustine's conception. The sensible world is not thought of by him as itself independent of the intelligible. It not only has its source in the intelligible world, but derives its whole support and direction from it; and reflects, after its own fashion, its content. It can not be perceived, therefore, save, so to speak, from the angle of the intelligible world; and in order that it may be understood, the soul must bring to its perception the principles derived from the intelligible world. In a word, the soul is caparisoned for the perception and understanding of the sensible world only by prior perception and understanding of the intelligible world. That is to say, the soul brings over from the intelligible world the forms of thought under which alone the sensible world can be received by it into a mental embrace.

This is, of course, a very developed form of Intuitionalism. According to the Stoics—those Sensationalists *a outrance*—the human mind is in the first instance a *tabula rasa*, on which outer things impress themselves (*τύπωσις*). But even the Stoics could speak of truths of nature. In their most materialistic development they could find a place in their system for general ideas common to all men (*κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, communes notiones*), which they not only recognized as real, but valued as the best constituents of human knowledge. As men have practically the same environment, they explained, the sum of the impressions made by

surrounding nature upon each, is practically the same as the sum of the impressions made upon all. Hence peculiar confidence should be put in the ideas common to all men: they are the general teachings of nature, that nature life in conformity with which is the wise man's mark. "Natural ideas" are not foreign, then, to the Stoic system; but when the Stoics spoke of these ideas as "natural", they did not at all mean that they constitute a part of the nature with which man is endowed. Man was not supposed to bring them into life with him, but distinctly to acquire them in the process of living: they are impressed by nature on his soul. The transition is easy, however, from the conception of a body of ideas natural to man in this sense, to a conception of a body of ideas belonging to his nature as such, or, in other words, innate. Along with his reason, it is now said, every man possesses by nature, that is, by his constitution as man, a body of ideas: they belong to his nature as a rational being. In making this step we have definitely passed over from Sensationalism to Rationalism, and have so far approached Augustine's conception. But we have not yet reached it. The doctrine of innate ideas, strictly construed in that form, is Deistic. These ideas are ours because they have been from the beginning once for all impressed upon our nature by our Maker, who has made us thus and not otherwise,—namely so that by the action of our intellect we become aware of the principles thus made a part of our very structure. Augustine, however, was as little Deistic as Sensationalistic in his thinking, and necessarily advanced a step further to a truly Theistic Intuitionalism. These ideas, he teaches, are natural to man in the sense that they inhere in his nature as such, and are not impressed on him by external nature; and they are innate in the sense that they belong to his nature from the beginning of his being. But he cannot conceive them merely as impressed on the mind, or rather built into its structure, once for all at its creation. He thinks rather of the soul as constantly dependent on God, who is no more its Creator than its Up-

holder and Director; and of its intrinsic ideas as, therefore, continuously impressed on it by God. Thus its light is God alone; and the soul, in intellection, bears the same constant relation to God the Illuminator as in ethical action it bears to God the Sanctifier. God, he is never weary of saying, in his own adaptation of a Platonic formula, is at once the Author of all being, the Light of all knowledge, and the Fountain of all good; the God of creation, of truth, of grace: or, otherwise put, the *causa subsistendi,* the *ratio intelligendi* and the *ordo vivendi.* His ontology of "innate ideas", accordingly, is that they are the immediate product in the soul of God the Illuminator, always present with the soul as its sole and indispensable Light, in which alone it perceives truth.

No doubt there is a Neoplatonic factor in this construction, and possibly also the modes of expression employed may betray a reminiscence of Stoic τύπωσις — with the source of the impression elevated, however, from nature to nature's God. But we must beware of pushing it out of its theistic sobriety into the regions of an essentially pantheistic mode of thought, whether developed or only implicated. Nothing could be farther from Augustine's meaning than that God, as the Universal Reason and Sole Intelligence, comes to the knowledge of the truth in us, and we in and by Him, so that our knowledge simply coalesces with His. His doctrine of creation, by which the creature is set as an objective somewhat, with powers of its own, over against God the Creator, placed him at a whole diameter's distance from the pantheistic tendencies of Plotinus, otherwise so much his master.[21] But neither does the "ontologism" of William of Paris and Malebranche, Fenelon and Bossuet precisely reproduce his meaning. Augustine does not teach that we contemplate immediately the Divine Being, and in Him the intelligible world, that pleroma of eternal and im-

[21] Cf. Nourrison, *op cit.* II. 301. 334; Grandgeorge, *St. Augustine et le Néoplatonisme,* p. 111; Portalié in Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionaire de Théologie Catholique,* I. 2330. *Per contra,* however, Ritschl, Loesche, etc.

mutable truths which constitutes the world of divine Ideas.[22] It would be much nearer his meaning to say that we see God in the eternal truths which by our *sensus intimus* we contemplate, than that we see them in Him. Undoubtedly he teaches that the soul has an immediate knowledge of God; and, in a sense, he does identify with God the intelligible world into contact with which the soul is brought by its *sensus intimus*. We should not be far from his meaning, however, if, reverting to a mode of representation we have already employed, we should say that the soul, set in its double environment, the sensible world on the one hand and the intelligible world on the other, as it knows the sensible world directly through the senses, so knows God in the intelligible world directly through the intellect. But God is not identified with the intelligible world, as it appears in the soul of man, except as its immediate author. He is in the soul of man not *substantialiter* but only *effective;* and it is precisely in this that the difficulty of the conception lies. If we may be permitted to employ theological conceptions here, we may say that Augustine's ontology of the intuition by which man attains intelligible truth, embraced especially two factors: the doctrine of the image of God, and the doctrine of dependence on God. To put it briefly, man's power of attaining truth depends, in his view, first of all upon the fact that God has made man like Himself, Whose intellect is the home of the intelligible world, the contents of which may, therefore, be reflected in the human soul; and then, secondly, that God, having so made man, has not left him, deistically, to himself, but continually reflects into his soul the contents of His own eternal and immutable mind—which are precisely those eternal and immutable truths which constitute the intelligible world. The soul is therefore in unbroken communion with God, and in the body of intelligible truths reflected into it from God, sees God. The nerve of this view, it will be observed, is the theistic conception of the constant dependence of the crea-

[22] Cf. Portalié as cited, p. 2335; and Storz, *Philosophie d. hl. Aug.*, p. 65 sq.

ture on God. This stands midway between the deistic conception, on the one side, that has no need of God except for the primal originating of the creature, and supposes that after that the creature's own powers suffice for all its acts; and the pantheistic view, on the other side, which substitutes the divine action for the creature's action and, having no need of a creature at all, transforms it into a mere simulacrum without reality of being or action. In the theistic view, there is postulated the creature as the product of a real creation, by which is produced a real thing with real activities of its own; and alongside of this, the real dependence of this creature for the persistence and use of all its activities on the constant action of God. Applying this conception to the problem of intellection, Augustine conceives the soul as at once active and acted upon, but as active only because acted upon. It is only in the light of God, the sun of the soul, that the soul is illuminated to see light.

There was nothing novel in the ascription of all human knowledge to the illumination of God. It was not only Numenius who declared all knowledge to be but the kindling of a little light from the great light which lightens the world.[23] Platonist and Stoic alike offered a metaphysical and epistemological basis for such a representation. According to the one, knowledge is recollection; and Cicero had explained this—or explained it away—as meaning that right knowledge is implanted in the soul by God at its creation, and is, therefore, inherent in it; while Plotinus' language on the subject is scarcely distinguishable from Augustine's.[24] According to the other, the human *logos* is but a fraction of the universal *Logos* and reproduces in its thought His normative mind. In the mere matter of forms of statement, therefore, Augustine had harbingering enough. It was, nevertheless, quite a new spirit which informed his declarations, the spirit of a pure theism, derived, not from his philosophical predecessors, but from those Scriptures

[23] Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* xi. 18. 8.
[24] Cf. *De civitate Dei,* x. 2.

which themselves also told him of the true light that lighteth every man who cometh into the world.[25] It was the personal God, therefore, whom he spoke of as the "Sun of the soul, by whose illumination alone can intelligible verities be perceived",[26] the "Light of the truth", by which alone is knowledge of the truth awakened in the soul,[27] or—changing the figure only—the inner Monitor and Master of the soul.[28] It was the personal Logos that he had in mind, through whose immanent working all things that exist exist, all things that live live, all things that understand understand. Surely if it be true even of the body that in Him we live and move and have our being,[29] it must much more be true of the mind, which, having been made in His likeness, lives and moves and has its being in Him in some more excellent, but of course not visible but intelligible way.[30] "Our illumination", he says, "is participation in that Word, that is to say, in His life, which is the light of men."[31]

We perceive that the outcome of this conception is that the condition of all knowledge is Revelation. Accordingly, our action in seeking knowledge is represented as essentially a consultation of God; God's action in giving us knowledge as essentially a transference of truth to us by a divine imprinting of it on the soul. That mental act which we call understanding, Augustine explains,[32] is performed in two ways: either by the mind or reason within itself, as when we understand that the intellect itself exists; or on occasion of a suggestion from the senses, as when we understand that matter exists: in the first of which two kinds of acts we understand through ourselves, that is, by consulting God[33] concerning that which is within us;

[25] Cf. *Tract. in Joan.* II. 7; *Epist.* 120. 4; *De pecc. merit.* I. 25, 37, 48.
[26] *Solill.* I. 8.
[27] *De pecc. merit.* i. 25. 37.
[28] *De magistro.*
[29] *Epist.* 120. 4; *De Trinitate,* xiv. 12.
[30] *De Trinitate,* xiv. 12.
[31] *De Genes. ad litt.* iv. 2.
[32] *Epist.* xiii (to Nebridius), 4.
[33] Deum consulendo.

while in the second we understand by consulting God regarding that of which intimation is given us by the body and the senses. That is to say, in brief, knowledge of the sensible and of the intelligible alike is God-given, and in both instances is to be obtained only by referring to His teaching. He adds, in another place,[84] that this God who is so consulted, and who, being so consulted, teaches us, is none other than Christ, who dwells in the inner man,—that is to say, "the incommutable Virtue of God, and His eternal Wisdom, which every rational soul, indeed, consults, though to each there is given only in proportion to his receptive capacity as determined by his own bad or good will". The divine act of giving, Augustine presents by predilection under the figure of an impressing as by a seal or stamp, upon the soul. In what may be thought, perhaps, the classical passage on this subject,[85] he raises the question whence men obtain their knowledge of God and of the moral law. Not from memory, he answers, whether of their former existence in Adam or of any other state. Whence, then? Can we suppose that they can read off these immutable laws from their own mutable natures; these righteous laws from their own unrighteous hearts? "Where, then, do these rules stand written, whence even the unrighteous may recognize what is righteous; whence he that has not may learn what he ought to have? Where can they stand written save in the book of that Light which is called the Truth, whence every righteous law is transcribed, and transferred into the heart of the man who works righteousness, not by a process of transportation, but by a process of imprinting, as the device from a ring while it passes over into the wax, yet does not leave the ring." What the soul receives, therefore, is not the ring itself with its device; certainly not the device in the ring; but the device as impressed upon it from the ring, and the ring only in and through the device. The care which is taken here to represent the process as a trans-

[84] *De magistro*, II.
[85] *De Trinitate*, xiv. 15. 21.

ference of the laws without transfusion of the substance may be said to be the characteristic feature of this passage, as it is of the entire teaching of Augustine on the topic. The figure itself is in repeated use by him, and always with the same implication. Nowhere does he permit the reader to suppose either that God in His substance invades the soul, or that the soul sees in God the ideas which constitute the intelligible world: although he insists steadily that these ideas are the ideas that are in God and that he who sees them, therefore, so far sees God—but in a glass darkly. In a word, he preserves the distinctness of the human soul at the same time that he discovers in the intelligible world open to the soul a point of contact with God; and in the soul's perception of the intelligibles a perception at the same time of God, whose existence thus becomes to the soul as intuitively certain as is its own.

The effect of such an ascription of all human knowledge to a revelation from God, is naturally greatly to increase the assurance with which truth is embraced. The ultimate ground of our certitude becomes our confidence in God. In the last analysis, God is our surety for the validity of our knowledge; and that, not merely remotely, as the author of our faculties of knowing, but also immediately as the author of our every act of knowing, and of the truth which is known. We must guard, indeed, against supposing that, in Augustine's view, the human mind is passive in the acquisition of knowledge, or that the acquisition of knowledge is unconditioned by the nature or state of the acquiring soul. We have already had occasion to quote passages in which the contrary is asserted, but we must now emphasise it with some energy. We have been contemplating thus far only Augustine's ontology of knowledge: that we may be sure that we understand him aright we need to attend also to his expositions of its mode. The fundamental principle which rules his thought here may be brought into relation with his favorite figure, if we bear in mind that an impression from a seal is conditioned not only by the device

on the seal from which the transference is made, but also by the nature and state of the wax into which it is made—which "takes" the impression, as we say. Suppose, for example, that the wax is not of a quality, or is not in a condition, to take or to retain with exactness or with clearness the device which is impressed upon it? Augustine accordingly insists that, although "every rational mind consults the eternal wisdom", that is to say, by virtue of its very rationality is a recipient of impressions from the divine world of ideas, and thus has the acquisition of truth opened to it, or even, rather, thrust upon it: yet this truth is "actually laid open to it ('unfolded to it,' *panditur*) in each case, only so far as it is able to lay hold of it ('receive it', 'take it', *capere*) by reason of (*propter*) its own will, whether evil or good".[86] In the interests of this point of view, Augustine made, in effect, a distinction between ideas, conceptions and perceptions. The ideas, which are reflections from the divine mind are always shining into the souls of men, unchangeable in the midst of men's multiform changes, whether these changes are due to their natural development from infancy to maturity, and on to old age, or to any other accident of life. But the perception of these ideas by the differing souls of men, or by the same soul in its varying stages or states, and, much more, the conceptions built up upon the foundation of these perceptions by the differing souls, or by the same soul in its varying states—obviously these are very different matters. In these things the soul itself comes into play, and

[86] *De magistro*, 11; cf. also *De Trinitate*, xiv. 15. 21, *ad finem*; *In Psalmos* iv. 8, *med. et fin.* Knowledge, therefore, with Augustine, is conditioned by the will; though we must be careful not to take the term 'will' in too narrow a sense—as if it always must mean in Augustine the faculty of determination. It is, rather, quite frequently the whole voluntary nature; and what Augustine is really teaching is that the ethical state of the soul conditions knowledge. See the whole subject discussed from different points of view by W. Kahl, *Die Lehre vom Primat des Willens bei Augustinus, Duns Scotus und Descartes*, 1886, and O. Zänker, *Der Primat des Willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin*, 1907. The literature of the subject is cited by these writers.

the result will differ as soul differs from soul, or the soul in one of its states differs from itself in another of its states. If the condition of all knowledge, then, is revelation, and therefore all knowledge is in its source divine; yet it is equally true that the qualification of all knowledge is rooted in the human nature that knows, and in the specific state of the human being whose particular knowledge it is. It is in this fact that the varying degrees of purity in which knowledge is acquired by men find their explanation.

The underlying conception here is the very fruitful one that knowledge is not a function of the intellect merely but involves the whole man. There is nothing on which Augustine more strenuously insists; as indeed there is nothing upon which from his psychological or ethical point of view it became him more strenuously to insist. His psychological insight was too clear, and his analysis too profound, for him to lose sight of the simplicity of the soul and its consequent engagement as a whole in all its acts; and the demands of his ethical nature were too clamant and his religious sense too lively to permit him to forget for an instant the determining effect upon every movement of the soul of the influences proceeding from them. Accordingly he does not content himself with declaring that no one can hope to see the truth without giving to philosophy his whole self.[37] Applying this conception in detail, he insists that God accords the truth only to those who seek it *pie, caste et diligenter,*[38] and urges therefore to a strenuous and devout pursuit of it, because it is only those who so seek whom God aids,[39] and the vision of the truth belongs only to those who live well, pray well and labor well.[40] The conception includes more than a contention that for the actual framing of knowledge there is required no less than the action of

[37] *Contr. Acad.* ii. 3. 8: ipsum verum non videbis, nisi in philosophia totus intraveris.

[38] *De quant. animae,* xiv. 24.

[39] *De vera religione,* x. 20: intende igitur diligenter et pie, quantum potes; tales enim adjuvat Deus.

[40] *De ordine,* ii. 19, 51.

God reflecting truth into the soul, an action of the soul's own in embracing this truth, and prior to that a preparation of the soul for embracing it. It seems to be further implied that the several orders of truth need different kinds or at least degrees of preparation for their reception. In proportion as we rise in the scale of knowledge, in that proportion embracing the truth becomes difficult and the preparation of the soul arduous. To attain the knowledge of God, which stands at the apex of achievement, demands therefore a very special purgation. Drawing near to Him does not mean journeying through space, for He is everywhere; it means entering into that purity and virtue in which He dwells.[41] "O God," he prays, "whom no one finds who is not fully purged."[42] The influence of his Neoplatonic teachers is here very apparent, and is further manifested in a tendency to represent the purgation of the soul for the higher knowledge as consisting largely in its emancipation from sense. With him as with them knowledge of the truth is constantly spoken of as hanging essentially upon the escape of the soul from entanglement with the sensible.[43] This, as we have seen, is a corollary of his Rationalism and was perhaps inevitable with his training. But these expressions which might be almost exactly matched in Plotinus, have in Augustine nevertheless an indefinitely deeper implication than in his Neoplatonic predecessors. With him the purely intellectualistic bearing which they have with them, has

[41] *De doctr. Christ.* i. 10. 10: "The soul must be purified that it may have power to perceive that light and to rest in it when it is perceived"; this purification is journeying to God, for it is not by change of place that we draw near to Him who is everywhere, but by becoming pure and virtuous. Cf. *De Trinitate*, iv. 18. 24: Sinful men need cleansing to be fitted to see eternal things; *De agone Christiano*, xiii. 14: A vicious life cannot see that pure and sincere and changeless life.

[42] *Solill.* i. 3.

[43] *Contr. Acad.* ii. 2: "It is philosophy which now that I have attained the leisure for which I have longed, nourishes me and comforts me. It is she who has delivered me finally from the superstitions into which I had fallen. For it is she that teaches me and teaches me truly, not to give my affections to what is perceived by the bodily eyes, to what strikes the senses, but rather to turn from it with contempt."

noticeably given way to a profoundly ethical one. Though he may still say that "the filth of the soul" "from which filth the more one is cleansed, the more readily he sees the truth", is shortly "the love of anything whatever except God and the soul";[44] and though, therefore, he may still relatively depreciate all knowledge other than that of God and the soul; yet after all, as he uses these terms, it is of something far more profound than the relative intellectual rank of the several objects of knowledge that he is thinking.

The implications of this general conception carried Augustine very far. Three of the corollaries which flow from it seem especially worthy of attention here. The first of these it that, the human soul being finite, it cannot hope to attain to absolutely perfect knowledge. The second is that, the human soul being subject to development, it can hope to attain to anything like adequate knowledge only by a slow process, and by means of aid from without. The third is that, the human soul in its present condition being sinful, there is a clog upon it in its aspiration to knowledge which it can never in its own strength overcome. In order that we may apprehend Augustine's thought we must therefore attend to his doctrine of mystery as lying at the heart of all our knowledge; to his doctrine of authority as the necessary pedagogue to knowledge; and to his doctrine of revelation as the palliative, and of grace as the cure, of the noetic effects of sin.

In his assertion of the certitude of human knowledge, Augustine is far from asserting that the human soul can know everything; or that it can know anything with that perfection of knowledge with which the infinite mind knows all things. It is impossible for the finite intelligence to comprehend in its mental embrace all that is the object of knowledge: it is as impossible for it to penetrate to the bottom of any object of knowledge which it embraces. For it, mystery not only surrounds the circle of knowledge illuminated by its intelligence, with a vast realm of impenetrable

[44] *De utilitate credendi*, 34.

darkness; mystery equally underlies all that it knows as an unfathomable abyss which it cannot plumb. We know, then, and can know, only in part: only part of what there is to know, and what we do know only in part. This is true of all our knowledge alike, whether of sensible things or of intelligible things, whether of the world without us or of the world within us, or—in the highest measure,—of the world above us, culminating in God, the mystery that surrounds whom dismays the intellect and compels us to exclaim that no knowledge can be had of Him beyond the knowledge of how ignorant we are of Him.[45]. Of our very souls themselves, the very selves which know and which are known most intimately of all things, we know next to nothing. Augustine exhorts his somewhat bumptious young correspondent who fancied, apparently, that he knew all that was to be known of the soul, "to understand what he did not understand, lest he should understand nothing at all."[46] For who knows either how the soul comes into existence, or (that impenetrable mystery), how it is related to the body? So far is Augustine from supposing, therefore, that the soul is clothed in omniscience, or that it can know unto perfection any single object of its knowledge, that he rather teaches that all our knowledge rests on mystery and runs up into mystery. What we know we know; and our certitude of that may be complete. But what we do not know surges all about us, an ocean of illimitable extent, and sinks beneath our very knowledge, a bottomless depth. We penetrate with our knowing but a very little way into the knowable before we lose ourselves in profundities which baffle all our inquisition.

The limitation which is placed upon our knowledge by our very nature as finite beings is greatly aggravated by the circumstance that we are not only finite but immature beings. We do not come into existence in the maturity of our powers; indeed, we remain throughout life, or we would better

[45] *De ordine* ii. 18. 47: cujus (Dei) nulla scientia est in anima, nisi scire quomodo eum nesciat. Cf. *De doctr Christ.* i. 6. 6.

[46] *De anima et ejus origine,* iv. 11. 15.

say throughout eternity, creatures whose very characteristic is change, or, to put it at its best, ever progressing growth. At no given point in this development, of course, are we all that even we shall become. For the attainment, then, in our immaturity, of such knowledge as belongs to us as finite beings, there is obvious need of help from without. In other words, there is place for authority, and its correlate, faith. This is an ordinance of nature. Those who are first infants, then children, and only through the several stages of gradual ripening attain the maturity of their powers, will need at every step of their growth the guidance of those who are more mature than they, that they may accept on their authority, by faith, what they are not yet in a position to ascertain for themselves, by reason. And, as it is inevitable even among mature men, that some should outrun others in the attainment of knowledge; and especially that some should become particularly knowing in this or that sphere of knowledge, to which they have given unusual attention, or for which they have enjoyed uncommon facilities; there will always remain for creatures subject to change and developing progressively in their powers, not only a legitimate but a necessary place for authority on the one hand and for faith on the other. Not, of course, as if faith should, or could, supplant reason, or be set in opposition to reason. On the one hand, a right faith is always a reasonable faith; that is to say, it is accorded only to an authority which commends itself to reason as a sound authority, which it would be unreasonable not to trust. On the other hand, faith is in its idea not so much a substitute for reason as a preparation for reason; and the effort of the wise man should be to transmute his faith into knowledge, that is to say as his powers become more and more capable of the performance and opportunity offers, gradually to replace belief by sight. But in any event for such creatures as we are, our walk must largely be guided by faith, and it is only through faith that we can hope to attain to knowledge.[47]

[47] For this doctrine in its highest application, cf. e. g. *De Trinitate* xv. 27. 49: "But if they think they ought to deny that these things are,

Now add the factor of sin,—sin, which enters the soul of man, already, one would think, sufficiently handicapped in attaining truth by its finiteness and its immaturity, and refracts and deflects the rays of truth reflected into it from the divine source, so rendering the right perception of the truth impossible. The finiteness of the soul only so far limits it in the attainment of truth, that, being finite, it cannot know all truth nor all that is true of what it truly knows: what it does know is truth, and so far as it is known this truth is truly known. The immaturity of the soul passes gradually away as its powers develop, and therefore imposes only a temporary check upon the attainment of truth,—determines that attainment to be a process of gradual advance instead of an instantaneous achievement. Neither the soul's finiteness, nor its mutability, accordingly, need more than warn us of the limitations of our powers and induce in us a becoming humility and patience. But the invasion of the soul by sin is a different matter. Here is a power which acts destructively upon the soul's native powers of apprehending truth, blinds the eyes of the mind, distorts its vision, fills it with illusions, so that it sees awry; and a power which so far from passing away with time and growth, battens by what it feeds on and increases in its baleful influence until it overwhelms the soul with falsehood. No merely incomplete, or as yet uncompleted, knowledge accordingly results; but just no knowledge at all, or even anti-knowledge, positive error, vanity and lies; and thus a condition is created which assuredly calls not for humility and patience, but for despair.

The question obtrudes itself whether such a doctrine does not render nugatory all of Augustine's carefully built up theory of the acquisition of knowledge. Granted that nor-

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because they, with their blind minds, cannot discern them, then those who are blind from their birth, also, ought to deny that there is a sun. The light shines in darkness, and if the darkness comprehend it not, let them first be illuminated by the gift of God, that they may be believers: and let them begin to be light in comparison with unbelievers; and when this foundation has been laid, let them look up and see what they believe, that at some time they may be able to see."

mal man may look within and find there impressed upon his very being the forms of thought by which God thinks, in the light of which he may see truth and know it to be divinely certain because certainly divine. Man as we know him is not normal man. Afflicted by the disease of sin which darkens the light that shines into him from God, clouding his vision of truth and deflecting all the activities of his mind,—who will give him true knowledge? Surely, whatever may be true of abstract man, sinful man, which is the only man we know, is on this teaching condemned to eternal nescience. Must not Augustine, on his own showing, in the case of actual man, take his place, then, among the Sceptics? It certainly is important for the understanding of Augustine's doctrine of knowledge to observe how he meets this obvious criticism.

Of the form in which the criticism itself is often urged, we may find a very instructive example in the formulation of it by Mr. John Owen, who, as an outcome of the very line of reasoning which we have suggested, formally classes Augustine not only among the Sceptics, but among the Sceptics of the worst order. Simple Scepticism, he tells us, affects the basis of knowledge only; Augustine's variey of Scepticism undermines the foundations not only of truth but also of morals. For, according to Augustine, he continues,—

"By the disobedience of its ancestor the majority of the whole human race has become totally incapacitated for knowing or doing what is right and good. The faculties of every man, both of soul and body, have become perverted and misleading. It is needless to dwell on the theological aspects of this momentous doctrine; our present concern is with its philosophical bearings. We here see, as I have already suggested, the Augustinian theology in intimate relationship with Skepticism. With one voice the Greek Skeptics had declared the senses to be untrustworthy, the reason to be perverted, all the natural powers of man to be insufficient to attain knowledge, and precisely the same conclusions were arrived at by Augustine with the portentous extention of the incapacity to all right and good action. The

latter fact renders, in my opinion, Augustine's theological Skepticism much more mischievous than any amount of mere speculative theoretical unbelief could possibly have been. . . . That man with all his efforts is unable to attain truth may conceivably be an unavoidable necessity of the only possible *modus operandi* of his faculties, and therefore the fact may not in the least detract from the beneficence of his Creator; but the moment we make his creation and fall, and perhaps his consequent eternal misery, indissoluble parts of the original intention of Omnipotence concerning him, that moment God is shorn of his attribute of goodness, man becomes the hapless victim of a caprice as unreasonable as it is irresistible, and the creation, so far as the majority of human beings is concerned, is a stupendous act of despotism and cruelty."[48]

We have required to quote so much of Mr. Owen's remarks in order to place his representation fully before us and we require to say this much to exonerate ourselves from the suspicion of having quoted so much merely in order that we might stultify Mr. Owen's profession of concerning himself solely with the philosophical bearings of Augustine's doctrine of original sin. In point of fact he concerns himself with little except its theological aspects. After having barely remarked that is has philosophical bearings, he lapses at once into an assault on the doctrine on the ground that it contradicts the beneficence of God and indeed transmutes the good God into a cruel demon. We must refuse to be led off from our proper subject by this impertinent display of the *odium theologicum*; and we take note here accordingly merely of Mr. Owen's philosophical criticism that Augustine's doctrine of original sin brings him into intimate relations with Greek Scepticism.

Apparently what Mr. Owen's means to suggest is that Augustine reached "precisely the same conclusions" with the Greek Sceptics, and differed from them only in the grounds upon which he based these conclusions. They contended that human faculties are, as such, incapable of ascertaining truth; he, that human faculties have been so injured

[48] John Owen, *Evenings with the Skeptics*, vol. II. p. 196.

by sin as to have become incapable of ascertaining truth. That there is a sense in which this representation is perfectly just, is obvious. Augustine did hold that the native depravity of man has nöetic as well as thelematic and ethical effects: and that sinful man, as such, is therefore precluded by his sinfulness from that perception of truth which can be only *pie et caste* attained. To him it was therefore axiomatic that the natural man is incapable of attaining to true knowledge, at least in its highest reaches,—those reaches in which the deflection of sin would be most apparent. But in his hatred of Augustine doctrine of original sin, Mr. Owen has failed to observe that Augustine did not leave matters at that point. Where he differs by a whole diameter from the Sceptics is that he knows a remedy for the dreadful condition in which human nature finds itself. When the Sceptics declared that it belongs to human nature as such to be incapable of knowledge, there was an end of the matter. The condition of man is hopeless: he actually lacks faculty for knowing. Augustine's contention, on the contrary, is that it is knowledge, not nescience, which belongs to human nature as such. And if he finds human nature in a state in which it cannot fulfil its destiny of knowing, he knows how it may be recovered to itself and to the capacity for knowledge which properly belongs to it. In other words, the sinful condition of human nature is viewed by Augustine as abnormal; and all the results of this sinfulness as abnormalities which may be and are to be overcome. That Mr. Owen says nothing at this point of the provisions for overcoming these abnormalities cannot be set down to the credit of his account of Augustine's teaching.

At another point of Mr. Owen's discussion, no doubt, there does occur some suggestion of these provisions, though certainly a very insufficient one. He remarks[49] that "from the earliest history of Christianity the Skeptical argument had been employed, for evidential purposes, as an *à priori* justification of Divine Revelation both in its ethical and

[49] *Op. cit.* p. 190.

intellectual acceptation." And he supports this by remarking further that "by the early Christian Fathers the confessions of ignorance, limitation, &c., on the part of Greek Skeptics were put forward to show the necessity of superhuman knowledge." Even this suggestion is introduced, however, not to palliate but to accentuate Augustine's fault, —not to point so much to the remedy which he offered for the nöetic effects of sin, as to the excess of his "depreciation of human nature." Augustine had so low an opinion "of the intellectual imbecility of humanity", it seems, that he readily accepted the dogma "of the natural depravity of man" "as a complete solution of what would otherwise have been an enigma" to him. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to perceive that the postulation of a divine revelation comes in upon the conception of the sin-born "imbecility of humanity" as a mitigation of its otherwise hopeless condition. The proclamation of the provision of a divine revelation, if on the one hand it implies a need for it, on the other hand asserts a remedy for that need. Nor does the assertion of divine revelation cover the whole provision which Augustine offers for the removal of the natural incapacities of sinful man. He did not confine himself to pointing out a mitigation for the symptom; he sought and found also a remedy for the disease. If the nöetic effects of sin might be neutralized by divine revelation, sin itself might be removed by divine grace. It is certainly grossly unfair to Augustine's teaching as to man's condition to focus attention upon the disease under which he holds that man suffers, and withdraw it entirely from the remedy which he asserts has been provided for this disease.

We must not, then, be misled into supposing Augustine to teach, even by remote inmplication, that man is hopelessly sunk in nescience or even in sin. Perfectly true as this is of his teaching of the condition of man considered in himself alone and so far as his own powers are concerned, it is considerably less than half the truth of Augustine's teaching of the condition of man. It means, no doubt, that Augus-

tine, as he looked upon the virtues of the heathen as little more than *splendida vitia*, so looked upon the philosophy of the heathen as very much a farrago of nonsense. What a multitude of philosophers there have been, he exclaimed, in effect, and almost more opinions than philosophers! Who can find any two of them who perfectly agree? Varro enumerates not less than two hundred and eighty-eight possible sects. It would be easier to find a needle in a haystack than truth among these professional purveyors of truth.[50] But then Augustine knew something better than heathen thought to which to direct one in search of truth, as he knew something better than heathen ethics to which to direct one in search of holiness. His great word was Revelation; and behind and above and all through Revelation, there was the greater word still, Grace. No doubt this means that he transferred dependence for truth, as for holiness, from man to God. He did distrust human nature as he found it. He did consider it in its own strength incapable of any good thing, and equally of any right thought. He did cast men back for all good on God's grace, for all truth on God's teaching. So far writers like Mr. Owen are quite right. Augustine did believe in the ingrained depravity of man in his present manifestation on earth; he did believe that this depravity renders him morally incapable and intellectually imbecile, if this somewhat exaggerated language pleases us. But he believed also in the goodness of God; and he believed that this good God has intervened with His grace to cure man's moral inability, and with His revelation to rescue man from his intellectual imbecility.

Nor was this doctrine of Revelation and Grace as remedies for man's sinful incapacities and condition a mechanical intrusion of an alien idea into Augustine's general conception. It rather stands in the most direct analogy alike with his whole conception of man's relation to God and with his particular view of man's natural needs and the natural provision for their satisfaction. Even had man not been

[50] See the *City of God*, xviii. 41.

sinful, Augustine would never have allowed that he was in a position of himself, apart from God, to do any good or to attain any truth. That would have seemed to him a crass Deism, of which he would have been incapable. Even sinless man would have been to him absolutely dependent on God, the Author of all being, the Light of all knowledge, the Source of all good. We have seen him openly teaching that man as man can see light only in the Light; that all truth is the reflection into the soul of the truth that is in God; in a word, that the condition of all knowledge for dependent creatures is revelation, in the wider sense of that word. When now he teaches that revelation in a narrower sense and a more objective form, is the condition of all right knowledge of higher things for sinful man,—a revelation which is an integral part of a scheme of grace for the recovery of sinful man, not only from the effects of his sin but from his sin itself,—he is speaking in close analogy with his fundamental theistic conception of the universe. He is but throwing sinful man back afresh on the God on whom men in all states and conditions are absolutely dependent.

Similarly, the provision which Augustine makes, in revelation, to meet the sin-bred inability of men to attain right knowledge, is only an extension in a right line of the provision he discovered for meeting man's natural weakness growing out of his finiteness, and especially out of his only gradually attained maturity. In that case, we remember, he pointed to authority as the remedy for as yet ineffective reason. The child is naturally dependent on the authority of its elders, who offer to its faith the truth which its reason is as yet incapable of discovering or authenticating for itself. In every sphere of life we remain dependent on the authority of those who are in this or that or the other department of knowledge better instructed than we; and he who will be taught nothing, but insists on following his reason alone, is soon at the end of living in this world. Revelation plays precisely the same rôle for the mind darkened by sin. The heavenly Father intervenes to meet the needs of sin-blinded

souls by offering to their faith, on the authority of God, the truth which they are as sinners incapable of ascertaining for themselves. This is the essence of Augustine's doctrine of revelation. Of course the condition of man as sinner determines as well the nature of the truths he needs to know as the manner in which alone he can come to the knowledge of them: the whole content of revelation is determined by the needs of those to whom it is made. But that may be left to one side here. What we are at present especially concerned with is that the need of revelation and the provision of revelation for sinful man stand in perfect analogy with the need and provision of instruction for, say, the immature child. The principle which governs in both cases is, not that reason is superceded by something better, but that, in default of reason due to special circumstances, provision is taken to supply the lack of reason, until reason may come to its rights. The lame man is supplied with a crutch until his lameness is healed. Here we have in brief Augustine's whole doctrine of revelation.

Clear and reasonable, however, as is Augustine's doctrine of revelation as the remedy for man's sin-bred disability to know aright, it seems to be very difficult for some writers to believe that it could have been a reality to him. It is not rare, therefore, to hear it intimated that he passed all his days under the torture of gnawing doubt, and flung himself upon the authority of the church as some sort of palliation of his wearing despair. His permanent state of mind regarding Christianity, we are told, is much that which is exhibited in a certain class of Romish controversial literature, in which after every other support for human trust has been sedulously removed we are ultimately invited to take refuge in the authority of the Church as the sole haven of peace. This representation is given expression, as well as elsewhere, in some remarks of Professor Adolf Harnack's, when he comes, in his *History of Dogma,* to deal with Augustine's attitude to the authority of the Church.[51] Here we are told

[51] English translation, vol. V. p. 79.

that Augustine had become convinced, in his conflict with himself, "of the badness of human nature," and had been left by Manichæism "in complete doubt as to the foundations and truth of the Christian faith." And then:—

"His confidence in the rationality of Christian truth had been shaken to the very depths, and it was never restored. In other words, as an individual thinker he never gained the subjective certitude that Christian truth (and as such everything contained in the two Testaments had to be regarded) was clear, consistent and demonstrable. When he threw himself into the arms of the Catholic Church, he was perfectly conscious that he needed its authority not to sink in scepticism or nihilism."

Dr. Harnack is too good a scholar to enunciate a historical judgment utterly without elements of truth. There are elements of truth of great importance even in this judgment, far from the mark as is the application which is made of them; and there are even points of great interest in the use which Dr. Harnack makes of these elements of truth. It is certainly true that in his experience with the Manichæans Augustine learned to distrust unaided reason as the source of religious truth; and discovered that there is a legitimate place for authority in religion. The Manichæans had promised him a purely rational religion; he found on testing it that what they gave him was a mass of irrationalities; and on feeling out for himself he discovered that unaided reason was inadequate to the task of meeting all the needs of man. There is truth, therefore, in saying that he once for all discarded reason as the sole instrument for the acquisition of truth in the religious sphere, and cast himself on instruction as the single hope of the soul in its longing after truth. But the sense in which this is true of Augustine is indefinitely different from the sense it takes upon itself in Dr. Harnack's representation. Beneath Dr. Harnack's representation there lies Dr. Harnack's own conception not only of the place of authority in religion, but of the nature of the Christian religion and its relation to authority, and of the nature of the particular source of author-

ity to which he conceives that Augustine fled in his need, and of the rationality of Augustine's act in taking refuge with it. His whole statement, therefore, leaves the impression that Augustine in despair of reason renounced rationality, and gave himself over to an unreasoned authority for guidance; and never again recovered, we will not say objective rationality in his religious views, but even subjective confidence. The very interesting defence of authority in religion—from the historical point of view at least, if not from the intrinsic—with which Dr. Harnack closes his discussion[52] does nothing to modify this impression. It remains the gist of his exposition that Augustine took refuge in authority, because he despaired of reason, and therefore his attitude towards Christianity remained throughout life that of an irrationalist.

Nothing, however, could be less true than this of Augustine's real attitude. His appeal to authority was in his own mind not a desertion of reason but an advance towards reason. He sought truth through authority only because it became clear to him that this was the rational road to truth. It was thus not as an irrationalist, but as a rationalist, that he made his appeal to authority. His breach with Manichæism and his gradual establishment in Christian truth, in other words, was on this side of it merely the discovery that the Christian religion is not a natural religion and is therefore not either excogitable or immediately demonstrable by reason working solely on natural grounds; but is rather a revealed religion and therefore requires in the first instance to be told to us. It is thus in the last analysis, supernaturalism as versus naturalism that he turns to;[53] and this is far from the same thing as irrationality as versus rationality—except, indeed, on the silent assumption that the supernatural is an absurdity, an assumption which was

[52] Pp. 82-83.

[53] *De utilitate credendi*, 29: "Therefore this so vast difficulty, since our inquiry is about religion, God alone can remedy: nor, indeed, unless we believe both that He is, and that He helps men's minds, ought we even to inquire of the true religion itself."

decidedly not Augustine's. In the sixth book of the *Confessions* he recounts to us the several steps by which he rose from the pure naturalism which had hitherto held him to this Christian supernaturalism. His disillusionment with Manichæism did not at once deliver him from his naturalistic point of view. He had found the tenets of the Manichæans irrational. But his rejection of them as such, did not at once entail the adoption of another set of tenets as rational. His sad experience with them operated rather to make him chary of committing himself to any other body of conclusions whatever. He remained in principle a naturalist *á outrance*. He demanded the apodeictic certainty of mathematical demonstration for conviction; that is to say, he still depended for the discovery of truth upon immediate rational demonstration alone. This alone seemed to him adequate evidence upon which one could safely venture. All this time, says he, he was restraining his heart from believing anything, and thus in avoiding the precipice was strangling his soul: what he was demanding was that he should be made as certain of things unseen as that seven and three make ten.[54] He goes on to remark that a cure for his distress lay open before him in faith (*credendo*), had he chosen to take that road, since thus the sight of his mind might have been purged for vision of the truth. But as yet he could not enter that path. It was not long, however, before it began to invite his feet, slowly but surely. He could not avoid perceiving after a while that it is the path of nature. He reflected upon the host of things which he accepted on testimony. He reminded himself that in it lay the foundation of all history: and that life itself would soon come to a standstill if we refused to act on the credit of others. He meditated further upon the strength of the conviction which testimony produces when its validity and adequacy are beyond question. As the great place which faith fills in common life thus became more and more clear to him, he could not escape the query why it should not serve a similar end

[54] *Confessiones*, vi. 4. 6.

in higher things. The principle of faith and its correlate authority, having once been recognized, it became indeed only a question of time before it should take its proper place in these higher concerns also. And, then, it was only a question of fact whether there existed in the world any adequate authority to guide men into the truth. Thus, says he, the Lord drew him on little by little, with a hand of infinite gentleness and mercy, and composing his heart gradually convinced him that in the Scriptures He had given to men an authority to which their faith is due, and through which they may attain by faith that knowledge of divine things to which they are as yet unable to rise through reason. "And also," he adds, "since we are too weak to search out the truth by mere (*liquida*) reason, and therefore need the authority of Holy Scriptures, I began to believe God never would have given such surpassing authority to those Scriptures throughout the whole world except that He wished to be believed through them and to be sought by their means."[55] There is depicted for us in this vital narrative, no despairing act of renunciation in which Augustine offered up his intellect a sacrifice upon the altar of faith, and sought peace from insatiable doubt in an arbitrary authority to which by an effort of sheer will he submits. What we see is a gradual advance under the leading of reason itself to a rational theory of authority in religion, on the basis of which rational certitude may be enjoyed in the midst of the weakness of this life.

What has been thus incidentally brought before us, it will be perceived, is Augustine's doctrine of faith and reason. The relations of faith and reason, as thus outlined, remained to him always a matter of sincere and reasoned conviction. We may read them so stated in the books *Against the Academics* and in the books *On the Predestination of the Saints* alike. It will be enough for our purpose, however, to observe how he deals with the matter in two or three treatises which are devoted expressly to elucidating certain

[55] *Ibid.* c. 8.

aspects of it. Take for example the treatises *On the Profit of Believing* (391) and *On Faith in Things Not Seen* (400), which were written not very far apart in time and in very similar circumstances. In both of these treatises he begins by setting himself sharply in opposition to the Sensationalists, "who fancy," says he,[56] "that there is nothing else than what they perceive by those five well-known reporters of the body," and "essay to measure the unsearchable resources of truth" by "the deceitful rule" of the "impressions (*plagas*) and images they have received from these"; whom, in a word, "folly has so made subject to their carnal eyes that whatsoever they see not through them they think they are not to believe."[57] From this starting-point, in both alike, however, the advance is made at once to the defence of faith as a valid form of conviction, with respect not only to things not perceived by the bodily senses, but also to those lying beyond the reach of the intellect itself.[58] And in both alike the stress of the argument is laid upon the naturalness of faith and its indispensableness in the common life of men.[59] Why should that act of faith which lies at the very basis of human intercourse be excluded from the sphere of religion,—especially in the case of one, say, of weak intelligence? Must a man have no religion because he is incapable of excogitating one for himself?[60] Certainly we must not confound faith with credulity: nobody asks that Christ should be believed in without due evidence that he is worthy of being believed in.[61] But, on the other hand, it is just as certain that we shall not attain to any real religion without faith. Say you are determined to have a religion which you can demonstrate. The very search for it presupposes a precedent faith that there is a God and that he cares for us; for surely no one will seek God, or inquire

[56] *De utilitate credendi*, 1.
[57] *De fide rerum quae non vid.* 1.
[58] *Ibid.* 2 *sq.*
[59] *Ibid.* 4; *De util. cred.* 23.
[60] *De util cred.* 24.
[61] *De fide rer. q. non vid.* 5: cf. *De utilitate credendi*, 22*sq.*, and 2[illegible] where the necessary distinctions are drawn.

how we should serve Him, without so much to go on.[62] And where and how will you seek? Perchance you will inquire the way of those who are wise? Who are the wise? How will you determine who are wise in such things? In the manifold disagreements of pretenders to wisdom, it will require a wise man to select the really wise. We are caught in a fatal circle here; we must needs be wise beforehand in order to discriminate wisdom.[63] There is but one outlet; and that outlet is, shortly, revelation. For revelation is a thing which can be validated by appropriate evidence even to those who have not yet attained wisdom; and which, when once trusted on its appropriate grounds, gradually leads us into that wisdom which before was unobtainable. Thus, to man unable to see the truth, a justified authority steps in to fit him to see it; and it is authority alone which can bring such wisdom.[64] This is the reason the Lord has chosen this method of dealing with us. Bringing us a medicine destined to heal our corrupted condition, "he procured authority by miraculous works, acquired faith by authority, drew together numbers by faith, gained antiquity by numbers, confirmed religion by antiquity: so that not only the supremely inept novelty of heresy in its deceitful working, but even the inveterate error of heathenism in its violent antagonism can never root up this religion in any way whatever."[65] Here we have Augustine's golden chain. Miracles, authority, faith, numbers, antiquity, an absolutely established religion: that is the sequence, travelling along which men arrive at a secure conviction which nothing can shake.

We may hear him argue the question with even more specific application to the Christian religion in a notable letter which he wrote about 410 to an eminent courtier and scholar.[66] "The minds of men," he tells us here, "are

[62] *De utilitate credendi*, 29.
[63] *Ibid.* 28.
[64] *Ibid.* 34.
[65] *Ibid.* 32 *ad fin.*
[66] *Epist.* 118 (to Dioscorus), 5. 32-33.

blinded by the pollutions of sin and the lust of the flesh"; they are therefore lost in the mazes of discussion and are unable to discover the truth of things by reason. Therefore, that men may have the truth, Christ came—the Truth Itself, in union with a man,—to instruct them in truth. Thus men are given the truth through faith, in order that "by instruction in salutary truth they may escape from their perplexities into the atmosphere of pure and simple truth." That is to say, we are introduced to truth by Christ's authority, so that, thus receiving it by faith, we may then be able to defend it by reason. "The perfection of method in training disciples," we read, "is, that those who are weak should be encouraged to enter the citadel of authority, in order that, when they have been safely placed there, the conflict necessary for their defence may be maintained by the most strenuous use of reason." "Thus," he adds, "the whole supremacy of authority and light of reason for regenerating and reforming the human race has been made to reside in the one saving Name, and in His one Church." For Christ has "both secured the Church in the citadel of authority.... and supplied it with the abundant armor of equally invincible reason." The former He has done by means of the "highly celebrated ecumenical councils, and the Apostolic sees themselves";—which is as much as to say, apparently, that the authority of the Church finds expression through these organs. And the latter He has done "by means of a few men of pious learning and unfeigned spirituality";—that is to say, apparently, these are the organs through which the inherent rationality of Church teaching evinces itself. The entire sense seems, then, to be that what is taught by the Church on authority, through the appropriate organs of authority, is equally defended by the Church by reason, through the appropriate organs of reason. The Church as the pillar and ground of the truth commends it to faith; the Church, giving a reason for the faith that is in it, defends it to reason. The Doctor,[67] in other words, is as truly a

[67] On the "Doctor" in the early church, see Smith and Cheatham, *Dict. of Christ. Antiquities*, 1876, vol. I. p. 570a; and Harnack, in his

manifestation of the Church's inherent life as the Bishop himself: reasoning is as inamissibly her function as authoritative definition. Here is certainly an elevation of authority, properly grounded, as a source of conviction; an elevation of faith, properly placed, as a mode of conviction. But here is no depreciation of demonstration and reason to make way for authority and faith. On the contrary, the two are placed side by side, as joint methods and organs for attaining truth; and the contention is merely that to each its own sphere belongs into which the other cannot intrude.

It has seemed most convenient to present in the first instance Augustine's entire doctrine of faith and reason in concrete form, and in its application to the main problem to which he applied it. But having in this way caught a glimpse of it as a whole and in its ultimate bearings, it seems desirable to pause and to glance in some detail at the main elements which enter into it.

Let us first look at the doctrine in its most general aspects. The fact of primary importance to note here is that with Augustine faith and reason are never conceived as antagonists, contradictories, but always as coadjutants, coöperating to a common end. The thing sought is truth: what Augustine has discovered is that there are two modes of mental action by which truth may be laid hold of. It may be grasped by faith, or it may be grasped by reason. "No one doubts," he tells us, "that we are impelled to the acquisition of knowledge by a double impulse,—of authority and of reason."[68] And, though we may be so constituted as eagerly to desire "to apprehend what is true not only by faith but by the understanding";[69] and may, therefore, give to reason the primacy in rank, yet we are bound to acknowledge for faith a priority in time.[70] Granted that faith may seem to be a mode of conviction more suitable for the ignor-

larger edition of the *Didaché*, 1884, pp. 131 sq; and in his *Expansion of Christianity*, E. T. vol. I. pp. 444 sq.

[68] *Contr. Acad.* iii. 20. 43, *ad fin.*; cf. *De ordine* ii. 9. 26, *ad init.*

[69] *Contr. Acad.* l. c.

[70] *De ordine*, l. c.

ant multitude than for the instructed few; yet there is no one who does not begin by being ignorant, and there are many things great and good which we could never attain were the door not opened to us by faith.[71] Life is too short to attempt to solve every question for ourselves, even of those which are capable of being solved. We must be content to accept many things on faith and leave difficulties to be dealt with afterwards, or never to be dealt with.[72] And surely it is the height of folly, because of insoluble difficulties, to "permit to escape from our hands things which are altogether certain."[73] What is it but pride—which is the destruction of all true knowledge—that leads us to demand that we shall, as we say, "understand everything"?

Not, of course, as if faith should be lightly or irrationally accorded If there is a sense in which faith precedes reason, there is equally a sense in which reason precedes faith. That mental act which we call faith is one possible only to rational creatures;[74] and of course we act as rational creatures in performing it. "If, then, "Augustine argues, "it is rational that, with respect to some great concerns which we find ourselves unable to comprehend, faith should precede reason; there can be no question but that the amount of reason which leads us to accord this faith, whatever that amount may be, is itself anterior to faith."[75] Faith is by no means blind: it has eyes of its own with which, before it completes itself in giving that assent which, when added to thinking, constitutes it believing,[76] it must needs see both that to which it assents, and that on the ground of which it assents

[71] *Ibid*

[72] *Epist* 170 (to Deogratias, A D 408 or 406) c 38: **sunt enim** innumerabiles [quaestiones] quae non sunt finiendae ante **fidem, ne** finiatur vita sine fide

[73] *De mus.* a, vi 5 8

[74] *Epist* 120 (to Consentius) etiam credere non **possumus, nisi** rationales animas haberemus

[75] *Ibid*

[76] *De praedest sanctt* 2 'Believing is nothing else than **cum assen**sione cogitare' *Enchrid* 20 'But if assent is taken away, **faith too** falls, for sine assentione nihil creditur'

to it. As we cannot believe without knowing what it is to which we accord our faith, so we cannot believe without perceiving good grounds for according our faith. "No one believes anything unless he has before thought it worthy of belief."[77] Reason, therefore, can never be "wholly lacking to faith, because it belongs to it to consider to whom faith should be given."[78] This function of reason, by which it considers to what men or writings it is right to accord faith is then precedent to faith; though faith is precedent to reason in the sense that, an adequate ground of credit having been established by reason, conviction must at once form itself without waiting for comprehension to become perfect.

Our knowledge thus embraces two classes of things; things seen and things believed. The difference between them is this: " with respect to things we have seen or see, we are our own witnesses; but with respect to those which we believe, we are moved to faith by other witnesses."[79] The distinction which Augustine erects between faith and reason, that is to say, is briefly that faith is distinctively that conviction of truth which is founded on testimony as over against that conviction which is founded on sight.[80] All the corollaries which flow from this distinction were present to his mind. He is found, for example, pointing out that all so-called knowledge itself rests on faith, so that in the deepest sense an act of faith precedes all knowledge. And on the other hand—and it is this point which is of most present interest to us—that all faith presupposes reason, and is so far from an irrational act that an unreasonable faith, a faith not founded in a reasonable authority demanding credit on reasonable grounds, is no faith at all, but mere "credulity", while what is thus unwarrantedly believed is

[77] *De praedest. sanctt.* ii. 5.

[78] *De vera religione,* xxiv. 45, also 46.

[79] *Epist.* 147. 3. 8.

[80] *Epist.* 147. 3. 7; *Eighty-Three Questions,* Quaest. 54. In *Retract.* i. 104. 3 he allows that in such distinctions he is employing the word 'knowledge' in a strict rather than a popular sense: in common speech we say 'we know' even what rests on testimony.

ately passed upon each several truth. The particular verdict of reason on each several truth must wait on the act of faith by which we honor the general verdict of reason on the validity of the authority; and it may wait endlessly without invalidating or weakening the strength of conviction which we accord to the deliverances of a revelation which has been really validated to us as such.

We may revert, of course, to the prior question, whether the assumed revelation on the authority of which faith is yielded has been soundly validated as such to reason. It is at this point that criticism of Augustine's system of faith becomes possible; and it is at this point that such criticism becomes sharp. We are told that Augustine accepted an alleged revelation on insufficient evidence; and that it is this fact which justifies the suspicion that his acceptance of it and the subjection of his reason to its authority were acts of violence done to his intellect in despair of ever attaining a solid basis in reason for religious conviction. It is quite possible to confuse in such a concrete judgment a number of suggestions, which we should discriminate if we are to form an estimate of the value of the criticism offered. We shall need to ask, for example, if what it is intended to suggest is that the evidence in existence for the reality of the revelation which Augustine accepted as a true revelation from God is insufficient to validate it; or only that the evidence which was actually before Augustine's mind and on which he personally depended in reaching his decision was insufficient. In the latter case we shall need to ask further if what is meant is that the evidence actually before Augustine's mind would be insufficient to convince us—seems to us in itself insufficient to command credit; or that it was actually insufficient to convince Augustine, so that, despite his protestations of conviction, he remained in reality unconvinced and at heart an actual sceptic all his days. It is the last of these propositions, it will be remembered, that Dr. Harnack affirms; although he does not keep it as rigorously separate from the others as would seem desirable. It is surely one

thing to say that Augustine is open to criticism for giving credit to the Evidences of Christianity and recognizing the revelatory character of the Christian system; and quite another thing to say that Augustine is open to criticism for the particular conception he entertained of the Christian evidences,—the selection he makes of the special items of evidence upon which he personally relies for the validation of the Christian system as a revealed religion; and still quite another thing to suggest that Augustine is open to criticism for his inaccessibility to the evidences of the Christian system as a revelation from God, and for remaining therefore all his life a doubter of the intellect, finding only a precarious peace for his distracted soul in an act of submission to an external authority arbitrarily yielded to in defiance of insatiable scepticism.

It can scarcely be expected that the whole body of the Christian evidences should be subjected to a new critical examination merely because a writer not himself able to look upon them as supplying a satisfactory proof of the Divine origin of the Christian religion, blames Augustine for placing upon them a value beyond that which he is himself able to accord. We must be prepared to find those who resist the force of this evidence themselves, despising those who yield to it as superstitious, or even accusing them of intellectual dishonesty. It surely is enough at this point simply to recognize that this not unnatural tendency of the naturalistic mind is not without its influence upon the proneness in some quarters to speak of Augustine as making a sacrifice of his intellect in throwing himself upon authority in matters of religion. One thing is perfectly clear: if Augustine made such a sacrifice he was himself completely unconscious of doing so. He nowhere betrays the state of mind which is here attributed to him. He speaks always in terms of the most complete conviction of the truth of the Christian religion, and rests himself with entire confidence upon the evidences which appealed to him. To go behind his obviously sincere asseverations of security of mind and

heart, because we are conscious that, in his place, we should have felt less secure, is to push the biographer's (and critic's) privilege of "imputing himself to his victim" to an unwarrantable extreme. Whatever we may feel Augustine ought to have done; whatever we may feel we, in his place, should have done; it certainly is a matter of historical fact that Augustine confidently accepted the Christian revelation as a genuine revelation, and found for his faith in it abundant justification. No fact in his mental history is more patent, or call it flagrant if you will. When in the closing words of his first Christian composition,[87] in the very act of consecrating himself to a life-long search of truth, he declares that "he certainly would never more give up the authority of Christ, because no stronger could be found," he speaks out of an unmistakably sincere conviction. And the note thus struck so far from fading away swells steadily to the end. Clearly the restless heart had found at last its rest: and rest is the characteristic of his Christian life. A sceptic, intellectual or moral, may be found in any man rather than in Augustine. He who in his despair as, in the crumbling of his former beliefs, he almost gave up hope of ever attaining assurance, yet could not fall in with the Academics because he still knew some things to be indisputably true, and only began to wonder whether the right way to truth was known to man—certainly could not lose his confidence after he had discovered the Way and established himself in it.

It remains a matter of interest of course to determine the nature of the grounds on which Augustine was convinced, or sought to convince others, of the truth of the Christian religion. To do so with any fulness would be, however, to write a section of the history of Apologetics, and would find its importance in that connection. We need not go so far afield in seeking to apprehend Augustine's doctrine of authority in religion. What is of primary importance here

[87] *Cont. Acad.* iii. 20. 43. It was the common sentiment of the men of the time: Paulinus of Nola says: Plurima quaesivi, per singula quaeque cucurri, Sed nihil inveni melius quam credere Christo.

is merely to ascertain in a simple manner his conception of the sources, nature and seat of this authority and the mode of its validation to men. In the next number of this REVIEW we shall seek to do this with as much completeness as is requisite for our purpose.

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WAS PAUL THE FOUNDER OF CHRISTIANIT

The centre of interest in New Testament criticism shifted for the moment from the Gospels to the Epistle from Jesus to Paul. An influential school of youn writers in Germany has confidently asserted that Paul not Jesus Himself was the real founder of Christian meaning the Christianity of the churches and the creeds. the ordinary Bible reader this statement will appear so pa doxical as scarcely to merit serious attention, while to student more or less acquainted with the course of New T tament criticism the attempt to prove an antithesis betw the teaching of Paul and that of the Twelve will seem lik wilful, if heroic, attempt to reoccupy an untenable posit The new view, however, is set forth in no tentative fash Its leading advocates, men like Wernle, Weinel and Wre are scholars of repute and writers of unusual literary s and their strategic method in taking the case out of hands of the theologians and appealing to the judgmen the intelligent laity has placed the advocates of traditi opinion rather on the defensive. The fight is now on dead earnest, we are told, and if the cause is lost it wil due to its inherent weakness, and not to lack of ability in leaders. An examination of the recent efforts at histor construction will at least bring us into contact with sev bold and original thinkers, and cannot be without posi gains in shedding light upon the life and work of Paul the history of the early church.

The following quotations from recent writers, w though differing widely in other respects, yet agree in t opposition to Pauline Christianity, will serve to show essence of the new contention:

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* This was already in type before we learned with regret of the d on Nov. 23, 1906, of the brilliant scholar and critic Dr. W. Wr professor in the University of Breslau. The article has been unchanged.

But for Paul, said Nietzsche (*Morgenröte,* 1892), "Christianity would not exist; we should hardly have heard of a small Jewish sect whose teacher died on the cross". Paul was "the first Christian, the inventor of Christianity. Before him there were only a few Jewish sectaries."

"The introduction of Christianity into the history of the world", says Wernle (*Beginnings of Christianity,* 1903, Vol. I. p. 159), "is entirely the work of Paul. He is not the founder of the new religion, and he did not wish to be accounted such. . . . But it was he who brought Christianity out of Palestine and transplanted it among the Greeks. . . . It was bound to undergo a radical transformation. . . . The new start is one of such importance that we must distinguish the pre-Pauline from the post-Pauline Christianity; or, what amounts to the same thing, the Palestinian sect and the world religion."

Weinel (*St. Paul, the Man and His Work,* 1906, pp. 5, 11) in answer to the question, "Who has the greater claim to be called the founder of the world-religion, Jesus or Paul?" says, " 'Paul', if by Christianity we understand belief in dogmas as to the person of Christ and his propitiatory death." He asks "Is the Christianity which Paul preached, and which still lives to-day in Church and dogma, another religion than the gospel which Jesus preached?" Paul is repeatedly called "the founder of the Church".

The conclusion of Wrede's monograph, *Paulus* (in *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher,* 1905), is that "Paul must be regarded as the second founder of Christianity." Not through the gospel of Jesus but through Paul and his companions can we account for the great teachers, "Tertullian, Origen, Athanasius, Augustin, Anselm of Canterbury, Luther, Calvin, Zinzendorf." "This second founder of the Christian religion has without doubt as compared with the first exerted on the whole the stronger—not the better—influence."

Dr. Kohler, in the *Jewish Encyclopedia* (art. "Saul of Tarsus") speaks of Paul as "the actual founder of the Christian Church as opposed to Judaism."

All the writers above quoted agree that Paul was the founder of Christianity as a universal religion. To him belongs the credit, or discredit, of founding the Christian

Church, which with its creeds and institutions has lived on through the centuries till to-day.

To say that Paul was the founder of the world-religion is obviously to deny that Jesus was its founder. However pure and exalted the type of religion which He exemplified and taught, He did not teach His religion as the only supply for a universal need; He did not form any definite plans for world-conquest, or organize a church with a universal mission. The conception of a religion which should meet the needs of all men, and lay upon its adherents the obligation of a continual propaganda, and break down all barriers of race, caste and nationality, has been called the greatest thought which ever entered the human mind. If such a conception belonged not to Jesus but to Paul, it is to Paul that we must accord the crown of intellectual supremacy. Both Wernle and Weinel, it is true, concede a universal element in the teaching of Jesus. Referring to the passage, "Many shall come from the east and the west, etc.", Wernle says (I p. 70), "How this admission of the Gentiles shall be brought about Jesus leaves to His God. He just gives the promise without giving His disciples any command to go forth as missionaries." And Weinel remarks: "Jesus would of course have raised no objection to the reception of the heathen. . . . He too, perhaps, once believed and said, that many would come from the east and from the west. . . . But words such as these were only occasional utterances, which bore witness to a heart free from all prejudice and full of love. They were not intended as indications for a definite organized work" (p. 221). Paul again goes beyond Jesus in clearly seeing and teaching that Christianity was independent of Judaism. Weinel says that "the consequences of His position in relation to the law remained completely concealed from Jesus" although He was opposed to ceremonial holiness (p. 219). Wernle believes that the statement in the Sermon on the Mount: "I am not come to destroy but to fulfil", belongs in its present form to the age after St. Paul. It cannot be ascribed to Jesus, for "its form betrays a theologian for

whom the question 'destruction or fulfilment of the law' implied a problem to be solved. For Jesus there was no such question, no question at all regarding the law in the strict sense of the word, for He was a layman and was in any case but moderately acquainted with the law—had perchance never studied it at all" (I. p. 88). Emerson has said that the human mind stands in perplexity, "demanding intellect, demanding sanctity, impatient equally with each without the other". To form the plan of a universal religion and to think out its true relation to Judaism, there was needed the mental grasp, learning and foresight of a Paul.

If Paul was the founder of universal Christianity, the popular estimate of his place in religious history must, it appears, be revised in two respects: First, he affected the religion of Jesus profoundly for the worse; and second, he saved it from oblivion and made it one of the great religions of the world. The name of Jesus, says Wernle, stands, it is true, in the centre of Paul's preaching, but he asks, "Is it not another Jesus?" (I. p. 167). Paul united the gospel of Jesus with a cosmology and a theology which "was bound to be welcomed by the decaying ancient world on account of its pessimism, its new myths, its ideal, its doctrine of hope" (I. p. 289). "Paul fought for the universalism of Christianity and the substitution of the religion of love for that of legalism: what he really attained was the establishment of the Christian Church with the new legalism of faith and the creed, with the return of all the Jewish sins of narrowness, fanaticism and the restricted conception of God" (I. p. 309). In similar vein Weinel says that "Paul was the first to intellectualize and thereby to narrow the original gospel" (p. 99). "The orthodox theories of the atonement can rightly appeal to St. Paul as their authority. . . . But we reject all such theories as to the death of Jesus . . . above all because they contain an unchristian, a less than Christian, conception of God and His relation to man" (pp. 311f.). Wrede is even bolder than Wernle in applying the expres-

sion "myth" to the Pauline conception of the incarnati
death and resurrection of Jesus (p. 103).

On the other hand, Paul's place in religious history as
founder of the world-religion becomes more important t
ever, and his services to the cause of true religion are fr
recognized. In his power of impressing his thought
his type of personal piety upon succeeding times he sta
almost without a rival. Wernle says that by means of
experience Paul "was able to look into the depths of
ligion as no previous thinker had done. In so far as
propositions merely reproduce this experience, they are
foundation stones of every theory of religion" (I. pp. 30
"Few men in all antiquity had a profounder knowledge
human nature", says Weinel (p. 364). His letter to
Philippians "contains the pattern of the perfect Chris
gentleman" (p. 373). His teaching, says Wrede, "has gi
to millions of hearts the best that they possess". With
it, "a Luther, Paul Gerhard and John Sebastian Bach co
not have been what they were", and it still fills with
thousands and tens of thousands of good and earnest
(pp. 103f.). Even so pronounced an opponent of Pau
doctrine as the writer in the *Jewish Encyclopedia* is
strained to say that though both philosophers and Jews
differ from him, "both will admit that he is a mighty bat
for truth, and that his view of life, of man, and of God
profoundly serious one. The entire conception of relig
has certainly been deepened by him" (Art. "Saul of Tars
p. 80).

This curious intermingling of praise and blame, o
met with in the same paragraph or even sentence, i
necessary result, as becomes increasingly apparent, of
fundamental assumption of the later critics, namely,
Paul in propagating the gospel of Christ essentially modi
its original content. Their volumes thus have to bear
singular aspect of being at the same time a eulogy of P
and an anti-Pauline polemic.[1] The Apostle as they desc

[1] Wrede is the most outspoken in his criticisms, while with We
praise and blame are about evenly balanced. Weinel's sympathetic

him was at once the leading exponent and missionary of Christianity and yet by implication its arch-heretic. His influence as a religious teacher has been so salutary and far reaching that it is due to him that any of us are Christians to-day, and yet he has so corrupted the message of the Master that the cry "Back to Jesus" means "Away from Paul and his doctrines". He "has impressed forever a whole series of fundamental ideas . . . upon the thought of the Western world" (Weinel, p. 8), and before his greatness as a thinker "one stands in silent amazement" (Wernle, I. p. 340), yet he was profoundly mistaken about the central point in his thinking, his relation to Jesus and His gospel. He combined in himself in short the greatest knowledge of human nature and the greatest self-deception and his work was both the greatest service and the greatest disservice that has ever been done to Christianity.

The most obvious criticism that can be made on this theory is that it is lacking in inner harmony. One must either love Paul or hate him, it has been said;[2] but this new theory requires of its advocates an unstable equilibrium between love and hate, between admiration and reprobation. The Paul described unites in himself qualities so diverse that, though he is offered in the place of Jesus as the explanation of world-wide Christianity, yet he himself becomes if not the miracle at least the riddle of history. It may be interesting to follow the new criticism as it seeks to explain Paul and to account for his conversion, his consciousness of apostleship, his mission to the Gentiles and his message We may then ask what is after all the fundamental question: Was the gospel which Paul preached really new?

The reader who, attracted by the title of Wernle's volumes, seeks in them an adequate account of the beginnings of Christianity will be disappointed at not finding any description or discussion of Paul's conversion. We are left in doubt as to whether at Damascus Paul really saw the

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mate of Paul's character will be welcomed as a real contribution to our appreciation of the Apostle.

[2] J. Kaftan, *Jesus und Paulus*, 1906.

risen Christ or not. The possibility of the resurrectio
indeed admitted. "Our judgment as to these appearar
depends on the credibility which we attach to St. Paul
his informant", that is, Peter. "Purely scientific consid
tions cannot decide" (I. p. 115). The whole course
the discussion, however, seems to assume that the Ch
whom Paul saw, or thought he saw, was not identical
the historic Jesus. This is distinctly stated in the
edition: "By means of his vision St. Paul became
creator of the new Christology, which drew its inspirat
not from history, but from something above it—a m
ical being, and which won over the heathen for this
reason" (E. T. Vol. I. p. 250). In the second (Germ
edition, this passage is omitted, and instead Wernle
plains why, in consequence of his vision of the risen L
the resurrection must have had for Paul "fundamental
nificance" and how it inevitably became for him the "
of Christianity" (*Die Anfange unserer Religion*,[2] p. 16
The vision at Damascus is constantly used as the ke
Paul's subsequent life, thought and activity. Without
apostolic consciousness, which there had its origin, "
incredible that Paul would have accomplished a tith
what he did" (I. p. 165). The key to the conquest
Christianity is Paul, the key to Paul's work is the visio
Damascus, but in Wernle's *Beginnings* there is no expl
tion of the vision itself. It had tremendous consequer
deeply affecting the course of history, but no cause fo
occurrence either objective or subjective is suggested

Both Weinel and Wrede have explanations to offer.
conversion, according to Wrede, was a sudden chang
view as to the Messiahship of Jesus without moral or

[1] The two editions of *Die Anfänge unserer Religion* appeared re
ively in 1901 and 1904. Vol I of the English translation was made
the first, and Vol II. from the second German edition The mai
ference between the two volumes in English is that in Vol I
conception of the sacraments is derived from Paul, while Vol II
supposes their existence in the early Christian Church. The quot
in the present article, except as specially noted, are from the E
translation where it agrees with the second German edition.

scious psychological preparation, mediated in some way by a pathological cause. From 2 Cor. xii. we see that there was something in Paul's religion, mystical, abnormal, inseparable from self-deception, and all this throws a very special light upon the first vision at Damascus (p. 17). What really occurred? "This much is certain. Jesus could not have stood in bodily form before His enemy. . . . Paul knows no resurrection of the flesh. . . . It could therefore have been no usual 'fleshly', no actual (*wirkliches*) 'seeing'" (p. 9). It is immediately added, however, "probably Paul never doubted that he actually (*wirklich*) had seen Jesus. . . . The vision worked upon him with the full power of an objective fact." The vision must have had a cause, we are told, although we may not be able to indicate it. "An actual view of the processes we can never obtain." The only explanation suggested is the following: "Fanatical opposition can assert itself on the surface, and in the still depths, without a man's understanding it himself, doubt can gnaw and foment and gather revolution around itself, and a new being fight its way out" (p. 10).

Weinel thinks that Paul's conversion was a moral experience, culminating in a hysterical attack which caused him to see a vision. Referring Rom. vii. to the struggle preceding conversion, he says "heavier and heavier did the curse of the law become" (p. 75). The voice which said "Why persecutest thou me?" was the voice of Paul's uneasy conscience" (p. 82). The psychical commotion disorganized his eye-sight, which explains his blindness. He had a vision, he saw, but how? "The answer", Weinel frankly says, "will vary according to a man's conception of the universe . . . meaning nothing about faith or religion. The question has no existence for faith. Faith knows that what happened, happened in any case because God chose to work it then—whether Paul beheld Jesus in the light, or whether it was merely a visionary sight. It is a question of our conception of the universe, in so far as it brings us face to face with the problem: Do we admit the possibility of ap-

pearances of persons from another world to the s
vision?" (p. 80). Weinel assumes that the questio
be decided in accordance with a ready-made concep
the universe, but the question, if it could be answe
purely historical grounds, is just one of those which
reasonably affect our conception of the universe. It
to be admitted that, apart from philosophical viev
evidence is sufficient to support the reality of an ob
appearance. But the question, says Weinel, has no
ence for faith. For Paul, of course, it would have exi
affecting vitally his claims to apostleship, and as part
general question of the resurrection it would have ex
for every believer. Even for Weinel himself we find
does exist for faith, for he says that Paul's failure
ceive that the vision was purely subjective has had d
ous consequences for religion. It led Paul to regard
as no longer "simply the heartfelt trust in God's mer
something besides, the fervent acceptation of a fa
Resurrection. . . . Hereby some of that 'belief i
has crept into Christianity which so easily destroys th
the inmost conception of faith. The outward occu
and the inner psychological process were identical fo
His failure to distinguish the two has forever bu
Christianity with the danger of this twofold concep
faith" (pp. 99f.).

If Paul were merely a private Christian his exp
at conversion would be relatively of little importanc
his conversion cannot be treated out of connection w
work as the apostle of Christ to the Gentiles,—or mo
that, as the founder of world-wide Christianity. W
Paul when converted become a missionary to the he
This is a difficult question for the newer criticism. T
his mission to a personal command from the risen
is excluded by hypothesis. If his own explanation
origin and success of his work is adopted—"God re
His Son in me that I might preach Him among the G
Christ wrought through me for the obedience of th

tiles"—then Paul has indeed the high honor in his mission and his message of being the apostle of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles, but he originated neither the universality nor the content of his gospel. On the other hand, to refer the mission directly to the vision at Damascus, considered as a purely subjective event, is to make that event still more wonderful. Through it Paul was converted not simply to the faith of which he was making havoc, but, it is implied, to a religion quite different from this, and through it he received a commission, so he thought, which he spent the remainder of his life in fulfiling. The heavier the explanatory task imposed upon the conversion, the more inexplicable does this as a merely natural event become.

"Whence", asks Wernle, "came the certainty of the apostolic calling? By far the most beautiful answer is to be found in First Corinthians: 'Necessity is laid upon me; yea, woe is me if I preach not the gospel.' The calling to go forth as missionary is an inner compulsion which Paul cannot at all withstand" (I. p. 165). But why this compulsion? "St. Paul gives us a clear account. He became at once Christian and apostle—such is his answer to the question—through the vision on the road to Damascus." But why was Paul an apostle to the Gentiles? While other considerations are mentioned, which, it is said, contributed to his decision, yet "the really decisive cause was the clearly felt impulse that urged him to go forth from the very moment of his call. He was under a necessity—he had to go to the Gentiles" (I. p. 174). It is said that Paul "draws no distinction between the general calling of an apostle and the special calling of a missionary to the heathen, but shows himself prepared to receive both at God's hands" (I. p. 161). Wernle, it will be seen, has no other account to give of the origin of Paul's mission to the Gentiles than that it was in obedience to an impulse—not a command—felt from the moment of his conversion.

While Weinel, at least nominally, connects the conversion and the missionary call, he finds it difficult to explain the

connection. He asks, "Why does Damascus mean a vocation to Paul?" and seeks another explanation the obvious one of a supernatural call. It is natura out of the fulness of the heart the mouth should yet, he says, "it is difficult to understand just w became apostle to the Gentiles". Weinel's own ex tion, stated with some diffidence, is based upon an pretation of two passages, Gal. v. 11 and 2 Cor. "In these passages we can trace the idea that Pa once known and preached Christ after the flesh—t he had, when he was still Saul, recognized and proc an earthly Jewish Messiah, and that he had alread a teacher, possibly also a missionary. In this case have been a pre-existent calling, or at least perha incipient though hidden desire which awoke within force in that supreme moment" (p. 154). To add difficulty of this exegesis as suggesting a "pre-existe ing" is the fact that Weinel in two other places say Paul believed that the Messiah was a heavenly being. as a Jew, Saul believed the Messiah to be already in ence. . . . He is living in heaven with God, when will send Him forth when the time is fulfilled" (p So again in explaining the origin of Paul's Christ "He now knew, from his own experience, that that he being, in whom his people believed, existed as an matter of fact. He was identical with Jesus" (p. 314) reader is obliged to choose between the pre-existent as explaining the mission, and the pre-existent Mess explaining the Christology.

Wrede, equally with Weinel, is somewhat at a l account for Paul's mission to the heathen. Paul hims admits, referring to Gal. i. 16 and Rom. xv. 15f., d that "the moment of the conversion itself had destine to be not only apostle in general, but apostle to the he (p. 14). Yet it is added that there seems to be a litt deception here; this sudden call is "psychologically h understand. In memory the perspective is easily sho

. . . At any rate the recognition of his life's task was an effect of the appearance of Christ; on the other hand, that he had 'seen' Jesus just as those apostles with whom He had lived constituted—for himself as for others—the title to apostolic dignity. The thought that Christ had Himself called him at that time lay not far away" (p. 15). Elsewhere Wrede says that the Jewish propaganda of the Diaspora may have co-operated in making Paul a missionary, but adds, "we are not in a position to trace his development clearly" (p. 42). Significant is the admission: "As to how Paul became a missionary to the heathen we are left with no trustworthy account, as soon as we refuse to place the beginning of the mission in the very hour of his conversion" (p. 29). It may be observed that no one of our authors has succeeded in breaking the organic connection between Paul's conversion and his sense of a divine call to preach the gospel to the Gentiles.

Paul's theology, equally with his call, is referred back to his conversion. The question of its source is doubly important because Paul is regarded as the founder of Christian theology not only without but within the New Testament. The Apocalypse, Wernle thinks, is in its theology a development of the gospel which Paul preached to the Gentiles. Its Christology shows "the unchanging outline of the Pauline Christology. It cannot possibly have originated twice over in different persons, unless indeed there were two appearances on the road to Damascus" (I. p. 386). The commission to evangelize the world is of course antedated when put into the mouth of the risen Christ. Wernle, as we have seen, traces Paulinism even into the imperial utterances of the Sermon on the Mount, and Wrede remarks that the Synoptic Gospels were composed in part under Paul's influence (p. 89). The John of the Gospel and Epistles cannot be appealed to as an independent theologian, for "there is no Johnnine theology by the side of and independent of the Pauline. . . . John and Paul are not two theological factors, but one."

(Wernle, II. pp. 274f.). "The significance of the Fourth Gospel consists in the fact that it refers the teaching of St. Paul back to Jesus Himself. This constitutes its value and its worthlessness, its force and its fatality" (II. p. 276). "When the Johannine Christ speaks of how He was with the Father before He became flesh, it is Paul himself that is speaking to us" (Wrede, p. 99). First Peter is "an altogether Pauline letter" (Wernle, II. p. 293). Paul is even said to have been, unintentionally, "the father of the New Testament", since he made the distinction between natural and revealed knowledge (II. p. 245). "Paul is everywhere the starting-point. It is his gospel that now speaks to us out of the words of Jesus and the original apostles" (II. p. 294).[4]

At the base then of the great structure of Christian theology stands the thought of Paul. Paul himself traces his theology to three sources: revelation—in part inseparable from his Christian experience—, Christian tradition and the Old Testament. "God revealed His Son in me." "God shined in our hearts." "I delivered that which I received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures." Both revelation in the usual sense and Christian tradition are with our critics excluded as sources by the assumption that Paul's gospel was so largely his own creation, but the prime source is found in the new opinions and experiences that date in some way from Damascus. The hour of his conversion, Wrede says, gave him the germ of which his theology is but the development (p. 48). In Wienel's treatment the connection between his theology and his con-

[4] While the influence of Paul is thus magnified, the extent of his direct authorship is limited. Wernle indeed draws from all the epistles except the Pastorals, but Weinel only uses the six most commonly acknowledged, Romans 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians and 1 Thessalonians. To these Wrede adds Colossians and Philemon. The extremes of a twofold process of addition and subtraction are found in the *Jewish Encyclopedia* (art "Saul of Tarsus"), where Paul is called "the actual founder of the Christian Church as opposed to Judaism," and yet even of his main epistles Romans is said to be largely "interpollated" and Galatians to be "spurious".

version is even closer, while Wernle says that "the decisive factor in the genesis of St. Paul's theology was his personal experience, his conversion on the road to Damascus" (I. p. 224). The explanatory burden laid upon this event is thus made heavier but without further explanation of the event itself.

What then were the novel elements in Paul's theology? Wrede gives three particulars: the universalism of his gospel, his Christology through which Christ became in origin and nature a heavenly being, and a new valuation of the death (and resurrection) of Christ (p. 96). The assumption is that the Jesus of Nazareth whom he was persecuting was for the early Christians only the Jewish Messiah. How He became for Paul in the hour of conversion the world's Saviour is left unexplained. There seems to be no very plausible reason for Paul's universalism either in thought or activity, except that he had received from the risen Lord "grace and apostleship unto obedience of faith among all the nations"; but if we accept Paul's own account then his gospel is not new either in its Christology or its universal destination.

Paul was original, Wrede and Weinel hold, in seeing in Jesus a pre-existent heavenly being. If the source of this new conception was an actual revelation of the glorified Lord to the eyes and mind of Paul, his change of view is not hard to account for. "For one who with Paul himself sees in Jesus a supramundane divine being, there is here indeed no problem" (Wrede, p. 84). Wrede, however, seeing in Jesus "what he was, an historical-human personality", must seek some other explanation, and finds it in the idea of a heavenly Messiah held by Paul previously to his conversion and identified through that event with the Jesus whom he was persecuting. "In the moment of his conversion as Jesus stood before him in the bright glory of His resurrection being, then he identified Him with his Christ", and transferred to Him the predicates of pre-existence and creatorship. But why did not the earlier disciples who

equally with Paul might have known the Messiah of t
Jewish apocalypses, and had, at least equally with him, se
the glory of the risen Lord, make this identification? T
answer is clear: "Intimate disciples could not so eas
believe that the man who sat with them at the table
Capernaum or journeyed over the Sea of Galilee, could
the Creator of the world" (p. 86). Wrede does not a
what view of Christ was held by James, distinguished
Paul as "the Lord's brother", and said by him to have se
the Risen Lord. Upon this question Wrede, and with h
Wernle and Weinel, are silent. It might further, perha
be asked whether Jesus, believing Himself to be the M
siah, was conscious of being the heavenly Being with wh
Paul identified Him. The question here would be out
place, for Wrede apparently does not think that Jesus look
upon Himself as the Messiah (see p. 94).[5]

Weinel accepts with Wrede Paul's identification of
pre-existent Messiah foreshadowed in some Jewish ap
alypses with the Jesus he was persecuting (p. 313).
does this as we have seen, however, in apparent forgetf
ness of his previous suggestion that Paul had, "while s
Saul, recognized and proclaimed an earthly Jewish Messia
(p. 184). In one respect Weinel is a partial antidote
Wrede. Although Paul surrounded the person of Je
with a heavenly aureole beneath which "His simple and
all-powerful features threatened to disappear", still,
must not suppose that Paul knew nothing of Jesus. "A
cording to his own words, he became acquainted with
outlines of the life of Jesus from the disciples themselv
and though his religion is everywhere in touch with
risen, living Lord, yet we find clear traces everywhere of
acquaintance with those memoirs of Jesus which afterwa
assumed a definite shape in our Gospels" (p. 317).[6] Wer

[5] In his earlier works, *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evange*
(1901), Wrede renews the attempt of Bruno Bauer to eliminate
Messianic element altogether from the life of Jesus. See Schweitz
Von Reimarus zu Wrede, 1906, p. 10.

[6] In Canon Knowling's *Witness of the Epistles*, 1892, and *The Te*

thinks that though the Jewish theory was simply that the name of Messiah was hidden with God, yet that "from very early times", much earlier than the composition of our nection with Jesus. "The same goal was reached as soon as Jesus' words about His being sent by God were taken literally" (I. p. 147). The idea of pre-existence was not therefore a discovery of Paul's. Wernle contends that it is labor lost to try to trace Paul's ideas before his conversion. "In fact, we are completely ignorant as to what ideas he had exactly at that time. . . . The apostle had one theology and only one, and that is a Christian one. Each single word of his epistles flows from his Christian consciousness" (I. p. 225). Since Paul had no knowledge of the living Jesus, only of the heavenly Christ, he could form his Christology, Wernle says, only by extracting from the current titles of Christ, such as Messiah, Son of God, Son of Man, what these seemed to contain. "The knowledge of the titles and of their values compensates for the lack of personal knowledge. How could it be otherwise? If one knows Jesus oneself all titles are inadequate" (I. p. 246).

Paul's theory of the death of Christ, Wernle holds, had its roots in the "Christophany". But the Christophany, he adds, will not account fully for the theory, since all that Paul could properly infer from it was that he individually was a sinner and that the Crucified and Risen one had died for his sins. It was in an apologetic interest, that is in defense of Christianity as a universal religion, that Paul made the theoretical extension of his experience and constructed the dogmas,—All men are sinners: Christ died for the sins of all men. Herein Paul went beyond the idea of the early Church that Christ as Messiah died for the sins of the Jewish nation, and still further beyond the thought of Jesus Himself that "some good end must surely be intended by His death. It must be fraught with blessing for many among the people who as yet believed not in Him" (I. p. 111). How or why,

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mony of St. Paul to Christ, 1905, the witness of Paul to the facts of the Gospel history is fully discussed.

in virtue of the Christophany, the passage was first
from the personal or the national to the universal do
appear. Wrede leaves it doubtful whether the early
tians brought the death of Christ into connection with
all, remarking that Paul's reception from tradition
fact that He "died for our sins", 1 Cor. xv. 3, "is o
manded by a very literal construction of his word
112). It should be observed in general that the
tophany at Damascus is treated by implication as if
not in any real sense an appearance of the risen Christ
is made the primary source of the theology which per
the New Testament and has for centuries dominated
tian thought.

It remains to speak of Paul's doctrine of justif
With this Weinel, at least, has the warmest sympat
was by Paul's antagonism to legalism that he becam
saviour of Christianity" (p. 101). He sees that th
trine is the formulated expression of a deep religiou
rience, and calls his theology at this point "the def
his holiest, his most cherished possession" (p. 101)
doctrine of justification by faith was "the core and
of his theology" (p. 289). Wernle sees in it the re
a profound experience dating from Damascus, but
that Paul's apologetic interests have here, to an
extent "injured the expression of his thoughts" (I. p
According to Wrede the doctrine of justification
neither from Paul's experience nor from Jewish pre
itions, but solely from the "needs of his heathen m
(p. 84). It was a controversial weapon (*Kampfes*
forged in order to keep the heathen converts from th
of Jewish custom and to assure the superiority of
tianity. Paul did not preach it at first and, we are
infer, would never have preached it but for the Je
Judaizers. The result of the controversy was that
tianity was made to appear as something entirely ne
religion with a distinctive principle. We are left in
as to the content of his earliest preaching. Un

may be remarked, he had seen in Christianity an opposition in principle to Judaism, he would not before his conversion have persecuted the new faith, nor have himself been persecuted as soon as he became its preacher. Weinel's insight is here truer than Wrede's. The doctrine of justification by faith was indeed a controversial weapon and was effective, as Wrede says, in emancipating Christianity from Judaism. But it was wielded by Paul so effectively because he had something to contend for, the reality of his own experience of salvation. It was a powerful weapon in the hands both of Paul and of Luther because in both cases it was forged in the heat of their own religious experience.

Could Paul, it is proper to ask, have become the man that he was apart from his theology—his views of sin, of justification, of faith, and of Jesus as the Crucified Saviour and glorified Son of God? It is not hinted by any one of our writers that this would have been possible. "His theology is his religion", Wrede admits (p. 48), and intimates that his theological writings have fed the religious life of Christian leaders from John to Luther. Wernle again scarcely believes that Paul could have been led to sainthood by any other than the theological road. The simple scheme of earlier Christianity, "Do God's will as Jesus taught it, and attach yourself to those who expect Jesus as their Lord", was, he says, for Paul "entirely inadequate". "Christianity was entirely a religion of redemption for him. He knew what that meant—to wish to do God's will and not be able to do it" (I. p. 76). The older form of religion would not, it is likewise intimated, have been adequate for the majority of Paul's hearers or been able to make headway among them. These, "belonging as they did to the classes that were morally degraded, were only too ready to accept the atoning death of Jesus which promised them remission of their punishment" (I. p. 188). But is the religion whose watchword is "Jesus as lawgiver", not "Jesus as redeemer", adequate to meet the religious needs of to-day? Into the answer to this question personal experience will largely enter. Such

a religion will not be adequate for those who, with the Apostle, know what it is to wish to do God's will and not be able to do it, nor for those who have found peace of conscience, moral strength and "joy in the Holy Ghost" in believing in the Christ whom Paul preached. Paul's theology and Paul's religion go together. His doctrines of grace will not be felt as a burden by those who share his experience of redemption, and with Paul call upon the name of the Lord Jesus Christ—his Lord and theirs.

But the religion of Jesus Himself, it is insisted, was something very different. He knew nothing of Paul's struggle and his antithesis of grace and the law. "That which Paul only learnt through the shipwreck of his old life, Jesus possessed from the very first as an original endowment" (I. p. 302). Why the absence of this antithesis in the case of Jesus? A sentence from Weinel, as we reflect upon it, may suggest the answer. "As a man increases in moral strength of character, so his conscience becomes more sensitive; he realizes more keenly the distance that separates him from the ideal, and hence the weight of the feeling of guiltiness oppresses him ever more heavily" (p. 92). We are not told why the best and holiest of men was an exception to this rule? The favorite text of the new criticism—"Why callest thou me good?"—is said to prove that Jesus places Himself entirely on the side of humanity. Yet our critics, while slow in dogmatic assertions of sinlessness, are equally so in suggesting any flaw in the character of Jesus. Weinel even says that Paul's dogmatic assertion that Jesus knew no sin, rests "indubitably upon the impression which the person of Jesus made upon the disciples" (p. 318). But the words of Jesus in the passage referred to imply that goodness is an attribute of Deity alone. The text may prove a double-edged sword in the hands of those who would exalt the character, but deny the divinity of Christ.[7]

[7] Prof. N. Schmidt in *"The Prophet of Nazareth"*, 1905, thus comments upon the passage in question: "When he humbly deprecates the title 'Good Master!' on the ground that none is good but one, namely, God, a majesty invests his figure such as no self-assertion could have

The apostle Paul as he is described in the Acts and Epistles is a wonderful man. About his figure lingers something of the mysterious glory which shone round him at Damascus. He was converted in a way which he himself regarded as without analogy in Christian experience. The choice of himself to be the herald of the good tidings to the Gentiles was something which excited his own wonder. Nobody could have imagined that the "chosen vessel" would be, not one of the Twelve who were disciples and followers of Jesus, but one who was His active and bitter enemy. Stranger even than the New Testament account of Paul is that which requires us to believe that he made havoc of the faith both before and after his conversion. He was the foremost champion of Christianity but in a sense its evil genius. He conquered heathenism, but only by preaching a new myth to the myth-loving Greeks. He freed Christianity from Judaism, but bound it fast with the fetters of dogma. Except for his work none of us would be Christians to-day, but our religion would now be better and purer if emancipated from his influence. He was the founder of the Church, but the Church must now, in sorrow or in anger, turn away from its creator.[8]

Are we then compelled by the facts to believe in this union of opposites? Was the Gospel which conquered the Roman world essentially new as compared with that of Jesus Himself and the original apostles? The evidence is to be found beside the Epistles only in the Gospels and the Acts. In the case of both of these we are at a disadvantage in using

lent it" (p. 380). Why "a majesty", the reader may ask, unless He could rightly claim the title, and if so, what then?

[8] The new criticism is not friendly to the Pauline doctrine of the Fall, but it sees in Paul's doctrinal teaching something similar to this, a falling away from the purity of the primitive gospel which for centuries has to that extent corrupted the whole Church. The late Pastor Kalthoff, who knew no Christ after the flesh, denying His historical existence, criticized the new views from this standpoint, remarking that modern theology, in assuming "an immediate perversion and falling away from a pure original principle" has placed itself "outside the method of general historical science". (See Schweitzer: *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, p. 312.)

the evidence, because of the alleged strong Pauline influence in both. If it is shown that the words of Jesus about Himself in the Gospels and the utterances of the apostles in the Acts are in harmony with the teaching of Paul, we are told that it is really Paul who is speaking to us out of the words of Jesus and His apostles. The evidence of Paul's own writings is, however, sufficient to show that there was no essential difference between the faith which Paul persecuted and that which he afterward preached. "Whether it be I or they", he said, about a point vitally affecting his Christology and his doctrine—that Christ died and rose again for our sins,—"so we preach, and so ye believed" (1 Cor. xv. 11). His written gospel in Galatians is said to be the same as was his oral gospel, and this, by implication, in the view of the churches of Judea which were in Christ, to have been the same as the faith of which he once made havoc (Gal. i.). The matter of discussion between himself and the other apostles was in relation to the Jewish law, and, however personal relations may at times have been strained, it is agreed both in Acts and the Epistles that here Paul's orthodoxy was completely recognized. In Paul's bitter contest with the Judaizers, neither party charged the other with different views of the person of Christ. The Jews persecuted equally Paul and "the churches of God which are in Judea in Christ Jesus" (1 Thes. ii.). Writing to the church at Rome where he had never been and claimed as yet no direct "fruit", Paul describes his religion in words ("Christ in you, etc.") which Weinel says are in accordance with the experience of all Christians of that time (p. 95). For some years he worked with Barnabas, a leader in the early church, and there is no trace of any difference of opinion except about John Mark, and the question of circumcision. Later his companion was Silas, a delegate from the Jerusalem Church. Why is it that upon the essential questions, "Who was Jesus?" "Did He die for our sins?" and "Did He rise again from the dead?" there is no trace in the New Testament of any disagreement between Paul and the earlier

apostles? It is significant that this question is not discussed by any of our authors. The only hint that we have observed toward an explanation of this singular agreement of the New Testament records is found in a single sentence of Wernle's second German edition (p. 177). It is said that while Paul makes of Jesus "an almost new creation", he yet uses the same titles as the apostles. This is a virtual confession that the difference in Christology so emphasized by the modern historian was not noticed by Paul himself or by the Jerusalem leaders. Even in the case of James, with whom according to the new theory the difference was most irreconcilable, the records give proof of essential agreement. This is shown by the title which Paul employs, "the Lord's brother," and by the fact, witnessed by both Acts and Epistles, of his laborious collection of alms for the Jerusalem Church.

When, further, we examine the contrast between the Christ of Paul and the Jesus of the Snyoptics we find that it is not so sharp as is sometimes assumed. It is weakened, first, by admitted elements in the Gospels which may be harmonized with Paul, or were even introduced under Pauline influence, and, second, by the alleged fact that the Gospel miracles have almost hopelessly obscured the true portrait of Jesus. "Certain expressions and verses in St. Mark which were intended in anything rather than a Pauline sense suggested to it [a later age] quite naturally Pauline thoughts of the Son of God, of the atoning death of Jesus, of universal salvation, of the necessity of faith. Before the Gospel of John was written the Synoptists were read in a Johannine, that is, a Pauline sense." (Wernle II, pp. 251f.). Again it is said that "even in St. Mark the stories of the miracles, inserted because of apologetic interests, have produced a bizarre and fantastical picture" (II, p. 256). Wrede thinks that there are in Mark only remnants of a true view of the actual life of Jesus. This is overlaid by a superhistorical faith-construction and "the Gospel of Mark belongs in this sense to

the history of dogma" (quoted in Schweitzer, p. 336). From Mark then may be derived a Pauline Jesus, who equally with the Jesus of the Epistles is to be rejected, or else a Jesus discerned in shadowy outline underneath the Paulinism and the miracle. In the dilemma which Wrede proposes, "Jesus or Paul," the disjunction is hardly complete, for if we reject Paul and his teaching the Jesus of all four of our Gospels must really be rejected also. We must give up too, according to Wernle, much of the teaching of Jesus which still remains when the Pauline and miraculous elements have been removed. We must give up not only His own "fantastic and erroneous conception of His return" (I, p. 150) but even the Messianic idea which though accepted by Jesus (controlling according to the Gospels His whole thought) was yet foreign to Him, and accepted only under compulsion (I, p. 52). The contrast, we perceive, is not between the Christianity of Paul and the Christianity of the Gospels but between the Jesus of Paul and a Jesus in whose portrait, it may reasonably be claimed, essential features are lacking.

When finally we look in the Acts for traces of doctrinal disagreement between Paul and the other apostles, we are again disappointed. This is because both Paul and the other apostles are here (unconsciously, it is said) described not as they were but as a later age thought they should have been. It should be noticed that all our records fail us when we try to discover any radical difference between Paul and original Christianity. With Wernle's remark that in the account of the apostles in Acts, we "are concerned with dogma rather than with historical recollections" (II, p. 291) should be compared the conclusions of Harnack's recent monograph, *Lukas der Arzt,* (Leipzig, 1906). As the result of a patient investigation of the style of Acts and the verbal usage he comes to the conclusion that on the question of authorship "the critique is wrong and tradition right." With special reference to two English writers, Hobart and Hawkins, he examines anew the traces of medical phrase-

ology, and the stylistic agreement between the "we" passages and the rest of Acts and the Third Gospel, and is forced to the conclusion that both books in their entirety are the work of Paul's intimate companion, "Luke the beloved physician." Harnack does not believe that everything that Acts contains is true, but he contends that in Acts we are dealing with an author most advantageously situated to find out the facts, and not with conceptions of a later age. Harnack says: "If Luke and not some later and unknown compiler is the author of the great historical work, then the psychological and historical problem which is given us is extraordinarily great" (p. iv). Increasingly difficult does the rejection of Acts become, when it is tested not by a preconceived theory but with Ramsay, for instance, by the results of archaeological investigation. The picture of Paul's preaching in the Acts is moreover in perfect harmony with that derived from the Epistles. At Damascus he preaches Jesus as the Son of God, and at Antioch tells of a justification by faith not to be obtained through the law of Moses. The Acts ascribes to Paul just what the Epistles give us, not a new but a more developed theology.

An important result of the admitted Lucan authorship of the Third Gospel is that the Synoptic picture of Jesus, though portrayed here by a close friend of Paul, remains in its contents practically uninfluenced by Pauline thought. For example, Luke's story of the infancy is not, it is asserted, known to Paul, while the miracles which Luke narrates so freely in common with Matthew-Mark are not mentioned in the Epistles. Harnack indeed finds, in support of the conclusion that Luke wrote the Third Gospel, that Luke has more Pauline words than Matthew or Mark. Matthew has 29 words used by Paul but not found in the other Gospels, Mark has 20 such words in common with Paul, John 17 words, and Luke (Gospel) 84 words, 49 of which are verbs (p. 14). But these words, as will be found on examination of Harnack's list, are not theological terms. The technical terms of Paul's theology, such as "the righteousness of

God," "the righteousness of faith," "promise" (except in xxiv. 49), "grace" as opposed to works, "hope" and "sin" (in the singular) are lacking in the Third Gospel. As Dr. Fairbairn has said in a recent lecture in this country, "the words of Jesus as presented in the Gospels remain unaffected by Pauline writings." The Lucan authorship of the Gospel and Acts being established, we have a guarantee, first, that the evangelical tradition not only was not but could not be altered by the strongest Pauline influence, and, second, that in the opinion of one of the Synoptic writers, himself a companion of Paul, there was no essential novelty in Paul's Christianity. If the Lucan authorship of the Gospel and Acts be admitted, the theory that Paul was the founder of universal Christianity or of the Christian Church falls to the ground.

Socrates and Plato, says Emerson, form a double star which the most powerful telescope will not entirely separate. Jesus and His great apostle can be separated only by imagining another Jesus than the Jesus of the Gospels, and another Paul than the Paul of the Epistles or the Acts. The resulting construction, however brilliantly presented, is necessarily logically unstable and so improbable historically that the reader cannot but feel, in examining it, that he is dealing with "dogma" of a modern kind rather than with history: Herein perhaps, to borrow a phrase from Wernle, lies "its value and its worthlessness, its force and its fatality."

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THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST IN THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

The Epistle to the Hebrews deals mainly with the two great offices of Christ as Revealer and as Priest. It is clear that the author consciously coördinates the two. In the opening verses which serve as a prelude to the entire Epistle we have side by side: "God spake in a Son" and "Having made purification of sins He sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high". But especially Chap. iii. 1, is interesting from this point of view. Here the Saviour is called "Apostle and Highpriest of our confession". The article, put only once, binds the two conceptions most closely together: He is Apostle and Highpriest in one, and His chief value for the believer consists in His being the two jointly; hence He forms as such the content of the confession and the readers are exhorted carefully "to consider" Him in this twofold capacity.

While the Epistle has in common with the other New Testament writings the representation of Christ as Revealer, it stands practically alone in explicitly naming Him a Priest. It were rash to infer from this that the conception was first created by our author. The sacrificial character of the death of Christ was a common article of faith long before. This was held in connection with Is. liii. Now it is precisely in Is. liii that the Servant of Jehova figures not merely as the passive lamb of sacrifice, but also as He who actively and freely pours out his soul unto death (verse 12) or even, according to the rendering, made his soul an offering for sin (verse 10). The CXth Psalm had been interpreted Messianically by Jesus Himself: His followers cannot have forgotten, that thereby He ascribed to His own Person the character of a Priest-King. Also the prophecy of Zach. vi, 12, 13, might easily have led to the same con-

ception, although there seems to be no positive evidence to this effect. According to Paul Christ is not merely the sacrifice, but also the one who brought the sacrifice, Eph. v. 2, and throughout the Apostle emphasizes the fact that He gave Himself up to death freely. How easily the idea of a mediatorial position between God and man closely approaching that of the priesthood might associate itself with this appears from 1 Tim. iii. 5: "For there is one God, one Mediator also between God and men, Himself man, who gives Himself a ransom for all." Closely related is the further thought that Christ makes intercession for believers in heaven, Rom. viii. 34. This again leads on to the conception of the παράκλητος in the Gospel and Epistles of John, especially in 1 John ii. 1. Further the Apocalypse represents believers as made by Christ "kings and priests to God", or "priests of God and of Christ", i. 6; v. 10; xx. 6; inasmuch as Christ's Kingship is prior to that of believers, indeed the source of the latter, it is likely that the writer on the same principle derives the priesthood of believers from a priesthood of Christ. A similar representation is found in 1 Pet. ii. 5: Christians are "a holy priesthood to offer up spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God, through Jesus Christ". It ought not to be overlooked, however, that these last analogies differ in one essential point from the teaching of Hebrews: they speak of believers being priests jointly with Christ, whereas according to our Epistle the Saviour's priesthood is something unique and incommunicable (cf., however, Chap. xiii. 15, "Through Him then let us offer up a sacrifice of praise to God continually, that is the fruit of lips which make confession to his name").

In Jewish literature analogies are not lacking. In places of the Talmud, where the heavenly sanctuary is spoken of, Michael or the Metathron appears as the officiating high priest.[1] The thought is likewise expressed that the Messiah

[1] The passages are given by Schöttgen, *Horae hebraicae et talmudicae in universum N. T.*, pp. 1212-1222, from Sohar, and by Röth, *Epistolam Vulgo*, etc., p. 17, and Tholuck in his comment on chap. viii. 1, from the tract Chagiga.

is dearer to God than the high priest Aaron.[2] In a Targum-passage, the Messiah is represented in connection with Is. liii. as making intercession for the sins of the people and bearing their sins.[3] Philo speaks much of his Logos as high priest; he calls him μέγας, depicts him as sinless, emphasizes his mildness and benevolence, makes Melchizedek his type, ascribes to him the work of intercession. He even speaks of the Logos as having the twofold office of representing sinful man with God and of being God's messenger to man. But a great difference exists between Philo's conception and the doctrine of our Epistle. It concerns the total absence in Philo of the soteriological, expiatory element. Philo's main interest lies in cosmical speculation and spiritualizing, and this controls his treatment of the Old Testament institutions as well as of other things. The antitypical sanctuary is the kosmos or the soul. In these the Logos is high priest. He stands metaphysically between God and the world. He is pledge to God that the world will not sink back into chaos, pledge to man that God will always retain interest in his creation, and thus he is the herald of peace from God to man. He represents not humanity alone, but the physical world and its elements, for which he makes prayers and offers thanksgiving. It is true Philo speaks of the reconciling of man with God as a function of the Logos. But even for this no real expiation is required. In the ethical sphere his task is simply to separate the good from the evil, to stand between the people of God and their pursuers. From the ritual sacrifices Philo does not rise to a truly expiatory sacrifice of a higher order, but simply to the spiritual sacrifice of the heart.

In the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* occurs a remarkable passage (*Test. Levi,* 18), being a prediction about a priest-king, also compared to a prophet, who will perform various eschatological acts. There are several features in this passage which render it analogous to the

[2] *Aboth,* R. Nathan, chap. xxxiii.

[3] Quoted by Schöttgen, *Horae hebraicae et talmudicae in theologiam Judaeorum,* p. 653.

representation in Hebrews. It is probably based on the CXth Psalm. The priest-king is brought into connection with Abraham. It is said that he will have no successor in eternity. At the time of his priesthood all sin disappears, the wicked cease doing evil, he opens the gates of paradise, removes the sword that threatened Adam, and gives the saints to eat of the tree of life. He binds Beliar and gives to his own children power to tread on the evil spirits. On the other hand, it should be observed that this Messianic priest is here derived from the tribe of Levi and no reference is made to any expiatory function.

The question why in the Epistle to the Hebrews, among all New Testament writings, the conception of Christ as Priest and Sacrifice, the whole expression of the gospel in terms of the ritual, plays such a prominent part still presses for an answer as much at the present day as ever before. It is true on the old view, which up to Röth (1836) held undisputed sway, and according to which the Epistle is addressed to Jewish-Christians living in Palestine and personally interested in the temple-service, the answer appeared obvious. But this view seems of late to have been losing ground, especially after the searching criticism to which it was subjected by von Soden in 1884. Even Zahn abandons it. The new view is not, however, necessarily distinguished from the old in that it affirms the Gentile-Christian character of the readers. It may do this, as is the case with von Soden, but it need not. Zahn, while absolutely detaching the Epistle from the local Jewish environment of Palestine and the temple-worship, yet advocates the Jewish nationality of the Christian readers, whom he seeks in Rome. Harnack is unjust in accusing Zahn of having only partially emancipated himself from the old tradition, simply because he continues to affirm that the readers were Christians from the Jews. This is unjust, we say, because the grounds on which Zahn affirms the latter are altogether independent of the old view, have in fact nothing whatever to do with the ritual content of the Epistle, and therefore, if sound, demand

recognition, wherever the readers may be located, and whatever interpretation may be placed upon the teaching of the Epistle. The specific difference of the new and spreading opinion is rather exclusively this, that it holds the ritual character of the content of the Epistle should not be explained from any direct personal concern of the readers with the Jewish ceremonial; and that it upholds this negative even where on other grounds the Jewish nationality of the readers is still maintained.[4] No matter whether the readers were Christians from the Jews or the Gentiles, some other explanation is sought for the prominence of the ideas of priesthood and sacrifice. Now this modern view, it must be acknowledged, is able to present a respectable array of evidence in its favor. It is hard to acquit Bruce of rashness when he simply brushes it aside as "a brilliant paradox". But Bruce was quite right in his perception, that what was the strong point of the old view, constitutes the weak point of the new view, viz., its manner of dealing with the pronounced ritual character of the Epistle. The old view accounted for this with ease and naturalness; of the new theory the same can hardly be said. Of course, if the Epistle

[4] The detachment of the Epistle from the circle of Jewish-Christians in Palestine does not neecssarily involve that the readers could have no practical personal interest in the temple-worship. Not even the dating of the Epistle after 70 A. D. would necessarily involve this. Among the Jews of the dispersion a lively interest in the temple and its service was kept up. After the destruction of the city and temple, the religious interest of the diaspora still continued to a certain extent to revolve around them. The Jews could not know and did not believe that the destruction would be permanent. In the Epistle of Barnabas the Jews are accused of still placing their confidence in the temple. Holtzmann has shown that the present tenses used where the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of the Old Testament ceremonial, occur also in Josephus, 1 Clement, Ep. ad Diognetum, all writings from after the year 70. (*Z. f. Wiss. Theol,* 1867, pp. 9 seq. Cf. also Friedmann and Grätz in *Theol. Jahrb.* 1848, pp. 338 seq.) It might be argued that if such an attachment persisted among the diaspora-Jews, it might likewise have continued among the Jewish-Christians of the dispersion. Still how an attachment of this kind could, in the case of Christians, give rise to any serious religious danger, is hard to conceive, and, as a matter of fact, not much use has been made of the above possibility in more recent attempts to solve the riddle of Hebrews.

be not a true letter, but a theological homily, as among others Reuss, Deissmann, and quite recently the late Wrede,[5] have asserted, there is no further explanation required for this peculiarity than the individual taste or preference of the author. We hardly believe, however, that this view, even after Wrede's skillful advocacy, will gain wide acceptance. The epistolary conclusion of the document is against it, and to declare this the product of an afterthought of the writer is a critical *tour de force*.

But, if we are dealing with a true letter, then the reason for the prominence and pervasiveness of the ritual element must be sought with the readers, not with the author in the first place. And here the new view has certainly made too light of the problem in hand. Von Soden held, and it has been extensively repeated after him, that the whole comparison between the two covenants and the two rituals serves no other than a mere theoretical purpose; it is simply the most convenient argument by means of which the writer seeks to convince the readers of the ideal character of Christianity as the perfect religion. The aim is nowhere to depreciate the old covenant, but exclusively to exalt the new. The Old Testament was the only Scripture to which the author could resort in theological argument, hence what more natural than that he should make extensive use of it? But is this really an adequate explanation? The problem is not why the writer operates so largely with the Old Testament, nor even why he so insistently places the new dispensation above the old, but, far more specifically, why he proceeds in both respects in such a peculiar way as to concentrate his argument almost exclusively upon the question of priesthood and sacrifice. By a mere dependence on the Old Testament this can scarcely be accounted for. There are after all many other important things in the Old Testament besides the ritual. We find it impossible to believe that the purport of the entire comparison is purely theoretical, that its concrete character does not stand in any connection whatever with

[5] *Das literarische Rätsel des Hebräerbriefs,* 1906.

the practical difficulty of the readers. Let us grant that the modern view has succeeded in overthrowing the notion of a threatened relapse into Judaism and an argument aimed at preventing this is, after all, no more than a negative conclusion; as to the positive problem what the whole discussion of priesthood and ritual is for, we are left in the dark. So far as we know the only serious attempt to throw light upon this subject is that made by Kögel in his treatise, *"The Hidden Character of Jesus as the Messiah, the Problem of the Epistle to the Hebrews"*, 1899,[6] a treatise which in our opinion has not received the attention it deserves. Kögel's trend of thought is as follows. The author addresses himself to readers who were in a deplorable spiritual condition due to religious externalism. What he offers them is intended as an antidote against this fundamental defect. More particularly the externalism of the readers had assumed a Christological form, whence the writer immediately places the figure of the Son in the foreground. There was a lack of appreciation of the true spiritual value of Christ's Person and work. In the second chapter it appears to what cause this was specifically due. From the fifth verse onward the writer is occupied with demonstrating the reasonableness and necessity of the humiliation, the sufferings and death of Christ. The readers evidently had shrunk from the idea of the Saviour's humiliation, and they shrank from this because of the thought of extreme glory they associated with the conception of Messiahship. Already in the second chapter the subject of the priesthood of Christ is lightly touched upon (vss. 17, 18), and that for the purpose of convincing the readers of the necessity of Christ's earthly humilation and weakness. This renders it probable that in the sequel also the elaborate presentation of the same theme will be in some way intended to meet the same difficulty. The first reference to a topic which lay uppermost in a writer's mind would almost inevitably reflect the point of

[6] Cf. also, by the same author, *Der Sohn und die Söhne, eine exegetische Studie zu Hebräer*, ii. 5-18, 1904, reviewed in this REVIEW, July 1905.

view from which he had been mainly considering it. As a matter of fact, the author does handle the theme of the priesthood of Christ in the sequel so as to make it meet an objection arising from the externalistic prepossessions of the readers. As they took exception to the humiliation, so they took exception to the exaltation of the Saviour, not of course as such, but because it involved His absence, invisibleness, the unostentatious character of his ministry in a remote sphere. On earth the Messiah's glory was veiled by His lowliness, in heaven it is withdrawn from sight through His exaltation. But the disposition which finds fault with both is in each case in principle the same: it is the desire to see, to have near, to touch, in a word, religious externalism. Now in order to meet this, the writer follows the same method he had followed in the second chapter. He explains that the very point of objection constitutes the source of value and efficacy in the Saviour's career. The invisibleness, the remoteness of the present activity of Jesus, far from interfering with its efficacious character, is precisely the ground of the latter. And for the purpose of doing this no better plan could possibly have been pursued than to represent Christ's work under the aspect of a ministration in the heavenly sanctuary. The whole discussion of the priesthood serves primarily the end of justifying the necessity of Christ's heavenly state of existence and heavenly mode of ministry. It is intended to bring out the superiority of the spiritual, invisible, as over against the sensual, and visible. Because he desired to work out this contrast, and for no other reason, the author has drawn the elaborate comparison with the Old Testament ritual within the scope of his argument. The Old Covenant, through the very externality and visibleness and earthliness and temporalness of its institutions, furnished an admirable foil to exhibit the glories of the spiritual, invisible, heavenly, eternal aspect of the work of Christ. It was a mistake to infer from the historical comparison which the Epistle draws that the difficulty of the readers lay likewise in the historical sphere. Closely looked

at the whole historical comparison appears to be subservient to the setting forth of the theological contrast between the sensual and the spiritual worlds, and it is in connection with this latter antithesis that we must look for the writer's diagnosis of the evil he seeks to correct. The readers were not at fault in showing any preference for the forms of the Old Testament cult in the concrete, theirs was a spirit of externalism, which virtually reproduced the Old Testament standpoint, even though it involved no craving for the ceremonies of the Old Covenant religion.

It is interesting to observe that this view of Kögel follows closely along the lines of the view of Riehm in his well-known work on the *Teaching of Hebrews*. Riehm already recognized the main fault in the readers to which the Epistle addresses itself as religious externalism. He likewise perceived that this fault did not concern exclusively the question of ceremonial, but bore also a Christological and eschatological aspect. But with Riehm all this was still coupled with the old opinion that the readers were Jewish-Christians of Palestine, and that their externalism assumed the specific form of reliance on the sacrificial cult, still in existence at the time of writing. Dr. Kögel entirely dispenses with this, and besides, both in the thoroughness and in the originality with which the principle is carried out, advances far beyond Riehm. The nationality of the readers becomes entirely immaterial on his view. While in point of fact, over against the modern proposal to make them Gentile Christians, Dr. Kögel adheres to the old theory that they were Christians from the Jews, this has nothing to do with his main argument. He does not base this conviction on the prominence which the ritual conceptions of priesthood and sacrifice obtain in the Epistle, but on other grounds. Acceptance of his view by no means carries with it assent to this specific opinion. Religious externalism, while a typical fault of Judaism, was certainly not a fault to which Gentile Christians were immune.

The view just presented throws an interesting light on

the fact that the Epistle by preference calls Jesus high priest. It is true both priest and high priest are used. But the two are not used indiscriminately. Wherever priest is found there is a special reason for its appearance. High priest is the normal designation. In the quotations from the CXth Psalm it was necessary to use "priest" because the Messiah is there so designated in dependence on the title given to Melchizedek in Genesis. The only exception is Chap. v. 10, where the quotation, however, is somewhat free. Wherever the contrast is between the Melchizedek order and the Levitical order of priesthood, "priest" was, of course, specially in place (Cf. Chap. vii, up till verse 22, also viii. 4.) In Chap. x. 21 we would expect "high priest", but here probably the addition of the adjective μέγας made the prefix ἀρχι appear superfluous. But as a rule the author reveals a special interest in representing the Saviour as high priest, not merely as priest in general. The explanation for this will suggest itself on observing that the one transaction in the Old Testament ritual on which the Epistle dwells more than on any other feature and the act to which it makes the central act of Christ's priestly ministry correspond, is the entrance of the high priest into the holy of holies on the day of atonement. The Saviour is a high priest because in the discharge of his ministry He enters into heaven. This is of the very essence of his priestly work, whence also in Chap. vii. 26 the "made higher than the heavens" is placed, as one of the two great requisites, side by side with "separated from sinners", Cf. further iv. 14; vi. 20; viii. 1, 4; ix. 11; x. 25. But, if the subject of the priesthood is pointedly treated in such a way as to make it in its central aspect identical with entrance into heaven, then the inference lies near, that the whole discussion of this subject ultimately serves the purpose of showing the necessity of the exaltation, of the heavenly state of existence of the Saviour. There is reason, as has been shown, to believe that the readers took offense at this, because it clashed with their externalistic conception of Christ and his

work and with their practical desire for a visible, present Saviour. In answer to this the author emphasizes that the Saviour is a high priest and that as such the only place where He can properly dwell and effectually minister is the heavenly sanctuary.

The first and most general element entering into the author's conception of a priest is that of leadership based on identification with those who are led. A priest is one who stands at the head of others and thus mediates their approach unto God. Thus the movement of the priestly function is in a direction opposite to that of the prophetic function. The prophet officiates from God to man, represents God with man; the priest officiates from man to God, represents man with God. In the passage v. 1-10, which sets forth the qualifications of a high priest, this is expressed by the words: "Every high priest is appointed on behalf of men in things pertaining to God" (*τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, cf. ii. 17). Priesthood, however, is not leadership in general; it is distinctly leadership based on and involving identification of nature and experience. The rendering of the term *ἀρχηγός* in ii. 10 and xii. 2 by either "author" or "captain" is inadequate precisely for this reason, that it leaves the element of identification in experience unexpressed. While *ἀρχηγός* etymologically and according to usage may mean both "author" and "captain", the writer in the two passages cited attaches to it a more specific sense. The *ἀρχηγὸς τῆς σωτηρίας* is one who leads others unto salvation by himself treading the path of salvation before (cf. v. 7); the *ἀρχηγὸς τῆς πίστεως* is one who leads others to faith by himself exercising faith in an ideal manner. Similarly the *ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ζωῆς* in Peter's speech, Acts iii. 15, is not merely the Ruler of life, but the one who first entered into life for his own person and now dispenses life unto others. That the author of Hebrews uses the term with this specific connotation appears from the fact that elsewhere, where the content requires no reference to it, he contents himself with employing the quite general term

αἴτιος, v. 9, "author of salvation". The word πρόδρομος in vi. so shares with ἀρχηγός this reference to identification in experience, the "forerunner" being one who not merely leads and opens access, but also anticipates in himself the enjoyment of the access he mediates to others. Back, however, of the identification in experience lies the more fundamental identification of nature. The priestly leadership is such that it cannot be performed by one who stands outside of the circle in whose interests he serves. The author accordingly emphasizes in the definition of v. 1 *seqq.* that a high priest must be λαμβανόμενος ἐξ ἀνθρώπων "taken from among men". The force of the participle present should be noticed: "one who is constantly, in each case, taken from among men", the permanent force of the requirement thus being brought out, as Westcott has strikingly observed. In this respect the priesthood differs from the prophetic and in general the revealing office. Angels can be and have been revealing agents. In connection with the revealing work of Christ the author nowhere reflects upon the fact, of which the modern Christian consciousness is so apt to make overmuch, viz., that in order to perform this work properly Christ needed to be man. On the contrary, here all the emphasis is thrown upon the thought that the Son's unique greatness, his difference from, his exaltation above man constitutes his chief qualification for the revealership. As a revealer He represents not man but God, therefore the nearer He stands to God the better He is qualified. As a priest, on the other hand, He represents man and his qualification is measured by his nearness to man. It is of importance to notice this point, because in Judaism a tendency prevailed to place intermediate angelic beings between God and man, because direct contact between God and the world had come to be regarded as derogatory to the divine majesty. This tendency showed its influence not merely with regard to the manward movement of revelation, but likewise with regard to the Godward movement of religious approach, as *e. g.*, when the archangel Michael

is represented as ministering at the altar in the heavenly sanctuary. Our author not merely makes the high priest a man, but insists upon it that the very nature of his office requires him to be a man.

Back of the identification of experience and the identification of nature lies a still deeper one, that of spiritual relation to God. This finds expression in Chap. ii. 11, "He that sanctifies and they that are sanctified are all of One". "To sanctify" is the specific work of a priest, so that we may substitute: "The priest and those whom he serves as priest are all of One." But the "oneness' here spoken of does not relate to physical oneness through descent, as if by the ἑνὸς Adam or Abraham were designated. It is a spiritual bond of unity, the One of whom all are is God. They are all sons of God in the religious sense, as appears clearly from the following quotations, by which the author shows that Christ is not ashamed to call them brethren, speaks of them as His children, and trusts in God His Father, as they trust in Him. Only, because they are one in this deeper, spiritual sense, it becomes necessary that they shall be identified in the common possession of flesh and blood. The author therefore adds this by way of inference in the 14th verse: "Since then the children are sharers in flesh and blood, He also in like manner partook of the same." And similarly on the participation in flesh and blood is built the further assimilation in all things, *i. e.*, in all experiences of human life according to verses 16, 17. In this passage, then, the three successive steps through which the priestly identification with the people passes are carefully marked.

To understand the reason for this identification we must first inquire into what the Epistle teaches concerning the connection between the covenant and the priesthood. Briefly this may be formulated to the effect that the priesthood is center and substance of the covenant, that in which the covenant actually subsists. The clearest expression this principle finds is in Chap. vii. 11-25, containing the com-

parison between the Levitical priesthood of the Old Covenant and the Melchizedek priesthood of the New Covenant. The two priesthoods are here compared from the point of view of their efficacy in giving "perfection", *τελείωσις*. The comparison of the priesthood passes over, however, almost imperceptibly, into a comparison of the two covenants, although the word *διαθήκη* is not used until verse 22. In the very first statement, verse 11, the centralization of the whole religious system in the priesthood finds striking expression, viz., through the parenthetic statement: "for the people under it hath received the law". This parenthesis serves to explain how a demand can be made of the priesthood that it shall lead to perfection. Perfection may be expected of every priesthood, because the whole religious system is centered in it; whatever is true of the system is true of the priesthood, and of course the system is a means to perfection. The priesthood was, as it were, the basis on which the entire structure of Old Testament religion had been reared *ἐπ' αὐτῆς ὁ λαὸς νενομοθέτηται*. The same thought finds formal expression in vs. 12, "Where there is a change of priesthood there is made of necessity a change also of law". The very fact that another priest, a priest of different lineage, arose, one not called after Aaron but after Melchizedek, this very fact proved that the organism of the covenant was being changed by God. The new priest was not simply an *ἄλλος* but a *ἕτερος*, something heterogeneous, we might say, to the law of the Old Covenant. The author proves this first in a rather external way, by the descent of Jesus, not from the priestly tribe of Levi but from Judah. As soon as the priesthood is transferred from the priestly tribe to another tribe this betokens the breaking up of the old system. Then, however, he proceeds to show the same thing in a much broader and more fundamental way in verses 15-17.[7] That the law changes with

[7] The words *καὶ περισσότερον ἔτι κατάδηλόν* at the beginning of verse 15 refer back to the proposition of verse 12, "where there is a change of priesthood there is made of necessity a change also of law" and *κατάδηλόν* stands on a line with *προδηλόν* of vs. 14.

the priesthood is even more evident from the fact that the new priesthood introduced is of a totally different nature, such as the old law could never have produced. Here it is not merely the law of Levitical descent which is said to have been abrogated, but the law of fleshly descent in general, nay the legal character of the dispensation as a whole, because *νόμος* (notice the anarthrous *κατὰ νόμον*) is supplanted by *δύναμις*, verse 16. It is not a change of species within the genus, but a change of the genus itself. The new priest is *ἱερεὺς ἕτερος* not *ἄλλος*. With the appointment of Christ as priest after the order of Melchizedek there follows "the disannulling of a foregoing commandment" and this is equivalent to "the introduction of a better hope, through which we draw nigh unto God", *i. e.*, of a totally new religious position and outlook. All this already presupposes that the covenant and the priesthood hang inseparably together. Still it is worked out rather from the point of view that, under the Old Covenant, at least, the system, the law, the covenant created and determined the priesthood. In verse 20, however, the author proceeds beyond this point of view to a representation which makes the covenant depend on the priesthood, so far as the new covenant is concerned. The excellence of the new covenant is in proportion to the excellence of the priesthood as evidenced by the oath which God swore at its introduction.[8] By so much as the oath lends weight to His priesthood, by so much also has Jesus become surety of a better covenant. It becomes very clear from this passage that in virtue of His priesthood Jesus is the *ἔγγυος*, "surety", of the new covenant. "Surety" means here the one who guarantees that the covenant shall accomplish what it is designed to accomplish. The idea stands in contrast to the inefficacy

[8] The point of the reference to the oath-swearing is that the new priesthood must be of supreme dignity and power, since God does not swear except in relations of extraordinary importance. The beginning of the Levitical priests lay not in an oath but in a legal ordinance. In their case law determined priesthood, hence the sequence is: oath—priesthood—covenant.

of the Old Covenant, which possessed no such guarantor. What the writer means is that Jesus by His supernatural personality, by His whole character affords the assurance that the covenant administered by Him will be efficacious.[9] The place taken here by ἔγγυος is taken in Chaps. viii. 6, ix. 15, xii. 24, by μεσίτης "mediator". The μεσίτης is one who stands between parties, especially parties in discord, to bring about a union. But sometimes the word has a more specific sense, in which it approaches ἔγγυος and signifies the one who obligates himself to render the mediation effective. The word μεσέγγυος, which is the classical term for the Hellenistic μεσίτης, expresses by its very form the combination of these two ideas in one. It is not possible to determine with absolute certainty whether our author uses the term in the general or the more specific sense. In the former case Christ's work as μεσίτης might have reference only to the initiating of the covenant at the beginning, being distinct from his work as priest under or in the covenant. In Chap. ix. 19 *seqq.* the mediatorship of Christ is contrasted with the mediatorship of Moses. Now the mediatorship of Moses was something that was confined to the initiation of the covenant and in no wise identified with the priestly λειτουργία under the covenant performed by the Aäronites. Probably, however, the author did not mean to draw a hard and fast distinction between the μεσιτεία and ἱερωσύνη of Christ, whatever might be the case with Moses. The emphasis in Chap. ix. naturally falls on the mediatorship as a work of inauguration, because the covenant is here represented as a testament set in operation by the death of Christ. In Chaps. viii. 6 and xii. 24 the mediatorship certainly includes the continuous priestly ministration. And if the author made the mediatorship coëx-

[9] The representation is a metaphorical one and should not be pressed so as to make it correspond in concrete detail with the forensic or commercial conception of the modus of the atonement. The old controversy as to whether Jesus became ἔγγυος with God for man, or with man for God, or in both capacities, lies outside of the scope of the passage.

tensive with the priesthood, it becomes probable that he ascribed to it the same assured, infallible character which the priesthood possesses, in other words that he conceived of the μεσίτης as a μεσέγγυος, as not merely endeavoring to unite but as guaranteeing and effecting the union between God and the people. Even the death of Christ, which set the testament in operation, made it operate with absolute certainty. Both terms, therefore, μεσίτης as well as ἔγγυος, are expressive of the principle that the priesthood hood is the heart and center of the covenant.

From what has been said it follows that the purpose of the priesthood can be accurately determined only in the light of the purpose of the covenant. Now the covenant is conceived of in the Epistle in a twofold way. On the one hand it is an instrumental institution, a means to an ulterior end, which end is variously described as salvation, rest, inheritance, arrival in the heavenly country or the city with the foundations, receiving of the unshakable kingdom. On the other hand it also appears as constituting in itself the ideal of religion realized, the perfect covenant being the consummate approach and nearness to God. As such it is the highest category of religion itself. On the whole, the Epistle follows the former representation. Back of the covenant lie the promises of God, and it is for the fulfilment of these promises that the covenant serves. Hence it is said that the covenant "is enacted upon better promises", viii. 6. This instrumental character of the covenant further appears from its relation to the idea of τελείωσις "perfection". The covenant and the priesthood are for the "perfecting" of men, *cpr.* vii. 19, ix. 9, x. 1. From this point of view they have merely to do with the removal of obstacles that keep man separated from God, and after these obstacles have ceased to exist might be conceived of as passing away, having become unnecessary. But, although this side stands in the foreground, the other side is by no means overlooked by the writer. In the passage he quotes from Jeremiah the reality of the covenant is placed in this, that Jehovah is a

God to Israel and Israel is to Jehovah a people, viii. 8-12. Believers are in virtue of the covenant "a household of God", iii. 6. Their life is essentially a λατρεία, a religious service, and this λατρεία is nothing else but the outward manifestation of the covenant, ix. 14. The covenant is also designated an "eternal covenant", xiii. 20, which implies that it embodies the religious ideal, since as a mere means to an end it could not be eternal. And what is true of the covenant is true of the priesthood. The priesthood also is viewed as embodying in itself the result of all instrumental processes, the attainment of the goal of all religion. Through the priest the people enter representatively into the sanctuary of perfect communion with God. Thus the priest not merely works in their interest, but also receives and enjoys in their behalf the fruit of his own labors. He dwells with God as the first heir of the blessedness to which his ministry has opened the way. And even after they themselves have attained to the position of the same religious privileges he may still be conceived as retaining the old preëminence and as continuing in this function, because in Him the actual approach to God is concentrated in a single point and made externally visible. Thus, according to Chap. xii. 24, the priesthood has its place among the eternal realities of the heavenly world, it forms part of the abiding things believers have "come unto". And the Saviour is called "a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek" because to his ministration there is no end.

Now, insofar as the priesthood is viewed alongside of the covenant as eternalized, it in a certain sense extends beyond and appears detachable from redemption. Christ will remain a priest even after redemption shall have fully run its course. To this idea, which undoubtedly has a solid basis in the Epistle, an interesting speculation has attached itself, for which the authority of the Epistle can hardly be claimed. If the priesthood extends beyond the redemptive stage, why, it is asked, should it not in the author's conception have preceded, both logically and chronologically, the redemptive

stage? Why not conceive of a head, an ἀρχηγός, a priest of unfallen humanity, furnishing the point of contact between men and God, gathering up in Himself the united concerns of men with God, voicing their religious approach to God in its various forms of expression? May not the author have followed Philo, who in some such general sense invests his Logos with priestly character, although here the redemptive phase is entirely lacking? From more than one side it has been affirmed that the Epistle's teaching on the priesthood actually has this wider background of a representative relation apart from sin. It is especially Westcott who by his advocacy of it has given a certain vogue to this view. According to him in the general scheme of Christ's relation to the world, the atonement is a mere incident, a modification made necessary through the entrance of sin. If sin had not entered, the Son would none the less have become the religious head and leader of the human race, and would just as much have become incarnate to discharge this function as He is now under the redemptive economy. Westcott bases this favorite idea of his on two or three passages and does not allow sufficient weight to the fact that it is rather discountenanced than favored by the general trend of the Epistle's teaching on the priesthood of Christ. From the everlasting and intrinsic significance of the priesthood of Christ we may perhaps infer, that in a world without sin there would be a priest to lead and represent humanity in its approach to God, but that in such a case this priest would be the incarnate Son the Epistle gives us no reason to suppose. So far as the priesthood of Christ is concerned, the author everywhere speaks in soteriological terms. In the definition of Chap. v. 1 it is expressly stated that the high priest is appointed to offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins. If the correct reading here be δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίας ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν, the "for sins" belongs only to θυσίας and the δῶρα will appear as not directly connected with sins. The unusual sequence, "gifts and sacrifices", instead of "sacrifices and gifts", might seem

to favor this. If, on the other hand, the τέ be stricken out, both gifts and sacrifices are affirmed to be "for sins".[10] But even on the former view it does not immediately follow that, because the gifts are not gifts for sins, the need of a high priest for offering them, has nothing to do with the presence of sin. Non-atoning gifts require a priest, not, perhaps, because a priest is absolutely and under all circumstances necessary, in every human approach to God, but simply, it may be, because sinful man cannot directly bring any gift, not even a non-atoning offering, without a priestly mediator. Westcott's conclusion, therefore, as if the passage taught that "man needs an appointed mediator even to bring his gifts to God", is not warranted. Only when for "man" we substitute "sinful man" can we be certain that we do not go beyond the intent of the author. In Chap. ii. 17 "the things pertaining to God" are likewise more closely defined by the following clause: "to make propitiation for the sins of the people". In Chap. vii. 25 the effect of the unchangeable priesthood of Christ is placed in this, that He can save to the uttermost. The main act of Christ's high-priestly work was the entering in, once for all, into the heavenly holy place, and by this He obtained eternal redemption, ix. 12. The purpose of his priesthood is to cleanse the heavenly things by sacrifice, ix. 23. And all that is said in Chaps. ix. and x. about the sacrificial work of Christ presupposes that it has reference to sin.

Westcott appeals to Chap. i. 2, God made the Son "heir of all things". This heirship, he thinks, must be an heirship of the world as such and under all circumstances, not merely an heirship contingent on and determined by redemption, because it corresponds to the mediatorial activity of the Son in creation: "Whom He made heir of all things, ... whom He also (*i. e.*, in correspondence with the ...gned to Him in the consummation of the world) ... worlds". As to this last point it might well be

[10] ... viii. 3, where the same phrase occurs with the τέ, the ...s not vary.

urged that the correspondence expressed by the "also" is fully preserved when the inheritance of the world on the part of the Son is understood as a redemptive inheritance. As God made the Son the mediator of creation, so He made Him the heir of redemption. The parallelism does not require, that the world shall be inherited by Christ as a purely-created, *i. e.*, natural, world, as distinguished from redemption. But, altogether apart from this, we must make the two strictures that heirship is not equivalent to priesthood and that heirship, if kept separate from redemption, does not involve incarnation. The Son could become heir of the (sinless) world without becoming man; He could not be priest of even such a world without being man. The context does not speak of the Son as incarnate Son exclusively; some of the predicates given Him obviously go back to the state of preëxistence, so that, if the thought of hypothetical heirship of the world under all conditions be found here, there is no need to join with it the thought of incarnation under all circumstances. The passage, therefore, teaches nothing of a priesthood of the Son which He would have discharged in the flesh as the incarnate head of an unfallen race. Nor is such an idea found in another passage quoted by Westcott in support of his view, viz., Chap. ii. 5-10. Here, we are told, the inheritance of the world to come which the exalted Christ receives appears as the realization of the destiny set before the human race at creation according to the words of the VIIIth Psalm. Therefore, the reasoning is, even before the fall in the creation-design of the world it was contemplated that the race should reach its destiny through the incarnation of the Son of God. On this we would comment as follows: If the words of the Psalm on "the Son of Man" were taken by the author of Hebrews as a direct reference to Christ the Messianic Son of Man, a view actually held by not a few commentators, then the passage would actually lend support to Westcott's contention. For in that case it would affirm, that in setting the destiny of the world at creation, God had assigned the

sovereignty over the world to his Son, and that as Son of Man, *i. e.*, as incarnate Son. In other words, provision would have been made from the outset for the incarnation. Even then, however, the question might be raised, whether we had anything more here than a sort of supralaspsarian representation, in which creation appears as subordinated to redemption, and therefore subordinated to redemptive heirship, not to non-redemptive heirship. But, as a matter of fact, this personal Christological interpretation of the phrase "Son of Man" is almost certainly incorrect. Westcott himself does not follow it. He assumes, and in our opinion quite correctly, that the writer of Hebrews interprets the "Son of Man" of the Psalm as referring to humanity generically. What the writer therefore affirms on the basis of the Psalm is that at the creation sovereignty over the world was destined to the human race. Up to verse 9 the "Man" and "Son of Man" of which he speaks is not an individual, not Christ, but mankind. Then in the 9th verse he makes the affirmation, that the fulfilment of this promise given to mankind originally, can be in principle beheld in the exalted Christ. But this is entirely an *à-posteriori* statement. The author by no means affirms that, contingently speaking, if sin had not entered, the form of fulfilment of the promise given to the race, would have been the same as it is now. This was a purely speculative question, which he hardly put to himself. It is quite true, God must have known from the very first, when He instituted the order of creation with its implied promise to the race, what would be the concrete form it was to assume in its realization. But God also knew from the very first, that sin would come into the world. Beyond the common supralapsarian representation this does not carry us; it does not demonstrate, that there was a divine purpose or promise to make the Son the human heir of humanity's destiny apart from sin and redemption. And even, though all this were to be overlooked, it would still have to be remembered that not the priesthood of Christ, but rather his royal office, his lordship over the world to come, is here spoken of. Application of the principle ex-

pressed to the priesthood would have to rest on inference.

Leaving, then, this speculation to one side and keeping ourselves within the limits set by the explicit statements of the Epistle itself, we are now prepared to answer the question why the priest must be identified with the people in the manner indicated above. Both for the absolute and for the instrumental significance of his office this is necessary. If He is to express in His own Person the nearness of men to God, then He must obviously partake of human nature, since otherwise no direct contact between God and man could be established. A priest who was not man would make a separation between the two parties in the covenant, just as a revealer who was not "the Son" would fall short of bringing the ideal direct speech of God to mankind. Whatever such a priest might do for the covenant in other directions, he could not realize in himself the consummation of the covenant in which God and man directly meet without any intervening agent of a different nature. This is the meaning of Christ's being *ἀρχηγός* and *πρόδρομος*. As He fulfills the destiny of the race in His lordship over the world to come, so He fulfills its destiny in entering upon the closest contact with God. He is within the veil. If we draw nigh to God it is through the fresh and living way He Himself has dedicated. Hence also it is not human nature in the abstract that is demanded for Jesus, but human nature placed in that specific spiritual relation to God which is expressed by the ideas of Sonship and faith, as the quotations in Chap. ii. 11-13 prove.

Most of the statements of the Epistle, however, bring the necessity of the identification of Jesus with human nature and human experience into connection with the instrumental aspect of His priesthood. The possession of human nature was necessary for the great act of sacrifice which consisted in His death. In a subsequent article we intend to discuss the much-mooted question, whether the writer represents Jesus as acting with reference to his death in the capacity of a priest or rather makes the priesthood begin with the entrance into heaven, so that the death would be excluded

from it. It is not necessary to prejudge this question here, because, even in case the answer were given in favor of the latter opinion, still the death would remain the necessary basis of the subsequent priestly ministration in heaven, and what is indispensable for the act of dying is indispensable for the priesthood resting thereon. In two passages at least Christ's partaking of human nature is treated from this point of view that it created the possibility for His death and through it the possibility for His subsequent priestly work. These passages are Chap. ii. 14 and Chap. x. 5-7. The former teaches that the Son became partaker of flesh and blood, that through death He might bring the devil to nought. The latter declares that a body was prepared for the Messiah in order that thus He might be enabled to execute the will of God concerning his sacrificial death. Still this by no means exhausts what the Epistle teaches under this head. For to the προσφέρειν "offering" belongs more than the self-surrender in death; its culminating part is the self-presentation in heaven. It is not merely necessary that a sacrifice be slain; it is equally necessary that the sacrifice be brought into the immediate presence of God as He dwells in the heavenly tabernacle. The sacrifice is not completed until this is done. This is not a result of the sacrifice; it is an integral part of the sacrificial transaction itself. And that this must be done by man, by a priest who is man, follows from the intimate connection between the two acts of self-surrender and self-presentation. Both together constitute one God-ward movement; what is necessary for the one is necessary for the other. If he who dies the sacrificial death must be a man, then he who presents the sacrifice in heaven must be a man, the latter being but the carrying out of the former. In connection with this aspect of the matter, it is true, the author does not dwell so much on the possession of human nature by Christ in the abstract, but rather on the possession by Him of human nature in a sinless state. But the one presupposes the other. The very point which the Epistle brings out is that no sinner, even if he had an adequate sacrifice of expiation,

could accomplish anything effectual by means of it, because, being a sinner, he would not be able to bring it near to God. The act of presentation being integral to the sacrifice, being required to complete it, could not be allowed to anticipate the effect of the completed sacrifice. And yet such would be the case, if a sinful man could come near to God to present his own expiatory offering. The privilege of drawing near would involve that the sacrifice had been accomplished, while as a matter of fact it was still incomplete. Consequently there must be a sinless one to appear before God in the place of man. While in Chap. iv. 25 the words "without sin" are not added for any specific reason, but simply to guard the perfection of the Person of Christ in general, as a saving clause to the preceding statement, that He was tempted in all things like unto us, in Chap. vii. 26 the Saviour's sinlessness is brought into direct connection with His priesthood and that from the point of view of His presence as a priest in heaven. The predicates here enumerated are not in the first place associated in the writer's mind with Jesus' earthly life under temptation; they rather describe what He is at present in His glorified state as the "become higher than the heavens" at the close indicates.[11]

It was not, however, for the purpose of becoming capable of death alone that the Son had to assume human nature. There is a much wider range of human experience which constitutes an important preparation for the discharge of the instrumental aspect of His priesthood. This will be the first subject for consideration in a subsequent article.

Princeton. GEERHARDUS VOS.

[11] It might be objected to the foregoing that in Chap. v. 2, 3 the qualification of the Old Testament high priest is in part sought precisely in this, that he is himself also compassed with infirmity and by reason thereof bound to offer for his sins. But the author is led to this statement only by his desire to emphasize the importance of sympathy. What was a relative qualification in the case of the typical priesthood of the Old Covenant becomes a disqualification for the ideal priesthood as realized in Christ. In point of fact, the main reason why the Old Testament priests were not ideal, truly effective priests lies in this, that they stood in need of offering for their own sins. They bore that in themselves which virtually annulled their priestly character, vii. 27, ix. 7.

THOMAS BOSTON.

Exactly two hundred years ago on the first day of May Thomas Boston entered on his Ettrick ministry. The day is memorable in the history of Scotland as that on which the Union between England and Scotland was finally consummated. In his *Memoirs*[1] Boston makes reference to the two events. The Union was regarded with anything but favour by the great majority of the Scottish people though it proved an incalculable blessing to Scotland, and two hundred years after its consummation we are being reminded by able articles in our leading journals of the feelings with which the people of 1706 and 1707 received the proposals for union. But the Scotland of to-day is more inclined to commemorate the event with rejoicings than to regard it as a calamity. Synchronising as has been noticed with this important event was the induction of the Rev. Thomas Boston to the parish of Ettrick. It, too, is an event that claims the attention not only of Scotsmen but of Presbyterians the wide world over. And already steps are being taken to commemorate the bi-centenary of the induction of Boston to the parish which was privileged to enjoy the oversight of one of the most renowned pastors that ever stood in a Scottish pulpit. But renowned as Boston was as a pastor and preacher, his fame as a student and scholar travelled beyond the bounds of his own church and country. Dr.

[1] "On the first day of May I was admitted minister of Ettrick; a day remarkable to after ages as the day in which the Union of Scotland and England commenced, according to the articles thereof agreed upon by the two parliaments. And on that very account I had frequent occasion to remember it; the spirits of the people of that place being embittered on that event against the ministers of the church; which was an occasion of much heaviness to me, though I never was for the Union; but always against it from the beginning unto this day." *Memoirs*, p. 208. The edition of the *Memoirs* quoted is that edited by Rev. G. H. Morrison and published by Oliphant, Anderson, and Ferrier, Edinburgh, 1899.

James Walker, who is a competent judge, has borne eloquent testimony to Boston's scholarship.[2] And even such a writer as the late Rev. Henry G. Graham in his *Social Life of Scotland in the Eighteenth Century* is constrained to bear testimony to Boston's remarkable influence though he refers to his theology in the flippant style common to writers of his school. "Notwithstanding much that seems extravagant to us," he says, "and melancholy in Mr. Boston, he was a man of ability and of great influence in his day; he was a powerful preacher of the grim school, the representative of a prominent type of thought and feeling; he moved the hearts and expressed the faith of a large proportion of the people throughout the country, who thumbed his *Crook in the Lot* and his *Fourfold State* with endless edification. Peasants and farmers read them by their peat fires, and shepherds on the solitary silent hills; his smaller works were the favourite chapbooks of pedlars, and the twelve portly tomes that contained his theological expositions were found in many a manse library and on the bookshelves of every Seceding minister long after the century was closed." (Vol. II, p. 80.) This may be regarded as a fitting time and place to make some reference to his place among Scottish preachers and theologians and to the part he played in some of the great controversies that agitated the Church of Scotland during his day.

[2] "At Simprin he had mastered the French language that he might have an entrance into French theological literature; but he seems to have been yet unacquainted with Hebrew. At the time he came to Ettrick, he tells us he borrowed a 'piece of the Hebrew Bible containing the books of Samuel and Kings' and with that set himself to the study of the 'Holy Tongue'. After a while he bought for himself the whole Hebrew Scriptures. 'This', he says, 'was the happy year wherein I was first master of a Hebrew Bible'. And now he 'plied the Hebrew original close and with great delight'. I need not tell at length how he ran the course of Hebrew scholarship till he became an enthusiast on the subject of Hebrew accentuation and wanted to publish it . . . He was the best Hebrew scholar in Scotland as he was the freshest and most powerful of Scottish living theologians. And I have been told by the most competent scholar of our country that he regards Boston's work as one of sterling value and not yet out of date." Walker's *Scottish Theology and Theologians*,[2] p. 321.

At the outset some reference must be made to his remarkable *Memoirs,* for, after all, it is here we find Boston as he was. Scottish religious literature is by no means barren in autobiography. The *Autobiography and Diary* of James Melvill is invaluable to the student of Scottish ecclesiastical history for the period which it covers and the *Memoirs* of the Rev. James Fraser of Brea is a rich storehouse of spiritual experience, fragrant still with the sweet incense of prayer. But it may be said that Boston's *Memoirs* combines in a remarkable degree the distinguishing features of Melvill's *Autobiography* and Fraser's *Memoirs.* The graphic pen pictures of persons, the happy descriptions of events in which Melvill was such a master are all characteristic of Boston's *Memoirs,* while on the other hand the deep religious experience of Fraser of Brea combined as it is with rare power in spiritual analysis and sane outlook on the remarkable phenomena of the spiritual life will be met with in Boston's autobiography. The *Memoirs* was published in 1776, forty-four years after his death. It has been said the *Memoirs* was probably edited by his son, Thomas Boston, who succeeded his father at Ettrick and was latterly minister of the Relief Church at Jedburgh. But, as the Rev. George D. Low has pointed out, this could scarcely be the case, as Boston the younger died in 1767. In all likelihood it was the grandson of the elder Boston, Michael, who prepared the *Memoirs* for the press.[3] In the "Address to his Children", which is prefixed to the *Memoirs,* Boston tells us that he left two autobiographic manuscripts.[4] The one was entitled *Passages of my Life* and the other *General Account of my Life.* The first was begun shortly after his settlement at Ettrick, and additions were made to it from

[3] See a very interesting article in *British Weekly,* Nov. 28, 1906, entitled "Thomas Boston: His Memoirs—Original Manuscripts," by Rev. Geo. D. Low, M.A., Edinburgh. A full account of the manuscripts of the *Memoirs* is given in this article, to which we are much indebted for the above. Mr. Low has decided to publish the *General Account of My Life,* and in all likelihood it will appear in the autumn of this year.

[4] Morrison ed. of *Memoirs,* p. 1.

time to time during his ministry till it was completed in October in 1730. In this he incorporated passages from a diary and other incidents he had previously taken note of. The second manuscript, the *General Account,* was begun in December, 1729, and completed in October, 1730. To both of these Boston added some passages afterwards. In the first edition of the *Memoirs* (1776) Michael Boston states in a note, "in preparing this work for the press, it was judged absolutely necessary, in order to prevent repetition, and references from the one volume to the other, to reduce both into one continued narrative or history, taking care all along to insert the *Passage of His Life* in the *General Account* in their proper places, according to their respective dates and years and as the nature of the subjects treated of required." The manuscripts of these two works were to remain in Boston's family—"the property thereof to be vested from time to time, in such an one of them, if any such there shall be, as shall addict himself to the holy ministry." In accordance with this wish, the manuscripts passed to his son Thomas and from him to Michael Boston, who died in 1785. Brown of Whitburn had evidently perused one of the manuscripts, and from the materials gathered by him it is now known that it was the *General Account* he had seen. But from 1785 nothing was known of what had become of this manuscript. The Rev. George Low, already referred to, having heard that the manuscript was still in existence, took steps to procure it, and was successful in his search. A number of changes, not improvements in all cases at least, were made by the editor in the first edition.[5] A number of editions of the *Memoirs* has appeared since. They constitute the twelfth volume of his collected works published in 1854.

[5] Boston wrote dovering, his grandson substituted slumbering; river becomes tear; allanerly, solely; coupling over, falling down; moyen, interests; din, noise; spunk, spark; bent sail, bent; feckless mints to duty, silly essays at duty. Of the errors of the first edition perpetuated in the subsequent editions one instance may be given "convened in the mass," whereas Boston wrote "convened in the manse." Other interesting omissions are given in the *British Weekly* in the article already referred to.

Probably the best edition is that edited by Rev. G. H. Morrison and published in 1899.[6] The *Memoirs* is addressed to his children, and in the address, as originally written, there are a few sentences that do not appear in the printed editions. "Let not my recording the lowness of my beginning offend you," he says; "for the lower I perceive the same to have been, it affords me the greater joy and rejoicing in that God, who hath done all things for me . . . As to what you may find recorded concerning any of ourselves; that ye would not wish; they were steps of providence to me, and may be useful to you through grace. The manuscripts, you will easily perceive, are not design'd for public view; and they are left in your own power. Moreover you would consider me writing them, as leaving this world, to have no more a portion in what is done under the sun, and as going into the other world, where many things here reckoned considerable, are of no weight nor value at all."

Thomas Boston was born in the little town of Duns which has the honour of being the birthplace of men renowned in the ecclesiastical world. Tradition says John Duns Scotus was a native of the parish; it is also the birthplace of Thomas MacCrie, the well known biographer of Knox. It was in 1676 that Boston first saw the light. While still a boy his father was cast into prison for nonconformity, and Thomas spent a night with him; the memory of which often haunted him in after years. He was early sent to school, "and having a capacity for learning and being of a towardly disposition," was kindly treated by the good dame who taught him first to master the mysteries of the alphabet. At the age of seven he tells us he read his Bible and had delight in reading it.[7] In 1684 or 1685 he went to the grammar school of his native town and while at this school he was a

[6] *Memoirs of the Life, Time, and Writings of the Reverend and Learned Thomas Boston, A.M.*, sometime minister at Simprin, afterwards at Ettrick. New Edition with Introduction and Notes by the Rev. George H. Morrison, M.A., Dundee. Edinburgh, and London: Oliphant, Anderson, and Ferrier, 1899.

[7] "Meanwhile I know nothing induced me to it, but the natural vanity of my mind: and curiosity as about some scripture histories. However,

diligent attender at public worship and gave what attention would be expected from a boy to the ministrations of the Episcopal incumbent. In 1687 he was taken by his father to a Presbyterian meeting in the Newton of Whitsome. The preacher was the Rev. Henry Erskine, the father of Ebenezer and Ralph, the two famous Secession preachers, and Boston heard for the first time a voice that called him to the consideration of eternal realities.[8] The sermons that most impressed him were preached from the texts "O generation of vipers who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?" and "Behold the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world". After this he regularly attended Henry Erskine's ministry at Revelaw, which was about four miles from Duns. "In the summer time", he says, "company could hardly be missed; and with them something to be heard, especially in the returning, that was for edification, to which I listened; but in the winter, sometimes it was my lot to go alone, without so much as the benefit of a horse to carry me through Blackadder water, the wading whereof in sharp frosty weather I very well remember. But such things were then easy, for the benefit of the word, which came with power." In the maturer experience of after years he looks back and reviews the fervent feelings of these early days and found that he was "raw and unexperienced, had much weakness and ignorance, and much of a legal disposition and way, then, and for a good time after, undiscerned", but yet he could honestly say that he "was in good earnest concerned for a saving interest in Jesus Christ". It may be interesting at this place to quote Boston as to the progress he had made at the grammar school and the subjects that were taught in such schools in Boston's time. "I learned the Latin rudi-

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I am thankful, that it was at all made my choice early; and that it hath been the study of my ripest years, with which I would fain close my life if it were His will." *Memoirs*, p. 7.

[8] Years afterwards in referring to this event he says: "Little wast thou thinking, O my soul, on Christ or thyself when thou went to the Newton of Whitsome to hear a preaching. When Christ first dealt with thee; there thou got an unexpected cast." *Soliloquy of Man Fishing*. Works V., p. 11.

ments, Despauter's grammar, and all the authors, in verse or prose, then usually read in schools; and profited above the rest of my own class, by means of whom my progress was more slow. And before I left the school, I, generally, saw no Roman author, but what I found myself in some capacity to turn into English: but we were not put to be careful about proper English. Toward the end of that time, I was also taught Vossius's *Elements of Rhetoric* and 15th May 1689 began the Greek, learned some parts of the New Testament, to wit, some part of John, of Luke, and of the Acts of the Apostles."[9] Boston was at this time only between thirteen and fourteen years of age, so that it will be admitted that he had made fair progress in education. Young Boston's mind was now set on the ministry, but his father not having sufficient means to give him a university education, the door seemed shut in his face. But neither father nor son gave up hope altogether. Sometimes the way looked so dark that Boston thought of turning to a trade, but his father would not hear of it. At length after two years the way was opened and Boston entered Edinburgh University in 1691. Of his life at the University we know little, except that he applied himself with diligence in the pursuit of knowledge and practised economy to such an extent that at the end of his Arts course his expenses only amounted to £11. The result of this rigid economy bore fruit in after years in the weakly constitution that made life a heavy burden to him many a day. In 1694 he graduated in arts and in the same year he received the bursary of the Presbytery of Duns. In the following year he began his theological course and spent one session at the university. It was allowable in his time for a student who had attended the theological classes for one session and who desired to support himself by teaching to complete his studies under the superintendence of the Presbytery. Boston determined on this course and after one month's experience of teaching in Glencairn he was appointed tutor in 1696 to the stepson of

[9] *Memoirs*, p. 12.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce of Kennet, at the salary of a hundred marks per annum. The Bruces of Kennet were the ancestors of the present Lord Balfour of Burleigh, the distinguished Scottish statesman. While at Kennet Boston did not hide his light under a bushel. The master and mistress being away from home he thought it his duty to keep family worship with the members of the household, while he catechised the servants, pressed the careless to secret prayer and reproved and warned against sinful practices. He reported the conduct of two servants to the lady, and as they were guilty of cursing and swearing after repeated admonitions he advised her that it was her duty to reform them, and if they still refused, to dismiss them from her service. This she promised to do, but when the term day came she dismissed the only two servants who had any show of religion, retaining the other two. Needless to say Boston felt this to be "very grievous", but it did not keep him from acting as a faithful monitor to the domestics at Kennet House, for he tells us that one Saturday night the servants had set a fire in the hall for drying their clothes, which they had been washing and which were to remain there until the Sabbath was over. "Grieved with this profanation of the Lord's Day", he says, "I spoke to the gentlewoman: who insinuating, that she had not done without orders what she had done, refused to remove them: whereupon I spoke to the lady, who soon caused remove the clothes and dispose them otherwise."[10] He also took good care that his pupil would not neglect attendance at church; hearing one day that he was not going to the means of grace, Boston made inquiries about the matter, with the result "both the mother and son went to church that day". But Kennet was one of Boston's Ebenezers, where his Lord abundantly blessed him. Writing of this period of his life in his *Memoirs* he says: "The time I was at Kennet, continues to be unto me a remarkable time among the days of my life. Once I fainted there, being on my knees at evening

[10] *Memoirs*, p. 26.

secret-prayer. . . . It was a time of much trouble to me, yet in the main a thriving time for my soul." He left Kennet in February 1697 and in June of the same year he was licensed by the Presbytery of Duns and Chirnside. For two years Boston remained without a call; heritors who did not understand the spiritual teaching of the young preacher and who by no means relished faithful preaching in the pulpit did their best to keep the people from having the man of their choice. At last in 1699 he received a call from the parish of Simprin, and on the 21st September of that year he was ordained to the office of the ministry. A minister could scarcely have entered on a more forbidding sphere of labour. The people were grossly ignorant, and as a result there was a chilling indifference to the exercises of the sanctuary. Nothing daunted, the young minister accepted the call, and as a keynote to his ministerial labours preached his first sermon from the text—"For they watch for your souls as they that must give account". And from that day there was a watching for souls that hallowed forever Simprin in his memory. He devoted his time to pastoral visitation, studying, praying with and for his people. He instituted prayer meetings and catechisings and gradually the blighting frosts of a long and dreary spiritual winter began to show signs of passing away. To use the Scriptural figure. "instead of the thorn there had come up the fir tree, and instead of the briar there had come up the myrtle". When he came to Simprin there was no family worship held in the place, but ere he left it worship was kept morning and evening in every home. Those earnest pleadings in secret were not unanswered, and the memory of those days drew from him in after years the acknowledgment: "Simprin was a field which the Lord had blessed; Simprin! O blessed be He for His kindness at Simprin." But diligent as Boston was as a pastor, he was no less diligent as a student. He read the *De Oeconomia Fœderum* of Witsius, and it is not too much to say that it left its impress on his theology. Another book that greatly influenced him was the first part

of the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*, to which reference will be made afterwards. His library was not princely in its treasures, but what he lacked in books he made up for in good, honest, original thinking. Booklovers will understand the following from his *Memoirs:* "The first parcel of books I got added to my small library was in the year 1702. The which year, in August, Mr. Simson aforesaid being in my closet, and looking at my book-press, smiled: the which from whatever principle he did it, touched me to the quick, being conscious of my want of a tolerable quantity. Among these were Zanchy's works, and Luther on Galatians, which I was much taken with: and Providence also laid to my hand, about that time, Beza's Confession of Faith. Most of the books mentioned in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th pages of my catalogue yet *in retentis* whose prices are set down with them, were purchased in that year, and the following 1703."[11] It was while at Simprin that he set to acquire a knowledge of French from a paper of rules given by a neighbour. He went through the book of Psalms in Hebrew and from the pulpit he delivered those remarkable sermons that were in after years to be used as the substance of the *Fourfold State*. In the quiet of his study he faced some of the deepest questions of theology, and we have his answers in his remarkable *Miscellaneous Questions and Tracts*.[12]. It was while at Simprin he took to himself a wife. "Whenever I saw her," he says, "a thought struck through my heart about her being my wife." It was a married life in which love of husband and wife burned with a beautiful flame, but it was a life which was likewise checkered with sore sorrow. Five children were born to them at Simprin, and two of these were soon laid in the churchyard. In 1706 he received a call from Ettrick, and after serious consideration accepted it. The wrench from Simprin was painful in the extreme, and as he beheld the deep grief of his beloved and attached people, his tears mingled with theirs. "How could my eyes fail", he

[11] *Memoirs*, p. 169.
[12] *Works*, Vol. VI.

said, "to trickle down with tears." He bade farewell to them in those impressive words of his Master so suggestive of passing opportunity, "In the last day, that great day of the feast, Jesus stood and cried saying, If any man thirst. let him come unto me, and drink".

On May 1, 1707, Boston began his ministerial labours at Ettrick. He now set his face to a sea of troubles, and as one sees the timid student facing his difficulties one might well wonder from whence came the strong resolution that never faltered until the difficulties vanished or were completely conquered, and the only answer that suits the circumstances is that Boston had learned that "prayer moves the Hand which governs the world". There now began a ministry memorable in the annals of the Scottish pulpit. Through years of strenuous toil, beset with trials of no ordinary kind, the faithful pastor went out and in among his people, breaking to them the bread of life, comforting the sorrowing, chiding their wanderings, but relieving their pain. Boston soon learned that Ettrick was not Simprin. He felt, to use his own words, that he was now from home and that he was but beginning to be a minister of a parish. The people of his new charge, generally speaking, were "naturally smart, and of an uncommon assurance; self-conceited and censorious to a pitch, using an indecent freedom with church and state". Opposition came to him from three sources. First, there were the followers of Rev. John MacMillan, the minister of the United Societies (now represented by the Reformed Presbyterians)—these he regarded as a dead weight on his ministry, though in its closing years the opposition was not so marked; the second source of opposition was a heritor supported by two elders, all of whom forsook attendance on the means of grace, though the heritor appears to have relented after Boston had received the call to Closeburn; the third source of trouble was the congregation, which was open to the influences brought to bear on it by the foregoing parties. It is almost needless to add, in view of the above account, that the Sabbath sermons were coldly

received, "but remarkable", says Boston, "was the pricking up of ears when anything relative to the public fell in; which was a wounding observe to me". But after years of strenuous toil the faithful pastor could bear testimony to the remarkable change that had come over the people: "They are by far more polished", he says, "in their manners than at that time and much more tractable and easy to me; and fewer scandals fall out among them. The old dissenters continue immovable; but their increasing is ceased". When it is remembered that Boston was "naturally timorous and diffident", the task before him at Ettrick seems too Herculean for a man of his disposition to face, but being a man whose life was steeped in prayer and "eager in pursuit when once engaged", he set his face to the high mountains that lay between him and the fruitful plains of his ardent hopes, and for him, like Napoleon, there were no Alps.

The parish to which Boston was called is a rural one in Selkirkshire. It is a place full of interesting traditions; to students of English literature it recalls James Hogg, "the Ettrick Shepherd". But to the student of ecclesiastical history it will be always linked with the name of Thomas Boston. During the time of the persecutions many conventicles were held among the mountains of Ettrick. Peden and Renwick preached at Birkenhope, Dobb's Linn and Talla Linn, and in this way a leaven of godliness was introduced. So that some of the families who had known the truth as it is in Jesus relished the preaching of Boston and did their best to protect him from the malice of his enemies. In the midst of all his trials Boston did not relinquish his studies, for we find the following entry in his *Memoirs* for the year 1711: "This was the happy year wherein I was first master of a Hebrew Bible and began the study of it." And all along it continued to be his "darling study". In the following year, 1712, the Church of Scotland found herself face to face with a new controversy over the Abjuration Oath. Scotland had now lost her Parliament through the Union of 1707, and the English Parliament—or perhaps

more correctly the British Parliament—passed an Act in 1712 imposing the Oath of Abjuration upon all ministers. The intention of the Oath was to safeguard the Queen and secure the Protestant succession to the crown. But if this were all none would have been more willing to take the oath than the Scottish ministers. It so happened, however, that the Oath was based upon two Acts passed by the English Parliament before the Union, in which it was expressly stipulated that the reigning sovereign should belong to the Church of England. Apart altogether from the excusable hatred of the more orthodox Presbyterians to "black prelacy", the oath was inconsistent with the Treaty and Articles of Union. The matter came up before the General Assembly. It was at this time, under the leadership of William Carstares, a wise statesman, but one who was more governed by the principles of worldly-wise policy than by the simplicity that is in Christ. Boston gives an account of the discussion in the Assembly: "The lawfulness of the Abjuration Oath was debated *pro* and *con* in a committee of the whole house, betwixt the Scruplers and the Clear brethren. All I had thereby was, that the principles on which the answers to the objections were founded, seemed to me of such latitude, that by them almost any oath might pass. The parties were, at that time as I think, at the very point of splitting; till Mr. Carstairs, principal of the college of Edinburgh and clear for the oath, interposed and prevented the rupture; for the which cause I did always thereafter honour him in my heart. For all that I heard advanced to clear the difficuties about it, I still continued a Scrupler; and therefore a little before I came away home, the Act imposing the oath being printed and offered to me at the door of the assembly-house I bought it, on purpose to know exactly the penalty I was like to underlie. Being come home, I did this day spend some time in prayer for light from the Lord about that oath. And thereafter entering on to read the prints I had on it, in order to form a judgment about it, I immediately fell on the act, whereby it was first of all framed and

imposed; and finding thereby the declared intent of the oath to be, to preserve the act inviolable on which the security of the Church of England depends, I was surprised and astonished; and upon that shocking discovery, my heart was turned to loathe that oath which I had before scrupled." The penalty for refusing to take the oath was £500 more money, says Boston, than ever he had received as salary, but his mind was made up as to his course. The sorely tried pastor "being wrestled out of breath with the parish" looked forward to the impending banishment or whatever punishment the Government would inflict with equanimity as a relief out of his present distresses. At last the fateful day came, December 1,[18] the last day for taking the oath, but the Government found so many Scruplers that they wisely refrained from exacting their fine. So passed away another dark cloud from the Ettrick pastor's firmament and Boston continued a Non-jurer till the day of his death.

It was in 1712 that Boston commenced the writing of the *Fourfold State,* and it is scarcely needful to say that it is as the author of this book that he is most widely known. Probably no theological book ever exercised such a mighty influence on the religious life of Scotland, and the sphere of its influence was not confined to Scotland alone, as Dr. Andrew Thomson in his *Thomas Boston of Ettrick: His Life and Times* informs us. "In a paper", he says, "of much ability and interest on 'Religious Thought in Wales', which was not long since read by Principal Edwards at a great meeting of the Presbyterian Alliance in London, it was stated that if you entered the house of a rustic elder or leader of the private societies fifty years ago, you would uniformly find that he had a small and very select library. Among other books you would be sure to lay your hand on translations into Welsh of Boston's *Fourfold State,* Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress,* Owen's *Person of Christ* and *Mortification of Sin in Believers* and others. It is also true that in our British colonies at the present day, especially where the Scot-

[18] *Memoirs,* pp. 263, 264.

tish element abounds in the population, the *Fourfold State* continues to be sought after and read, and we have received testimony from natives that it is extensively sold and circulated on the misty coasts of Labrador." The *Fourfold State* has passed through many editions, and it is interesting to observe that the London Religious Tract Society still issues the work. It was in 1711 his friend Dr. Trotter proposed to his beloved pastor that he should print some of his sermons. Boston received the proposal at first with astonishment, but after some consideration he shewed the notes of a certain series of sermons dealing with man's fourfold state to his friend. Dr. Trotter was greatly pleased with them. Boston now went with the matter to his great Counsellor. "I spent most of this day (January 16)", he says, "in prayer and meditation for light in this matter: and after all I found that I had rational grounds to oblige me to make an essay; but could not find such a lively sense of the call of God thereto as I desired. I observed, that the papers being kept up so long after I was made to wait for their return, was of a piece with the Lord's ordinary way with me, to bring matters first very low before they rise. One told me she observed that these sermons had more influence on the people of their neighborhood, than any before or since. I found myself this night convinced, that they might be useful to many in regard of the room the Lord has given me in people's affections; and this went nearest to the raising in my heart such a lively sense of the command or call of God, as might help me to believe, that He would be with me in the work; which is the thing I want."[14] This was only one of many such appeals for guidance in this matter. Boston was earnestly seeking God's glory, and he could honestly say, "I can appeal to God that it is not a name for myself I seek. The Lord knows that I could be content to lose name or credit amongst men, so that the sermons are useful to poor souls." The work was actually begun on January 29, 1712, when, "after prayer and getting

[14] *Memoirs*, p. 256.

my heart composed", he says, "to a dependence on the Lord, I began to write out my sermons". The book was finished on the 9th March, 1713, but was not printed until 1720. It was well nigh strangled in its birth, for one of the civic dignitaries of Edinburgh, who had assisted in the negotiations for procuring a publisher, offered his services as proof-reader. But when the proofs reached the author at Ettrick he found that not only were printer's errors corrected, but important changes were made in the body of the work. This vexatious delay, however, was at last overcome and the book went forth to the world entitled *Human Nature in its Fourfold State of Primitive Integrity, Entire Depravity, Begun Recovery, and Consummate Happiness or Misery.* The work consists of sermons preached at Simprin, which were recast in 1708 and 1709 and preached again at Ettrick. The book immediately found a public. It had the qualification of a book that was to last—it made no appeal to a passing fancy, but dealt with those mighty problems that must ever have an interest for men and women who realise the momentousness of life. Its theology is the theology of the Bible as interpreted by the great Dutch divines and the Marrowmen. The ring of the federal theology and the full and free offer of Christ so much in evidence in the Marrow theology may all be traced in this religious classic. Its teaching has been beautifully described by one when he says: "Boston took the bewildered child of trespass familiarly by the hand and descending to the level of his untutored capacity gave him a clear and consecutive view of the innocence from which he had fallen, the misery in which he was involved, the economy of restoration under which he was situated, and the hope which, by submitting to that economy, he might warrantably entertain. His eye as he wrote was upon the unawakened sinner, that he might arouse him from his dangerous lethargy; upon the anxious inquirer, that he might guide his steps into the right way; and upon the young convert, that he might guard him against devious paths and perilous delays. He never failed to show the bearing of

Christian doctrine upon the conscience, the affections and the life and to mingle with the light of systematic arrangement beseeching tenderness and practical appeal."

In the spring of 1713 he borrowed a copy of Cross's *Taghmical Art* from a neighbour, and "had I known then", he says, "what was in the womb of that step of Providence, I had surely marked the day of my borrowing that book as one of the happiest days of my life". This book set him to the study of the Hebrew accents, and it may be safely said that no Scottish minister ever studied this intricate subject with greater zeal and with more abounding prayer. In his *Memoirs* he tells us the story of his struggles and how he failed to get his work on the accents published. To him it was the great work of his life. His enthusiasm brought him into correspondence with some of the great continental scholars of the day. Among those who took a friendly interest in his work were Sir Robert Ellys and the Dutch scholars Schultens, Gronovius and Loftus. Boston translated his essay into Latin, but he died without seeing his hopes realized in its publication. In 1738—six years after his death—it was published at Amsterdam with the title *Tractatus Stigmologicus*. The main contention of the essay was to prove the divine authority of the accents. "It is something to know", says Mr. Morrison in his introduction to the *Memoirs,* "and it is worthy of remembrance that the evangelical minister of Ettrick, whose works were treasured by the cottar and the herd, was welcomed as an equal by the finest Hebrew scholars in the world."[15]

In 1714 the famous Simson case began to agitate the peace of the church. Simson was professor of divinity at Glasgow. He was charged with teaching Arminianism, but the Assembly, after inquiring into the charges, allowed him to escape with a gentle reprimand. Boston was ill at ease with the Laodicean methods of the Assembly, and predicted further trouble from the same source. Nine years later Boston's fears were realized, for now Simson was charged with

[15] *Memoirs,* p. 34.

Arianism. The charges, it is true, were difficult to prove, but they were sufficiently well substantiated to move the Assembly to pass sentence of perpetual suspension. Boston felt this to be trifling with a great issue, so he rose in his place in the Assembly "with an air of great majesty", says an eye witness, "that I shall never forget", and, addressing the Moderator: "Moderator! I cannot help thinking that the cause of Jesus Christ as to the great and essential point of His supreme Deity is at the bar of the Assembly requiring justice; and as I am shortly to answer at His bar for all that I say or do, I cannot give my assent to the decision of this act. On the contrary, I find myself obliged to offer a protest against it. And therefore, in my own name, and in the name of all that shall adhere to me, and if none here will for myself alone, I crave leave to enter my dissent against the decision of this act." "Sir," said the Moderator, a very grave, solemn man, "will you tear out the bowels of your mother?" "If that were the tendency of this", was Boston's reply, "rather would I take and tear it into a thousand pieces." Boston did not persist in recording his protest, so the Simson case came to an end.

In 1716 a call came to him from Closeburn, and the event is memorable for the remarkable effect it had on the people of Ettrick. All of a sudden they seemed to have realized that a prophet had been among them all these years, and to show their anxiety at the prospect of losing their pastor a fast day was appointed in which they might plead with the Head of the Church not to remove His servant from them. It was the beginning of better days. A remarkable change came over the people and the seed that was sown with tears was now beginning to bear fruit.

The next great controversy in which Boston took a part was that which raged round the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*. The subject has already been dealt with in these pages,[16] and only a few sentences are necessary to refer to Boston's connection with it. It was during his Simprin

[16] The Princeton Theological Review, July, 1906.

pastorate that he came across a copy of the first part of the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*. It was the means of clearing up some difficulties he had in preaching the gospel. Nothing was heard of the book for years until, while the Assembly was discussing the Auchterarder Creed, as it was called—"I believe it is not orthodox and sound to teach that we forsake sin in order to our coming to Christ." Boston communicated to a fellow member of Assembly the great help he had received through reading the *Marrow*. Ultimately the book came into the hands of James Hog of Carnock, who published it. It was severely attacked by Principal Hadow of St. Andrew's; so began the Marrow Controversy. Boston was condemned along with the other Marrowmen by the Assembly. In 1721 Boston's two friends, Gabriel Wilson and Henry Davidson, suggested that he should write notes on the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*. These were finished in the following spring, but, owing to his respect for church authority, they were not published until 1726. They went forth to the world under the name of Philalethes Irenaeus, and had in view the confutation of Hadow's *Antinomianism of the Marrow Detected*. Boston has left on record that he was much addicted to peace and averse to controversy, but once engaged therein he was "set to go through with it". It must have cost his sensitive spirit a great deal of pain those bitter contentions in the church courts.

Boston was now turning his face towards the setting sun, and he was not without warnings his course would soon be over. In the last decade he preached to his people a series of sermons on Affliction. These were subsequently published under the title *"The Crook in the Lot"*, being mainly founded on Eccles. vii. 13: "Consider the work of the Lord: for who can make that straight which he hath made crooked?" Many a sorrowing pilgrim has read these precious pages and felt the burden that was so heavy to bear lifted off the shoulders. Boston was a true son of consolation. The angel of death often visited his home and the tender-hearted father bowed his head in submission when the dread mes-

senger entered in. How tender a heart he had may be gathered from the following incident narrated in his *Memoirs:* "When the child was laid in the coffin, his mother kissed his dust. I only lifted the cloth off his face, looked on it, and covered it again, in confidence of seeing that body rise a glorious body. When the nails were driving, I was moved, for I had not kissed that precious dust which I believe was united to Jesus Christ, as if I had despised it. I would fain have caused draw the nail again, but because of one that was present I resented and violented myself." During the closing years of his life he had another great trial through the mental weakness of his wife. With eagerness the devoted husband watched for any returning gleam that might tell that the night was past. "Now we were", he says, "with our broken ship within sight of the shore and I was like one stretching out his hand and crying, Help forward! Help forward! But behold in a little after the storm arose anew and the ship was beaten into the main ocean out of sight of land again." But if the latter years of her life were thus darkened Boston recalled the years when she was the joy and light of his home and he has left on record as fine a tribute as ever a husband paid to a wife. This is how he describes her: "A woman of great worth, whom I therefore passionately loved and inwardly honoured. A stately, beautiful and comely personage, truly pious, and fearing the Lord; of an evenly temper, patient in our common tribulations and under her personal distresses. A woman of bright natural parts, an uncommon stock of prudence; of a quick and lively apprehension in things she applied herself to; great presence of mind in surprising incidents; sagacious and acute in discerning the qualities of persons, and therefore not easily imposed upon; modest and grave in her deportment but naturally cheerful; wise and affable in conversation, having a good faculty at speaking, and expressing herself with assurance; endowed with singular dexterity in dictating letters; being a pattern of frugality, and wise management of household affairs; therefore entirely committed

to her; well fitted for, and careful of, the virtuous education of her children; remarkably useful to the country side, both in the Merse and in the Forest through her skill in physic and surgery which in many cases, a peculiar blessing appeared to be commanded upon from heaven; and finally a crown to me in my public station and appearances. During the time we have lived together hitherto, we have passed through a sea of trouble, as yet not seeing the shore but afar off. I have sometimes been likely to be removed from her; she having little continued health, except the first six weeks, her death had oftentimes stared us in the face and hundreds of arrows had pierced my heart on that score; and sometimes I have gone with a trembling heart to the pulpit, laying my account with being called out of it, to see her expire. And now for the third part of the time we have lived together, namely ten years complete, she has been under a particular racking distress; and for several of these years, fixed to her bed; in the which furnace the grace of God in her hath been brightened, her parts continued to a wonder and her beauty which formerly was wont, upon her recoveries, to leave no vestige of the illness she had been under, doth as yet now and then show some vestiges of itself."[17]

Boston's labours were now nearing an end. Weakly in body and haunted often by melancholy he persevered in the pursuit of his duties. When one looks over the record of that life so full of noble purpose persisted in to the end, seeking the highest interests of the people committed to him, the words "Well done, good and faithful servant" come involuntarily to the lips.

Many of Boston's works were published posthumously, and though not so popular as the *Fourfold State* and the *Crook in the Lot,* yet there is a freshness in the treatment of the subjects that make Boston's sermons readable to the present day. An edition of his collected works was published in 1854 under the editorial care of Rev. Samuel Mac-

[17] *Memoirs,* p. 157.

Millan. This edition, which consists of twelve volumes, does not contain what Boston himself regarded as his *magnum opus*, the *Tractatus Stigmologicus*.

Boston did not live to see the Secession of 1733, having passed away peacefully on May 20, 1732. It is difficult to estimate Boston's place as a theologian, his fame as a preacher and pastor seems to have obscured to a certain extent what belongs to him in other departments. But it is not claiming too much for him when we say that he was the Turretine of Scottish Theology. Not that his system was modelled after that of Turretine, for he was more under the influence of Witsius, but the same clear sententious treatment of doctrines characteristic of Turretine was also characteristic of Boston. In his *Memoirs*[18] he gives a pen picture of himself remarkable for its fidelity. In it he tells us: "I was not of quick apprehension; but had a gift of application; and things being once discovered I was no more wavering in them. . . . My talent lay in doing things by a close application, with pains and labour." Boston was only 56 years when he finished his course, and, reviewing his life two years before his death, he sums up his impressions in the concluding sentences of his *Memoirs:* "Upon the whole, I bless my God in Jesus Christ, that ever He made me a Christian, and took an early dealing with my soul; that ever He made me a minister of the Gospel, and gave me some insight into the doctrine of His grace; that ever He gave me the blessed Bible, and brought me acquainted with the originals and especially with the Hebrew text. The world hath all along been a step-dame to me; and wheresoever I would have attempted to nestle in it, there was a thorn of uneasiness laid for me. Man is born crying, lives complaining and dies disappointed from that quarter. 'All is vanity and vexation of spirit—I have waited for thy salvation, O Lord'." Such is the language of a pilgrim journeying on to a better country with the pearly gates of the New Jerusalem already in

[18] *Memoirs*, p. 474, 5.

sight, and as we read the expressions of gratitude ending with the mournful plaint our thoughts turn to that life of noble endeavour, checkered as it was with so many sorrows, and feel constrained, in the words of Carlyle,[19] to say: "Here is a Life-battle right nobly done. Seest thou not,

The storm is changed into a calm,
At His command and will;
So that the waves which raged before
Now quiet are and still!
Then are they glad,—because at rest
And quiet now they be;
So to the haven He them brings
Which they desire to see.

We part now with one of the most intensely human and lovable Scottish pastors of the eighteenth century and pay our tribute of respect in the halting rhyme but noble appreciation of Ralph Erskine.

The great, the grave, judicious Boston's gone
Who once like Athanasius bold, stood, firm, alone.
Whose golden pen to future times will bear
His name till in the clouds his Lord appear.

Wick, Scotland. D. BEATON.

[19] *Oliver Cromwell* V, p. 155. London, 1894.

REVIEWS

RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHY.

TIME AND REALITY. A "Monograph Supplement" from *The Psychological Review*, Vol. VI, No. 3, October 1904. By JOHN E. BOODIN, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, University of Kansas. The Macmillan Company. Paper. Large octavo, pp. 119.

These pages present a keen and able study of a very old and a very difficult question in metaphysics. The author's views, he tells us, were developed largely under the influence of the Harvard School. James, Royce and Münsterberg entered in an important way into the process of clearing up his own conception which was known among his philosophical friends as "the Creeping in" concept instead of that of the Serial Character of time. He maintains that Kant does not distinguish between the formal aspect, and the Content of time. The author thinks clearly and writes intelligibly. He holds that time cannot be stated as a series or order concept, because the series and order concepts already presuppose time in their genesis, and, once constituted, involve the coexistence of the terms, within the timeless meaning of the subject" (p. 24). Positively, he would define time "as non-being: not relative non-being merely, which has to do with difference at different points of reality; but absolute or dynamic non-being, as real and ultimate as the habit and structure aspect, which it makes relative and which in time limits and defines it" (p. 28). The pamphlet is, for the most part, a defence of this view and an explication and application of it in the wide areas of philosophical thought; but it was evidently written for select metaphysical aristocrats, and it is pretty certain that to others than such it will never come.

Trenton. HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE VOCATION OF MAN. By JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. Translated by WILLIAM SMITH, LL.D., with Biographical Introduction by E. RITCHIE, Ph.D. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1906. Paper. 8vo.; pp. xii., 178.

This little book gives us, as Dr. Ritchie says in his brief Introduction, much of Fichte's philosophy, but little of his system-building. The author divides his treatise into three parts or "books", having for their

themes, respectively, Doubt, Knowledge and Faith. In the first book, the conclusion reached is that the thought of man is utterly unable to extricate itself from the struggle between the view on the one hand that the I is but the pre-determined product of the World-order and the Consciousness, on the other, of a self-originated volition and will and love which is all my own. The second book, following the Socratic method and making "The Spirit" and the "I" the interlocutors in the conversation, has knowledge for its theme. We are told that knowing a thing is always knowing that we know it. That is, Cognition involves Consciousness, or according to some of the older psychologists, self-consciousness; but how to make the leap safely from the self back again to the not-self is the stiff and stubborn problem. Intuitively, we objectify the subject self, but where is the warrant for so doing? Knowledge is by and bye reduced to illusion, under the searching cross-examination of the "I" and, accordingly, no more in knowledge than in doubt is the rest of the rational soul to be found. "For the whole material world arises only through knowledge and is itself our knowledge; but knowledge is not reality just because it is knowledge" (p. 91). Hence the necessity of Faith; Faith is voluntary acquiescence. "It is not knowledge but a resolution of the will to admit the validity of knowledge" (p. 100). We do not believe this or that because we must, but because we will. Here is the Fichtean principle of the primacy, the supremacy of the will. It is the understanding which we enter into with ourselves to regard as true and to proceed upon it as true, the thing which seems to us as if it were true. We cannot go behind the returns—our knowing is of the phenomenal only. If it seems to me that I ought to do a thing, that is enough; I'll forthwith resolve to do it. All other categories and relations are subordinate. This is "Man's Vocation" to moral activity. "To the question, whether, in deed and in fact, such a world exists as that which I represent to myself, I can give no answer more fundamental, more raised above all doubt, than this: I have most certainly and truly these determinate duties, which announce themselves to me as duties toward certain objects, to be fulfilled by means of certain materials; duties which I cannot otherwise conceive of, and cannot otherwise fulfill, than within such a world as I represent to myself (p. 109). We could easily forget that we were reading the words of the great German idealist and believe that we were reading the pages of S. T. Coleridge when we find this truly Coleridgian dictum "The self-active reason is will" (p. 151). "I know immediately only what I ought to do. This will I do, freely, joyfully, and without cavilling or sophistry, for it is Thy voice that commands me to do it; it is the part assigned to me in the spiritual world-plan; and the power with which I shall perform it is Thy power" (p. 160).

The publication of this essay as one of the "Philosophical Classics" in the Religion of Science Library series is quite in line with much of the thinking of the present time. That there is good truth in Fichte's teaching in this treatise cannot be denied. A sound epistemology must always assign a place to the will in all knowledge, however purely in-

tellectual it may seem to be either in its processes or in its objects. We need not go the length of the agnostic and affirm the illusory character of all knowledge. To disprove the validity of knowledge and then to accept the postulates of faith, at the command or even at the consent of the will, is to throw out the babe with the bath. The difference between the faculties of the soul is a fiction if we mean by it anything more than the different faculties of the one soul. We cannot dissociate their respective activities from each other. We must not discredit the mind's knowing to the end that we may exalt the dignity of its willing. Ritschlianism develops from the philosophy of this essay as the flower from its bud, and while it has much to answer for in its impossible attempt to jettison metaphysics and to throw suspicion upon the validity of knowledge in the sphere of religion, yet it also must be reckoned with as a strong reaction from the haughty attitude of Rationalism and from the barren heights of a frigid Intellectualism.

Trenton. HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE WITNESS OF SIN. A Theodicy. By Rev. NATHAN ROBINSON WOOD, Medford, Mass. 12mo., pp. 151. New York, Chicago, etc.: Fleming H. Revell Company. [1905]

In this little book we have a sober and sustained attempt to develop a rational theodicy. And it is to be welcomed and admired as all serious attempts to unravel great mysteries are to be welcomed and admired. The reasoning is careful and close; and the author spares no pains to develop his great theme fully. We wish we could add that he has been as successful as painstaking. With all our hearty respect for its sincerity and earnestness, however, we have not been able to find the argument convincing. If we should speak our whole mind about it frankly, in fact, we are afraid we should have to say that it seems to us to have almost as many gaps in it as a paling fence. This, primarily, because of the influence of unwarranted presuppositions; and, secondarily, because of the unwary employment of undistributed middles.

The essence of the theodicy which is here offered in view of sin, is that God could not help it. Sin is in spite of God. The reason why God could not help it is because the possibility of sin is inherent in free-agency. In creating a free-agent God thereby created the possibility of sin. To suppose Him to wish to have a free-agent without the possibility of sin is to suppose Him to desire a contradiction, and that is to deny His wisdom. The creation of free-agents, now, is determined by the Divine goodness. For it is only by the creation of free-agents that holiness can be obtained. The possibility of sin thus underlies the possibility of holiness: holiness requires for its production the possibility of sin. That God may have holiness in His universe He must have free-agents; that He may have free-agents He must have the

of free-agents as if "coercion" were the only way in which the Divine Governor of all things could secure holiness in the creatures of His will is beside the mark. Could God not have preserved His creatures in holiness otherwise than by "coercion"? Could he not, for example, have shielded them from temptation, or from such temptation as should overcome the set of their wills to good? Or could He not have strengthened the set of their wills to good by serious impulses until they should be "capable" of overcoming any possible temptations which could assail them?

In a word, is it not quite clear that if sin arises in God's world—made by Him and made by Him purely according to the counsel of His own will (for who was there in that primal precreative "time" to be His counsellor?)—it must be not "in spite of God" but in accordance with His will? And is it not quite clear that therefore no theodicy is found in the face of the presence of sin in God's universe, until it is made clear that God's goodness and righteousness remain unsullied though He has appointed sin to occur in His universe? That the only possible theodicy in a word turns on the discovery of an end in view great and glorious enough to justify the incidental evils wrought by permitted sin? And is it not probable that it is the general perception of this which accounts for the fact which Mr. Wood thinks strange—the fact, that is, that the generality of reasoners on this great theme assume at the outset that the precise fact to be accounted for is the permission of sin (p. 75)? Of course, it is easy to say that this is merely the Calvinistic solution. It is the Calvinistic solution; and that not only the solution of the later Calvinism or of the extremer Calvinism or of hyper-Calvinism, as Mr. Wood imagines, but of all Calvinism. He will find it enunciated by Calvin himself and by Augustine before Calvin. But the adverb "merely" is wholly unjustified. It is the only possible solution. The simple truth is that Calvinism, as it alone can present a rational optimism, so it alone can offer a reasonable theodicy: or to put it at its true height, that Calvinism *is* the only rational optimism, and Calvinism *is* the sole sufficing theodicy. This is because in Calvinism alone belief in God—God not only with a big G, but with a big O and a big D as well—comes to its rights: and it is only when we see God and see Him as God with all that involves, that we see to the heart of things. The great philosophy of the Decree—in it alone lies the key to the universe.

The trouble with Mr. Wood's theodicy at bottom then is, that it reckons too much without God. It takes its first steps rightly, and says, with full truth, that sin is the product of the perverse action of the creative will. But it stumbles at the second step, which must relate this perverse action to the creative will of God. Mr. Wood tries to keep it unrelated to God: he says it is "in spite of God"; and that all that God has to do with it is to put up with it. And yet it occurs in God's universe, which He made, and which He made by His absolute will, and which therefore must express His pure will in its entirety and in all its interrelation of parts! Nothing is more certain than that

sin occurs in God's universe, not because God could not keep it out, but because it fell in with His plan to have it in. What, then, shall we say? What, but that the end to be attained was great and glorious enough to justify the incidental evil arising from sin? Shall we boggle here and declare that thus we suppose "too much of a Divine doing of evil that good may come, or an apotheosis of the Jesuitical creed that the end justifies the means?" (p. 78). We must at least allow that profound questions like this cannot be argued without some care in distinguishing between things that differ. To suppose that God uses evil to produce good is not the same as to suppose that He does evil that good may come; and though it does leave Him responsible for the occurrence of evil in His universe it does not make Him responsible for the evilness of the evil that occurs in His universe. If we deny God in ascribing evil to Him as its cause, we no less deny Him if we suppose evil to emerge in a universe of His making without His permission, His bounding and limiting, His control, and His utilization of it. It is just this situation indeed which creates the problem of theodicy: if God is in no sense responsible for the presence of sin in His universe, the necessity for a theodicy is superceded. I knew a woman once, a very wise and good woman, who was kept very anxious by the persistent disobedience of her little daughter, who haunted the nursery hearth, although repeatedly forbidden not to go near the fire. I saw this woman one morning deliberately sit quietly in her nursery, sewing, and watch her child, furtively glancing over its shoulder meanwhile to see if it were observed, approach the fire, in flagrant disobedience, and thrust its finger into the blaze to discover what it felt like! I never heard this woman—she was a wise and good woman—deny that she was responsible for the consummation of her little daughter's disobedience in act on this morning: or for the injury to the child's finger wrought by the burn, and the pain that resulted. But I never heard her accuse herself—she was, we repeat, a wise and good woman—of wrong doing on this account. She said she had a good reason for doing what she did—embodied in the maxim that "the burnt child dreads the fire"—and was satisfied with the result. The child did wrong, she said, but she herself did right in permitting the chaild to do wrong—because, though the child meant evil, she meant it for good. These things are an allegory. And they teach that things evil in themselves God may embrace within His all-embracing plan for good, and that the philosophy of Joseph (Gen. L. 20) lies at the root of God's government of the universe and constitutes its theodicy.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

SPINOZA AND RELIGION. A Study of Spinoza's Metaphysics and of his Particular Utterances in regard to Religion, with a view to Determining the Significance of his Thought for Religion, and, incidentally, His Personal Attitude toward it. By ELMER ELLSWORTH POWELL, A.M., Ph. D., Professor of Philosophy in Miami University. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1906. 8vo.; pp. xiii. 344.

We have in this volume an able and impartial attempt to determine, first, what Spinoza taught and, second, how this teaching relates itself to religion. The author intimates in his preface that no system of thought is more difficult to understand or explain than is that of Spinoza. However, the task which he set for himself is not the explication nor, indeed, the statement of that system. It is rather the valuation or appraisement of it from the point of view of the religious consciousness. The book opens with a brief but informing biographical sketch of Spinoza. Born in 1632, his forty-five years were filled with strenuous though quiet and uneventful toil. He was a poor Jew, a lens-grinder by trade, like Kant simple in his tastes and habits, a helpless sort of old bachelor who lived the life of the cloister and saw only with the abstract vision of the metaphysician and the doctrinaire. Professor Powell has no very honoring estimate of Spinoza's moral qualities. What his admirers have called his noble self-effacement, he regards only as the excessive caution of the coward. He employed, in large measure, the dubious and dangerous policy of "accommodation". The first among his *regulæ vivendi* for the devotees of knowledge runs as follows: "To accommodate our speech to the mind of the multitude and to practice all those things (in vogue) which do not hinder us from attaining an end. For we are able to obtain no little advantage from the multitude, provided we accommodate ourselves as far as possible to the mind of the same. Moreover, as a result of this policy, they will lend friendly ears to the truth". (*De Intellectus Emendatione*, p. 6.) The author believes that we must bear this policy in mind if we are to judge correctly the sincerity and value of many of Spinoza's utterances which sound religious. He believes that he had a double line of expression for his doctrines, the esoteric and the exoteric, and a study of the two does scant honor either to his candor or his courage. There are three counts in the author's indictment, which may be summed up and indicated as follows: 1. Retaining religious terms after they had been consciously emptied of all religious content; 2. Stilted deductions of irrevelant conceptions formally but superficially resembling religious notions; and 3. Now and then saying outright what he did not mean concerning matters which did not affect his philosophy much but which appeared to be very religious. Thus viewed, Spinoza had in him anything else than the stuff out of which martyrs are made. In these three specifications we have the key to Professor Powell's judgment of Spinoza. It is presented plainly and is maintained with great force. He insists that Spinoza should be judged by the principles of his philosophy and not by the pious *obiter dicta* which he sometimes throws in and which are often incongruous with his philosophy, sometimes indeed contradictory to it.

We are given a brief chapter on Spinoza's epistomology; and this is well, for the true clue to the theological valuation of any metaphysical system is often to be found in its presupposed or implied theory of knowledge. Of course, Spinoza's whole system is thoroughly *à priori*. His methods are purely mathematical. He took geometry as his special model, assuming the infallible validity of its conclusions and forgetting

that no other department of human knowledge can be dealt with *more geometrico*. He held that all knowledge involves the knowledge of God. He has defined his starting point when he has defined Substance, which he does thus: "that whose conception needs the conception of no other thing." Of course, that involves self-existence, eternity and infinity. It has an infinite number of attributes, of which, however, the human mind can know only two, namely, thought and extension. This preliminary assumption of agnosticism may be a violent emergency measure, forced by the exigencies of his hard and fast *apriorism*. For it is Agnosticism, pure and simple, seeing that we cannot in any way or sense know the infinite substance lying under the two knowable attributes, nor, indeed, can we know the infinite number of attributes—minus two—which this infinite substance possesses. Everything happens with mathematical certainty and precision, following from the nature of Substance. Logical connections are *ipso facto* actual facts. Thought relations are hypostasized, whence it follows that cause and effect categories are identical with those of premise and conclusion. Possibility spells Actuality. God cannot help doing everything that lies in his power. Final causes are human figments. No moral attribute is predicable of Substance, and his own definition of God is given in these famous words: *"Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum; hoc est, substantiam Constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit* (Ethics i. def. 6).

So much for a glance at Spinoza's philosophy, but only to prepare the way for squaring it, if possible, with the elements of the religious consciousness. Having defined one term of the comparison, the author proceeds to define the other, and he does it very satisfactorily, indeed. The three aspects of religion, namely, the doctrinal, the emotional and the practical, are well considered. Whereupon the author ventures a definition of his own, taking care to combine the three elements just discussed. The greatest interest for the present purpose focusses in the word "Personal", which he will not upon any consideration consent to omit or to slur over. This is for him the crux of any definition, and he criticizes both Dr. Caird and Professor James for their sin of omission in this regard. He quotes as supporting his own position the familiar words of the late Professor Romanes when he says "To speak of the Religion of the Unknowable, the Religion of Cosmosism, the Religion of Humanity, and so forth, where the Personality of the First Cause is not recognized, is as unmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a triangle or the rationality of the equator" (Thoughts on Religion, p. 41). It is obvious that if Spinoza's philosophy of the *una et unica Substantia*, that is, of a non-moral, non-personal and (saving the two attributes which are knowable) unknowable Substance, is to be weighed in this balance, it will certainly be found wanting. Spinoza's God is in no possible sense personal; and if it be said that he calls his Substance "perfect", it can easily be made to appear that by this he only intends the attribute of infinitude. The author finally concludes that there is no escape from calling his system Atheism. "We employ

the term with no desire to imply either praise or blame, but only for the sake of clearness. Whether Spinoza's atheism is practically inferior or superior to religion, and whether it is theoretically less true or more true, are questions which we are not called upon to decide; but that it is not religion, is sufficiently clear. So far from being the religious philosopher *par excellence* which he is often supposed to be, he represents the directly opposite spirit and world-view" (p. 241). Having reached this somewhat startling conclusion, the author goes on to consider certain elements of Spinoza's teaching which seem to stand in the way of such an adverse judgment. His famous doctrine of *Amor Dei intellectualis* is subject to discount by reason of Spinoza's lack of candor, and, stripped of its religious associations, means simply this, namely, "not an affection felt for a self-conscious and responsive being, as has sometimes been naïvely assumed, but only the mental joy experienced in cognitive processes, together with such valuation of the object of knowledge conditioning the joy as is appropriate to that experience; in other words, it is nothing but delight in the intelligible as intelligible" (p. 255). The saying that pleased Goethe so much, "He who loves God cannot presume that God loves him in return", follows *more geometrico,* in this wise: God, as Substance, loves no one, and therefore the wish to be loved by God would be to wish that God were not God. Spinoza's doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul is simply the metaphysical tenet of the eternity of the mind, *ante* as well as *post.* Dogmas must not be true but pious: the religious postulates of Christian ethics are salutary fiction; though it were better, he thinks, that men should swear by the safety and liberties of their country than by God. Miracles are "mere absurdity"; Jesus Christ was merely man, and his resurrection was "spiritual". His philosophy of Determination has no place for sin *qua* sin. It is mere negation. Salvation is for the metaphysicians only, and as Mr. Pollock has characterized it, is "acquiescence in the order of nature, with the delight in knowledge thereby engendered, and living a righteous life at the bidding of reason". All this prepares Professor Powell to believe that there was some truth in the story, which has always been regarded as somewhat apochryphal, but which is ascribed to Phillipus van Limborch, an eyewitness, that at a dinner table, when someone was saying grace, Spinoza busied himself in making certain signs by which he apparently wished to indicate the stupidity of the performance. Our author thinks Spinoza was too prudent and too considerate to have been guilty of such a rudeness; but he thinks that he well might have signified his estimate of the performance to his intimate friends, and that Limborch caught a glimpse of what was going on. He believes Spinoza capable of doing it so far as his real and sincere religious convictions would be concerned.

This is a sharp and severe arraignment of Spinoza's attitude toward religion. Many there be who will stubbornly resent it, and cry out at its injustice. Many have ranked the "God-intoxicated philosopher" among the greatest saints of history. Von Dalberg enthusiastically speaks thus: "Spinoza and Christ, in these two alone is found pure

knowledge of God; in Christ the secret higher way to divinity; in Spinoza the highest peak that reasoning can reach". Hegel characterized his system as "Acosmism", and Lord Tennyson once said that Spinoza is so full of God that he sees him everywhere—so much so that he leaves no room for man".

Who is right let the experts judge. For ourselves we strongly incline to accept Professor Powell's conclusions as supported by facts. Spinoza never advanced beyond the bounds of metaphysics, and a metaphysical foundation or framework falls infinitely short of religious faith or life. Whether he was indeed an atheist or an acosmist is not much more important than a choice between tweedle dee and tweedle dum. If atheism is pancosmic, pantheism is acosmic, and in its implications either is as great an error as the other. Coleridge called pantheism "painted atheism"; and although he was anxious to clear Spinoza of the charge of atheism, he felt bound to admit that he denies all intelligence to the Absolute.

We believe this book is valuable and timely. The swing of thought is to-day toward pantheism and not toward materialism, but pantheism with its necessary elimination of Personality and Will and Love from its theistic conception is only a synonym for atheism itself. How often and how sadly has the wisdom of man been fooled by the high-sounding use of the capitalized adjectives the *Absolute*, the *Infinite*, the Immutable *et hoc omne genus* because it is forgotten that these words are only adjectives and that they can have no possible significance except as they connote attributes of that noun which names that which is "absolute", "infinite", etc., that in which these properties inhere and to which these attributes belong? And it is, moreover, necessary to remember that the highest achievement of science, as well as the deepest insight and profoundest postulate of philosophy, requires that this ultimate Being, Substance, Noumenon or what not, must be conceived under the supreme and final category of Personality.

Trenton. HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

FAITH AND THE FAITH. By T. T. EATON, D.D., LL.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 8vo., pp. 78.

An excellent and suggestive treatment, in two chapters, of the two themes designated in the title. The style of both the thought and the language is popular rather than erudite, and, for the purpose of the author, all the more effective on that account. The essay on the subjective "faith" abounds in brief and telling quotations from various writers and the ideas presented are fresh and full of helpful seed-thoughts. The second essay shows the author to be a staunch and courageous champion of the objective "faith once delivered to the Saints". He scorns the new theology and boldly declares that, after reading thousands of pages from its best defenders, he has failed to find a shred of evidence in its support. The three cardinal truths which he

names as being violently assailed and as calling for aggressive defence, are The Substitutionary Sacrifice of Christ, The Authority of Holy Scripture and The Guilt of Sin. The book is vivacious, up to date and strong. To be sure, many will stigmatize it as dogmatic, but in the presence of the charge the author may recall Matthew Arnold's reply when, after accusing Carlyle of dogmatism, and being charged by a friend with being as dogmatic as Carlyle, he said: "That may be true, but you overlook an obvious difference. I am dogmatic and right and Carlyle is dogmatic and wrong."

Trenton. HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE SCIENTIFIC CREED OF A THEOLOGIAN. By RUDOLF SCHMID, D.D., late court chaplain. Translated from the second German edition, by J. W. STOUGHTON, B.A. (Camb.). New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1906. Pp. xxiii, 251.

The Theories of Darwin, by the same author, was reviewed by me in 1883; and declared to be the most useful discussion from the philosophical side that I had met with in that particular field. McCosh's publications on the same questions were in truth more satisfactory, but they did not discuss the views of individual writers as Schmid did. On the other hand, Schmid went wrong, as I believe, and is still wrong as to the subject of inspiration. He holds strongly to inspiration of the religious elements of the Bible, but regards himself free to make fables of it on historical or scientific matters; so that his books are like the image whose head was gold and its feet a mixture of iron and clay.

In the Preface to the present work he takes back the view of its predecessor as to the relation of Science to the Biblical Record of Creation. We may remark that meanwhile much light has been cast on the style of the Creation record by the discovery of tablets which must have been known to, and may have been used by the writer. What Schmid, like many others, recognizes is the pure monotheism which is characteristic of the narrative of Genesis. But he repeats what he said in his former work, that the second and two following chapters of Genesis are inconsistent with the first chapter; and as he supposes the second to be older than the first, he defends the first at the expense of the second. In his former work he compared what he calls the two narratives of creation, and concluded that one of them was unhistorical.

In this decision he has had many followers. For our own part, we have never been able to view the second chapter as a repetition of the story of creation. In chap. I, there is a preliminary account of man's creation, as the finish of a long record; in chap. II, there is a touch-and-go reference to the general creation, and then in detail a narrative of the early experiences of man, and his relations to his environment; no room for comparison, either harmonising or its opposite.

At a later stage in the present volume the author reveals the source of his trouble. It is the biblical chronology. As to the age of the earth and its inhabitants he writes (p. 144) that the results of science

are opposed to the real or alleged words of the Bible. "It is, indeed, impossible in face of these results of science to maintain the opposite utterances of the Bible. But the abandonment of this standpoint . . . is for Christianity no loss. For this abandonment limits the character of the revelation of Holy Scripture to what is valuable for religious feeling, and especially to what relates to our redemption through Christ."

We assume that he has never heard of Dr. W. H. Green's demonstration that there is no real primeval Chronology taught in the Bible. Nor is this surprising; for within the last year or two, our American champion of Bible-authority had a plea in favor of Ussher's Chronology without mentioning Dr. Green's proof contra.

The other subjects dealt with, and ably dealt with, by Schmid are the coexistence of natural causation and teleology in the inorganic, and the organic world, and the merits of recent researches as to evolution, and especially as to the creation of man. These he holds to be by a process of descent from other forms, under God's determining and all-ruling will. He refutes the mechanical theories of Haeckel and others as to the origin of the human spirit and consciousness, citing eminent scrientific writers, chiefly German, who have led in a reaction in favor of adaptability and design as manifested in the world.

The chief cause of the breach which has sometimes arisen between science and theology is shown to be the overstepping of bounds. Both scientists and theologians have done this, the theologians when they prescribed the method scientists must pursue and the results at which they must arrive. A Christian or Antichristian view of the world is certainly not the result of scientific research, but an act of personal choice.

Princeton University G. MACLOSKIE.

CHRIST AND SCIENCE. Jesus Christ regarded as the Centre of Science. The Cole lectures for 1906, delivered before Vanderbilt University. By FRANCIS HENRY SMITH, Professor in the University of Virginia. Fleming H. Revell Company: New York, Chicago, etc. Six lectures. 12mo., pp. 240.

This is an Experience-meeting among the Methodists, in which an old man gives us his ideas concerning Science, the Old and the New Testament, Jesus Christ, and Universities and Students, and things in general. You will not be long looking over the book until you find yourself admiring and loving the old man; and, if you make enquiry, you will learn that for long time he has been preëminently the admired and beloved teacher in the grand old University which he has served for nearly all his lifetime.

He is very concise in his style, striking off in a picturesque sentence the result of the observations and meditations of his past years; especially concerning that science of Physics, of which he has been an

ardent student. He is free in acknowledging the fallibility of scientific men and describes their investigating as a sort of hunting after wild game by means of artifice and expedient. The investigator must watch and creep and seek a vantage-ground; and after all in most cases he fails. As the Lecturer goes along in this style, his pages sparkle with illustrations, chiefly from his own department of physics, and most of all from its recent developments concerning electrons and radioactivity. We have felt it very pleasant to take a round-trip with such a man through this wonderland.

Whilst conservative in his scientific as well as his Biblical mentality, he is by no means reactionary; he will not form harmonies where they do not manifestly exist; even between different branches of science he finds apparent contradictions, like those which trouble some minds as between science and faith. And he illustrates, often with freshness and force, the fundamental harmonies that are coming into view between God's works and His word. He heartily enforces the need of faith in scientific work, as well as in religion. Science as well as Scripture requires the perfect man to be humble, simple, true and believing.

When he comes to Christ his style is at its best. Following the Saviour to the fields which Jesus loved and where he watched the birds and the lilies, and the growing corn, he hits off the character of the Saviour in a way that is to us somewhat new and very beautiful.

It is manifest that Professor Smith put to himself the question which must arise with every student of God's handiworks; whether on the whole this study helps or hinders his spiritual growth. And the result in his case is that it was a help. Because of his faith, on the one hand, he has been, and is (long life to him), a better student of science, and more successful in his high office than he could be without his faith. On the other hand, his science helped him to see God everywhere; and when he came to Scripture it helped him to find such harmonies as never were found, and never could be found in the writings of uninspired humanity.

Princeton University. G. MACLOSKIE.

To CHRIST THROUGH CRITICISM. By RICHARD W. SEAVER, M.A., B.D., Scholar, and Senior Moderator in Mental and Moral Science: Donnellan Lecturer, Trinity College, Dublin: Rector of St. John's, Malone, Belfast. Containing the Substance of the Donnellan Lectures Delivered before the University of Dublin, 1905-6. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. (Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.) 1906. 8vo., pp. 211.

These lectures reveal a serious and reverent attempt to show that the heart of the Christian religion has not been destroyed, nor even wounded, by the New Criticism in the sphere of the New Testament. Correctly enough the author regards the Person of Christ as the soul of revealed

Christianity, and, although he is perhaps a little vague as to the meaning he attaches to *divinity*, he is prepared to defend the divinity of Christ; and he is, doubtless, correct in arguing that the Higher Criticism has not "taken away our Lord." He apparently disagrees with that respectable body of contemporary scholars who continue to believe that the Apostle John wrote the Fourth Gospel, and he does not hesitate to test the accuracy of points of the Gospel history by his conceptions of "the Spiritual Christ" (p. 204). But while conservative New Testament scholars may be unprepared to accept various of his leading assumptions, we cannot but admire his irenic aim and spirit. In literary form the lectures attain to a fairly high standard. In the main, their thought is clear and unmistakable.

A brilliant chapter and, to our mind, a quite satisfying piece of writing, is that in which the author discusses "the miraculous element". The following sums up his conclusions relating to the miracles of Jesus: "We are not compelled to think of a break, a discontinuity in nature in the case of the miracles of Jesus. The ordinary laws of inorganic matter are daily being interfered with by life, which has higher laws of its own. We know by experience, that through the exercise of a spiritual power, the will, laws of nature are directed towards our ends. If this be the case with us, spiritually imperfect as we confessedly are, what may we not reasonably expect in the case of one spiritually perfect, as Jesus Christ? If the laws of nature be the expression of the will of God, we may be confident that in no case were they contravened by Him whose whole life was complete fulfilment of the divine obedience" (p. 110). Less satisfactory is the author's discussion of the Atonement, wherein in trying to describe what is evidently intended to be understood as the Calvinistic view of the relation of the death of Christ to the decrees of God he really offers a caricature of the Calvinistic type of thinking (p. 161). To single out one more illustration of the author's conclusions with which we beg to differ, we may refer to his reference to the subject of War, in his concluding chapter. He finds that "at first sight" War, Law and Trade are opposed by the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount; "yet Christian society", he adds, "has long since made up its mind about them, and we all accept them as among the necessities or occupations of human society", etc. So? The present writer, then, must be ruled out of the human family,—for he is not of the "all"—along with the Society of Friends, the members of the Peace societies of England and America and a growing multitude of Christians in general who decidedly do not believe that War is one of the "necessities" of a Christian state, but who, on the contrary, regard it as an illogical and ungodly element in the body of Christian civilization. Would not the author probably have included Slavery and the Duel, if he had been writing seventy-five years ago, as "necessities" of the Christian state?

In purpose and method, however, these lectures are constructive and in temper they are kindly and spiritual.

Cranford, N. J. GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

T'AI-SHANG KAN-YING P'IEN. Treatise of the Exalted One on Repose and Retribution. Translated from the Chinese by TEITARO SUZUKI and DR. PAUL CARUS. Containing Introduction, Chinese Text, Verbatim Translation, Translation, Explanatory Notes, and Moral Tales. Edited by DR. PAUL CARUS. With Sixteen Plates by Chinese Artists and a Frontispiece by Keichyu Yamada. 8vo., pp. 139. Chicago, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Co. London: Keegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1906.

YIN CHIH WEN. The Tract of the Quiet Way with Extracts from the Chinese Commentary. Translated from the Chinese by TEITARO SUZUKI and DR. PAUL CARUS. Edited by DR. PAUL CARUS. With Frontispiece. 8vo., pp. 48. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. London Agents: Keegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1906.

These are the two tracts which represent the ethics of Taouism. The form in which they are issued does credit to the translators, to the editor, and to the publisher. Nothing is left undone to render these venerable and interesting booklets intelligible and attractive; and we are glad. We could scarcely be taught more impressively how ineffaceably God has written his law on the human heart: most of those natural virtues which the common conscience of man requires are here enjoined. Moreover, we are shown as impressively the inconsistency and the folly of man when not enlightened and guided by special divine revelation. Thus amid many commendable precepts in these tracts we find others which are merely silly and puerile. For example: "Never destroy paper which is written upon," "Do not spit toward shooting stars," etc. The reason for this is also evident. There are almost no allusions to any duty to a Supreme Being. Hence, as right is grounded in expediency rather than in His eternal and immutable nature, it is vain to look for anything like an ethical system. At best we can have only ethical precepts, some of which are likely to be inconsistent. We may not hope for principles of righteousness. We may not close this brief notice without calling attention to a misleading statement at the opening of the Introduction to the first of the above works. It is this: "The treatise of "The Exalted One on Repose and Retribution" will probably have to be assigned the first place of all publications on the globe. Its editions exceed even those of the Bible and Shakespeare." This may be, but are the editions anything like as large or the copies sold so numerous as those of the Bible?

Princeton. WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY, being an Examination of the More Important Arguments For and Against Believing in that Religion. Compiled from Various Sources by LT.-COL. W. H. TURTON, D. S. O. Royal Engineers. Fifth Edition. Seventh Thousand. 8vo.; pp. viii., 539. London: Wells, Gardner, Darton & Co., Ltd., 3 Paternoster Buildings, E. C., and 44 Victoria Street, S. W. 1905.

The first edition of this work, published in 1895, was very favorably reviewed in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, No. 44, by the present writer. Since then it has been carefully revised three times, has been somewhat shortened, and in the case of a few of the chapters has been rearranged. These changes have only confirmed the reviewer in his original judgment that, all things considered, Lt.-Col. Turton had given us the ablest discussion of the Christian Evidences in English. The publishers, too, have rendered the book as attractive as he had made it strong.

Princeton. WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

A REASONABLE VIEW OF THE OLD TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES. By A. LAYMAN. London: Elliott Stock, 62 Paternoster Row. Pp. 40. Price 1 shilling.

The author makes no claim to originality, but attempts to summarize the results of "Constructive Criticism". He rehearses the more familiar theories of the radical critics, and suggests a reconstruction of the Old Testament history. It is insisted that the only book of the Old Testamen which was completed before the exile was the Book of Deuteronomy. This book was the work of priests employed by Josiah in carrying out his religious reform. It was not until after the return that the larger part of the Pentateuch was composed. The elaborate ritual of the sacrifices suggested in Leviticus was not established in the wilderness by divine command, but was borrowed from the customs of the Babylonian idol-worshipers. The Book of Chronicles contains impossible amplifications of the grandeur of King Solomon. "Many of the statements are manifestly self-contradictory, and point to a very low state of morals. It is an anachronism that they should be placed in the hands of the heathen as the inspired Word of God. The compilers of the Books of the Old Testament ascribed to David, to Solomon, and to Moses words they never wrote, but they only acted in accordance with the practice of ancient times". The writer sums up his message in a quotation which begins as follows: "Judaism is a Jewish rendering of the ancient Babylonian, Egyptian, Hindoo, and Zoroastrian religions, blended, modified, improved". How thankful we are for this word "Improved"! It is rather amusing to notice one who is borrowing so freely from the writings of infallible critics, one who is able to correct the statements of inspired writers, declaring that "Jerome translated the Greek Scriptures in the year 500", and that "the years of Melchisedec, and other persons who are stated to have lived to a very considerable old age, were not solar years, but lunar years, or more properly speaking, lunar months". To many persons this will be the first suggestion of the measure of Melchisedec's life. It is doubtful whether these borrowed statements will commend themselves to most readers as "A Reasonable

View of the Old Testament Scriptures" in harmony with "human reason, with morality, with the profoundest philosophy, and with all possible scientific discovery".

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE CORRECTED ENGLISH NEW TESTAMENT. A revision of the "Authorized Version" (by Nestle's Resultant Text), prepared with the assistance of eminent scholars, and issued by SAMUEL LLOYD, a life-governor of the British and Foreign Bible Society, as his Memorial of the Society's Centenary, 1904. With Preface by the Bishop of Durham. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1905. 16mo.; pp. xxviii. 516.

Nothing could be more welcome to a lover of the English Bible than the frequent attempts now making to better it. Among these attempts the one now before us has especial interest from its origin, purpose and principles. It has arisen out of an earnest desire to perfect the English form of the Scriptures, with the especial intent of making their contents more accessible to the general reader. It is presented to the British and Foreign Bible Society as a memorial of its centenary and a gentle reminder that its full task is not yet done. And it is ruled by the principle that readableness is as valuable an asset for a popular book as extreme exactness of rendering. What the translators aim at is apparently to combine with the attention to details characteristic of the translators of the Revised Version of 1881, a similar attention to the general effect of clauses and sentences and paragraphs, thus securing, as they hope, a more faithful version because a version which does not so lose itself in niceties that it cannot convey the impression of the whole,—which is after all the main matter.

An appreciative but cautious preface by Bishop Moule expresses his "deliberate concurrence with the idea and programme" of the undertaking—"on the whole". "On the whole"—because he does not approve wholly of the textual basis of Nestle's text; nor go all the way with one of the expedients adopted to give a more harmonious English form to the result—viz., the transposition of words and phrases. But he thinks the Revised Version does lack seriously in "English felicity", and that in "countless instances" the present version succeeds in this where its predecessor failed. We cannot say that a cursory reading of the book has made quite so favorable an impression upon us as its better study has made on Dr. Moule. We thankfully recognize the earnest spirit which has governed its preparation and the considerable measure of success which has crowned its effort. But the book as a whole has failed to commend itself to us, as we read, as more felicitous than even the Revised Version, which, in the New Testament at least, has undeniably sacrificed felicity of phrase in numberless passages to an exactness of rendering which can scarcely escape the reproach of pedantry. Pedantry does not seem to us to be escaped by this rendering either, though it is a pedantry of a different kind; not so much the pedantry of the classical school-room as the pedantry of the purveyor

of "plain English". "Felicitous" is scarcely the term which would have suggested itself to us to describe its English style, which seems to us good, indeed, but lacking in life and sometimes forced. Nor do we think it has gained greatly by the text it has adopted as its basis, good again as it undeniably is—and better in Nestle than here, by so much as in a few rather important cases the translators have deserted Nestle's guidance.

Let us open the book at the beginning—at that exceedingly plain passage of the genealogy of Jesus—and we shall have at once a fair example of what the new translation gives us. Instead of (Mat. i. 1) "the book of the generation of Jesus Christ", it would have us read simply, "the genealogy of Jesus Christ": and this we consider an improvement,—and possibly as good a rendering as could be made—unless indeed we could be more literal at the same time that we are faithful and render: "The genealogical register of Jesus Christ". Then (verses 3 and 5) we are to read instead of "of Tamar, Rahab, Ruth", etc., "by Tamar", etc., and (v. 6) instead of "her that had been the wife of Uriah" simply "by the widow of Uriah". The primary change here seems to be in the interest of current technical language and may be accepted on that ground, while the reduction of the paraphrase in v. 6 is surely an improvement and might be made even better by reading "by Uriah's widow". In verses 11, 12 and 17, the heavy phrase of the older version is resolved into the simpler "the Babylonian captivity", and v. 17 is reduced to the form of an enumeration, and the archaic preposition "unto" changed to "to", but at the same time the tense of the verb is altered. This plain passage is, in other words, plainly dealt with and with excellent effect. When we reach the 18th verse, however, we strike a "transposition" which at first sight at least does not so easily commend itself. For the archaic "on this wise" it is proposed to read the simple "thus", but this "thus" is carried back to the beginning of the sentence and we are asked to accept this form: "Now, thus was the birth of Jesus Christ"—which impresses us as very harsh, far harsher than the purely literal rendering would be: "Now, Jesus Christ's birth was thus". Nor do we like the presentation of the next verse, with its theatrical pause and hyphenated emphasis: "After Mary his mother had been betrothed to Joseph, before they came together she was found to be with child—by the Holy Spirit". In the interests of a really plain English and of care not to overdo the aorist participle, why not say simply: "His mother Mary was betrothed to Joseph, but before they came together she was found with child by the Holy Spirit"? And so it goes on, commending and not commending itself to the reader by turns—now introducing a slightly plainer rendering, now missing an important emphasis (as in v. 21),—and, on the whole, shall we say making an improvement on the Revised Version, or not?

On the whole, we think not. And this becomes clearer when we proceed from narrative passages, which lend themselves to simple treatment, to didactic ones, in which an attempt at simple English may involve confusion of the sense. Take, for example, Rom. 5: 12: "Wherefore,

as through one man sin entered the world, and death through sin, even so death passed upon all men, seeing that all sinned". This is simple enough: but is it what Paul said? Take again, Rom. 5: 18: "Therefore, as the result of one transgression reached unto all men unto condemnation, even so the result of one acquittal reaches unto all men unto a justification giving life". Can that even pretend to represent the Greek? Take again Heb. i. 1: "God, having spoken in the prophets in time past, in many portions and in many ways, to the fathers, hath, at the end of these days, spoken to us by a Son", etc. Can that enter a claim to being even simple and clear—as simple and clear as the Revised Version? And does not the rendering of Heb. i. 6: "And, again, when He bringeth the First-born into the world, He saith . . . " attain its clarity at the expense of its faithfulness? Who would even imagine from that rendering that it is of the *second* coming of Christ that the author is speaking: "But when He shall again have brought in the first-born into the world . . . "? On the whole, then, we seem to perceive that the zeal to render the English text clear and simple has pressed too often beyond the mark—sometimes defeating itself, sometimes sacrificing the true sense to plainness of expression, sometimes issuing in sheer confusion. Many times, undoubtedly, it has been more successful, and no one will hesitate to endorse Bishop Moule's verdict that this rendering constitutes "a very important and faithful contribution to the great and necessarily gradual work of providing an ultimate ideal English Bible". Suggestions there are here which future revisers may well take to heart: but as a Bible to be taken as it stands—our conviction is that the old is better. It is excessively hard to make a better English version of the New Testament than that we already have.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

THE PROPHET OF NAZARETH. By Nathaniel Schmidt, Professor of Semitic Languages and Literature in Cornell University, Director of the American School of Archæology in Jerusalem. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1905. Pp. x, 422. Price, $2.50 net.

Prof. Schmidt's book bears an appropriate title. When he calls Jesus "The Prophet of Nazareth" the negative implication is that the founder of Christianity claimed to be a prophet only, not the Messiah; the positive implication, that the great influence exerted by Him in the past and expected still to proceed from Him in the future is essentially a prophetic influence, the influence of teaching, not that of supernatural power. Towards impressing these two facts upon the reader the whole book is directed. He who would look in it for a detailed and exhaustive discussion of the life of Jesus would be disappointed. Barely two chapters of fourteen are given to this, covering no more than 78 pages out of a total of 422. In part this is due to the negative, agnostic conclusions at which the author arrives in his discussion of the sources: so little certain is known of the history of

Jesus that a brief compass suffices for telling it; consequently, we hear much more about the Gospels and their criticism than about Jesus Himself. But to a larger degree this disproportion is due to the author's consciously-pursued aim of eliminating the Messianic factor from the life and mind of Jesus, which can, of course, be done only through a lengthy critical investigation. Evidently Prof. Schmidt feels, and correctly so, that in the Messianic consciousness lies the root of the whole evil growth of Christology, of all the supernatural, divine attributes the Saviour has borne to the church through the ages: here also lies the fatal hindrance to that clear appreciation of Jesus in his prophetic character, from which he has such high hopes for the future. As long as Jesus continues to figure as the Messiah, He will also loom in the minds of men as that which the early church, on the basis of his Messiahship, made Him, the divine dispenser of supernatural powers. It boots little to reject the Fourth Gospel with its high doctrine of the Lord's preëxistence and divinity, or to eliminate from the Synoptics all analogous testimony to the superhuman character of Jesus; whilst the Messianic element remains, the saving Christ, the divine Christ will ever anew be born in the hearts and heads of mankind. Hence, Prof. Schmidt is not satisfied with the makeshifts that are sometimes resorted to, where it is desired to neutralize this factor without going to the extreme of rejecting it in toto as unhistorical. He will have none of the view that the Messianic idea was the perishable form in which the unique religious and moral consciousness of Jesus clothed itself, nor of the view that the Messiahship was to Jesus a burden rather than a glory and joy, nor of the view that He contemplated Himself rather as one destined to Messiahship in the future, than as one clothed with Messiahship in the present. All these attempts are shallow compromises: the simple truth is that the Messianic idea played no rôle in the mind and experience of Jesus whatever. It is true the author claims to have reached this conclusion against his own wishes and prepossessions, under the sheer compulsion of the evidence. Nevertheless, we here and there discover clear traces of the influence which his idealization of Jesus as a prophet and religious genius has had in making the Messianic consciousness appear to him an *à-priori* impossible thing. In discussing the classical passage Mt. xi. *27* he declares: "Such an utterance is out of harmony with the admittedly genuine sayings of Jesus, and casts an undeserved reflection upon his character. . . . How can the gentle teacher . . . be supposed to have imagined himself possessed of all knowledge and regarded all other men as ignorant of God?" (p. 152). That is to say, it is ultimately the character of Jesus, as the author apprehends it, which protests against his Messiahship.

Prof. Schmidt is careful to undermine the Old Testament basis of the Messianic interpretation of Christ and Christianity. He bestows a great deal of pains upon showing that the traditonal exegesis of the prophecies and types is a delusion. In fact, he goes to the trouble of examining all these predictions and types and pointing out how in each

case they can be interpreted with perfect naturalness without aid of the Messianic theology. It might seem as if all this labor were superfluous for the author's own purpose. Whether the Old Testament prophecies contain a Messianic eschatology or not is or ought to be from his standpoint immaterial for the question of the Messianic consciousness of Jesus. The only relevant point to raise would be not what the prophecies contained, but what Jesus found there, how He interpreted them. If Prof. Schmidt, nevertheless, takes the trouble of clearing away from the Old Testament all this Messianic lumber, we feel tempted to believe that he here applies the same principle which led him to declare the Messianic element impossible within the character and mind of Jesus. If in Jesus, the supreme prophet, there is no place for this idea, because it is an idea belonging to a distinctly lower level of religious development, why should there be room for it in the great Hebrew prophets of earlier date?

Hence all so-called Messianic predictions are explained as hopes attaching themselves to contemporaneous historical persons. It was the elevation of Jehojachin from his dungeon and the birth of his son Sheshbazzar that inspired the sublime oracles of Is. ix. and xi. In some of the Psalms living Hasmonæan rulers are referred to and only considerably later were the Psalms Messianically interpreted. "So far as documents give evidence, the expectation of a future deliverer of Israel, designated as the Messiah, seems to have appeared for the first time soon after the conquest of Palestine by Pompey in 63 B. C. It is found in the so-called Psalms of Solomon" (p. 68). And even this Messiah, become an eschatological figure at so late a date, remained for a long time purely political, and the Messianic hope was cherished only by some fractions of the people. The author does not think much of the most recent theory, that the Messianic eschatology was developed under the influence of Persian thought, for the very reason that the Persian Saoshyas were of an unpolitical character. It is no wonder that he refuses to credit Jesus with the application to Himself of a notion of such antecedents and such content. But surely our Lord Himself took a different view of the origin and meaning of the Messianic material in the Old Testament. Nor can we see that the author has done justice to the Apocalyptic literature. He practically ignores the transcendental Messianism that is indubitably present there. The whole recent trend towards recognizing a high Jewish Christology is left out of account. Little is said about the doctrine of the Messiah's preëxistence. Partly this is again due to a late dating of the sources (*e. g.*, the Similitudes of Enoch from the time of Domitian), partly to the assumption of Christian interpolations in the original Jewish documents. The author seems bent upon the persecution of the Messianic concept even here and determined to rout it out of its last refuge in the apocalyptic writings. To be sure, after so little attention has been paid to the transcendental Christology, it is somewhat surprising to read on p. 89: "The reaction against thoughts peculiar to the followers of Jesus had probably removed some of the transcendental aspects of

the Messianic ideal" (*i. e.*, from the thought of post-Christian Judaism). "The Messiah expected even by an Akiba was just the kind of man that Simon was". But from the entire preceding discussion the impression might easily have been gathered that the Messianic ideal had never varied much from the type of Simon.

Coming to the Gospels, we here also find that the author's critical views are well-adjusted to the main thesis he advocates. None of the Gospels were written by apostles or eye-witnesses, or existed at all before some sixty years or more had passed since the death of Jesus. They are late translations of the original Aramaic tradition, suffering from a load of accidental or intentional changes, weighed down with layer after layer of corrections, comments and interpolations. Prof. Schmidt expresses himself so strongly on this point, that one might justly expect the historic existence of Jesus itself to become imperiled by his doubts. He himself feels this and confesses to having faced this problem without fear or prepossessions. But "it was with a deep satisfaction the author found himself borne along by the force of what seemed to him incontrovertible facts to the conviction that Jesus of Nazareth actually existed, that some of the events of his life may be known to us, that some of his words may be recovered, and that his personality, imperfectly as we know it, and widely as it differed from the estimate of the church, is as sublime and potent for good as ever" (p. 233). If we enquire into the critical canons by means of which the salvage of this precious remnant out of the wreck of tradition is effected we find them to be the following: the translatability of a saying into Aramaic is a test of genuineness, especially when translated back it reveals an even more remarkable originality than in the Greek; the Schmiedel-principle, that an utterance which runs contrary to the belief of the later church about Jesus must be authentic, is brought into requisition; the later prevalence of the Messianic dogma especially is worked along this line, on the ground that whatever was least suitable for "the Messianic propaganda made by a group of demagogues and teachers in the interest of the Nazarene" must for that very reason go back to Jesus, *e. g.*, the parables with their constant emphasis on the kingdom of heaven and the Father in heaven. That is to say: incompatability with the Messianic idea creates a presumption of genuineness. But, if on the basis of such considerations the author is able to save sufficient material out of which to construe his conception of "the prophet of Nazareth", it is obvious that, negatively viewed, his critical canons are admirably adapted for eliminating the Messianic element from the Gospels. Negatively almost anything can be done with a tradition that comes down to us in such a corrupt state. As to further details of Gospel-criticism the author falls in with Wrede in his scepticism about the alleged superiority of Mark from a historical point of view. "The assumption that he comprehended the growth of Jesus' Messianic consciousness and the gradual unfolding of his Messianic programme better than the other evangelists is not well founded" (p. 224). And in general the two-document hypothesis finds no favor in his sight.

The hypothesis of a *Logia Jesu* is unnecessary for the explanation of the synoptic problem, indeed only productive of new difficulties. Even the Greek Matthew is older than Mark.

In arguing from the Gospel-material in favor of his main contention the author makes ample use of the critical freedom he has thus proclaimed for himself. His chief reliance is, of course, the ruling out of all the Son-of-Man-passages, so far as they have Messianic implications. The methods and conclusions on this point are the same as those employed by him in the well-known article in the Encyclopædia Biblica. Jesus used it a few times in genuine sayings of man generically. In the original form of the Synoptic Apocalypse (a Jewish work) a man was introduced who was none other than the celestial being of Dan. vii. 13, identified sometimes with the Messiah, sometimes with Enoch, sometimes (as the author himself believes to be the case in the Daniel-passage) with Michael. This Synoptic Apocalypse was translated into Greek; and, because it was concerned with the destruction of Jerusalem, and Jesus was known to have predicted the overthrow of the Jewish state and cult, the Christians in adopting the Apocalypse could not help identifying the Son-of-Man figure with their Messiah. In its literally translated Greek form the phrase Bar-Nasha easily assumed the appearance of a title. Then gnostic speculation about "the Macrocosmic man" and "the second man" merged with this idea of the "Son of Man" in Daniel. While these things were floating in the air the translated apocalypse was incorporated in part in the Gospels, and from it, what appeared to be a Messianic usage, was carried over into other passages of the gospel-narrative.

It is to be regretted that the author has not supplemented his negative procedure of eliminating the Messianic element from the life of Jesus by a positive construction of the genesis of the Messianic character of Jesus in the mind of the disciples after Jesus' death. To know how the phrase "Son of Man" became a Messianic title may be of some interest: of incomparably greater interest from the author's point of view is the problem how the prophet of Nazareth came to be considered the Messiah. Why was not the prophetic category sufficient for the veneration of his disciples in the sequel as well as during his life-time? And to this we must add another remark with reference to the negative procedure itself. By a critical or exegetical examination one by one of the passages or groups of evidence in which the Messianic concept occurs the author seeks to convince us that there is no necessity for assuming its presence in the original history or tradition. But even granting (what we are by no means ready to grant) that he has in all these instances made out a plausible case, the number itself of the instances it is necessary thus to get rid of either by excision or interpretation is so great as to hang a heavy load around the neck of the hypothesis. Besides, even with all this mass of evidence neutralized in one way or another, one cannot help feeling that the Messianic spirit is still there in the Gospels, intangible perhaps, but none the less real and persistent. It is a spirit that will not be exorcised by dealing with

individual passages. Even in his prophetic utterances Jesus speaks with an authority greater than that of any prophet. The problem is not to explain away certain Messianic elements in the sources, but to wipe out the pervasive Messianic character of these sources, and that in such a way as to retain of the de-Messianized material something substantial enough out of which to construct a life-like plausible plan of the life and teaching of Jesus. We do not believe that with all his critical acumen, historical grasp and literary skill the author has succeeded in doing this.

Still another point in which we have to find fault with Prof. Schmidt's method concerns the over-assurance of his presentation and exploitation of critical views which are, to say the least, still under debate, as if they were definitely settled and could be henceforth used as so many axioms. Frequently views of this kind are given without so much as an intimation that even in far from conservative circles great diversity of opinion or scepticism on such matters prevails. We mention only two or three instances. The author espouses the view that the virgin-birth was superimposed upon the original form of the gospel-narrative according to which Jesus was the son of Joseph and Mary. But he does not explain what the retouching precisely consisted in, nor make any reference to the serious criticism that has been passed upon every hypothesis so far proposed in this direction. While accepting the theory of the Gentile origin of the virgin-birth conception, he makes no attempt to reconcile it with the palpably Jewish character of the narratives of the nativity. Another instance is his acceptance of Wrede's view with reference to the recognition of the *Messiasgeheimnis* by the demoniacs. Here again we receive no inkling of the objections raised against this view within the critical camp itself. In general one would never infer from the author's smooth representation that the dissensus among critics even on the great dominating problems has increased to such an extent as to threaten chaos for their whole treatment of the life and teaching of Jesus.

Apart from the Messianic problem, the author's sketch of Jesus appears to us one-sided. The religious aspect of His personality and teaching remains altogether too much in the background, whereas the ethical aspect is magnified to the utmost. In fact, the author finds fault with Wellhausen, who, while describing with fine appreciation Jesus' religious message, fails in his view to do equal justice to his ethical teachings. Wellhausen would be quite justified in turning back this charge with the terms reversed upon Prof. Schmidt himself. The religion the latter ascribes to Jesus is largely the indirect religion of ethics.

In the concluding chapters, entitled The Present Problem and The Leadership of Jesus, the author deals with the relation of Christianity to the practical issues of modern life. We have all respect for the earnestness with which the qualifications of Jesus to meet the needs of humanity at the present-day are upheld as over against all other intellectual or economic panaceas. In describing the pressing nature of the problems and the acute character of the evils of modern life no

one will accuse Prof. Schmidt of undue optimism. But is it not over-sanguine to expect the cure for all this tremendous disease and evil from Jesus as a Prophet and Teacher? The Jesus who in former ages has healed the nations and renewed the fountains of life for humanity was surely far more than this. It is the old delusion of rationalism that the world can be saved by teaching. Even the Prophet of Nazareth as Prof. Schmidt loves to describe Him, must prove sadly unequal to this gigantic task, if He has no other means for its execution than the few ethical and religious apophthegms fished up by the critics, as alone genuine, out of the turbid stream of tradition.

Princeton. GEERHARDUS VOS.

JESUS UND PAULUS. Eine freundschaftliche Streitschrift gegen die Religionsgeschichtlichen Volksbücher von D. BOUSSET und D. WREDE. Von D. JULIUS KAFTAN. Tübingen 1906. Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Pp. 77.

The value of this little brochure should not be measured by its size. It derives unusual interest from the fact that the Jesus-Paul controversy stands to-day in the forefront of theological discussion, and even more from the fact that one of the best-known representatives of the old Ritschlian guard here throws down the gauntlet to the two most able and conspicuous champions of the *"religionsgeschichtliche Methode"*, Drs. Bousset and Wrede. Dr. Kaftan calls his booklet "a friendly controversial treatise", but for all that it is not lacking in candor and incisiveness. If some things are said in it which too clearly reflect the peculiar Ritschlian standpoint of the writer to meet with our unqualified approval, a great many more things are said whose pertinence and convincing character is entirely independent of any dogmatic presuppositions. In a certain sense one might even say that the writer's consistent Ritschlianism has endowed him with a peculiar qualification to expose and castigate the flagrant faults of the method against which his attack is directed. He first of all addresses himself to the principles on which, according to their editor, Schiele, the *religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher* are based. To most of these he takes no exception. There is one, however, which falls under his condemnation: "the principle of the inexorableness of the scientific method, which arranges all spheres of the universe according to their special character and subjects them to the common rules of reason". Dr. Kaftan objects to this, that there is no such thing as "inexorable method"; method is not a matter of "ethics", but of "technique", more subject to change than almost anything else. What really hides itself under this phrase of "the inexorableness of scientific method" is nothing else but the inexorable determination of the advocates of the method under review, that the Christian religion shall have no special standing, but shall in the investigation of its origin and development submit to the same laws of reason which apply to other religions. In other words, the *à-priori* rationalistic principle of the naturalistic character of Christianity finds here expression. This, of course, cannot but provoke the violent dissent of a Ritschlian of the

old type, for whom the tenet still holds, that, ruling out all natural theology, ours is a religion derived entirely through revelation in Jesus Christ. But it is interesting to observe the specific Ritschlian form this protest against rationalism assumes with Dr. Kaftan. He bases it on the positivistic principle of the theoretical unknowableness of the metaphysical background of things, on the relativity of all science. All dogma must be excluded from scientific investigation, not only in the premise, but also in the conclusion. "Shall an exception to this be made", he asks, "in favor of the dogmas of rationalism?" He rightly divines that back of all the talk about method, lies the modern view of the world with its bald negation of the supernatural. But his Ritschlianism shuts him up to a position where he can wield no other weapon against this than the neo-Kantian contention that no theoretical world-view is possible of any kind, rationalistic or otherwise, and that the maxim of "the inexorable method" is a base betrayal of the principle of the relativity of all scientific knowledge. Still, it is of some value to be able to register the judgment (however supported) of a man of Dr. Kaftan's reputation, to the effect, that in the work of the *"religionsgeschlichtler"* an *à-prioristic* rationalism voices itself. Precisely, because it is avowedly based, not on theological, but on philosophical grounds, the judgment is above suspicion of prejudice. If one of us conservatives were to offer such criticism the retort would come quickly, that we call rationalism everything that is not in line with our supernaturalism, though it be the pure induction of science. To Dr. Kaftan's criticism no such answer can be made. And the criticism of unscientific *à-priorism* is all the more pertinent in the present case, because the followers of the new method almost weary us with their protestations, that they desire to offer and do offer nothing else but pure distilled science, from which every traditional, dogmatic ingredient has been removed. They make a point of showing us the real Jesus, the real Paul, not the Jesus and Paul as we are accustomed to see them through the colored glasses of our creed. Where such professions are made, it is doubly unpardonable to lay on the colors of the *"moderne Weltanschauung"*.

First of all, then, Kaftan takes Bousset to task for the latter's representation of the historical Jesus, or, more strictly speaking, in Bousset he takes issue with the entire modern conception of Jesus. For Bousset is excellently suited to serve as a type of this conception, since he does not stand for any of its abnormal excrescences or exaggerations. Bousset admits that Jesus considered himself the Messiah. He holds to the historicity of the title "Son of Man" as a self-designation on Jesus' part. If there be something fundamentally wrong from the historic point of view in his picture, it may safely be assumed that the same faults belong in far more accentuated form to other less guarded and less sane descriptions. Now the main criticism urged against Bousset's view of Jesus is this, that it does not give due weight to the Messianic element as the central factor in the Saviour's self-consciousness. Bousset first describes Jesus as a prophet, his activity as pro-

phetic activity, and only towards the close comes to speak of the idea of Messiahship. This sequence is characteristic of the relative importance attributed to these two aspects of Jesus' work. The Messianic idea was for him simply a form in which he expressed the content of his inner life, an inadequate form, and not only that, but also a burden under which He had to labor in silence until the close of his life, a conviction which never became a source of true joy to him. Kaftan very properly protests that this is a marvellous way of writing history. Not a particle of proof has been adduced either by Bousset, or by any other of the modern writers, who so glibly talk of a distinction between the religious content of Jesus' life and the clumsy Messianic form, in which it found expression to himself, not a particle of proof has been adduced to show that in Jesus' own consciousness there was any basis for such a distinction or that any reality corresponded to it. The distinction has its sole origin in the aversion of the modern mind to the Messianic concept, an aversion born from the perception that the latter sums up in itself the supernatural, eschatological aspect of Jesus' Person and work. What is offered as the historical picture of Jesus is in reality the profession of faith of a modern Christian, his estimate of what Jesus should be, in order to appeal to our age, not a faithful reproduction of what Jesus was to His own mind and experience. If anything is plain, then it is this, that according to the Gospels Jesus did not feel the Messianic vocation as a burden. Nor was it the mere fringe of His consciousness, it was present to Him at all times, dominated and colored all other aspects of His life and activity. If a large part of His ministry bore prophetic features, this was not because before all else He regarded Himself as a prophet, but simply because He judged such prophetic work esential and subservient to the prosecution of his Messianic calling. In other words, we have in the Gospels not a prophet in the guise of the Messiah, but a Messiah engaged in prophetic work. Because Bousset reverses this and is not able to view the prophetic activity in a Messianic light, he also misinterprets "the enthusiastic features" in the career of Jesus as morbid phenomena of his nervous constitution. Over against this Kaftan places the view, that all the religious and ethical teaching which formed the content of Jesus' prophetic message, appeared to Him in the light of an anticipation, a provisional application and possession of the principles and blessings of the Messianic Kingdom, so that the religion and ethics of the Gospel-sayings should, in order to reproduce the true mind of Jesus, be interpreted, not according to the shallow modern conception, but in their full soteriological value. And the Jesus who thus viewed and felt Himself at every point of his work the Messiah confidently expected from God the authentication of His Messianic dignity in some solemn supernatural act, whereby the new aeon would be actually introduced. This act the disciples believed to have taken place in the resurrection, and therefore dated from it the new order of affairs. From a Jesus thus interpreted and from Him only can we say that there is a direct line of transition to the primitive apostolic preaching. A Jesus-religion,

such as the modern theologians conceive of, has never existed, neither before the death of Jesus in his own mind, nor after his resurrection in the mind of the disciples; and "if it had existed, this would have been in direct opposition to the mind and intent of Jesus Himself. If anybody thinks that the signs of the times point in such a direction, that the further development of Christianity should be held to that course, let him act on that conviction; but let him not appeal in justification of his view to the historical Jesus, for every appeal of this kind is a stupendous self-delusion" (p. 27).

So much for the Jesus of Bousset. Now as to the Paul of Wrede. As is well-known, the latter writer, in his contributions to the series of *Volksbücher*, has placed Paul at the farthest remove from Christ, so as to present him practically as the second and more influential founder of Christianity. At the same time, this view implies a depreciating estimate of the value of Paul's work; the influence of the Apostle was away from the direction marked out by Jesus; it meant the substitution of a religion of redemption for the simple gospel of Christ. This religion of Paul is largely Christological in its origin, and through the Christology, of which it is the offshoot, reaches back into Paul's prae-Christian past, into Judaism. Wrede is inclined, on the other hand, to deny, or at least to minimize, the presence of the Messianic element in the consciousness of Jesus, so that inevitably Jesus and Paul are drawn far apart on this most important point. While thus making much of the element of redemption in Paul's teaching, Wrede relegates to a quite secondary place the doctrine of justification through faith. This was a mere temporary phase of the Apostle's preaching called forth by an apologetic emergency, of purely missionary significance, in no wise the center of his gospel. Redemption meant to him the process of the actual deliverance from the world, from the flesh, sin, the law, death. It takes place wholly in the objective sphere, in Christ, His death, His resurrection; all man has to do with reference to it is to believe, *i. e.*, (according to Wrede's interpretation), to accept the doctrine. Prof. Kaftan not unnaturally thinks that this is as much, if not more, of a perversion of the historical Paul as the Jesus-picture drawn by Bousset is of the true Jesus. But he finds himself in a peculiar quandary when it comes to proving this, because Wrede has from the outset rendered his own position invulnerable by two assertions. The one is that by long intimate acquaintance with the traditional Paul the average theological mind has become utterly disqualified for seeing the Apostle in his true historic character. The other assertion is that the thought of the Apostle moves with entire freedom and carelessness, regardless of logical harmony in the field of doctrinal expression. Consequently, whatever might be gathered from the Pauline documents in refutation of Wrede's construction of the center of Paul's gospel, is sure to be put down to the account of logical inconsistency and not allowed to stand as evidence of a different construction. Under these trying circumstances our author decides that nothing remains for him but to offer a historical and psychological explanation of the genesis of this peculiar

interpretation of Paul, which Wrede would foist upon us, and the demonstration of the un-Pauline character of which he has precluded by his twofold assertion. The explanation is as follows: the whole trouble lies in the unconscious bondage of Wrede to an old, inveterate prejudice, viz., that Paul was a dogmatician, and that, consequently, the interpretation of his thoughts ought to take its point of departure from a doctrinal conception. That is the root of the whole evil. The prejudice dates from the days of the old orthodoxy, but Baur and Holsten have carried it over into the modern historical discussion of Paulinism. And so it lingers and works its havoc in the mind of Wrede. Now, it is not our present purpose to take issue with Kaftan as to the sense and extent in which Paul can be said to have been or not to have been a "theologian" or "dogmatician". We are not quite ready to fall in with the present vogue of denying in toto the Apostle's theological bent. It is not necessary to run into extremes here. Paul may have been a theologian to some extent, and yet it need not follow that his whole gospel was the product of theological excogitation. In some respects his theology may have been the fruit of his life-experience and in other respects his life-experience may have been shaped by his theology. Kaftan himself admits that there is an element of theology in the Apostle's teaching, although he assigns this to the periphery rather than to the center. But, leaving all this to one side, we think the writer has skillfully laid bare the source of the radical distortion of Paul's gospel in Wrede's treatise. The gospel of redemption, broadly speaking, was certainly not objective in the sense affirmed by the latter; it was the outcome of a vital religious experience. Paul's theology was a theology based on life, to be sure a life not purely subjective, but supernaturally communicated and authenticated to him, so that its bestowal could be called in the full sense of the word a revelation. And this applies likewise to his teaching on justification by faith, which Wrede would separate from the redemption-theology. Both are at bottom equally experiential, equally vital, and both belong together. The definition of faith as a bare acceptance of the redemption-doctrine, is a caricature of the true Pauline conception of faith. Besides this undue emphasis on the dogmatic element, there are two other features of Wrede's interpretation of the Apostle to which Kaftan vigorously objects. The one is what he calls "an exaggerated striving after historical objectivity". By this is meant that Wrede almost proceeds on the principle: nothing is genuinely Pauline if a modern mind is able sympathetically to understand it. The more unintelligible and bizarre the thoughts appear to us, the more certain it is that Paul actually conceived them. This is illustrated from Wrede's treatment of Rom. vii. and reduces it *ad absurdum* by quoting his statement, that the picture of redemption drawn by Paul is absolutely "cold and impersonal"; that is to say, not to Paul, but to the modern mind. Undoubtedly this is true of the picture as drawn by Wrede. Whether the pretended reproduction be faithful to the original is another question. The second objection Kaftan makes is to the tendency evinced by the

new method of emphasizing in Christianity all those features in which it presents points of contact, analogy with other religions and obliterating those features wherein consists its uniqueness and distinction. Others, especially Von Dobschütz, have urged this criticism before, but Kaftan presses it home with peculiar cogency. The *"religionsgeschichtler"* make everything of what he calls the "Stoffe", and overlook the spirit within. With a sort of horror he receives Wrede's declaration, that New Testament science stands as yet only at the beginning of this line of research, and asks in despair, whether it is absolutely unavoidable that we should enter upon this "wilderness-journey". In a later passage, in a more hopeful frame of mind, he expresses his confidence, that within fifty years all these "infant-diseases" of the period of *"Religionsgeschichte"* will have been left far behind.

After having thus rescued both Jesus and Paul from misrepresentation, Dr. Kaftan easily reaches the conclusion, that the two do not stand apart, far less are in conflict wtih each other. Jesus more Messianically and soteriologically interpreted and Paul less dogmatically interpreted are seen to move along the same line and to agree in the substance of their gospel. Indeed, Paul is the one who, humanly speaking, has saved primitive Christianity from degenerating and losing itself in phantastic apocalyptic expectations. He has done this by emphasizing the spiritual essence of the eschatological hope as already accessible in the present life, both on its side of forgiveness and of redemption from the world, binding these two to the Person of Christ and insisting upon it that the latter shall issue not into ascetic avoidance but into healthy Christian activity upon the world as the only means of truly entering into the life of God.

A concluding chapter is devoted to the triad Jesus-Paul-John. Dr. Kaftan finds it necessary to speak of this, because it is really in the Fourth Gospel he finds the beginning of the cleavage which separates the Catholic Church from the Apostolic age. Only the beginning; for what he refers to concerns not the kernel and substance of this gospel, only its Hellenistic frame. As to the main substance, he believes John to be in thorough accord with Jesus and Paul. In fact the Johannine discourses of Jesus, while not historical as such, are but the translation into gospel-form of the common apostolic conception of Christ as κύριος, a conception the apostolic church developed in true harmony with the mind of Jesus. But, if retrospectively conceived, the Fourth Gospel is absolutely true to the original spirit of Christianity, at the same time, considered prospectively, by reason of its Hellinistic setting, it prepares the way for the subsequent intellectualisation of Christianity in the Hellenistic world. And to a certain extent there are traceable the faint beginnings of this process even in Paul. Only it is insisted upon, that both in Paul and in John, whatever there is of this nature lies on the periphery, not in the center. It becomes significant and influential only in view of the subsequent development, not within the sphere of the Pauline or Johannine teaching itself. These are the ideas with which we have long been familiar from Harnack, and we can forego

criticizing them here. Dr. Kaftan is strong on the point of the distinctness of the New Testament writings from all other primitive Christian literature. He is not ashamed to profess himself still a believer in what has been scornfully called "the dogma of the New Testament". While this position, with its Ritschlian implications, may not, in our opinion, meet all the necessities of the case, yet we gladly take note of the author's tribute to the uniqueness of the New Testament, so far as it goes. As over against men like Bousset and Wrede, he is on our side.

We conclude our review with quoting a sentence from one of the last pages, because it gives in a few words the gist of the whole matter and is offered by the writer as such: "The modern theologians attempt to shove the idea of redemption aside into the periphery, whereas in reality it constitutes the center of all living, spiritual religion, in particular of Christianity. What we need and must strive after is that in all matters of faith this idea shall be recognized as the prime moving element."

Princeton. GEERHARDUS VOS.

THE GOSPEL HISTORY AND ITS TRANSMISSION. By F. CRAWFORD BURKITT, M.A., F.B.A., Norissian Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. 1906. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. Pp. viii. 360. Price, $2.00 net.

This volume is composed of ten lectures delivered at the Passmore Edwards Settlement in London as the Jowett Lectures for 1906 and repeated as an inaugural course at Cambridge. Mr. Burkitt recognizes that the question of historical truthfulness or trustworthiness constitutes the fundamental problem in the study of the Gospels. The problem is not a simple one, to be answered offhand. Many elements enter into the complex array of evidence upon which any adequate answer must be based. Linguistic evidence, textual evidence, and literary evidence, however much these may serve primarily their own ends, contribute materially toward the solution of the historical problem. Moreover, the point of view of the person passing judgment on the historical trustworthiness of the Gospels, his presuppositions or ideas, whether philosophic, religious or historical,—the whole subjective element which enters with the investigator into the investigation of the problem, can not be neglected. Mr. Burkitt states in the Preface the ideas he holds as the result of his investigations. "It is sometimes supposed that the result of modern historical criticism is to diminish the historical value of the Gospels. My own researches have made me believe that there is a much larger element of genuine history in the Canonical Gospels, than a general view of the tendencies which influenced Christendom during the first century and a half of its existence might have led one to anticipate" (p. v). Every generation must reconstruct its picture of the past, its conception of Jesus, and to do this it must have recourse to the historical documents. "It is not to get new ideas of religion or of philosophy that we need a minute and searching historical criticism; rather do we need to test the ideas we already have by the historical facts, and

we cannot get at the facts without the criticism" (p. 30f.). The reciprocal relation of ideas and facts is thus mediated by historical criticism. If our ideas of the past and of Jesus are to be tested by the facts and the facts are to be determined by historical criticism, it is evidently of great importance that the canons of historical criticism be commensurate with the subject of investigation.

Mr. Burkitt does not conceal the difficulties which confront the literary analysis of the Gospels in the attempt to ascertain their sources. He illustrates this strikingly from the Diatessaron and from Mt. xii. 3-8 and Lk. vi. 3-5, pointing out how difficult it would be to reconstruct the separate Gospels from the former or Mk. ii. 25-28 from the latter had the common sources or source been lost. Mr. Burkitt is confident, however, that the main source of the Synoptic Gospels is a single written document and that this document can be identified with the Gospel of Mark, since the phenomena presented by the passages in which Matthew and Luke agree against Mark do not require the hypothesis of an *Ur-Marcus*. Thus Mr. Burkitt concurs with Wellhausen in maintaining the literary originality of Mark. Only in one instance does he discover evidence of a written source, an eschatological fly-leaf, used by Mark (xiii. 3-37). But if in addition to literary originality the Gospel of Mark possess historical trustworthiness it will stand certain tests. It will be generally consistent; it will fit in with the known political and social history of the time; and it will not lend itself easily to attempts which seek to explain the Gospel as a work designed to set forth particular doctrines or theories about Jesus or the Church (p. 66). The Gospel of Mark satisfies these tests; but it must also reasonably answer some of the main questions which lie at the very root of the Gospel history. These questions are: How does the story of Jesus Christ fit into general history? How did the Christian Society come into being? What did Jesus Christ teach? How did Jesus of Nazareth become what He was? (p. 76). Two of these are answered in the Gospel of Mark; the third is also adequately answered; but the fourth is in Mr. Burkitt's opinion insoluble.

The Third Gospel and Acts were written by Luke in old age after the appearance of the Antiquities of Josephus, probably between 95 and 105. The Gospel of Matthew cannot be dated with certainty (probably near the close of the first century, cf. p. 199); and although the name of the compiler cannot be ascertained, we can learn somthing about the sources he used and the ideas in which he moved. Beside Mark another document composed principally of the sayings of the Lord was used in common by Matthew and Luke. The character of this document and its contents may be ascertained from a comparison of the matter common to Matthew and Luke but not found in Mark. In order to prepare the way for inferences in regard to this common source, called Q, Mr. Burkitt examines the use made by Matthew and Luke of the sources which are not lost, *i. e.*, the Old Testament and Mark. Luke uses the LXX. Matthew, however, while using the LXX in some instances, reveals knowledge of the Hebrew text and probably

made use of some collection of Old Testament passages or *Testamonia*, primarily Messianic. This collection may have been made by Matthew the publican in Hebrew—(the famous *Logia* mentioned by Papias. Cf. Euseb. *h. e.* iii. 39), and its use by the compiler of the First Gospel would explain the title "according to Matthew". This all points to a Palestinian origin for the stories peculiar to the First Gospel. Matthew and Luke differ in their use of Mark. Matthew shortens the Markan narrative, suppresses the human emotions of Jesus, transposes earlier parts of the story, interpolates long discourses and stories of questionable historicity (although of Palestinian origin), follows Mark in the passion narrative, and omits very little of the material furnished by Mark. Luke, however, omits freely, departs from Mark in the passion narrative, shortens Mark but keeps his order, and inserts fresh incidents separately. From these facts it may be inferred that Luke has preserved the order of Q better than Matthew. The surest criterion of the content of Q is the agreement of Matthew and Luke, but in view of the parallel of Lk. xxii. 24-30 in Mt. xix. 28 it is probable that Q did not close with Mt. xxv. 31-46 but contained an account of the passion.

Since Jesus wrote nothing and our knowledge of His teaching rests ultimately on the memory of His disciples, some external test is needed to assure us that a saying attributed to Him really comes from Him. Such a test, not for completeness but as indicating the main impression of His teaching, is found in the double attestation of Mark and Q. After giving a list of the sayings thus attested Mr. Burkitt dwells among other things on Jesus' conflict with the Scribes and Pharisees and the eschatological element in His teaching. This latter can not be allegorized away, although "the hope of the Second Coming of the Son of Man has faded with us into an unsubstantial dream". "The true way is to accept the Coming of the Messiah upon the clouds of heaven to gather together His elect from every quarter as the natural picture, the natural way of expressing faith and hope in the triumph of good over evil, all that people mean nowadays by the vague word Progress" (p. 179).

Mr. Burkitt discusses in a chapter entitled The Gospel in Matthew and Luke the characteristic features of these Gospels. The point of view of the First Gospel is determined by the interests of the Jewish Christian readers; and Mr. Burkitt points out the striking features in Matthew's style and ordering of his material. In partial agreement with Wellhausen he thinks that Matthew's record of the sayings of Jesus reflects and has been colored by the conditions and ideas of the Jewish Christian Church. He confesses indeed that the problem of determining how far the sayings of Jesus recorded in this Gospel are historical is a delicate one, but he is confident that the explanation of the parable of the Tares is distinctively the handiwork of the Evangelist, although the parable itself comes from Jesus. The Gospel of Luke is characterized by a tendency toward a voluntary poverty and toward asceticism.

The chapter on the Fourth Gospel is perhaps the most unsatisfactory.

The historicity of the Fourth Gospel is surrendered on the ground of the discrepancy between it and Mark and also because this Gospel is held to be ideal history. The resurrection of Lazarus could not have happened because Mark is silent about it, showing that he did not know of it. Again, the silence of the Fourth Gospel about the Eucharist can only be regarded as deliberate, and the transferrence of the Eucharist teaching of Jesus from the last supper to the earlier Galilean miracle is an equally deliberate sacrificing of historical truth. A similar judgment is passed on the teaching of the Fourth Gospel about Baptism and the Ministry of Jesus. In its account of Jesus' discussion with the Jews "there is an argumentativeness, a tendency to mystification, about the utterances of the Johannine Christ which, taken as the report of actual words spoken, is positively repellent" (p. 227). "The only possible explanation is that the work is not history, but something else cast in an historical form" (p. 228). The Church, however, accepted this Gospel because it expressed the belief of the Church about the person of Christ. "The Christ of the Fourth Gospel is not the Christ of history, but the Christ of experience" seen *sub specie aeternitatis* (p. 230). Nevertheless, the emphasis placed on the real incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus separates the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel from the Jesus of Gnostic speculation. Moreover, the disputes of Jesus with the Jews contain historical elements. But the real object of the Evangelist was "the deliberate substitution of other ideals for the expected coming of the Messiah on the clouds of heaven" (p. 243). Mr. Burkitt connects the Gospel with a Jew of Jerusalem, either directly or indirectly, and on the evidence of the de Boor fragment and the Syriac Martyrology favors the distinction between the John of Ephesus and the Apostle John. "The Fourth Gospel is written to prove the reality of Jesus Christ. But the Evangelist was no historian: ideas, not events, were to him the true realities, and if we go to his work to learn the course of events we shall only be disappointed in our search" (p. 256.)

The remaining chapters are devoted to, the Gospel Canon; Marcion or Christianity without a History; and the Rivals of the Canonical Gospels. Mr. Burkitt conceives of the Four Gospels as attaining to canonicity because they satisfied the Church's requirements. Marcion was the first to canonize the New Testament (p. 319). Mr. Burkitt's conception of the origin of the New Testament Canon depends much on the argument from silence and neglects the evidence of the New Testament itself.

Princeton. WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

PAULINE AND OTHER STUDIES IN EARLY CHRISTIAN HISTORY. By. W. M. RAMSAY, Hon.D.C.L., etc., Professor of Humanity in the University of Aberdeen. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 3 and 5 West Eighteenth St. 1906. $3.00 net.

Professor Ramsay is best known to New Testament students as the sturdy defender of the historical character of the Acts and the

brilliant protagonist of the South-Galatian theory. He appears in both of these roles in the interesting essays now collected under the title of *Pauline and other Studies*. It is refreshing to hear from a layman, who is at the same time a trained geographer and historian, that "the practical man, and the scholar who studies antiquities for their own sake, will always find Acts a first-hand and luminous authority". The main topics treated are the conversion, personality and statesmanship of Paul; the influence of paganism upon the Church in Asia Minor; and the authorship, trustworthiness and chronology of Acts. Incidentally, Professor Ramsay defends Paul's philosophy of religion in Romans i, and tells the curious story of a vision by an uneducated German woman of the house near Epheseus where the Virgin Mary had lived, and the discovery same fifty years later (in 1891) by a priest of Smyrna of a house corresponding almost exactly in appearance and location, to the one described.

The first chapter, "Shall We Hear Evidence or Not?" is a strong plea for an open-minded examination of the evidence for an appearance to Paul of the living Lord. A vigorous protest is made against the tendency to assume at the outset that Paul's vision was due to some kind of mental unsoundness. Paul not only convinced those who heard him that he was sane and spoke the truth, but "he has moved the world, changed the whole course of history, and made us what we are. Is the world moved at the word of a lunatic? To think so would be to abandon all belief in the existence of order and unity in the world and in history".

Professor Ramsay reminds us several times that he could never accept the Acts as reliable history till he came to see that it could be interpreted in accordance with the South-Galatian theory. He plainly intimates that the historicity of Acts and the South-Galatian theory must stand or fall together, and warns us that we must accept the latter, together with the identification of the visits of Gal. ii. and Acts xi., under pain of being thrown into the arms of the Tübingen critics. We are by no means convinced that the general question of the reliability of Acts and the special question of the direction of Paul's journeys are necessarily bound up together as closely as the development of Ramsay's opinion might suggest. He himself has shown so broadly that "Paul and Luke stand together", and by his splendid appreciation of the Apostle and his testing of Luke at so many points he has made us recognize so "absolutely and irresistibly and forever that Luke had known the man, had been his friend and confident and coadjutor", that the weight of his testimony will be felt even by those who cannot accept favorite theories.

The longest essay in the book is that on the statesmanship of Paul. The main thesis is that Paul's declaration before the council, "I am a Pharisee, son of Pharisees", was meant by the speaker to emphasize the political and not the religious points of agreement between himself and the Pharisaic party. Thus interpreted the words "stand forth as the sharpest and most comprehensive statement that has come down

to us from him about his work and his plans". He meant that his supreme purpose was the spiritual conquest of the Roman Empire, as over against the Sadducean policy of compromise and accommodation. If Paul was asserting his religious agreement with the Pharisees, it is said that he was adopting a device not consistent with perfect straightforwardness of character. If he had a political policy in mind, however, "he was asserting the continuity of his mental development from first to last". Professor Ramsay admits that Luke's account ("of the hope and resurrection of the dead, etc.") is "so expressed as to lend itself readily to the commonly accepted view"; and he even allows that Luke himself, who was a Jew and did not understand the Jews, may possibly have so interpreted Paul's words; but he is not deterred thereby from a confident defense of his own interpretation. The essay is valuable for its wealth of learning, its dialectical skill and the light which it sheds upon Paul's farseeing missionary policy; but when we turn again to Paul's own words, Acts xxiii. 6, and his repetition of them, xxiv. 21 ("I cried among them, Touching the resurrection of the dead, etc."), it is so evident that Paul was thinking of the religious doctrine of the Pharisees and not of their attitude toward the Roman state, that with reference to our author's thesis we are tempted to exclaim, "Much learning has made thee mad".

It is safe to say that Professor Ramsay has done more than any other living writer to stimulate interest in the Acts and to strengthen confidence in its historical accuracy. That a brilliant historical student, a layman, and an admirer of the Tübingen views, should come by the way of purely historical investigation to recognize in Luke an historian of the first rank, is in itself an argument whose force can be felt by those who are unable to enter into the subtleties of critical discussion. The views which such a scholar holds cannot be laughed out of court. Interesting here is what Professor Ramsay says of Lightfoot: "The quality in Lightfoot's work that most impressed me was his transparent honesty, his obvious straining to understand and represent every person's opinion with scrupulous fairness. In him I was for the first time conscious of coming in contact with a mind that was educated, thoughtful, trained in scholarship, perfectly straight and honest, and yet able to accept simply the New Testament in the old-fashioned way. . . . The combination had previously seemed to me impossible in our age, though possible at an earlier time; and its occurrence in Lightfoot set me to rethinking the grounds of my own position."

The volume is handsomely printed and bound, with a map of the Pauline world and numerous illustrations.

Lincoln University, Pa. WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON.

THE CREED OF CHRIST. A Study in the Gospels. By RICHARD VENABLE LANCASTER. Richmond, Va. The Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1905. 12 mo. pp. 206.

This is as unpretentious a little volume as it is an excellent one. Mr. Lancaster makes no pretense of having discovered a new Christ; or any-

thing startlingly new about the Christ already known. He has simply asked what the body of beliefs were which Christ held and which—humanly speaking—determined, (may we say, moulded?) His life. And having drawn them out in an orderly manner, he sets them up in the sight of others, that they too may look and see and be refreshed.

The topics dealt with comprise our Lord's conception of the Scriptures, God, Satan, Sin, Punishment, Himself, Redeemed Men, the Kingdom, the Kingdom in the world, the Holy Spirit, the Home-going, the Second Coming, the Final Glory. Taken together they make a little System of Theology: and a very good, sound and uplifting system, which, if a man make it his system, may inspire and bless the life.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

Quellenschriften zur Geschichte des Protestantismus, herausgegeben von Joh. Kunze und C. Stange. Drittes Heft: DER HEIDELBERGER KATECHISMUS UND VIER VERWANDTE KATECHISMEN (Leo Jud's und Micron's kleine Katechismen, sowie die zwei Vorarbeiten Ursins) mit einer historisch-theologischen Einleitung, herausgegeben von Lic. A. LANG. Leipzig: A. Diechert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1907. 8vo.; pp. civ, 218.

The first impression received on opening this book is that "The Grammarian's Funeral" ought to be paraphrased and made to serve as the author's epitaph, so great an amount of patient and minute comparison does his work reveal. His purpose is to supplement, and in some points to correct, the great work of Gooszen: *De Heidelbergsche Catechismus,* 1890. In the preface it is pointed out that Gooszen's method, which was to quote after each question of the Heidelberg Catechism the related statements from the earlier Lasky, Zurich, Geneva and Ursinus groups of catechisms, several of which were inaccessible, prevents the formation of a fair judgment of each source in itself, and hence of its relation to the great Heidelberg work. Some of these documents have since been published by Cohrs in his *Die evangelischen Katechismusversuche vor Luthers Enchiridion* (Berlin, 1900-'02), and by Reu in his *Quellen zur Geschichte des kirchlichen Unterrichts,* etc. (Gütersloh 1904). These new collections contain also the Strassburg Catechism and several other South German catechisms, unknown to Gooszen. Making use of these, together with all the catechisms cited by Gooszen, Lang attacks anew the problems of the sources, the originality and the theological character of the Heidelberg Catechism.

For his readers' benefit he publishes the original text both of the Heidelberg Catechism itself and of the four others named in the title. Of these Leo Juda's and Micronius' were not accessible in any modern edition. The latter belongs to the Lasky group, and was written in 1552

by Martin Micronius, pastor of the refugees' church in London, largely as an abridgement of John Lasky's first East Friesland catechism of 1546.

The introduction, filling one-third of the book, is crowded with details of comparison and conjecture, and not only contains much that is valuable to the student of Reformed doctrine, but suggests much that our modern Reformed churches stand in danger of forgetting.

The first chapter deals with the Reformed catechisms before the Heidelberg. A preliminary section describes various "catechetic attempts" before 1529, some of which were dependent on the Moravian *Kinderfragen*, and all of which show more or less strongly the influence of either Zurich or Strassburg, though none of them exhibits a clearly defined Reformed type of doctrine. None of them were of any special influence upon later catechisms. Lang names thirteen of these (cf. Cohrs), and they furnish a striking proof of the original and essential place which systematic religious instruction took in our Reformed churches. If we would be true to our history, we should certainly give to our most perfect of catechisms a large and ever larger place in the home, the Sabbath-school and the pastor's own teaching.

The two following sections are devoted to the Strassburg catechisms and some others from upper Germany related to these. Each of the three Strassburg leaders was a contributor to this work. Capito's *Kinder Bericht* from 1527 is noteworthy from the circumstance that the characteristic Reformed wording of the Lord's Prayer (with *unser Vater* and *vom Bösen*) is found first in it. It teaches clearly the doctrine of predestination. Two catechisms from Bucer, 1534 and 1537, in their several revisions, reflect the various doctrinal disputes of that period in Strassburg. Bucer's work did much toward settling the proper form and contents of a catechism. Matthew Zell published three catechisms, each incomplete according to the already established outline adopted from Luther,—decalogue, creed, Lord's Prayer and sacraments. They are marked by religious warmth and by their emphasis on comfort, the keynote of the Heidelberg Catechism. In Lang's later analysis of the Palatinate catechism Bucer's and Zell's are often cited. Meckhart's *Short Christian Instruction*, 1548, used in Augsburg until 1632, is characterized as one of the best of the earlier Reformed productions. It is built upon Bucer's.

Section fourth brings us to Zurich and the three catechisms of Leo Juda. His *Christian Introduction*, 1534, and *Shorter Catechism*, 1535(?), are especially important. Bullinger tells us that he used other similar works freely in their composition. The *Shorter Catechism* was quite widely used in Switzerland and even in East Friesland. By these two catechisms not a little light is thrown on the state of affairs between Zwingli's death and the rise of Calvin. Two of Lang's statements, however, seem to be questionable: first, that this *Shorter Catechism* is marked by the covenant idea; and secondly, that it shows a pronounced Zwinglian type. An examination of the document itself shows nothing of the doctrine of the two covenants, characteristic of developed Cal-

vinism. The word is used in only four or five answers and in a simple biblical way. As to the second point, Lang himself is driven to qualify his statement. There is no trace of the peculiarities of Zwingli's teaching in the doctrine of original sin, while the doctrine of the sacraments is mediating. Predestination is not expressly taught, yet the elect are often spoken of. Thus nothing seems to remain but the Zwinglian emphasis on the idea of God as the fundamental religious motive. The wonder is that there is so little especially suggestive of Zwingli in it; and so much belonging to the more genuine Reformed spirit and teaching, when we remember that this catechism comes from a friend of Zwingli, laboring in Zwingli's city, only four years after Zwingli's death.

Calvin's catechisms are better known. Lang does them justice, and points out several marks of progress observable in them over all former attempts. It is to be remembered that the *Institutio* of 1536 was itself in purpose and outline a catechetical treatise. Specially noteworthy is Calvin's emphasis on the third use of the law. Lang contradicts Gooszen's attempted distinction in the Heidelberg Catechism of a soteriological-biblical tendency coming from Bullinger and a speculative tendency from Calvin, at least so far as the catechisms are witnesses. The one from 1541, when compared with that from 1537, shows just the opposite development in Calvin himself. It is further noted that his great catechism was written just after his return from Strassburg, where he had had an opportunity to learn much about catechism-making.

The Lasky group represents new and to some extent independent Reformed territory. Lang discovers in the Heidelberg Catechism traces of important influence from the Lasky and Micronius catechisms. They are themselves dependent chiefly upon Calvin's, but also upon Leo Juda's, Bucer's and Zell's; and Micronius was very plainly under Bullinger's influence. These productions, says our critic, are better than all their predecessors in catechetical form, in simplicity and in unction.

Bullinger's writings, and especially his *Catechesis* of 1559, stand alone. They are, says Lang, stamped with Zwinglianism and colored by humanism. Much is made of the covenant idea, and in the catechism nothing of predestination. On the whole, Bullinger speaks less to practical edification than the others. But his contribution is important on account of the peculiar historical and theological position of its author, and its very marked influence on the Heidelberg Catechism. All these groups, divergent as they are, yet show an underlying growing unity. They all reflect Luther's leading in the determination of contents. Lasky furnishes a model of catechetical question-form, and Calvin a model of internal unity. In a catechism built out of such materials high perfection might well be expected.

The second half of the introduction brings us to the Heidelberg Catechism itself. Against Heppe's view that it rests on Melanchthon, and Gooszen's contention for the predominating influence of Bullinger, Lang holds, and, in our judgment, proves that when we go back of Ursinus and Olevianus, Calvin was its master genius, and after him

Bucer; although it reflects also the minds of many men in many centers, and is therefore fairly entitled to be called the ecumenical expression of the Reformed faith in catechetical form. To establish his position he gives a minute analysis of Ursinus' *Summa,* finding in it traces of influence from each of the groups examined above; outlines and estimates the amount of change in the abridged *Catechesis,* which really embodies Ursinus' direct contribution to the Heidelberg Catechism; and then by another minute analysis shows how far this is reproduced in the finished work, and what other sources or original features appear. His conclusion thoroughly confirms what Sudhoff said fifty years ago,—Calvin is its ruling spirit. Indeed the *Summa* seems more Calvinistic than the Geneva Catechism itself, for the later editions of the *Institutio* have contributed to it.

What of the doctrine of the covenants? It does not appear in the Heidelberg Catechism nor in Ursinus' preliminary draft, although in his *Summa* it was developed more fully than ever before,—the creation-covenant of works being explicitly taught. Ursinus' motive in the development of this mode of statement had been to defend the eternal validity of the law as a rule of conduct. This double-covenant idea Lang traces half to Calvin and half to Melanchthon, denying Bullinger's part in it. And he explains its omission in Ursinus' abridgement not by the Elector's desire to conform the document so far as possible to the *Augustana variata,* as Gooszen contends, but by the offence which the doctrine gave, and by the complete change of method necessitated in the double presentation of the law. This is no doubt just as much a conjecture as Gooszen's, but the fact that in the Palatinate Church Ordinances of 1563, which Frederick sanctioned, the doctrine is again brought forward, seems to throw the balance of credibility in Lang's favor.

One other question is important,—the relation of the Heidelberg Catechism to the doctrine of predestination. Lang's contribution to this question consists in setting aside the ill-considered things that others have said about it. The fact is, that the doctrine is sharply formulated by Ursinus, was taught elsewhere by Olevianus, but seems nowhere to be explicitly set down in the Heidelberg Catechism. Was this due to the influence of Boquinus and others in Heidelberg, or to the scruples of Bullinger and Lasky, or to Melanchthon's position, or to something else? Lang might have said, but does not, that by 1563 Bullinger had risen very near to Calvin's level (cf. *Conf. Helv. post.,* 1562), and that in the Lasky catechisms there is nothing inconsistent with predestination, and not a little that involves it (*e. g., Emden, qu.* 45). He finds it sufficient to say that the Heidelberg Catechism followed the Reformed precedent in passing this great subject over, and keeping to what comes within practical religious experience—a statement which, however, cannot be taken quite literally; further, that the Heidelberg Catechism is full of references to particular grace, perseverance and election. This fact illustrates at once the uniformity of the Reformed conviction on this topic and the composite, or perhaps we may even say

the compromise, character of the Heidelberg document. Lang finds the great excellence of the Heidelberg Catechism in its comparative freedom from theologizing, and its emphasis on a religion rooted in vital fellowship with Christ.

It seems a pity that the author did not put a climax to his sound and sane work by introducing his German readers to the crown of all Reformed catechetical treatises, in which were gathered and properly set all the jewels from all these earlier works, and which proved at last that theology need not be sacrificed in order that religion may be kept alive,—in a catechism or anywhere else,—but that consistent thinking and fervent devotion belong together and help each the other to reach the nd of every catechism, which is a well-rounded edification—"that ye may be perfect and symmetrical, lacking in nothing". And who, by dedicating to our Westminster Standards such painstaking research as Lang's, will bring to American Presbyterians what we still lack and so much need, the well-laid foundations for a better knowledge of the history of which we are the heirs?

Erlangen, Germany. E. B. WELSH.

JOHN CALVIN, THE ORGANIZER OF REFORMED PROTESTANTISM (1509-1564). By WILLISTON WALKER, Titus Street Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale University. G. Putnam's Sons, New York and London. 1906. 12mo.; pp. xviii, 456.

In days when French and German scholarship is doing so much to enrich our knowledge of Calvin and his age it is especially gratifying to welcome an American biography of the celebrated reformer. The volume before us, contributed by Prof. Walker to the series of *Heroes of the Reformation,* presents, with a reasonable degree of completeness, in a straightforward though somewhat listless style, the salient facts in Calvin's life and work. The author has striven hard to preserve a judicial temper in the treatment of the many controverted points, and his book is remarkable, considering its theme, for the absence of all superlatives whether of praise or of blame. He is not indeed devoid of a certain sympathy with his distinguished subject—a thorough study of Doumergue's great work must do at least so much for any one; but, on the other hand, no reader will catch from these pages any of that enthusiastic regard, not to say affectionate reverence, for Calvin, which those of his own day who knew him best seem so freely to have manifested. Least satisfactory of all is the twenty-page characterization of Calvin's theology. We should have preferred a more thorough and accurate exposition of the facts, and less of the author's patronizing comment that insinuates that an abandonment of many Calvinistic principles by the thought of to-day necessarily marks great progress since the first or last edition of the *Institutio* appeared. We cannot at any rate blame Calvin, if with him "as with Augustine" Adam "is a personage of great significance"; for Calvin, whom even the author regards as the prince of exegetes in that age, was probably correct in supposing

that St. Paul had a similarly high estimate of Adam's "fateful" "relation to the race".

Throughout the first half of the book the author has leaned hard, as was inevitable, upon the monumental work of Doumergue—a misfortune, though in no sense a fault, which every biographer of Calvin for many a year to come will have to suffer. But freely as he acknowledges his indebtedness to the professor of Montanban, the author has manifestly spared himself no pains in coming to his own conclusions. He has examined the sources for himself and his independent judgments are worthy of the most earnest consideration. As over against the conclusions of Doumergue the most interesting portion of the book, as also the most valuable portion from the scientific point of view, is the chapter on Calvin's religious development. To be sure, if we scrutinize the positive results of the author's investigations, we might be inclined to say that he has given this phase of his theme a disproportionate treatment. Nevertheless, the discussion will stand upon its own merits as an exceptionally solid piece of historical work. Prof. Walker states the problem of Calvin's conversion with clearness and accuracy and then gives an admirable critical sketch of the attempts that have been made toward its solution. We are satisfied, as we had been before reviewing the evidence as set forth anew by Prof. Walker, that if by Calvin's conversion—which he himself called "sudden"—we are to understand something deeper and more thorough-going than mere intellectual assent to the evangelical principles, this radical change cannot be placed, as it is by Doumergue, so early as 1528. Prof. Walker tries to do justice to the statements of Beza and Colladon according to which the influence of Olivétan upon Calvin must indeed have been exerted at about that time. But, as our author with nice discrimination points out, there is no evidence that Calvin was attracted to distinctively Protestant views by any influence emanating from Olivétan. And so far as the celebrated Greek teacher Wolmar is concerned, it is likewise unsafe to assert more than that, in all probability, he was an ardent Erasmian humanist at that time. It was, according to Prof. Walker's interpretation of the facts, some time between the publication of the *Commentary on Seneca* and the delivery of Rector Cop's Address that the decisive change must have occurred; in other words, late in 1532 or at least before Nov. 1, 1533. We agree, too, with the author in rejecting the artificial antithesis of Lecoultre's celebrated dictum, that the change was *"ni une conversion de l'intelligence, ni une conversion du sentiment, mais une conversion de la volonté"*. On the question of Calvin's authorship of Cap's Address Prof. Walker, in harmony with the tendencies of the day, is inclined to favor the negative. As a matter of fact, therefore, the last word on the subject of Calvin's conversion has still to be written. The author's statement in regard to the reformer's religious development is doubtless as good a one as present possibilities permit.

Prof. Walker purposely refrained, in order to save space, from giving a detailed account of the varied contests in Geneva that absorbed so

much of Calvin's strength, but the Servetus episode is fully related and justly characterized. The sojourn in Strassburg (Chap. ix.) brings out in clear outlines Calvin's indebtedness to the German reformers, especially Bucer. As the sub-title indicates, special stress has been laid upon the reformer's achievement as the organizer of Protestantism.

Taken as a whole, the work is fully up to the standards of scholarship and literary skill which this admirable series of biographies has taught us to expect. The volume is adequately indexed. The bibliographical note at the beginning gives a critical resumé of the Calvin literature up to date. The illustrations are not so numerous as in some of the companion volumes, and neither of the two reproductions, one of an engraving and the other of a painting of Calvin, can claim to give us a thoroughly life-like representation of the reformer: even the portrait after the style of Holbein, in the Public Library in Geneva, cannot with certainty be said to have been taken from life.

Philadelphia. FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

THE RELIGION OF CHRIST IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1906. Crown 8vo.; pp. vii. 197.

A brightly and persuasively written plea (from the pen, one would imagine, of a hereditary Unitarian,) for the new "humanitarianism" in the conception of the Christian religion—of Christ and His work. There is no "external authority" in religion, no "special revelation",—no "dogmatic authority outside the human heart"; "history and psychology furnish the only safe foundation upon which to build". Building on this foundation, we determine Jesus to have been a mere man, teaching a religion which is "mere theism", theism fired by love. By deifying Jesus, we deprive humanity of its noblest witness that God is with it: for He is the first religious genius who has taught us by word and example that greatest of truths, and they are His faithful followers who—not cry to Him "Lord, Lord,' but—, "encouraged by his assurances and example to believe that men are in truth the children of their Father in heaven, set themselves very simply to try and do the will of that Father as declared by His Son Jesus". It is true Jesus was not a perfect man: He shared the popular unphilosophical outlook of His day and environment, falling below some pagan thinkers in some of His teachings. But who among the spiritual leaders of the world have equaled Him in His power of turning the ideal into reality? His power lay, in one word, in His faith: and therefore Christianity is something more than an ethical code—it is a faith,—the faith of Jesus continued in His followers; for it is the religious consciousness of Jesus "transmitted to His followers which is the inspiring and energizing power among them". Entering by the force of our will, "strong and single", into the life He has illustrated—shaking off the spiritual palsy that

would fain be saved rather than save itself—we shall find salvation, not by being conveyed after awhile to an impossible heaven, but by living here in the consciousness of God and in obedience to His will. Of course, Jesus did not mean this when He spoke of "eternal life"—He shared the Pharisees' belief in a future life with a heaven and a hell. But surely we may learn the essence of life from Him while discarding His natural errors of theory. And this—it may well be it is not "the Christian religion",—but it surely is "the religion of Christ": and that is far better. The world has been a long time coming to it: as Lessing tells us, "the Christian religion" has been tried for eighteen centuries,—let "the Religion of Christ" be now tried. Jesus—Luther—Theodore Parker—these names mark the stages up to it: and a Liberal Christianity is announcing it with myriad voices. Shall we not at length enter into our real heritage?

It is in these dulcet tones that the new Christianity would woo us—the Christianity of Bousset and Wernle and Wrede and Heitmüller and the "school of comparative religion"; the Christianity to which Christ has ceased to be the object on which faith rests and become only an outstanding subject in which faith manifests itself,—no longer our Saviour, but only our example. Perhaps the reading of the signs of the times here given us is the true one. Perhaps Theodore Parker has blazed out the path in which the professors of the Christian religion—no, we beg pardon, of the Religion of Christ—are to walk for a season. Who knows into how deep a declension we may sink before we rise again? But that Christianity can rest at this point, no one can possibly believe who believes in Jesus, not only as a good man (of course limited by the conditions of his time and life), but as the Son of God come down from heaven to save the world by His blood and righteousness and now ascended on high as head over all things for His Church, which is the fulness of Him who filleth all things. It is all a question whether we believe in the Jesus of the Gospels or only believe with the Jesus of the anti-supernaturalistic critical reconstruction. For the one, we have all history and our hearts' deepest needs, yea and also the Holy Spirit working in us faith in His Name—to testify. For the other, we have absolutely no testimony, except this irrefragible certainty—that thus it must needs be if—if man needs no salvation and there is no Almighty arm stretched out from heaven to save him. Supernaturalism and anti-supernaturalism—there is the real hinge of the question: and on the side of supernaturalism stands everything but an anti-supernaturalistic prejudice.

Princeton. B. B. WARFIELD.

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY IN OUTLINE. By WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN, Ph.D., D.D., Roosevelt Professor of Systematic Theology in the Union Theological Seminary, New York; Author of *The Essence of Christianity*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906. Pp. 468.

In this volume, as the title indicates, Prof. Brown has attempted an outline of Christian doctrine. The book is written in a clear and simple

style, and as one reads its pages he seems to understand the author easily. Nevertheless, after finishing a chapter and asking oneself exactly what the writer's views are on certain definite points, he feels that the position of the author on fundamental questions is not clearly defined after all. This will appear as we proceed to give a brief statement and estimate of Prof. Brown's views on some of the main questions.

The Introduction in two chapters treats of the Idea, Relations, Sources and Method of Christian Theology. It is not easy to determine precisely what is the author's conception of this science. "Christian theology, or dogmatics, as it is technically called," he tells us (p. 1), "is that branch of theological science which aims to give systematic expression to the doctrines of the Christian faith." These doctrines are to be understood as being "the abiding convictions about God, man, and their relations, growing out of God's historic revelation in Christ, and verifying themselves progressively in Christian experience, which together make up the Christian conception of life, and the acceptance of which forms, on the intellectual side, the bond of union between the members of the Christian Church". Certain questions at once arise. Is the subject-matter of Christian theology the Christian faith or God? Is the seat of authority—that which makes theology a normative science—"Christian experience" or " the historic revelation in Christ"? If the latter—then how is this revelation conceived, and what is meant by the statement that these "abiding convictions" "grow out" of the historic revelation?

In regard to the first question, Prof. Brown tells us (p. 8) that the "subject-matter of theology is not the religious experience itself, but the God whom that experience reveals". This is satisfactory. It saves theology a place as a distinct science, and prevents its becoming merely a part of anthropology or psychology. Nevertheless, the author does not seem consistently to have adhered to this idea of theology throughout these introductory chapters. The subject-matter of theology is conceived to be, not so much God, as the Christian faith in both the objective and subjective senses of the term faith. In other words, the subject-matter of theology is conceived of as being either a view of the world or an experience, both of which are the result of the influence of Jesus Christ. This, however, cannot be an ultimate conception of Christian theology as a science. If the subject-matter of theology be Christian experience or faith in the subjective sense, theology is reduced to a branch of psychology. If faith be taken in the objective sense as denoting the Christian revelation, then it is not that revelation but the God whom it reveals, who is the "subject-matter" of Christian theology. It should be said, however, that Prof. Brown does not make Christian experience the subject-matter of theology. The function of Christian experience is to interpret and verify the historic revelation. This brings us to the other questions above stated.

It is still more difficult to determine exactly what Prof. Brown's answer is to the question whether the "historic revelation" or Christian experience is the final authority in religious knowledge. The doctrines

of the Christian faith are said to be "abiding convictions" which "grow out" of God's historic revelation in Christ. But precisely what does this mean? Does Prof. Brown mean to say, with Rothe, that the Scripture doctrines are the result of human reflection upon a series of facts, the chief one being Christ? Or does he mean to say, with Sabatier, that Christian doctrine is the product of Christian life? In other words, whence is the doctrinal statement of Christianity to be derived, and what is the source of the normative character which the author claims for it? Prof. Brown thinks that the Bible, the Creeds of the Church, and the writings of theologians are the "proximate" sources of the statement of Christian doctrine, the "ultimate" source being "the Christian religion itself and the revelation in which it had its rise". In other words, a distinction is made between the Bible and the Christian revelation which it contains. And since Christian doctrines are "abiding convictions", the permanent elements must be separated from those which are only of passing significance and which partake of the limitations of the times in which the doctrines grew up. Thus Christian theology becomes " a normative science whose function it is to discriminate that which is essential and permanent in the Christian faith from that which is accidental and temporary, and to present the common Christian convictions in the form best fitted to give clearness to thought and definiteness to purpose" (p. 6). But how are we to determine what is of permanent value in Christian doctrine, and what after all is the seat of authority? Prof. Brown seeks a synthesis between the internal and external views of authority. To find it in the Christian experience of the individual, he thinks, is too individualistic a procedure. But the view of authority which finds its seat in the individual conscience, he says, is not inconsistent with the acceptance of an objective standard. This standard is found in the fact that man is a social being, so that there is a social sanction or control for the Christian experience of the individual. We should observe, however, that this will give us no authority outside of humanity. Consequently, in this way we can get only a very imperfect and fallible norm by which we are to sift out the abiding elements of Christianity. It is not, however, from the somewhat abstract discussion of "authority" that we really get the author's view of the norm by which we are to determine what is of permanent value in the doctrinal content of Christianity. It is from his discussion of the idea of theology in the opening chapter. We there learn, that theology has to do with religious convictions verifiable in experience; that these convictions have a definite origin in the Christian revelation; that they abide in the midst of change, and consequently need restatement to adapt them to a changing intellectual environment. We may, perhaps, describe this method somewhat as follows: The source of these religious convictions is to be found in the views of God and life which Jesus taught, and in the life which sprang from His influence. The Christian theologian must take this product together with the whole statement of doctrine by the Christian Church, and must sift out the permanent elements by

means of Chirstian experience, and must then restate the doctrine in the light of and in accordance with contemporary thought and science. Thus (p. 13) in the section entitled "Theology and Contemporary Thought", it is explicitly stated that the theologian "must look to science for the critical apparatus by which to determine what belongs to the essence of Christianity, and to distinguish its experimental content from its changing forms." And it is also said (p. 18) that it is Christian experience which determines the elements of permanent value in the creeds of the Church. Accordingly, in this process of determining what is essential in Christian doctrine the Bible is really subordinated and subjected to Christian experience and contemporary thought; and Prof. Brown does not hesitate, for example, to reject the idea of penalty which he admits to have been taught by Isaiah and Paul. Nor may it be said that it is the revelation in Christ which is the determining factor, since it is not the Christ of the Gospels and the Epistles who is norm of Christian revelation, but a Christ whose deity is stated in terms of contemporary thought, so that when we affirm that Jesus is divine we do not mean "that God is to be found only in Jesus, but that He is everywhere and always like Jesus". The doctrine of the deity of Christ means that "in Christ we have the revelation of the true nature of the ultimate reality who is the source and law of all things" (p. 347). This means simply that the immanence of God in all finite existence has reached its fullest expression in the man Jesus. In the Person of Christ, therefore, there is no supernatural revelation. Nor is the revelation in the teaching of Jesus supernatural in any such sense as would discriminate it as to its mode of delivery, from general or natural revelation, since the mark of a supernatural revelation, according to Prof. Brown, is to be sought simply in the character of its content, not in the mode of its origin. From this it is evident that we have no supernatural revelation in Christ. The determining authority in religious knowledge for Prof. Brown really is a philosophy which he calls contemporary thought. Accordingly, it must follow that there can be no finality attaching to the doctrines of Christianity, but when contemporary thought changes, we will need a reinterpretation of Christian doctrine. Prof. Brown seems to feel this: for he says (p. 50) that the finality of the Christian revelation means that "through all the stages of God's self-manifestation, the Person of Christ remains the controlling factor; that he still keeps his place, and, we believe, will continue to keep it, as the highest realization of the divine ideal, and the most powerful means of realizing that ideal among men". Prof. Brown does well to add the words "we believe" to this statement that Christ will continue to keep his place. For upon the author's premises there is no logical warrant for this belief. If the restatement of the doctrine of the Person of Christ in the light of contemporary thought leaves us with a merely human Christ, why may not contemporary ethics, for example, transcend the so-called historic Jesus altogether? Indeed, some contemporary thought is doing that very thing. The whole question of the finality and permanent validity and value of Christianity and Christian

doctrine resolves itself into the question whether Jesus is really divine in the fullest and metaphysical sense of the term, and whether God has through Christ and his Apostles revealed himself to man in a supernatural manner; or whether Christianity is simply the culmination of God's natural self-manifestation to humanity. The latter is evidently Prof. Brown's idea. The issue and the antithesis is a real and vital one. It cannot be avoided by saying that Christianity is a supernatural revelation because of the supreme value of its content, but not as to the mode of the delivery of its doctrine. We do not, however, feel obliged to give up the Christianity of the New Testament—for we cannot but think that that is what Prof. Brown has done—at the demand of his philosophy which he calls contemporary thought. Some contemporary thought, indeed much contemporary thought, overemphasizes the immanence of God, and minimizes or does away with the supernatural modes of the divine activity. But such a philosophy has been prevalent since the first Christian centuries, and is no truer to-day than it was then. We prefer to judge contemporary thought from the standpoint of the supernaturalism involved in the Christianity of the New Testament writers, and to accept not only its religious content, but also its doctrinal form.

We have, perhaps, dwelt at too great length upon questions of prolegomena, and should give some idea of the author's views on special doctrines. His view of the Person of Christ we have seen to be humanitarian, since by his deity is only meant that he is the fullest revelation and highest expression of the divine immanence. Prof. Brown's doctrine of the Trinity is practically the modalistic. In the chapter on the Trinity we find the view expressed that the Word and Spirit no longer denote to us realities in God which we can picture apart from our experience, but are interpretations of that experience itself" (p. 160). Of course, we cannot "picture" to ourselves the Word and Spirit as realities in the divine nature, and, we may add, neither do they give us any pictorial interpretation of our experience. The question, however, is not whether we can "picture the Word and Spirit as realities in God", but whether or not they are realities in the divine nature, and what is meant by the author's statement that these terms are "interpretations" of Christian experience. His answer to this question can be obtained from the words immediately following those quoted. The terms Word and Spirit are said to lend themselves to-day to the expression of the same conviction to which they gave utterance in the past, the conviction, viz., "that through the historic revelation which culminates in Jesus Christ, as in the inner experience which appropriates him as Lord, we have to do not simply with human ideals, however exalted, or human aspirations, however sincere, but with the great God himself as he is manifesting himself in gracious, fatherly love to his needy children". In other words, God is a "self-imparting" God; he is everywhere revealing himself in and through humanity, and the culmination of this process is in Christ and in the hearts of Christians. But any monarchian could have said this. Monarchianism did not

resolve the doctrine into a "mere analysis of human experience". Prof. Brown sympathizes with those who have been "unwilling to stop with a Trinity of manifestation", because this seems to resolve the doctrine into a "mere analysis of human experience". He too shares "the same longing for communion with the living God". But in the recognition of the truth of the divine immanence, "the antithesis between the Trinity of essence and that of manifestation disappears". The meaning of all this seems to be that there is no "Trinity of essence", but that the term Trinity, nevertheless, expresses a real truth, *i. e.*, one ontologically grounded in God, viz., that he is a self-revealing and self-imparting God. This is simply the doctrine that the terms Word and Spirit are expressive of modes of God's relations *ad extra*. The modalistic conception of the Trinity did not stop with "mere human experience" any more than does Prof. Brown.

The doctrine of the Atonement set forth is the moral influence theory. For after following his usual method of indicating the elements of truth in all the other views, and after pointing out their defects, Prof. Brown says that the Atonement's "saving efficacy consists in its moral influence in arousing repentance and faith" (p. 365). Obviously that which has atoning value is man's repentance and faith. From this we would expect to find a doctrine of sin which would eliminate the ideas of guilt and penalty altogether. We are surprised, therefore, to find them retained and defined in a way which would seem to imply the governmental theory of the Atonement (pp. 285ff.). The subjects coming usually under the Application of Redemption and Eschatology are distributed under other heads, and receive a somewhat scanty treatment.

We believe that Prof. Brown has made an honest and exceedingly painstaking effort to state Christian doctrine in such a way as to do justice to the Christianity of the New Testament and to the statement of Christian doctrine wrought out by the Church of God under the illuminating guidance of the Holy Spirit. But any attempt to state Christianity in the terms of a philosophy which minimizes the supernatural is foredoomed to failure.

At the end of the volume will be found a classified bibliography. This, though not intended to be exhaustive, is nevertheless very full, and will be of great help to the student of theology.

Princeton. C. W. HODGE.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

GOD'S CHOICE OF MEN: A Study of Scripture. By WILLIAM R. RICHARDS, Pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church, New York City. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1905. 8vo., pp. 231.

The "provoking occasion" of this book, we are told, was a charge of hypocrisy made by the editor of a leading New York newspaper against

an alleged large number of Presbyterian ministers who "remain outwardly faithful to a creed" which they have "inwardly rejected"; who, more particularly, have become convinced that there is no such God as the "God of the Westminster Confession". Accordingly, in this series of sermons, published as the constituent chapters of the book, Dr. Richards essays to give us "a new-fashioned treatment of the old-fashioned doctrine of God's election of men". The material is divided, somewhat arbitrarily, into two parts, the first exhibiting a number of scriptural examples of God's choice of men and various examples of the human responses to this divine election", while the second half deals more narrowly with the "purpose of election, raising the inquiry what God chooses men for."

The sermons as a whole bear the well-known traits of Dr. Richards' pulpit work. They are simple, direct, incisive in style, practical and experimental rather than dogmatic in method, enlivened with many a fine fetch of fancy as well as with many a flash of subtle spiritual discernment, thoroughly biblical at the center, if not along the entire periphery, of their thought. The book is suggestive and stimulating; and in spite of an occasional thrust at the Westminster divines on the one hand, and the opponents of every sort of "election", on the other, there is an overplus of sweeter and stronger notes of religious sincerity and earnestness that give the pages a peaceful import and make them good devotional literature.

But we cannot help feeling that Dr. Richards would have rendered his apologetic service more successfully, if, before finding fault with the statement of our Confession on the subject of the divine decree, he had taken more pains to ascertain just what the much abused document teaches. We lack confidence in any guide who would introduce us to the intricacies of the theology of the Reformation, when we find him repeating the erroneous judgment that Calvin (*Institutio,* III, ch. iii, § 7) referred to the decree of reprobation as a *"decretum quidem horribile"*. And our confidence is by no means strengthened when we are told (p. 7) that the "Reformation creeds might have left one to suppose that God sometimes elects His favorites to a sinecure"—an estate of grace, presumably, in which they have no duties or responsibilities. The fact is that Dr. Richards has reduced the teachings of Scripture on his theme to the one great principle that God elects men to service. So eager is the author to write this truth large upon his every page that although, according to his preannounced plan, he was reserving this aspect of the problem for the second part of the volume, he must needs make it the chief burden of the first half of the book also. Now assuredly this is a cardinal biblical truth: it cannot be too strongly put. But does Dr. Richards suppose this is a twentieth century discovery? Was not this the precise conviction of those imperturbable predestinarians of the 16th and 17th centuries whose achievements in behalf of religious and civil liberty we are here so often called upon to admire? And having this assurance of faith that steeled their hearts for heroic endurance, did the creed-makers forget to declare

themselves on this fundamental question? What sort of historical investigation is it that fails to find this "supreme saving truth" in the Westminster Confession, or indeed in any of the more elaborate Protestant symbols? How fully even Melanchthon as early as 1530 apprehended the purpose of election may be seen in the Augsburg Confession, Art. xx, and how large Dr. Richards' thesis loomed up in the conception of the Westminster divines he might easily have ascertained by a perusal of the chapters on the divine decree, on sanctification, and on good works.

The truth is that Dr. Richards simply refuses to grapple with the problem of the divine election conceived *sub specie æternitatis*. The biblical examples of election are reduced to simple cases of providential calls in the temporal sphere. With what violence to the plain statements of Scripture this is sometimes accomplished may be seen, *e. g.*, in his sermon on the "election" of Jacob as against Esau, where, in spite of what Paul says about the pretemporal nature of this act of choice, the transaction is regarded simply as a sort of divine recognition of the wily Jacob's desire to have his brother's birthright: election on the basis of a divine foreknowledge; rather, indeed, as a reward of Jacob's meritorious faith! Similarly Jer. xviii. 6, "Behold, as the clay is in the potter's hand, so are ye in mine hand, O house of Israel", is made to mean that we as Christians are called to liberty—an exegetical result that is true enough in the light of other declarations of Scripture, but which can be secured from this passage only in some such arbitrary manner as the author on his own confession has had to employ: "I cannot understand all that the apostle says about it in the ninth chapter of Romans, but it is evident (?) that the figure itself means freedom."

We admire the practical and helpful paragraphs in this book which, so far as they go, place clearly before us one of the most important, as well as one of the most attractive, features of Calvinism. But we are of the opinion that the apostle Paul, and the authors of the Westminster Confession after him, had a much richer conception of the sovereign will and purpose of God in the whole cosmos than Dr. Richards' restricted treatment of *God's Choice of Men* would lead one to suppose.

Philadelphia. FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER

CHRISTUS IST MEIN LEBEN. Akademische Predigten von Dr. H. Cremer, weil. Prof. d. Theol. in Greifswald. Herausgegeben von Lic. E. Cremer. Pfarrer in Rehme in Westfalen. Gütersloh: Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1906. Pp. 237.

These 27 sermons by the late Prof. Cremer, gathered and issued by his son, were preached to the students of the University of Greifswald. They set forth fully and clearly the way of life as it is in Christ Jesus. Because Germany has been the home of Rationalism, and because here and there a University professor makes himself conspicuous by doubting or denying the Truths of revelation, many have come to the conclusion that the entire German Protestant Church is permeated by unbelief.

Nothing could more effectually refute this assumption than the homiletic literature of Germany, of which the sermons under review, by the author of the well-known Biblico-Theological Lexicon of the New Testament Greek, are a fine illustration.

TWISCHENSPIELE zu den gebraüchlichsten Chorälen der lutherischen Kirche, bearbeiteb von J. A. Theiss, Organist an der Bethlehems-Gemeinde zu Milwaukee, Wis. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House. 1903.

In many German churches it is still customary for the organist to play interludes between the hymn stanzas. The book before us provides such interludes for all the best known German choral melodies, in each case adapting them to the character of the particular melody. All of them are reverent and dignified, and the book can be heartily commended to organists who feel the need of something of the kind.

LECTURES ON HOMILETICS. By HENRY C. GRAVES, A.M., D.D., Teacher of Homiletics and Biblical Analysis in the Gordon Bible and Missionary Training School, Boston. American Baptist Publication Society. Philadelphia. 1906. Cloth. 156 pages.

These studies have been very carefully prepared by one who has manifestly acquainted himself with the large and increasing literature in the field of Practical Theology. His suggestions in this brief and comprehensive volume indicate a personal experience in class-room work, and in the successful instruction of theological students. The book contains twelve brief lectures. They are all definitely outlined and clearly illustrated. They are replete with suggestions which will be found of great value to every theological student and minister. The book is specially commended to such Christian workers as have been denied the privilege of specific or complete theological courses.

Princeton. CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

AMERICAN BAPTIST YEAR BOOK, 1906. American Baptist Publication Society. Philadelphia. Paper. 230 pages. Price 25c.

This excellent compendium of information in reference to the work and organization of the Baptist Church has been most carefully prepared by the editor, the Rev. J. G. Walker, D.D. It contains reports of all the missionary and benevolent societies of the denominations, together with a full account of the various state organizations, giving careful statistics of their membership, growth, and benevolent contributions. This is followed by a complete list of all the ordained ministers in the United States, and all the American missionaries in foreign lands. There is also mention of the ordinations, and the deaths during the year 1905. There is appended a tabulated summary of "The Baptists in the World", together with a statistical table of the religious denominations in the United States. This volume presents an admirable summary

of the strength and the enterprises of this great branch of the Christian Church.

Princeton. CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

SPURGEON'S ILLUSTRATIVE ANECDOTES. Selected and Classified by the REV. LOUIS ALBERT BANKS, D.D. New York and London: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1906. 313 pages. Cloth. Price $1.20 net.

No one could be better prepared for his task than the compiler of these selections from the sermons of Spurgeon. Dr. Banks is known as one of the most successful illustrative preachers of his time. He fully appreciates the power which Spurgeon manifested, of vivid and clear illustration. In this collection of anecdotes, the author follows the admirable plan of adding to the immediate illustration a sufficient portion of the sermon from which the anecdote is taken, to show its full bearing and significance. The volume will be of great service to those who are seeking for simple and forceful illustration, and its publication is a helpful reminder of the absolute necessity to the successful preacher of careful and striking illustrations.

Princeton. PAUL MARTIN.

TUXEDO AVENUE TO WATER STREET. By AMOS R. WELLS. Funk & Wagnalls Company. New York and London. 1906. Cloth. 259 pages. Price $1.00.

This little story by the editor of *The Christian Endeavor World*, is intended to illustrate the power which can be exercised by a strong and wealthy church, located in the poorest section of a great city. As the author declares, "it is the story of a transplanted church", and pictures the experience of a wealthy congregation when its church home is suddenly changed from "Tuxedo Avenue" to "Water Street". The writer significantly suggests the provision of a large endowment, to insure the continued existence and success of the church in its new location. He declares that the book is the "story of an Impossibility; or of what some will consider an impossibility; yet it is also the story of a possibility,—the action of the people; and of an assured certainty—the action of God; but it is a probability; it shows a church going forth, as all churches will some day go forth, to the place where the need is, where the work and the blessedness are."

Princeton. PAUL MARTIN.

KEYWORDS IN THE TEACHING OF JESUS. By A. T. ROBERTSON, D.D., Professor of New Testament Interpretation in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. Cloth. 128 pages.

Dr. Robertson has rendered the Church a distinct service in publishing these seven brief studies in fundamental Christian doctrines. The chapters of this book were delivered as lectures at the Summer Assem-

bly at Jackson Springs, in 1904; but in this permanent form they will reach a much wider circle than would otherwise have been possible.

The subjects treated are: "God the Father", "The Son", "Sin", "The Kingdom", "Righteousness", "The Holy Spirit", "The Future Life". The discussion is clear, Scriptural, illuminating. The volume would be of great service for Bible classes; or as a text book for summer schools. It is deserving of the very widest circulation.

Princeton. PAUL MARTIN.

THE FOURSQUARE CHRISTIAN; or, The Fourfold Doctrine of the First and Great Commandment. By REV. E. P. WHALLON, Ph.D., D.D. Cincinnati: Monfort & Co. 1905. 8vo., pp. 256.

In brief chapters, under the four divisions of Christian Experience, Christian Worship, Christian Faith, and Christian Service, many aspects of the Christian life are presented practically. The volume would be more attractive if printed in larger type, and the contents more useful if brightened by more variety and freshness of treatment. The matter of the homilies is Scriptural, sane and wholesome.

Princeton. PAUL MARTIN.

VISION AND TASK. By GEORGE CLARKE PECK. New York: Eaton & Mains. 1905. 8vo., pp. 289.

The sermons contained in this volume are thoughtful and helpful, and are couched in good, easy flowing English. The author is, perhaps, unconsciously to himself since he does so naturally, a biographical preacher. He loves embodied truth. The portrayal of the Bible personages involved in the text, together with incidents from other lives, furnishes the foundation and the illumination of text and theme. As one reads the volume he wonders why more preachers do not learn and practice the art of biographical preaching. Every one is interested in people and will listen to the story of a life. The method secures freshness and variety of treatment and makes themes, in themselves too deep and difficult for the hearer (and sometimes for the preacher himself) interesting and helpfully applicable to our lives when in conditions or under circumstances similar to those of the persons described.

Princeton. PAUL MARTIN.

LICHT DES LEBENS. Ein Jahrgang von Evangelien-Predigten aus dem Nachlass des seligen D. Carl Ferdinand Wilhelm Walther, gesammelt von C. J. Otto Hauser, Pastor der ersten deutschen ev.-luth. Dreieinigkeits-Gemeinde zu St. Louis, Mo. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House. 1905. 1p. 688.

Dr. Walther (1811-1887), the author of these sermons, was one of the foremost theologians of the Lutheran Church in America, and as preacher, teacher and writer the most potent force in the large and influential Missouri Synod and the Synodical Conference. Besides his many other publications, three volumes of his sermons appeared between 1871 and the year of his death. The volume before us contains 68

sermons preached between the years 1841 and 1886. Like all of Dr. Walther's sermons, these are characterized by eloquence of diction, simplicity of style, and above all by intense evangelistic fervor. They are in every respect models of what sound Gospel sermons ought to be, and afford most edifying and refreshing reading in these days of negation and doubt.

IN MEMORIAM. Dreissig Leichenreden, dargeboten von Pastor C. Gross, Sr. St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Publishing House. 1905. Pp. 160.

This small collection of funeral sermons likewise comes from a member of the Missouri Synod, pastor of a Lutheran church at Fort Wayne, Ind. What has been said above of the sermons of Dr. Walther applies with almost equal force to these. They are a plain, straightforward presentation of the Word of Life, full of that comfort and instruction which in days of sorrow only the Word can give.

ZWEITER SYNODAL-BERICHT des Brasilianischen Distrikts der Deutschen Ev.-Lutherischen Synode von Missouri, Ohio und andern Staaten. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House. 1906. Pp. 88.

This pamphlet, giving the proceedings of the last meeting of the Brazil District of the German Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio and Other States, is devoted chiefly to an elaborate paper by the Rev. H. A. Klein, on "The Doctrine of the Church", which he treats under the following heads: I. What is the Church? II. How is the Church constituted? III. What are the marks of the Church? IV. What are the Church's rights and duties? V. When do we make a right use of the doctrine of the Church?

CLARK'S PEOPLE'S COMMENTARY. HEBREWS, JAMES I. II., PETER. By O. P. EACHES, D.D. American Baptist Publication Society. Philadelphia. Cloth. 368 pages.

This volume offers a careful, comprehensive, and unusually helpful interpretation of these four New Testament epistles. It is as the author suggests, a popular commentary. It will be of great service to the layman, and to every Bible reader; yet it is specially designed for pastors and Sabbath School teachers. Its clearness of statement and apparent simplicity of treatment do not, however, disguise the fact that it is based upon the most careful and scholarly research and investigation. It is, as the writer states, "prepared upon a critical basis"; yet, as is everywhere manifest in the volume, it is eminently practical in its design. In the *Preface,* the writer suggests the burning questions of the present day upon which light is thrown by these epistles; as for instance the following: "Are all Christians priests?" "Can ordinances save?" "Are any sacraments necessary?" "Is there a larger hope for those who die without Christ?" "Did the death of Christ have an objective efficacy?" "Is there value in prayer?" A commentary written with

these questions in mind cannot fail to have definite bearing upon present day problems.

The introduction contains helpful discussions of the subject, outline, authorship, and character of the separate epistles. In addition to this, there occur in the course of the exposition, some fifty "brief discussions" of important matters, or disputed doctrines. Each page of the commentary contains a portion of the text of the Revised Version, beneath which, in large type, is found the interpretation of the verses, and at the end of each chapter the brief discussions to which reference has been made; and then a series of practical remarks which are helpful and illuminating. The doctrinal implications of the commentary are conservative; its character is scholarly, and its tone devotional and spiritual. The volume is to be cordially commended to ministers, and Christian workers, and to all who desire a brief and helpful exposition of these practical New Testament epistles.

Princeton. CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

THE STRUGGLE FOR AMERICA. By R. P. BRORUP. Published by North and South Publication Company. Fitzgerald, Georgia. Paper. 93 pages. Price 25c.

This brief volume contains nine interesting essays on sociological problems. The general scope will be manifest from the following titles: "The Social Question in the United States", "Morality and Marriage", "The Anglo-Saxon Race in the South", "The South and the Negro", "Immigration". No one can read these pages without being impressed anew with the difficult problems which confront the nation, especially in connection with the negro question in the Southern States.

Princeton. CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

EARLY DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RUSSIA. By JOHN C. HILDT. (Series XXIV, Nos. 5-6, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science.) Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1906. 8vo., pp. 194.

The successive negotiations between the two nations from 1776 to 1824 are historically described. The results of the negotiations are briefly summarized at the close. The record is a creditable one for both nations, manifesting the spirit of friendship and fair dealing. The citation of sources and authorities is full and careful.

Princeton. PAUL MARTIN.

THE FINANCES OF AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS. By A. M. SAKOLSKI, Ph.D. (Series XXIV, Nos. 3-4, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1906. 8vo., pp. 152.

The sources of income; the expenditures for strikes, sick and death benefits, and for administration; and the methods of administration of a number of the typical and more important Unions are carefully studied and exhibited.

Princeton. PAUL MARTIN.

SUPPLEMENTARY EXAMPLES TO BOOK II, STANDARD AMERICAN ARITHMETIC. (The same to Book III.) Compiled by G. H. RUNGE. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House. 12mo., pp. 16.

Lists of examples for practice.

REGELN FÜR DIE DEUTSCHE RECHTSSCHREIBUNG NEBST WÖRTERVERZEICHNIS. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House. 1905. Pp. 47.

A series of easily understood rules, with appropriate examples, governing the use of letters, capitals and foreign words in the German language. A list of the foreign, or borrowed, words in their proper form is appended.

Princeton. PAUL MARTIN.

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THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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AUGUSTINE'S DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE AND AUTHORITY.

In a former number of this REVIEW[1] we attempted to give a general exposition of Augustine's doctrine of knowledge and authority, which naturally ran up into some account of his doctrine of authority in religion. The more detailed study of this specific subject we were forced, however, to postpone to another occasion. We wish now to take up this topic and to make as clear as possible Augustine's teaching concerning it.

The cardinal facts to bear in mind are that, to speak broadly, with Augustine the idea of Authority coalesces with that of Revelation, the idea of Revelation with that of Apostolicity, and the idea of Apostolicity with that of Scripture. With him therefore the whole question of authority in religion is summed up in the questions whether there is a revelation from God in existence, where that revelation is to be found, and how it is validated to and made the possession of men: while the master-key to these problems lies in the one word apostolicity. Whatever is apostolic is authoritative, because behind the apostles lies the authority of Christ, who chose, appointed and endowed the apostles to be the founders of His Church; and Christ's authority is the authority of God, whose Son and Revelation

[1] THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, July, 1907, pp. 353-397.

He is. The great depository of the apostolic revelation is the Holy Scriptures, and these Scriptures become thus to Augustine the supreme proximate seat of authority in religion. The line of descent is, therefore, briefly, God, Christ, the Apostles, the Scriptures,—the Scriptures being conceived as the embodied revelation of God, clothed with His authority as His inspired word, given to us by His accredited messengers, the apostles. Let us see how Augustine expresses himself on each of these points in turn.

On the actual authority of Scripture he certainly expresses himself in no wavering terms. The Holy Scriptures, he tells us, have been "established upon the supreme and heavenly pinnacle of authority"[2] and should therefore always be read "in assurance and security as to their truth"[3] and all their statements accepted as absolutely trustworthy.[4] To them alone among books had he learned to defer this respect and honor,—most firmly to believe that no one of their authors has erred in any respect in writing:[5] for of these books of the prophets and apostles it would be wicked[6] to have any doubt as to their entire freedom from error.[7] "To these canonical Scriptures only", he repeats,[8] "does he owe that implicit subjection so to follow them alone as to admit no suspicion whatever that their writers could have erred in them in any possible respect, or could possibly have gone wrong in anything." The accumulated emphases in such passages, no more than fairly represent the strength of Augustine's conviction that, as he puts it in another place, "it is to the canonical Scriptures alone that he owes unhesi-

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[2] *Ep.* 82 (to Jerome), ii. 5: sanctam scripturam in summo et caelesti auctoritatis culmine collocatam.

[3] *Ibid.:* de veritate ejus certus et securus legam.

[4] *Ibid.:* veraciter discam.

[5] *Ibid.:* i. 3.

[6] Nefarium.

[7] *Ibid.:* ad. fin.

[8] *Ibid.:* iii. 24: sicut paulo ante dixi, tantum modo scripturis canonicis hanc ingenuam debeam servitutem, qua eas solas ita sequar, ut conscriptores earum nihil in eis omnino erasse, nihil falliciter posuisse dubitem.

tating assent."[9] It is this contention accordingly in its most positive form which he opposes endlessly to the Manichæans in his long controversy with them. He points out to Faustus, for example, that a sharp line of demarcation is drawn between the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments and all later writings, precisely in point of authority. The authority of the canonical books, "confirmed from the time of the apostles by the successions of the bishops and the propagations of the churches, has been established in so lofty a position, that every faithful and pious mind submits to it". Other writings on the contrary, of what sort soever they may be, may be read "not with necessity of believing but with liberty of judgment". The same truth may indeed be found in some of these which is found in Scripture, but never the same authority, seeing that none of them can be compared with "the most sacred excellence of the canonical Scriptures". From what is said by other books we may accordingly withhold belief, unless indeed it is demonstrated "either by sound reason or by this canonical authority itself"; but "in this canonical eminence of the Holy Scriptures, even though it be but a single prophet, or apostle, or evangelist that is shown to have placed anything in his Scriptures, by this confirmation of the canon we are not permitted to doubt that it is true".[10] Similarly when writing to the Donatist Cresconius,[11] he refuses to treat even Cyprian as indefectible. "For", says he, "we do no injury to Cyprian when we distinguish his books—whatever they may be—from the canonical authority of the divine Scriptures. For not without reason has there been constituted with such wholesome vigilance that ecclesiastical canon to which belong the assured books of the prophets and apostles, on which we do not dare to pass any judgment at all, and according to which we judge with freedom all other writings whether of believers or of unbelievers". In a word, Augustine defends the absolute authority of every word of

[9] *De natura et gratia,* lxi. 71: sine ulla recusatione consensum.
[10] *Contra Faustum Man.,* xi. 5.
[11] ii. 31, 39.

Scripture and insists that to treat any word of it as unauthoritative is to endanger the whole. This he argues to Jerome[12] and over and over again to the Manichæans, culminating in a most striking passage in which he protests against that subjective dealing with the Scriptures which "makes every man's mind the judge of what in each Scripture he is to approve or disapprove". "This", he sharply declares, "is not to be subject for faith to the authority of Scripture, but to subject Scripture to ourselves: instead of approving a thing because it is read and written in the sublime authority of Scripture, it seems to us written rightly because we approve it".[13]

With no less emphasis Augustine traces the supreme authority which he thus accords to the Scriptures to their apostolicity. Their authority is according to him due in the first instance to the fact that they have been imposed upon the Church as its *corpus juris* by the apostles, who were the accredited agents of Christ in founding the Church. In laying this stress on the principle of apostolicity, he was, of course, only continuing the fixed tradition of the early Church. From the beginning apostolicity had been everywhere and always proclaimed as the mark of canonicity,[14] and apostolicity remained with him the only consciously accepted mark of canonicity.[15] He says expressly that "the truth of the divine Scriptures has been received into the canonical summit of authority, for this reason,—that they are commended for the building up of our faith not by anybody you please, but by the apostles themselves".[16] The proper proof of canonicity is to him therefore just the proof of apostolicity: and when it has been shown of a declaration that it has been made by an apostle, that is to give it

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[12] *Ep.*, xl., 3, 3.

[13] *Contra Faustum Man.*, xxxii. 19.

[14] This has recently been shown afresh by Kunze, *Glaubensregel. Heilige Schrift und Taufbekenntnis* (1899), pp. 114 sq., 249 sq. Cf. Cramer, *Nieuwe Bijdragen*, etc., iii, 155.

[15] Cf. Kunze, as cited, p. 302.

[16] *Ep.* 82 (to Jerome), 7: non a quibuslibet, sed ab ipsis apostolicis, ac per hoc in canonicum auctoritatis culmen recepta.

supreme authority.[17] Though one declaration may be from the writings of one apostle and another "from any other apostle or prophet—such is the quality of canonical authority, that it would not be allowable to doubt of either".[18] To say "canonical" writings accordingly is to add nothing to speaking of them as genuine writings of the prophets and apostles.[19] The genuineness of the Christian Scriptures as documents of the apostolic age is, therefore, the point of chief importance for him. "What Scriptures can ever possess weight of authority", he asks with conviction in his voice, "if the Gospels, if the Apostolic Scriptures, do not possess it? Of what book can it ever be certain whose it is, if it be uncertain whether those Scriptures are the Apostles', which are declared and held to be the Apostles' by the Church propagated from those very Apostles, and manifested with so great conspicuousness through all nations?"[20] We are not concerned for the moment, however, with the nature of the evidence relied on to prove these books apostolical: what we are pointing out is merely that to Augustine the point of importance was that they should be apostolical, and that this carried with it their canonicity or authority. Their authority was to him rooted directly in their apostolicity.

How completely Augustine's mind was engrossed with the principle of apostolicity as the foundation of authority is illustrated by a tendency he exhibited to treat as in some sense authoritative everything in the Church for which an apostolic origin can be inferred. The best example of this tendency is afforded by what we may call his doctrine of tradition.[21] This doctrine is, in brief, to the effect that

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[17] *Contra Faustum Man.*, xi. 5.

[18] *Ibid.*, 6.

[19] *Ibid.*: vere.

[20] *Ibid.*, xxxiii. 6.

[21] To Roman Catholic writers Augustine's doctrine of tradition seems that of the Church of Rome. Cf. Schwane, *Dogmengeschichte der patrist. Zeit*, § 89. 9 (pp. 703 sq.), and, though following Schwane closely, yet somewhat more dogmatically, Portalié in Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionaire de théol. Cathol.*, i. 2340. Schwane insists that Augustine

where the guidance of the Scriptures fails, the immemorial mind of the universal Church may properly be looked upon as authoritative, on the presumption that what has always been understood by the entire Church is of apostolic origin. Repeated expression is given to this position; for example, in his Anti-Donatist treatise *On Baptism* (c. 400) where he is seeking to defend the validity of heretical baptism and is embarrassed by Cyprian's rejection of it on the plea that Scripture is silent on the subject. Cyprian's principle, "that we should go back to the fountain, that is to apostolical tradition, and thence turn the channel of truth to our own times" he of course heartily accepts;[22] he seeks only to turn it against Cyprian. "Let it be allowed", he says, that the "apostles have given no injunctions" on this point—that is to say, in the canonical Scriptures. It is not impossible, nevertheless, that the custom (*consuetudo*) prevalent in the Church may be rooted in apostolical tradition. For "there are many things which are held by the universal Church and are *on that account* (*per hoc*) fairly (*bene*) believed to be precepts of the apostles, although they are not found written", *i. e.*, in the Scriptures:[23] or, as it is put in an earlier point, "there are many things which are not found in the letters of the apostles, nor yet in the councils of their followers, which yet *because they have been preserved throughout the whole church* (*per universam ecclesiam*) are believed to have been handed down and commended by them".[24]

Even when thus arguing for the apostolicity of tradition, however, Augustine never forgets the superior authority of

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joins oral Apostolic traditon to Scripture as necessary both for its completeness and for its interpretation, and that with reference to doctrine as well as usages; yet admits that to Augustine the Scriptures occupy the first place in authority and contain all things necessary to salvation, and that with adequate clearness; and that only the Scriptures are inspired and infallible (cf. loc. cit. p. 233 sq.). Probably even this is assigning to tradition a much greater rôle than Augustine gave it, particularly with reference to doctrine.

[22] *De Bapt. contra Donat.*, v. 26, 37.

[23] *Ibid.*, v. 23.

[24] *Ibid.*, ii. 7. 12; cf. iv. 6. 9.

Scripture. Perhaps the most instructive passage in this point of view is one in which he is investigating the value of baptism of infants. After appealing to the tradition of the universal Church he proceeds as follows: "And if anyone seeks a divine authority in this matter—although what is held by the universal Church, and that not as a thing instituted by councils but as of primitive inheritance (*nec conciliis institutum sed semper retentum est*) is most properly (*rectissime*) believed to have been handed down by apostolic authority,—we are able in any case (*tamen*) to form a true conjecture of the value of the sacrament of baptism in the case of infants from the circumcision of the flesh . . . "[25] Here, in the very act of vindicating apostolicity, and therefore authority, for universal primitive custom, language is employed which seems to betray that Augustine was wont to conceive "divine authority" (*auctoritas divina*) the peculiar property of Scripture. In another Anti-Donatist treatise—the work against the grammarian Cresconius (c. 406)[26]—we read somewhat similarly that "although no doubt no example" of the custom under discussion " is adduced from the canonical Scriptures, the truth of these Scriptures is nevertheless held by us in this matter, since what we do is the *placitum* of the universal Church, which is commended by the authority of these very Scriptures; and accordingly since the Holy Scriptures cannot deceive, whoever is afraid of being led astray by the obscurity of this question should consult with respect to it that Church which without any ambiguity is pointed out by the Holy Scriptures".

This care in preserving the superior right of Scripture is not to be accounted for as due to the exigencies of the controversy with the Donatists. It reappears in more formal form in purely didactic teaching,—in a reply, for instance, which Augustine made to a series of questions addressed to him by a correspondent on matters of ritual observance.[27]

[25] *Ibid.*, iv. 24. 31.

[26] *Opus cit.* i. 23. 39.

[27] *Epp.*, 54 and 55 (to Januarius,—the 40th of that name in Smith and Wace,—about 400).

Here Augustine distinguishes carefully between three varieties of such observances: those prescribed by Scripture, those commended by the practice of the universal Church, those of merely local usage. When an observance is prescribed by the authority of divine Scripture, no doubt can be admitted but that we must do precisely as we read.[28] Similarly also only insane insolence would doubt that we ought to follow the practice of the whole Church, throughout the world.[29] In matters of varying usage in different parts of the Church, on the other hand, we must beware of erecting our own custom into a guide, and should conform ourselves freely to the custom that obtains in the Church where we may chance from time to time to be,—in short, follow Ambrose's wise rule of "doing when we are in Rome as the Romans do".[30] There is nothing that Augustine deprecates more than the arbitrary multiplication of ordinances, by which, he says, the state of Christians which God wished to be free—appointing to them only a few sacraments and those easy of observance—is assimilated to the burdensomeness of Judaism. He could wish therefore that all ordinances should be unhesitatingly abolished which are neither prescribed by the authority of the Holy Scriptures, nor have been appointed by the councils of bishops, nor have been confirmed by the custom of the universal Church[31]—in which sentence the selection of the terms so that "authority" is ascribed to Scripture alone is not unwitting.

Elsewhere, no doubt, Augustine uses the term "authority" more loosely of the other sources of "custom" also. This is true, for example, of the opening paragraphs of these very letters. Here he carefully draws out the three-fold distinction among ordinances, which he applies throughout. The fundamental principle of the discussion on which he

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[28] *Ep.* 54, v. 6: non sit dubitandum quin ita facere debeamus ut legimus.

[29] *Ibid.;* quid tota per orbem frequentat ecclesia.

[30] *Ibid.*, ii. 3, where a pleasant anecdote is told of Ambrose's advice to Monnica to follow his example in this.

[31] *Epist.* 55, xix. 35; cf. xiv. 27, where the "authority" of the divine Scriptures and the "consent" of the whole Church are brought together.

is about to enter, he tells us, is that our Lord Jesus Christ has subjected us to an easy yoke and a light burden, laying upon us only few sacraments and those not difficult of observance. He then adds: "But with respect to those not written but traditional matters to which we hold, observed as they are throughout the whole world, what we are to understand is that they are retained as commended and instituted by the Apostles themselves, or by plenary councils, the authority of which in the Church is very useful".[32] The term "authority" happens to be employed here only of what the context tells us is the least weighty of the three "authorities" to the observances commended by which we should yield obedience: the Scriptures, universal primitive custom arguing apostolic appointment, and conciliary enactment. We may look somewhat roughly, perhaps, upon these three "authorities" as representing to Augustine respectively the authority of "Scripture", the authority of "tradition", and the authority of "the Church"; and if so, then these three "authorities"—the Scriptures, Tradition, the Church—took rank in his mind in that order. First and above all is the "authority" of Scripture, which is just the infallible Word of God, whose every word is to be believed and every precept obeyed just as it stands written. Then comes the "authority" of immemorial universal tradition, on the presumption that just because it is immemorially universal it may, or must, be apostolic; and if apostolic then also of divine appointment. Last of all comes the "authority" of the Church itself, for which no claim is made of divine infallibility, since that is an attribute of Scripture alone,—nor even of such constructive apostolicity as may be presumed of immemorial tradition; but only of righteous jurisdiction and Spirit-led wisdom. Neither the individual bishop, nor any body of bishops assembled in council, up to the whole number in the plenary or ecumenical council, though each

[32] *Epist.* 54. 1: illa autem quae non scripta sed tradita custodimus, quae quidem toto terrarum orbe servantur, datur intelligi, vel ab ipsis apostolis, vel plenariis conciliis, quorum est in eccelesia saluberrima auctoritas commendata atque statuta retineri.

and all are clothed with authority appropriate to the place and function of each, is safeguarded from error, or elevated above subsequent criticism and correction. This high altitude of indefectible infallibility is attained by Scripture alone.[33]

An appropriate authority is granted of course to bishops, each in his proper sphere: but no one of them is free from error or exempt from testing and correction by the Holy Scriptures. Its own appropriate authority belongs similarly to councils of every grade: but no one of them can claim to have seen truth simply and seen it whole. If the Donatists appealed to Cyprian and his council, for example, Augustine, while ready to yield to Cyprian all the deference that was his due, did not hesitate to declare roundly, "The authority of Cyprian has no terrors for me",[34] and to assert that no council is exempt from error.

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[33] Cf. Reuter, *Augustin. Studien,* p. 329: "There is not, to my knowledge, to be found in Augustine, any statement giving *un*ambiguous expression to this notion [of the infallibility of the Church]. We read, *Contra Cresconium* ii. 33. 39, 'Since Holy Scripture cannot err'; but I have sought in vain for any declaration corresponding to this with reference to the Church. The assertion, 'Outside the Church, there is no salvation' is nowhere complemented by this other one, 'The Church cannot err'." Reuter proceeds to say that, although this precise formula does not occur, yet "important premisses of it" may be found in the Anti-Manichæan treatises; but here opinions may lawfully differ. On what follows in the text Reuter, pp. 328 sq., 333 sq., may be profitably consulted; cf. also Schmidt, in Liebner's *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie* (1861), vi. 197-255, esp. 234 sq.

[34] *De Bapt. contr. Donat.* ii. 1. 2: non me terret auctoritas Cypriani. This does not mean, of course, that he denies all authority to Cyprian; but only that he knows the limits of Cyprian's authority. So, when he says, *De Bapt.* iii. 3. 5. *med:* "No authority (nulla auctoritas), clearly, deters me from seeking the truth", he is not proclaiming an abstract indefeasable liberty in seeking the truth, as A. Dorner (*Augustinus,* p. 236) appears to suppose (cf. Reuter, *op. cit.* 335, note 4), but means only to say that Cyprian expressly leaves the path open and does not interpose his authority (whatever that may amount to) to shut off free investigation. Accordingly, he repeats at the end of the paragraph more explicitly: "We have then liberty of investigation conceded to us by Cyprian's own moderate and truthful declaration." The assertion of a zeal for truth which takes precedence of all else, apparently wrongly attributed to this passage, may be more justly found in the remark

For, he explains at length,[35] no one "is ignorant that the Holy Canonical Scriptures, as well of the Old as of the New Testament, are contained within their own determined (*certis*) limits, and that they are so set above all later letters of bishops that with respect to them it is not possible to doubt or to dispute whether anything that stands written in them is true or right, while all the letters of bishops which, since the closing of the canon have been written or are being written, are open to confutation, either by the wiser discourses of some one who happens to be more skilled in the particular matter, or by the weightier authority or more learned prudence of other bishops, or by councils,—if there chances to be anything in them that deviates from the truth." And as little is anyone ignorant "that the councils themselves which are held in the several regions and provinces must without any evasion yield to the authority of plenary councils which are assembled from the whole Christian world; and that even the earlier plenary councils themselves are corrected by later ones, when by some actual trial, what was closed has been opened, and what was hidden has come to light". We perceive accordingly that the limiting phrases in the famous passages in which Augustine declares the Holy Scriptures the sole infallible authority in the world are by no means otiose. He means just what he says when he writes to Jerome, "For I confess to your charity that I have learned to defer this respect and honor to those Scriptural books only (*solis*) which are now called canonical, that I believe most firmly that no one of those authors has erred in any respect in writing";[36] or again when he says in another place, "In the writings of such authors"—that is to say Catholic writers—"I feel myself free to use my own judgment, since I owe unhesitating assent *to nothing*

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which occurs in the *Contra. Ep. Man. Fund.* iv. 5, to the effect that "if the truth is so clearly proved as to leave no possibility of doubt, it takes precedence of all things which keep me in the Catholic Church". Cf. Schmidt, as cited above.

[35] *Ibid.*, ii. 3. 4.

[36] *Ep.* 82, 3.

but the canonical Scriptures".[37] A presumptive apostolicity may lend to the immemorial customs of the universal Church an authority which only arrogance can resist; and to the Church which was founded by the apostles, and made by them a depository of the tradition of truth, a high deference is due in all its deliverances: but to the Scriptures alone belongs supreme authority because to them alone belongs an apostolicity which coalesces with their entire fabric. They alone present us with what we may perhaps call "fixed apostolicity".

The ground of this conception of apostolicity as the principle of divine authority lies ultimately in the relation in which the apostles stood to Christ. The apostles, as Christ's accredited agents, empowered by His Spirit for their work, are, in effect, Christ Himself speaking. This idea underlies the entirety of Augustine's reasoning, and is very fully developed in a striking passage which occurs at the close of the first book of the Harmony of the Gospels.[38] He tells us here that our Lord, "who sent the prophets before His own descent, also despatched the apostles after His ascension. . . . Therefore, since these disciples have written matters which He declared and spoke to them, it ought not by any means to be said that He has written nothing Himself; for the truth is that His members have accomplished only that which they became acquainted with by the repeated statements of the Head. For all that He was minded to give for our perusal on the subject of His own doings and saying, He commanded to be written by those disciples, whom He thus used as if they were His own hands. Whoever apprehends this correspondence of unity and this concordant service of the members, all in harmony in the discharge of diverse offices under the Head, will receive the account which he gets in the Gospel through the narrative constructed by the disciples, in the same kind of spirit in which he might look upon the actual hand of the Lord Himself.

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[37] *De natura et gratia,* lxi. 71.

[38] *De consensu Evang.* i. 35. 54.

which he bore in that body that He made His own, were he to see it engaged in the act of writing". Apostolicity therefore spells authority because it also spells inspiration: what the apostles have given the Church as its law is the inspired Word of God. The canonical Scriptures are accordingly "the august pen of the Spirit" of God;[39] and in reading them we are, through the words written by their human authors, learning "the will of God in accordance with which we believe these men to have spoken",[40] seeing that it is "the Holy Spirit who with admirable wisdom and care for our welfare has arranged the Holy Scriptures" in all their details,[41] and has spoken in them in perfect foresight of all our needs and perplexities.[42] Accordingly Augustine makes the Lord declare to him, "O man, verily what my Scripture says, I say"; and this is the reason that we may be assured that the Scripture is true,—because it is He that is true, or rather the Truth Itself, who has given it forth.[43] Thus the circle of the authority of the Scriptures completes itself. The Scriptures occupy the pinnacle of authority because they are the Word of God, just God's congealed speech to us. We know them to be such because they have been given to us as such by the apostles who were appointed and empowered precisely for the task of establishing the Church of God on earth, and who are therefore the vehicles for the transmission to us of the will of God and the Word which embodies that will.

But have the Scriptures which we have and which have acquired canonical authority in the Church, really been given to us by the apostles as the Word of God? How shall we assure ourselves of these Scriptures that they possess that

[39] *Conff.* vii. 21. 27: venerabilem stilum Spiritus Tui.

[40] *De Doctr. Christ.*, ii. 5. 6.

[41] *Ibid.*, 8.

[42] *Ibid.*, iii. 27. 38: "assuredly the Holy Spirit who through him [the human author] spoke these words, foresaw that this interpretation would occur to the reader. . . . "

[43] *Conff.* xiii. 29. 44: O homo, nempe quod Scriptura mea dicit, ego dico. . . . O Domine, nonne ista Scriptura tua vera est, quoniam tu verax et veritas edidisti eam?

apostolicity which lends to them their revelatory character and makes them our supreme authority? The answer returned by Augustine to this question has been most variously conceived, and indeed, out of the several interpretations given it, heterogeneous traditions of his teaching have grown up as discordant at the extremes as the formal principles of Romanism and Protestantism. If we could content ourselves with a simple concrete statement, it doubtless would not be far astray to say briefly that Augustine received the Scriptures as apostolic at the hands of the Church; and that this is the meaning of his famous declaration, "I would not believe the Gospel except I were moved thereto by the authority of the Catholic Church". But the question at once arises whether this appeal to the Church is for conclusive testimony or for authoritative decision. Divergent interpretations at once intervene, and we find ourselves therefore little advanced by our concrete response. The precise question that is raised by these divergent interpretations is whether Augustine validated to himself the Scriptures as apostolic in origin and therefore the revealed Word of God by appropriate evidence, more or less fully drawn out and more or less wisely marshalled; or declined all argument and cut the knot by resting on the sheer enactment of the contemporary Church. In the latter case Augustine would appear as the protagonist of the Romish principle of the supreme authority of the Church, subordinating even the Scriptures to this living authority. In the former he would appear as the forerunner of the Protestant doctrine of the supreme authority of Scripture.

The proper evidence of the apostolicity of the canonical Scriptures is, of course, historical. Apostolicity is a historical conception and its actuality can be established only on historical evidence. When Augustine declares of Scripture that it owes its authority to its apostolicity, he would seem, therefore, already to have committed himself to dependence for the validation of the authority of Scripture upon historical evidence. Many others than the Romanists.

however, have found Augustine defective in his teaching or at least in his practice at this point. Neander remarks that Augustine having been brought by Manichæism into doubt as to which were the true documents of the Christian religion, and not being prepared for a historical investigation to determine the truth of the matter, had nothing left him but to fall back upon the tradition of the Church;[44] and this opinion is echoed by Reuter,[45] and sharpened by Harnack.[46] It is to be observed, however, that, when we have suggested that Augustine's dependence was placed wholly on the "tradition of the Church",[47] as Neander phrases it, we have not removed the ground of his conviction out of the sphere of historical judgments. To say 'tradition' is indeed only to say 'history' over again. And the question at this point is not whether the historical evidence which Augustine rested upon was good historical evidence, but whether he rested upon historical evidence at all, rather than upon the bare authority of the contemporary Church. It will be useful to recall here Augustine's discussion of 'tradition' to which we have just had occasion to advert. We will remember that he expressly distinguishes between 'tradition' and 'Scripture', and decisively subordinates the authority of 'tradition' to that of 'Scripture'. It would certainly be incongruous to suppose him to be at the same moment basing the superior authority of Scripture on the inferior authority of tradition,—in any other sense than that in which fact is based upon its appropriate evidence. We should bear in mind, moreover, that his appeal to 'tradition' was in the instances brought before us distinctly of the nature of an appeal to testimony, and as such was distinctly discriminated from an appeal to the 'Church', speaking, say, through a bishop or a council, and as distinctly preferred to it. His purpose was to validate certain customs prevalent in the Church as

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[44] *Katholismus und Protestantismus* (1863), p. 82.
[45] *Augustin. Studien*, p. 491, note 1.
[46] *History of Dogma*, v. p. 80; cf. Loofs, *Leitfaden*, etc.
[47] die Ueberlieferung der Kirche.

incumbent on all. This he does, not directly by asserting as sufficient the authority of the contemporary Church, as if the Church was as such clothed with the right to determine the practice of its adherents by a mere *ipse dixit*. He proceeds, rather, indirectly, by seeking to establish the apostolicity of these customs by an appeal to the immemorial universality of their tradition in the Church. Obviously 'tradition' is treated here not as authority, but as evidence; and the "authority" thus validated by tradition is treated as superior to the "authority" of the contemporary Church speaking through whatever channels. It certainly would be incongruous to suppose that he was nevertheless consciously basing the authority of Scripture, which was to him superior to that of even tradition, on the bare authority of the Church, which he defines to be inferior to either. His appeal to the 'Church', as by its 'authority' moving men to believe the 'gospel' can scarcely be understood otherwise, therefore, than as a broad statement that the Scriptures are validated as apostolic and therefore authoritative in some way by the Church. What is meant, when this is made specific, is, obviously, that the testimony of the whole Church, borne unbrokenly from the beginning, to the apostolicity of the canonical Scriptures is conclusive of the fact.

In his appeals to the 'Church' after this fashion Augustine certainly had in mind the Church as a whole, as extended through both space and time; and his fundamental contention is that the testimony of this Church is of decisive weight to the origin of her Scriptures in apostolic gift, and therefore to the authority of the Scriptures as an inspired revelation of the divine will. Such an appeal is distinctly of the nature of an appeal to historical testimony. But the nature of this appeal would not be essentially altered were we to omit consideration of the extension of the Church in time and focus attention on its extension in space alone, as many suppose Augustine to have done. To appeal to the testimony of the universal Church is to adduce historical evidence. Even if we do not accord such weight

to this evidence as was obviously accorded to it by Augustine, this difference in our estimate of its conclusiveness should not blind us to its nature. We may smile if we will at the easiness of Augustine's historical conscience, and wonder that he could content himself with testimony so untested. But we ought to recognize that in so doing we are criticising his sense of historical values, not disproving that his resort to the Church was precisely for testimony.

Nor is it very difficult to do serious injustice to Augustine's sense of historical values in a matter of this kind. It is very much a matter of times and seasons. An appeal to the testimony of the universal Church at the close of the nineteenth or at the opening of the twentieth century is not altogether without historical value. But we must not fail to bear in mind that an appeal to the testimony of the universal Church at the close of the fourth or the opening of the fifth century is something very different from an appeal to its testimony at the close of the nineteenth or the opening of the twentieth century. Certainly the testimony of the universal Church at the close of the first or the opening of the second century is still treated in wide circles, as in such a thing as the apostolic gift of the Scriptures, conclusive. And it is not an easy matter accurately to estimate exactly the rate at which the value of this testimony decreases with the lapse of time. Are we so sure that its value had depreciated by the close of the fourth century to such an extent as to render an appeal to the Church as witness-bearer, at that period, absurd? The Church to which the Scriptures were committed by the apostolic college, by whom it was founded and supplied with its *corpus juris,*—is not this Church the proper witness to the apostolicity of the Scriptures it has received from the hands of its apostolic founders? And is it strange that it has always been appealed to to bear its testimony to this fact? No doubt, as time passed and the years intervening between the commission of the Scriptures to the Church and its witness-bearing to them increased, this testimony became ever weaker as

testimony. And no doubt as it became weaker as testimony it naturally took to itself more and more the character of arbitrary authentication. No doubt, further, it was by this slow transmutation of testimony into authentication that the Romish conception of Scripture as dependent upon the Church for its authentication gradually came into being. And no doubt still further the change was wrought practically before it was effected theoretically. Men came practically to rest upon the authority of the Church for the accrediting of Scripture, before they recognized that what they received from the Church was anything more than testimony. The theoretic recognition came inevitably, however, in time. So soon as the defect in the testimony of the Church arising from the lapse of time began to be observed, men were either impelled to cure the defect by an appeal to the Church of the past, that is to say by a historical investigation; or else tempted to rest satisfied with the authority of the living Church. The latter course as the line of easiest resistance, falling in, moreover, as it did, with the increasingly high estimate placed on the Church as mediatrix of religion, was inevitably ultimately taken; and the Romish doctrine resulted. Let it be allowed that in this outline we have a true sketch of the drift of thought through the Patristic Church. It still is not obvious that this development had proceeded so far by the close of the fourth century that Augustine's appeal to the 'Church' to authenticate the 'Gospel' must be understood as an appeal to the authority strictly so called rather than to the testimony of the Church. On the face of it, it does not seem intrinsically absurd to suppose that Augustine may still at that date have made his appeal to the Church with his mind set upon testimony. And when we come to scrutinize the actual appeals which he made, it seems clear enough that his mind rested on testimony.

Perhaps there is no better way to bring the fact clearly before us than to note the passages quoted by the Romish expositors with a view to supporting their view that Aug-

ustine based the authority of the Scriptures immediately upon the dogmatic authority of the Church. Thus, for example, Professor E. Portalié writes as follows:[48]

"Above Scripture and tradition is the living authority of the Church. It alone guarantees to us the Scriptures, according to the celebrated declaration in the treatise *Against the Epistle of Manichæus called Fundamental,* v, 6: 'I indeed would not believe the Gospel except the authority of the Catholic Church moved me'. Compare *Against Faustus the Manichæan* XXII. 79; XXVIII. 2."

We reserve for the moment comment on "the celebrated declaration" from the *Contra Epist. Man. Fund.* and content ourselves with observing that if it indeed implies that Augustine based the authority of Scripture on that of the "living" Church, it receives no support from the companion passages cited. They certainly appeal to the "historical" Church, that is to say adduce the testimony of the Church extended in time rather than the bare authority of the Church extended in space. So clear is this in the latter case[49] that Augustine in it sets the testimony of the Manichæans to the genuineness of their founder's writings side by side, as the same in kind, with the testimony of the Church to the genuineness of the Apostolic writings. I believe, he says, that the book you produce is really Manichæus', because from the days of Manichæus until to-day it has been kept in continuous possession and estimation as his, in the society of the Manichæans: similarly you must believe that the book we produce as Matthew's is his on the same kind of testimony in the Church. To the fixed succession of bishops among the Christians is assigned no different kind of authority than is allowed to the fixed succession of presiding officers among the Manichæans; in both alike this succession is adduced merely as a safeguard for trustworthy transmission. No doubt Augustine represents the testimony of the Church as indefinitely more worthy of credit than that of the Manichæans, but this is a different matter:

[48] Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionaire de théologie Catholique,* i. 2341.
[49] *Contra Faustum Manichaeum,* xxviii, 2.

gradus non mutant speciem. Similarly, in the former citation[50] Augustine's appeal is not specifically to the Church of his time, but to the "holy and learned men" who were living in the time of the writers—real or alleged—of the books in question, who, he says, would be in position to know the truth of the matter. Nothing can be clearer in this case either, than that the point of Augustine's argument turns on the validity of the testimony of the Church, not on the dogmatic authority of the Church.

The note struck by these passages is sustained in all Augustine's discussions of the matter and sometimes swells to an even clearer tone. Take for instance the *argumentum ad absurdum* with which he plies Faustus[51] to the effect that we can never be assured of the authorship of any book "if we doubt the apostolic origin of those books which are attributed to the apostles by the Church which the apostles themselves founded, and which occupies so conspicuous a place in all lands". Clearly the appeal to the Church here is for testimony, not for authorization, as is evidenced very plainly in the sequel. For Augustine goes on to contrast the hardiness of the Manichæans in attempting to doubt the apostolicity of books so attested, with their equal hardiness in accepting as apostolic books brought forward solely by heretics, the founders of whose sect lived long after the days of the apostles; and then adduces parallels from classical authors. There are, he tells us, spurious books, in circulation under the name of Hippocrates, known to be spurious among other things from the circumstance "that they were not recognized as his at the time when his authorship of his genuine productions was determined". And who doubts the genuineness of these latter? Would not a denial of it be greeted with derision—"simply because there is a succession of testimonies to these books from the time of Hippocrates to the present day, which makes it unreasonable either now or hereafter to have any doubt on the subject". Is it not by this continuity of the chain of evidence

[50] *Ibid.*, xxii. 79.
[51] *Ibid.*, xxxiii. 6

that any book is authenticated—Plato's, Aristotle's, Cicero's, Varro's—or any of the Christian authors'—"the belief becoming more certain as it becomes more general, up to our own day"? Is not the very principle of authentication this: the transmission of information from contemporaries through successive generations? How then can anyone be so blinded by passion as "to deny the ability of the Church of the apostles—a community of brethren as numerous as they were faithful—to transmit their writings unaltered to posterity, as the original seats of the apostles have been occupied by a continuous succession of bishops to the present day?" Are we to deal with the apostolic writings differently from the natural dealing we accord day by day to ordinary ones,—whether of profane or religious authors?[52]

The matter is not different when at an earlier place in the same treatise[53] he takes up much the same point on which he is arguing in the famous passage "I would not believe the Gospel, etc.". When Manichæus calls himself an apostle, he says, it is a shameless falsehood, "for it is well known that this heresy began not only after Tertullian, but after Cyprian". And what evidence can Manichæus or Faustus bring forward, which will satisfy anyone not inclined to believe either their books or themselves? "Will Faustus take our apostles as witnesses? Unless he can find some apostles in life, he must read their writings: and these are all against him. . . . He cannot pretend that their writings have been tampered with; for that would be to attack the credit of his own witnesses. Or if he produces his own manuscripts of the apostolic writings, he must also obtain

[52] Cf. *ibid.* xxii. 19: "Why not rather submit to the authority of the Gospel which is so well-founded, so confirmed, so generally acknowledged and admired, and which has an unbroken series of testimonies from the Apostles down to our own day, that you may have an intelligent belief?" Cf. also xi. 2, xiii. 4, xxxiii. 6 and 9. Because Augustine was deeply impressed by the catholicity of the Church's testimony (as *e. g.*, *De morr. eccles. cath.* xxix. 61) is no reason why we should fail to see that he is equally impressed by its continuity,—that is, by its historical character.

[53] xiii. 4. 5.

for them the authority of the Churches founded by the apostles themselves, by showing that they have been preserved and transmitted by their sanction. It will be difficult for a man to make me believe him on the evidence of writings which derive their authority from his own word, which I do not believe. . . . The authority of our books, which is confirmed by the agreement of so many nations, supported by a succession of apostles, bishops, and councils, is against you. Your books have no authority, for it is an authority maintained by only a few and these the worshippers of an untruthful God and Christ. . . . The established authority of the Scriptures must outweigh every other: for it derives new confirmation from the progress of events which happen, as Scripture proves, in fulfilment of the predictions made so long before their occurrence." Of course this is a piece of polemic argumentation, not a historical investigation: but the gist of the polemic is simply that the Scriptures of the Christians owe their authority to a valid historical vindication of them as of apostolic origin, while the Scriptures of the Manichæans lack all authority because they lack such a validation. Augustine does not think of such a thing as simply opposing the authority of the Church to the Manichæan contentions; and much less of course does he take a roundabout way to the same result, by opposing to them the authority of Scriptures which owe all their authority to the mere *ipse dixit* of the Church. If he speaks of authority as given to sacred books only "through the Churches of Christ", it is clear that this does not mean that these churches communicate to these Scriptures an authority inherent in the Churches, but only that it is by their testimony that that supreme authority which belongs to the Scriptures from their apostolic origin is vindicated to them, as indeed it is confirmed to them by other testimonies also, those, to wit, of miracles and fulfilled prophesy and the consent of the nations and the succession of apostles, bishops, and councils,

nfine ourselves to items enumerated here. Surely it be doubted that here also Augustine's appeal to the

Church as authenticating the Scriptures is to the Church as a witness, not as an authorizer.

It is natural to turn from this passage immediately to the closely related one in the treatise *Against Manichæus' Epistle called Fundamental,* in which the famous words, 'I would not believe the Gospel, etc.', occur. If the passage which we have just had before us is rather a piece of sharp polemics than a historical investigation, much more this. Augustine proposes here to join argument with the Manichæans on the pure merits of the question at issue between them. He wishes to approach the consideration of their claims as would a stranger who was for the first time hearing their Gospel: and as they promise nothing less than demonstration he demands that they give him nothing less than demonstration before asking of him assent.[54] He warns them that he is held to the Catholic Church by many bonds, which it will be hard to loosen: so that their task of convincing him on the ground of pure reason will not be an easy one. He has found a very pure wisdom in the Catholic Church—not indeed attained to in this life by more than a few spiritual men, while the rest walk by faith, but nevertheless shining steadily forth for all who have eyes to see it. He has been deeply impressed by the wide extension of the Church. The authority it exercises,—"inaugurated by miracles, nourished by hope, augmented by love, established by antiquity"—has very strongly moved him. The unbroken succession of rulers in the Church possesses for him a great weight of evidence. He confesses that the very name of 'Catholic'—retained unchallenged amid so many heresies,—has affected him deeply. What have the Manichæans to offer him which would justify him in setting aside these and such inducements to remain a Catholic? Nothing but the "promise of the truth" (*sola veritatis pollicitatio*). The "promise" of the truth, observe: not "the truth" itself. If the latter,—why, Augustine gives up the contest at once. For he allows without dispute, that if they give him truth itself—so clearly

[54] *Contra Epist. Manich. Fundam.* iii. 3.

the truth that it cannot be doubted,—*that* is something that is to be preferred to all these things which he has enumerated as holding him in the Catholic Church,—these and all other things that can be imagined as holding him there. For nothing is so good as truth. But he persistently demands that there must be something more than a "promise" of truth before he can separate himself from the Catholic Church,—or rather, as he puts it, before he can be moved "from that faith which binds his soul with ties so many and so strong to the Christian religion". It is, then, we percieve, strict demonstration which Augustine is asking of the Manichæans, and he conducts the argument on that basis.

Turning at once to Manichæus's *Fundamental Epistle* as a succinct depository of nearly all which the Manichæans believe, he quotes its opening sentence: "Manichæus, an apostle of Jesus Christ, by the providence of God the Father". There he stops immediately to demand proof,—proof, remember, not mere assertion. You have promised me truth, he says,—demonstrated truth: and this is what you give me. Now, I tell you shortly, I do not believe it. Will you prove it to me: or will you, in defiance of the whole claim of the Manichæans, that they ask faith of no man save on the ground of demonstration, simply demand of me belief without clear and sound proof? If you propose proof, I will wait for it. Perhaps you will turn to the Gospel and seek there a testimony to Manichæus. But suppose I do not believe the Gospel? Are you to depend for your proof—you who differentiate yourselves from Christians in this, that while they demand faith, you offer them demonstration and ask belief of nothing until you have demonstrated it,—are *you* to depend for your proof on this very faith of the Christians? For observe, my faith in the Gospel rests on the authority of the Catholic Church. And moreover, I find myself in this quandary: the same Church that tells me to believe the Gospel tells me not to believe Manichæus. Choose, then, which you will. If I am to believe the Catholics, then I cannot believe Manichæus—for they tell me not

to. If I am not to believe the Catholics, then, you cannot use the Gospel, because, it was out of the preaching of the Catholics that I have been brought to believe the Gospel. Or if you say I am to believe them in this one matter and not in the other—I am scarcely so foolish as to put my faith thus at your arbitrary disposal, to believe or not believe as you dictate, on no assigned ground. It was agreed that you should not ask faith from me without clear proof—according to your universal boast that you demand no belief without precedent demonstration. It is clear, then, that to render such a proof you must not appeal to the Gospel. "If you hold to the Gospel, I will hold to those by whose teaching I have come to believe the Gospel; by their instructions I will put no credit in you whatever. And if by any chance you should be able to find anything really clear as to the apostolicity of Manichæus you will weaken the authority of the Catholics for me, since they instruct me not to believe you; and this authority having been weakened I shall no longer be able to believe the Gospel for it was through them that I came to believe it." The upshot of it is that if no clear proof of Manichæus' apostleship is to be found in the Gospel, I shall credit the Catholics rather than you; while if there is such to be found in the Gospel I shall believe neither them nor you. Where then is your demonstration of the apostleship of Manichæus—that I should believe it? Of course I do not mean I do not believe the Gospel. I do believe it, and believing it I find no way of believing you. You can point out neither in it nor in any other book faith in which I confess, anything about this absurd apostleship of Manichæus. But it is certainly evident that your promise to demonstrate to me your tenets signally fails in this case on any supposition.

This is Augustine's argument in this famous passage. Undoubtedly the exact interpretation of its implications with respect to the seat of authority in Christianity is attended with considerable difficulty. And it is not altogether strange that the Romanists have seized upon it as subordi-

nating the 'Gospel' to the 'Church': nor even that they have been followed in this, not merely by extreme rationalists predisposed to every interpretation of a Patristic writer which tends to support their notion that the clothing of Scripture with absolute authority was a late and unhistorical dogmatic development,[55] but also by many scholars intent only upon doing complete justice to Augustine's opinions.[56] There are serious difficulties, however, in the way of this interpretation of the passage. One of them is that it would in that case be out of accord with the entirety of Augustine's teaching elsewhere. It is quite true that elsewhere also he speaks of the authority of the Church, and even establishes the Church on the "summit of authority". But in all such passages he speaks obviously of the Church rather as the instrument of the spread of the saving truth than as the foundation on which the truth rests,—in a word as the vehicle rather than the seat of authority.[57] And in general, as we have already seen, Augustine's allusions to the Church as "the pillar and ground of the truth" throw the stress on its function of witness-bearing to the truth rather than found the truth on its bare *ipse dixit*. It is scarcely likely that he has spoken in a contrary sense in our present passage. We must not permit it to fall out of sight that Augustine's point of view in this passage is that of one repelling the Manichæan claim of strict demonstration of the truth of their teaching. His rejoinder amounts to saying that they cannot ground a demonstration upon a Gospel accepted only on faith. The contrast at this point is not between the weakness of the basis on which they accept their tenets and the incomparable weight of the authority of the Church on which Christians accept the 'Gospel'. On the contrary, the contrast is between the great-

[55] Cf *e. g.* H. J. Holtzmann, *Kanon und Tradition* (1859), pp. 2. 3

[56] Cf. *e. g.* Harnack, *Hist. Dog.* v. 80; Loofs, *Leitfaden d. DG*, Dornet, *Augustinus*, Kunze, *Glaubenslehre*, etc.

[57] Portalié, as cited, 2413, adduces in proof that Augustine places the Church "above even Scripture and tradition", *De utilitate credendi* xvii. 35, comparing *Ep.* 118, 32.

ness of their claims to demonstration and the weakness of its basis—nothing but the 'Gospel' which is accepted on "authority" not on "demonstration"—on "faith" not on "reason",—in effect, on "testimony", not on "sight". In a word, the "authority of the Church" is adduced here not as superlatively great—so great that, in the face of it, the Manichæan claims must fall away let them be grounded in what they may; but rather as incongruously inadequate to support the weight the Manichæan must put on it if he is to build up his structure of demontration. The Manichæan undertakes a demonstration, scorning a faith that rests on authority: and then actually wishes to rest that demonstration on a premise which has no other basis than a faith that rests on authority. He cannot *demonstrate* that Manichæus was an Apostle of Christ on the testimony of a 'Gospel' which itself is accepted on the *authority* of the Catholic Church: 'authority' being used here in its contrast with 'reason', not with 'testimony', and in pursuance of Augustine's general contention that all religious truth must begin with faith on authority and not with demonstration on reason. This being the case, so far is the passage from predicating that Augustine esteemed the 'authority' of the Church as 'the highest of all' as the Romish contention insists,[58] that its very gist is that the testimony of the Church is capable of establishing only that form of conviction known as 'faith' and therefore falls hopelessly short of 'demonstration'.

Such being the case we cannot be surprised that in all ages there has been exhibited a tendency among those more or less emancipated from the Romish tradition to deny that even this famous passage asserts the supreme authority of the contemporary Church. Striking instances may be found for example in William Occam[59] and Marsilius of

[58] Cf. Portalié, as cited, 2413 and 2341.

[59] Occam explains that the ecclesia quae majoris auctoritatis est quam evangelista, est illa ecclesia cujus auctor evangelii pars esse agnoscitur (Goldasti mon. tom. I. fol. 402). That is to say, he understands the Church here as projected through time, and as including even Jesus

Padua[60] in the fourteenth century and in John Wessel[61] in the fifteenth: and examples are not wanting throughout the whole period of papal domination.[62] Of course the early Protestant controversialists take their place in this series. With them the matter was even less than with William Occam and Marsilius a merely academical question. In their revolt from the dogmatic authority of the Church and their appeal to the Scriptures alone as the sole source and norm of divine truth, they were met by the citation of this passage from Augustine. As on its theological side the Reformation was precisely an 'Augustinian' revival, the adduction of Augustine's authority in behalf of the subjection of Scripture to the Church, was particularly galling to them and amounted to a charge that they were passing beyond the limits of all established Christianity. They were indeed in no danger, in casting off the authority of the Church, of replacing it with the authority of any single father. Doubtless Luther spoke a little more brusquely than was the wont of the Reformers, in the well-known assertion: "Augustine often erred; he cannot be trusted: though he was good and holy, yet he, as well as other fathers, was wanting in the true faith". But the essential opinion here expressed was the settled judgment of all the Reformers and is by no means inconsistent with their high admiration of Augustine or with their sincere deference to him. The

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Himself: the historical not the contemporary Church. But he takes "authority" strictly. Cf. Neander, *Hist. of Church*, E. T. v. 40.

[60] Marsilius explains: Dicit autem Augustinus pro tanto se credere evangelio propter ecclesiae catholicae auctoritaten, quia suae credulitatis initium inde sumpsit, quam Spiritu Sancto dirigi novit: fides enim quandoque incipit ex auditu,—in which he anticipates the general Protestant positon. Cf. (quite fully) Neander, E. T. v. 27-28.

[61] *De Potestate ecclesiastica* (*Opp.* p. 759): "We believe in the Gospel on God's account, and on the Gospel's account in the Church and the Pope; not in the Gospel on the Church's account: wherefore that which Augustine says (*Cont. Epist. Man. Fund.* c. 6, etc.), concerning the Gospel and the Church, originis de credendo verbum est, non comparationis aut praeferentive. For the whole passage and others of like import, see Gieseler, *Ecclesiast. Hist.* iii. 5, § 153, E. T. iii. 468; and cf. Schmidt, *Jahrbücher f. d. Theol.* (1861), vi. 235.

[62] Cf., for example, the instances mentioned by Chamier, below.

gist of the matter is that though they looked upon Augustine as their great instructor, esteeming him indeed the greatest teacher God had as yet given His Church; and felt sure, as Luther expressed it, that "had he lived in this century, he would have been of our way of thinking"; they yet knew well that he had not lived in the sixteenth century but in the fourth and fifth and that in the midst of the marvellous purity of his teaching there were to be found some of the tares of his time growing only too richly. Ready as they were to recognize this, however, they were not inclined to admit without good reason that he had erred so sadly in so fundamental a matter as that at present before us; and they did not at all recognize that the Romanists had made good their assertion that Augustine in saying that "he would not believe the Gospel except as moved thereto by the authority of the Catholic Church" was asserting the Romish theory that the authority of the Church lies behind and above all other authorities on earth—that, as even Schwane puts it, the Church is the representative of God on earth and its authority alone can assure us of the reality of a divine revelation.

Already at the Leipzig disputation with Eck, Luther had been triumphantly confronted with this statement of Augustine's; and in his *Resolutions* on that debate he suggests that Augustine was only giving what was historically true in his own case.[63] Augustine had himself been led to believe the Gospel through the ministration of the Church; and he adduces this fact only that he might bring to bear upon his heretical readers the impressive testimony of the whole Church, which was, of course, of much more moving weight than his own personal witness could be. As a matter of fact, comments Luther, the Gospel does not rest on the Church, but contrariwise, the Church on the Gospel. It was not Luther's way to say his say with bated breath. This is the way he expresses his judgment in his *Table Talk*:[64]

[63] See Köstlin, *Luther's Theology*, E. T. ii. 224. 255, and esp. i. 320-321.

[64] "Of the Fathers", near the beginning (Bohn's Ed.). Augustine's

"The Pope to serve his own turn, took hold on St. Augustine's sentence, where he says, *evangelio non crederem*, etc. The asses could not see what occasioned Augustine to utter that sentence, whereas he spoke it against the Manichæans; as much as to say: "I believe not *you*, for you are damned heretics, but I believe and hold with the Church, the spouse of Christ". It seemed to Luther, in other words, quite one thing to say that the credit of the Church ought to be higher than that of the Manichæans, and quite another to teach that the authority of the Church was needed to give authority to the Gospel. Perhaps the consentient opinion of the Reformers in this matter is nowhere better stated, in brief form, than in the Protestant *Objections* to the Acts of Ratisbon, which were penned by Melanchthon.[65] "Although therefore", we read here, "the conservation of certain writings of the Prophets and Apostles is the singular work and benefit of God, nevertheless there must be recognized that diligence and authority of the Church, by which it has, in part testified to certain writings, in part by a spiritual judgment separated from the remaining Prophetic and Apostolic Scriptures those that are unworthy and dissentient. Wherefore Augustine commends to us the authority of the primitive Church,[66] receives the writings that are approved by the Catholic consent of the primitive Church; (and) repudiates the later books of the Manichæans. Accordingly he says: *'I would not believe the Gospel except the authority of the Catholic Church moved me'*. He means that he is moved by the consentient testimony of the primitive Church, not to doubt that these books were handed down from the Apostles and are worthy of credit (*fide*)". In a word, according to Melanchthon, Augustine is to be read as appealing to the testimony of the Church not as asserting its authority.

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statement is invoked in the bull, *Exsurge Domine*, published by Leo X in 1520 against Luther.

[65] *Corpus Reff.* iv. 350. A French version is given in the Brunswick ed. of Calvin's works, v. 564.

[66] Auctoritatem primae ecclesiae.

In the same line follow all the Reformers, and much the same mode of statement may be read, for example, in Butzer, or Calvin, or Bullinger, or Peter Martyr. "I will not now remember", writes Bullinger,[67] "how by manifest words the standard bearers of that see do write, that the Canonical Scripture taketh her authority of the Church, abusing the sentence of the ancient father St. Augustine, 'I would not have believed the Gospel, if the authority of the early Church had not moved me'." . . . How they abused it Peter Martyr tells us more fully:[68] "But they say that Augustine writes *Against the Epistola Fundamenti,* 'I would not believe the Gospel except the authority of the Church moved me'. But Augustine wished to signify by these words nothing else than that much is to be attributed to the ministry of the Church which proposes, preaches, and teaches the Gospel to believers. For who of us came to Christ or believed the Gospel except as excited by the preaching of the Gospel which is done in the Church? It cannot be inferred from this, however, that the authority of the Gospel hangs on the Church in the minds of the auditors. For if that were true, long ago the Epicureans and Turks had been persuaded . . . ." As was to be expected it was Calvin who gives us the solidest piece of reasoning upon the subject. The gist of what he says is that Augustine was not setting forth the source whence the Gospel derives its authority, but the instrument by which men may be led to recognize that authority. The unbeliever, he remarks, may well be brought to trust the Gospel by the consent of the Church; but the believer's trust in the Gospel finds its authority not in the Church, but in the Gospel itself, and this is logically prior to that of the Church, though no doubt, it may be chronologically recognized last by the inquirer. The Church may thus bring us to the Gospel and commend the Gospel to us; but when we

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[67] *Decades,* v. 2 (Parker Soc. ed. iv, p. 67).

[68] *Loci Communes,* Zurich, 1580, i. 251 (iii. 3. 2).

have accepted the Gospel our confidence in it rests on something far more fundamental than the Church. Augustine, he insists, "did not have in mind to suspend the faith which we have in the Scriptures on the will and pleasure (*nutu arbitrioque*) of the Church, but only to point out, what we too confess to be true, that those who are not yet illuminated by the Spirit of God, are by reverence for the Church brought to docility so as to learn from the Gospel the faith of Christ; and that the authority of the Church is in this way an introduction, by which we are prepared for the faith of the Gospel". Augustine is perfectly right, then, he continues, to urge on the Manichæans the universal consent of the Church as a *reason* why they should come believingly to the Scriptures, but the *ground* of our faith in the Scriptures as a revelation of truth is that they are from God.[69]

The Protestant scholastics, of course, developed what had by their time become the traditional Protestant contention, and defended it against the assaults of the Romish controversialists. Who first invented the philological argument that Augustine uses in this sentence the imperfect for the pluperfect "in accordance with the African dialect"—so that he says, not "I would not believe the Gospel, but, historically, "I would not have believed the Gospel"—we have not had the curiosity to inquire. If we may trust the English version of the *Decades,* Bullinger already treats the tense as a pluperfect. Musculus,[70] who devotes a separate section of his *Locus de Sacris Scripturis* to the examination of Augustine's declaration lays great stress on this partic-

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[69] *Institutes,* i. 7. 3. Calvin very appositely points out that Augustine in the immediately preceding context represents the proper course to be to "follow those who invite us first to believe what we are not yet able to see, that, being made able by this very faith, we may deserve to understand what we believe, our mind being now inwardly strengthened and illuminated not by men but by God Himself" (c. 5). In these words, Calvin remarks, Augustine grounds our confidence in the Gospel on the internal operation of God Himself upon our minds. Cf. below, note 88.

[70] *Loci Communes,* Basle, 1599, pp. 181-183 (Locus xxi).

ular point, that in it *non crederem* is used for *non credidissem;* and Musculus is generally cited by later writers upon it. This is true, for example, of both Whitaker and Chamier, who with Stillingfleet may be mentioned as offering perhaps the fullest and best discussions of the whole matter. Whitaker[71] devotes a whole chapter to it, and after adducing the arguments of Peter Martyr, Calvin and Musculus, affirms that "it is plain that he (Augustine) speaks of himself as an unbeliever, and informs us how he first was converted from a Manichæan to be a Catholic by listening to the voice of the Church"—in which remark he appears to us to be quite wrong. Chamier's[72] treatment, which also fills a whole chapter, is exceedingly elaborate. He begins by calling attention to the singularity of the passage, nothing precisely to the same effect being adducible from the whole range of Augustine's writings. Then he cites the opinions of eminent Romanists divergent from the current Romish interpretation,—those of John, Cardinal of Torre Cremara, Thomas Valden, Driedo, Gerson, who represent Augustine as assigning only a *declarative* authority to the Church, or as speaking not of the "living" but of the "historical" Church. "Augustine", says Driedo, "speaks of the Catholic Church which was from the beginning of the Christian faith": "by the Church", says Gerson, "he understands the primitive congregation of those believers who saw and heard Christ and were his witnesses". All these are good staggers towards the truth, says Chamier: but best of all is the explanation of the passage which is given by Petrus de Alliaco, himself a cardinal, "in the third article, of the first question on the first of the sentences". In the judgment of this prelate Augustine's meaning is not that the Church was to him a *principium theologicum,* by which the Gospel was theologically proved to him to be true, but only a "moving cause" by which he was led to the

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[71] *Disp. on Holy Scripture* (1610), iii. 8 (Parker Society, E. T., p. 320).

[72] *Panstrat. Cathol.* (Geneva, 1626), vol. 1, pp. 195 sq. (I. i. 7. 10).

Gospel,—much "as if he had said, 'I would not believe the Gospel unless moved thereto by the holiness of the Church, or by the miracles of Christ: in which (forms of statement) though a cause is assigned for believing the Gospel, there is no *principium prius* set forth, faith in which is the cause why the Gospel is believed". In a word, as it seems, Petrus de Alliaco is of the opinion that Augustine's appeal to the Church is to its testimony rather than to its authority. This opinion, now, continues Chamier, is illustrated and confirmed by weighty considerations brought forward by Protestant writers,—whereupon he cites the arguments of Peter Martyr, Calvin, Musculus, Whitaker, and through them makes his way into a detailed discussion of the passage itself in all its terms. Rivalling Chamier's treatment in fulness if not equalling it in distinction is that given the passage in Stillingfleet's *Rational Account of the Grounds of the Protestant Religion,*[73] under the three heads of (1) the nature of the controversy in which Augustine was engaged: (2) the Church by whose authority he was moved; and (3) the way and manner in which that Church's authority moved him,—certainly a logically complete distribution of the material. The whole argument of scholastic protestatism is brought before us in its briefest but certainly not in its most attractive form, however, in the concise statement given in De Moor's Commentary on John Marck's Compend.[74] According to this summary: (1) The Papists in adducing this passage to support their doctrine of the primary authority of the Church deceive themselves by a two-fold fallacy,—(A) They draw a general conclusion from a particular instance: it does not follow that because Augustine did not believe the Gospel except as moved by the authority of the Church, therefore no one can believe the Gospel whom the authority of the Church does not move; (B) They misunderstand Augustine, as if he were speaking of himself at the time of his writing, instead of at the time of his con-

[73] i. 7; *Works* (1709), iv, pp. 210 sq.

[74] *De Moor in J. Marck. Compend* (1761), vol. i, p. 160 (cap. ii. 37. ad fin.).

version. "For where he says, 'I would not believe were I not moved' he is employing, as the learned observe, an African mode of speech, familiar enough to Augustine, in which the imperfect form is used for the pluperfect" . . . "His meaning then is not that believers should depend on the authority of the Church, but that unbelievers should take their start from it"; and in this sense he elsewhere speaks often enough. (2) Augustine is not speaking here of *auctoritas praecipiens, juris et imperii* (injunctionary authority, with a legal claim upon us for obedience) "as the Papists insist,—as if Augustine would have believed solely because the Church pronounced belief to be due": but of *auctoritas dignitatis* (the authority of observed desert), "which flows from the notable manifestations of Divine Providence observable in the Church,—such as miracles, antiquity, common consent (ch. iv.), and which may lead to faith though it is incapable of implanting it in the first instance". (3) "What is noted here, then, is the external motive of faith, but not at all the infallible *principium credendi,* which he teaches in the fourth chapter is to be sought in the truth alone. . . . And it is to be noted that the fathers elsewhere rightly hold that the Holy Scriptures are superior in authority both *in se* and *quoad nos* to the Church. . . . "

Of course it is observable enough from this survey, that the interest of the Protestant scholastics was far more in the dogmatic problem of the seat of authority in Christianity, than in the literary question of the precise meaning of Augustine's words. We must bear in mind that the citations we have made are taken not from studies in literary history but from dogmatic treatises; and that their authors approach the particular question upon which we are interrogating them from a dogmatic point of view, and in a doctrinal interest. There would be a certain unfairness in adducing these citations in a connection like the present, therefore, were there any real occasion to defend the tone in which they are couched. This is by no means the case.

We need not hesitate to recognize nevertheless at once that some of the reasoning employed by them to support their interpretation will scarcely bear scrutiny. It is a counsel of despair, for example, to represent Augustine as employing—"in accordance with the usage of the African dialect"—the imperfect in a pluperfect sense. We may readily confess that the supposition does violence to the context of the passage itself, which requires the imperfect sense; it seems clearly to be the offspring of a dogmatic need rather than of a sympathetic study of the passage. And we are afraid the same must be said of the general conception of the meaning of the passage which has probably given rise to this philological suggestion,—viz., that it is a historical statement of Augustine's own experience and means merely that he himself was led by the Church's authority to the Gospel. He is not writing his autobiography in this passage, but arguing with the Manichæans; and he is not informing them of what had been true of his own manner of conversion but confounding them by asserting what in a given case he, as a reasonable man, would do. There are elements enough of doubtful validity in the argument of the Protestant scholastics, therefore,—as there could not fail to be in the circumstances. But it is quite another question whether their general conception of the passage is not truer than that of their Romish opponents, and whether they do not adduce sound reasons enough for this general conception to support it adequately. It is a matter of common experience in every department of life,—and not least in judicial cases, where the experience has been crystallized into a maxim to the effect that it is best to announce decisions and withhold the reasons—that the decisions of men's judgment are often far better than the reasons they assign for them: and it may haply prove true here too, that the position argued for by the Protestant scholastics is sounder than many of the arguments which they bring forward to support it.

It must be confessed, meanwhile, that modern Protestant opinion does not show so undivided a front as was the case

during the scholastic period. The majority of Protestant scholars, historical investigators as well as dogmatic systematizers, do, indeed, continue to defend the essential elements of the interpretation for which the Protestant scholastics contended; but even these ordinarily adopt a different line of argument and present the matter from a somewhat different point of view; and there are many recent Protestant scholars, and they not invariably those deeply affected by the rationalism of the day, who are inclined to revert more or less fully to the Romish interpretation. Even Dr. W. G. T. Shedd, who reproduces more of the scholastic argument than is now usual,[75] shows the effect of the change. Even he quotes Hagenbach[76] approvingly to the effect that Augustine "merely affirms" "a subjective dependence of the believer upon the authority of the Church universal, but not an objective subordination of the Bible itself to this authority"; though he proceeds to weaken "the subjective dependence of the believer upon the authority of the Church" so as to leave room for a "private judgment". What in his view Augustine is asserting is the duty of the individual to respect the authority of the Church, because the "Church universal has an authority higher than that of any member", and it is therefore unreasonable for the individual, or a heretical party, to "oppose its private judgment to the catholic judgment". Or rather, what he supposes Augustine to affirm is—as he fortunately weakens the statement in the next sentence,—"the greater probability of the correctness of the Catholic mind, in comparison with the Heretical or Schismatic mind, and thereby the *authority* of the Church in relation to the individual, without dreaming, however, of affirming its absolute *infallibility*,—an attribute which he confines to the written revelation". Augustine's notion of "ecclesiastical authority" is by this expedient reduced to "the natural expectation of finding that the general judgment is a correct one", coupled with "the right of private judgment;

[75] *Hist. of Christ. Doctr.* i. 143-150. Cf. S. Baumgarten: *Untersuchung. theol. Streitigkeiten,* iii. 2. 8.

[76] *Dogmengeschichte,* § 119.

the right to examine the general judgment and to perceive its correctness with his own eyes". Thus, Dr. Shedd supposes, "Augustine adopts the Protestant, and opposes the Papal theory of tradition and authority". "The Papist's method of agreeing with the catholic judgment", he explains, "is passive. He denies that the individual may intelligently verify the position of the Church for himself, because the Church is *infallible,* and consequently there is no possibility of its being in error. The individual is therefore shut up to a mechanical and passive reception of the catholic decision. The Protestant, on the other hand, though affirming the high probability that the general judgment is correct, does not assert the infallible certainty that it is. It is conceivable and possible that the Church may err. Hence the duty of the individual, while cherishing an antecedent confidence in the decisions of the Church, to examine these decisions in the light of the written word, and to convert this presumption into an intelligent perception, or else demonstrate its falsity beyond dispute. 'Neither ought I to bring forward the authority of the Nicene Council', says Augustine (*Contra Max. Arian.* II. xiv. 3), 'nor you that of Ariminum, in order to prejudge the case. I ought not to be bound (*detentum*) by the authority of the latter, nor you by that of the former. Under the authority of the Scriptures, not those received by particular sects, but those received by all in common, let the disputation be carried on, in respect to each and every particular' ".[77]

What strikes one most in these remarks of Dr. Shedd is that they begin by attributing to Augustine a doctrine of the authority of the Church universal over the individual, which forbids the individual to oppose his private judgment to the catholic judgment: proceed to vindicate to the individual a private judgment in the sense of a right to examine the general judgment that he may perceive its correctness with his own eyes,—that is to say to an active as distinguished from a merely passive agreement with the catholic judgment: and

[77] *Opus cit.* 148-149.

end by somehow or other supposing that this carries with it the right to disagree with and reject the catholic judgment on the basis of an individual judgment. The premise is that it is not reasonable to erect the individual judgment against the Catholic judgment: the conclusion is that it is the duty of the individual to subject the catholic judgment to his personal decisions: the connecting idea is—that the individual ought to be able to give an active and not merely a passive reception to the Catholic decision. The logic obviously halts. But it seems clear that what Dr. Shedd is striving to do is to give due validity to what he considers Augustine to assert in his famous declaration, viz., this, that the individual is subjectively under the authority of the Church; and yet at the same time to vindicate for Augustine a belief in the right of private judgment. He wishes to do justice to the conception of "authority" which he supposes Augustine to have had in mind in this expression, without doing injustice to Augustine's obvious exercise of freedom of opinion under the sole authority of the Scriptures. It cannot be said that he has fully succeeded, although there is much that is true in his remarks, considered as an attempt to give a general account of Augustine's estimate of the authority of the Church. But it is of no great importance for our present inquiry whether he has fully succeeded in this particular effort, or not; since, as has already been pointed out, Augustine does not seem to intend in this passage to place the individual subjectively under the "authority of the Church"; but appears to employ the term "authority" in an entirely different sense from that which it bears in such phrases,—the sense namely in which it is the synonym of "testimony" and the ground of "faith", in distinction from the "demonstration" of "reason" which is the ground of that form of conviction which he calls "knowledge".

From another point of view of importance Dr. Shedd's instinct has carried him very near to the truth. We refer to the recognition that informs his discussion that Augustine

did make more of the Church and of the authority of the Church than the Protestant scholastics were quite ready to admit. It is probably the feeling that this is the case which accounts for much of the tendency among recent scholars to concede something to the Romish interpretation of Augustine's doctrine of the authority of the Church. It certainly cannot easily be denied that Augustine does declare in this passage, that the credit we accord the Gospel hangs on the credit we give the Church. In this particular passage, this no doubt means no more than that we are dependent on the Church to accredit to us the Gospel; that it is from the Church's hands and on her testimony that we receive the Gospel as apostolic and divine. But, if we raise the broader question of Augustine's attitude towards the Church in its relation to the reception of the truth it cannot be successfully contended that it was solely as a *motivum credibilitatis* that he reverenced the Church. To him the Church was before all else the institute of salvation, out of which there is no salvation. And although it may be difficult to find expressed in language parallel to this crisp *extra ecclesiam nulla salus,* that outside of the Church there can be no right knowlege of God, it nevertheless certainly belongs to the very essence of his doctrine that outside of the Church there can be no effective knowledge of God. The Scriptures may be the supreme authority for faith, and it may be true, therefore, that wherever the Scriptures go, the salvatory truth will be objectively conveyed; but it is equally true that with Augustine this Word of truth will exert no saving power save in and through the Church.[78] As the Church is the sole mediatrix of grace and that not merely in the sense that it is through her offices alone that men are brought once for all to God, but also in the sense that it is through her offices only that all the saving grace that comes to men is conveyed to them,—so that we are with Christ only when we are with His body the Church, and it is only

[78] The distinction between 'habere' and 'utiliter habere' or 'salubriter habere' was made to do yoeman's service as regards baptism, in the Donatist controversy.

in the Church that communion with God can be retained as well as obtained,—it follows that the Word, however well known it may be and however fully it may perform its function of making known the truth of God, profits no man spiritually save in the Church.[79] It seems to be implicated in this that it is part of Augustine's teaching that the revealed truth of God, deposited in the Holy Scriptures, will not profit men even intellectually so that they may come by it to know God save in communion with the Church. Certainly he would never allow that an adequate knowledge could be obtained of that truth which must be chastely and piously sought and the key to which is love—access to which is closed to all but the spiritual man—outside the limits of that Church the supreme characteristic of which is that in it and in it alone is the love of God shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which He has given unto us.[80]

The reverence which Augustine accordingly shows to the teaching of the Church is both great and sincere. It is no meaningless form when he opens his treatise on the *Literal Interpretation of Genesis*[81] or his great work on *The Trinity*[82] with a careful statement of the faith of the Church on the topics to be dealt with, to stand as a norm of teaching beyond which it would be illegitimate to go[83]—declaring moreover with complete simplicity, "This is my faith, too, since it is the Catholic faith".[84] There can be no question therefore that he accorded not merely a high value but also a real authority to the teaching of the Church, an authority which within its own limits may well be called a "dogmatic

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[79] Cf. A. Dorner, *Augustinus*, pp. 233 sq., and H. Schmidt, in *Jahrbücher f. d. Theologie* (1861), vi. 233.

[80] *De unitate eccles.* ii. 2: "The members of Christ are linked together by means of love that belongs to unity, and by means of it are made one with their Head."

[81] *De Gen, ad Lit. imperf.* ad init. (Vienna Ed., xxviii. 460).

[82] *De Trinitate*, i. 4. 7.

[83] *De Gen. ad Lit.* i.: catholicae fidei metas; praeter fidem catholicae disciplinae; 2: "as the Catholic discipline commands to be believed."

[84] *De Trinitate*, i. 4. 7. ad fin.

authority". But it needs also to be borne in mind that the organs of this authority were not conceived by him as official but vital—those called of God in the Church to do the thinking and teaching for the Church;[85] that the nature of this authority is never conceived by him as absolute and irreformable but always as relative and correctible—no teaching from any source is to be accepted unhesitatingly as above critical examination except that of the Scriptures only; and that as to its source this authority is not thought of by him as original but derived, dependent upon the Scriptures upon which it rests and by which it is always to be tested and corrected. The Catholic faith as to the Trinity, for example, which is also his faith because it is the Catholic faith, is the faith that has been set forth, not by the organized Church on its own authority, but by "the Catholic expounders of the Divine Scriptures", intent upon teaching "according to the Scriptures"[86] and therefore only on the authority of these Scriptures. If there can be no question, therefore, that Augustine accorded a "dogmatic authority" to the Church, there can be no question either that the "dogmatic authority" he accorded to the Church was subordinated to the authority of the Scriptures, and was indeed but the representation of that authority in so to speak more tangible form. This, it is obvious, is in complete harmony with what we have already had occasion to note, in the matter of Christian observances, as to the relative authority Augustine accorded to the Scriptures, Tradition, the Church—in descending series. Only, it is to be noted that the dogmatic authority of the Church of which we are now specifically speaking expresses itself not merely, and not chiefly, through conciliar decrees, but rather through the vital faith of the people of God, first assimilated by them from the Scriptures, and then expressed for them by the appropriate organs of the expression of Christian thought,

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[85] *Epist.* 118, v. 32-35: "armed with the abundant weapons of reason, by means of a comparatively few devoutly learned and truly spiritual men."

[86] *Ibid.*, ad initium.

which in general are the Doctors of the Church. Such being the case, there can no question be raised whether or not the Church may be conceived as the supreme seat of authority in the dogmatic sphere. In many cases the proximate seat of authority it doubtlessly is; but never the ultimate seat of authority. That belongs with Augustine ever and unvaryingly to the Holy Scriptures,[87] witnessed to by the Church as given to it by the apostles as the infallible Word of God, studied and expounded by the Church for its needs, and applied by it to the varying problems which confront it with the measure of authority which belongs to it as the Church of God, the pillar and ground of the truth.

It is, however, in a deeper sense than even this that Augustine thought of the Church in relation to the acquisition of the knowledge of the truth. With Augustine the Church as it is the mediatrix of divine grace, is also the mediatrix of divine knowledge. As such the Church holds a position of the very highest significance between the supreme seat of authority, the Holy Scriptures, and the souls of men. Only in and through the Church can a sound as well as a saving knowledge of the contents of the Scriptures be hoped for; only in and through the Church can the knowledge of God enshrined in the Holy Scriptures avail for the illumination of the intellect with true knowledge of God, no less than for the sanctification of the soul for true communion with God. But, it must be remembered that in speaking thus, Augustine is thinking of the Church not mechanically as an organized body acting through official organs, say the hierarchy, but vitally, as the *congregatio sanctorum* acting through its vital energies as a communion of love. The Church in which alone according to Augustine true knowledge of God is to be had is fundamentally

[87] *Epist.* 164, iii. 6, offers a typical mode of statement: "And with respect to that first man, the father of the human race, that Christ loosed him from hell almost the whole Church agrees; and it is too considered that the Church does not believe this in vain,—whencesoever it has been handed down, although the authority of the Canonical Scriptures is not expressly adducible for it (etiamsi canonicarum Scriptuarum hinc expressa non proferatur auctoritas)."

conceived as the Body of Christ. And this is as much as to say that the essence of his doctrine of the authority of the Church would not be inaptly expressed by the simple and certainly to no Christian thinker unacceptable formula, that it is only in Jesus Christ that God can be rightly known. The Church of Christ is the Body of Christ, and this Body of Christ is the real subject of the true knowledge of God on earth: it is only therefore as one is a member in particular of this Body that he can share in the knowledge of God, of which it is the subject. This is the counterpart in Augustine of that doctrine of the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti* which was first formulated by Calvin and from him became the corner-stone of the Protestant doctrine of authority: and it differs from that doctrine only because and as Augustine's doctrine of "the means of grace" differs from the Protestant.[88]

Augustine's doctrine of the Church is a fascinating subject on which it is difficult to touch without being carried beyond the requirements of our present purpose. Perhaps enough has already been said to indicate sufficiently for the end in view the place which the Church holds in Augustine's

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[88] On Augustine's conception of the Church as a communion of saints, see the fifth of Reuter's *Augustin. Studien;* and compare Schmidt as above cited, esp. from p. 233. On Augustine's relation to the Protestant doctrine of the "testimony of the Holy Spirit" see Pannier, *Le Témoignage du Saint-Esprit* (1893), pp. 67-68. After citing *Tract. iii. in Ep. Joan. ad Parthos,* ii. 13; *De Trinitate,* III. 1-2; *Conff.* vi. 5, and xi. 3, he adds: "There certainly is not yet here the whole of the witness of the Holy Spirit. . . . But St. Augustine has the intuition of a mysterious work which is wrought in the soul of the Christian, of an understanding of the Bible which does not come from man, but from a power external to him and superior to him; he urges the rôle which the direct correspondence between the Book and the reader must play in the foundation of Christian certitude. In this, as on so many other points, Augustine was the precursor of the Reformation, and a precursor without immediate continuers." In point of fact Augustine is just as clear as the Reformers that earthly voices assail only the ears, and that cathedram in coelo habet qui cordia docet (*Tract. iii. in Ep. Joan. ad Parthos,* ii. 13). He differs from them only in the place he gives the Church in communicating that grace out of which comes the preparation of the mind to understand, as well as of the heart to believe, and of the will to do.

doctrine of authority. In the sin-bred weakness of humanity, the Church mediates between the divine revelation deposited in the Holy Scriptures and the darkened mind of man; and thus becomes a paedagogue to lead men to the truth. It is in the Church that the truth is known; and this not merely in the sense that it is in the hands of the Church that the Scriptures are found, those Scriptures in which the whole Truth of God is indefectibly deposited; but also in the sense that it is in the Church alone that the mysteries of the faith, revealed in the Scriptures, are comprehended: that it is only in the participation of the graces found in her that men may hope to attain to the vision which is the possession solely of saints. The true knowledge of God belongs to the fellowship of His people, and out of it cannot be attained. And therefore, although Augustine knows of many things which bind him to the Catholic Church and the adduction of which as undeniable credentials giving confidence to those who hold to that Church, he thinks should impress any hearer,—such as the consent of peoples and nations, the just authority it enjoys among men, the unbroken succession of its rulers from the beginning, and the very name of Catholic,—yet the real thing which above all others held him to the Catholic Church was, as he was well aware, that there was to be found in it "the purest wisdom" (*sincerissima sapientia*). He needs indeed to confess that to the knowledge of this wisdom only a few spiritual men (*pauci spirituales*) attain in this life, and even they (because they are men) only very partially (*ex minima quidem parte*), though without the least uncertainty (*sine dubitatione*).[89] The crowd (*turba*) meanwhile walk even in the Church, by faith,—since their characteristic is, not vivacity of intellect, but simplicity in believing,—the Church performing its function to them in holding out the truth to them to be believed. So that even the crowd are made in the apprehension of faith—each according to his ability—to share in the truth of which the Church is the possessor. All

[89] *Contra Epist. Manich. Fund.* i. 4. 5.

the time, however, there is in the Church and in it alone for the few spiritual men both the fulness of truth to be known and the opportunity to know it. The underlying idea is clearly that for the knowledge of the truth there are requisite two things,—the revelation of the truth to be apprehended and the preparation of the heart for its apprehension: and that these two things can be found in conjunction only in the Church. Our thought reverts at once to Augustine's fundamental teaching that the remedy for the disabilities of sinful men is to be found in the two-fold provision of Revelation and Grace. In the Church these two provisions meet, and it is therefore only in the Church that the sin-born disabilities of men can be cured: and only in the Church that men, being sinful, can attain to that knowledge of divine things in which is life.

By this construction, it will not fail to be perceived, Augustine sets the Church over against the world,—or, as he would have phrased it, the glorious city of God over against the earthly city—as the sole sphere in which true knowledge (*sapientia*) is found. Thus there is introduced a certain dualism in the manifestation of human life on earth. Two classes of men are marked off, separated one from another as darkness is separated from light. In the one, at the best only broken lights can play; because it is the natural development of sin-stricken humanity alone that it can offer. In the other may be found the steady shining of that true light which shall broaden more and more to the perfect day. The dualism of this conception of human life is resolved, however, by two considerations. In observing human life in its dualistic opposition we are observing it only in its process of historic development. The dualism is constituted by the invasion of the realm of darkness by the realm of light: and it exists only so long as the conquest of the darkness by the light is incomplete. A temporary dualism is the inevitable result of the introduction of any remedial scheme which does not act immediately and all at once. In the City of God—the Church of God's saints—we perceive the pro-

gress of the correction of the sin-born disabilities of men. Again the opposition of nature and the supernatural as the principles of the opposing kingdoms, must not be pressed to an extreme. With Augustine, as we have seen, all knowledge, even that which in contrast with a higher supernatural, may rightly be called natural knowledge, is in source supernatural: all knowledge rests ultimately on revelation. The problem to him was not, therefore, how to supplant a strictly natural knowledge by a strictly supernatural knowledge: but how to restore to men the power to acquire that knowledge which we call natural—how to correct sin-bred disabilities so that the general revelation of God may be reflected purely in minds which now are blinded to its reflection by sin. For this end, a special revelation, adapted to the needs of sin-disabled minds, is called in. Special revelation is not conceived here, then, as a substitute for general revelation, but only as a preparation for its proper assimilation. The goal is still conceived as the knowledge of God by direct vision; and special revelation is presented only as spectacles through which the blind may trace out the way to the cure. The intervention of God by a special revelation works, therefore, harmoniously into the general scheme of the production of knowledge of God through general revelation. The conception is that, man being a sinner, and unable to profit by general revelation, God intervenes creatively by special revelation and grace,—by special revelation enabling him to walk meanwhile until by grace he is once more prepared to see the Light in its own light. Special revelation, given through the prophets and apostles, is embodied in the Scriptures and brought to bear on man by the Church, in which is found the grace to heal men's disabilities. The Church therefore sets up in the world a City of God in which, and in which alone, man may live free from the disabilities that clog all action in the earthly city.

If we cry out that the remedy is incomplete, the answer is that it were better to say that the cure it is working is as

yet uncompleted. So long as grace has not wrought its perfect work in our souls, there remains a dualism in all the functioning of our souls; so long as grace has not wrought its perfect work in the world there will remain a dualism in the world. But when grace has wrought its perfect work, then, as sin has been removed, the need of special revelation falls away, nay the need of all the instrumentalities by which grace is wrought falls away—the Church, the Scriptures, Christ the Mediator Himself,—and God alone suffices for the soul's requirements. The end to which all is directed and in which all issues, is not the destruction of nature but the restoration of nature: and when nature is restored, there is no longer need of the remedies. "There is nothing", says Augustine with emphasis, "that ought to detain us on the way" in our aspiration to God, in whom alone can we find our rest. And to put the sharpest possible point upon the remark he at once proceeds to apply it to our Lord Himself, who, says he, "in so far as He condescended to be our Way", wished not "to hold us".—the reference being possibly to Jno. 20 [17]—"but rather to pass away, lest we should cling weakly to temporal things, even though they had been put on and worn by Him for our salvation, and not rather press rapidly through them and strive to attain unto Himself who has freed our nature from the bondage of temporal things and set it down at the right hand of His Father".[90] The whole soteriological work of our Lord, in other words, is viewed by Augustine as a means to the end of our presentation, holy, and without spot, to the Father, and therefore as destined to fall away with all means when the end is attained.[91] When the

[90] *De Doctr. Christ.* i. 34. 38.

[91] Th. Bret, *La Conversion de S. Augustine* (Geneva, 1900), p. 64, generalizes as follows: "We remark, however, that Augustine is affirmative only in what concerns the activity of Christ as reconciler. The rôle of eternal mediator, of perpetual friend, between the individual and God, was never clearly understood by Augustine. For him Christ came to restore man to his true condition, but, that once attained, the rôle of Saviour passed into the background. The sinner once cleansed of his sins, and placed in an atmosphere of the grace of God, found himself

Mediatorial Christ is viewed thus as instrument, of course the lower means also are so considered. Augustine, even, in a passage in the immediate neighborhood of what we have just quoted, speaks as if a stage of development might be attained even in this life in which the Scriptures, say, might fall out of use as a lame man healed would no longer need his crutch. "A man", says he,[92] "supported by faith, hope and love, and retaining these unshakenly, does not need the Scriptures except for instructing others". He adduces certain solitaries as examples: men in whom I Cor. 13[8] is already fulfilled,—who "by means of these instruments (as they are called)" have had built up within them so great an edifice of faith and love that they no longer require their aid. So clear is it that by him all the means put in action by grace to cure the sin-bred disabilities of man were strictly conceived as remedies which, just because they work a cure, provide no substitutes for nature but bring about a restoration of nature.[93]

Augustine's whole doctrine thus becomes a unit. Man is to find truth within himself because there God speaks to him. All knowledge rests, therefore, on a revelation of God; God impressing on the soul continually the ideas which form the intellectual world. These ideas are taken up, however, by man in perception and conception, only so far as each is able to do so: and man being a sinner is incapacitated for their reception and retention. This sinful incapacity is met in the goodness of God by revelation and grace, the sphere of both of which is the Church. The

directly united with the Father without the intervention of the Son." This is only very partially correct; and its incorrectnesses touch on some important elements of Augustine's teaching. But it contains the essential matter.

[92] *De Doctr. Christ.* i. 34. 43.

[93] The general conception—but guarded from the fancy that attainment in this life can proceed so far as to be freed from the necessity of means—is among the inheritances of Augustinians until this day. Cf. *e. g.* A. Kuyper, *Encyc. of Sacred Theology,* E. T., pp. 368 sq.; and especially H. Bavinck, *Gereform. Dogmatiek,* i. 389 sq., where the necessary cautions are noted. The misapprehensions of Harnack (*Hist. of Dogma,* E. T., v. 99-100) will be obvious.

in other words as temptation? Is the perfecting of Christ confined to the production of sympathy out of sufferings and temptations, or does it also have another side, so that we can speak of a development of the ethical and religious nature of the Saviour generally? Finally, does the term τελειοῦν "perfecting", where it is used in connection with these experiences, bear the moral-subjective sense of rendering Jesus perfect in holiness, or does it express the official-objective idea that these experiences somehow fitted, equipped Him for the discharge of his high-priestly work?

In Chap. ii. 10 we have the general thought, that, because Jesus is ἀρχηγὸς σωτηρίας, the instrument by whom God leads many sons to glory, it was fit that God should perfect Him through sufferings. Sufferings are here the means to perfecting, but it is not directly stated how this nexus is to be understood. It has been proposed to make the τελειῶσαι διὰ παθημάτων of verse 10 equivalent in meaning to the "being crowned with glory and honor on account of the suffering of death" spoken of in verse 9. The connecting γάρ at first sight seems to favor the equivalence of the two statements. The sense would then simply be that God used the sufferings, on the principle of "cross and crown". to introduce Jesus into the state of consummate glory, and τελειῶσαι would contain no reference to this glory as an equipment for further, either priestly or other service. There are, however, two details of expression which this exegesis fails to explain. The substitution of διὰ c. Gen. for διὰ c. Acc. and that of the plural "sufferings" for "suffering" must both be significant. If the former shows that the perfecting is conceived rather as an end aimed at on the part of God than as a reward reaped on the part of Christ, the latter proves that the "sufferings" come under consideration in their plurality, as successive events, as a course of training leading pedagogically to the τελείωσις. Jesus' sufferings were intended by God to fit or equip, and in so far to perfect, Him for his work as ἀρχηγὸς σωτηρίας. But the author does not immediately proceed to explain how

the sufferings served this purpose. Whether they worked through the production of sympathy, or in some other way as a course of ethical training we are not told as yet. More light on this is shed by the relation which verse 10 bears to the following context, and especially to the climax of the latter in verses 17, 18. For it is plain that verse 11 takes out of the specific affirmation of fellowship in suffering expressed in verse 10 the idea of fundamental identification in standing before God in general, and that the following statements by a process of particularizing again bring down this general thought to the point where it reaches its special application to the suffering of human life, the "in all things", as verse 17 expresses it. If this understanding of the progress of thought be correct, it follows that to the *διὰ παθημάτων τελειῶσαι* of verse 10 essentially the same meaning must attach as to the more explicit formulas employed in verses 17 and 18 to explain the philosophy of Jesus' suffering and temptation in conection with His priesthood. Now of verses 17 and 18 the meaning cannot be doubtful. The identification between Christ and the readers in suffering fits Him for the discharge of the priesthood: it does this by enabling Him to become "a merciful and faithful high priest". And the quality of mercy thus developed is not mercy in general in response to suffering as such. In two ways the author makes plain that he has in mind a specific ethical sympathy which is concerned with the sufferings of the readers on their moral side, in their bearing on the fact of sin. For *ἐλεήμων* (as well as *πιστός*) is defined by the following: "for the propitiation of the sins of the people". If mercy operates towards the propitiation of sins, there must be some connection between the suffering which excites it and these sins, for otherwise it would exhaust itself in the relief of suffering as such. In the abstract here again more than one possibility suggests itself. The mercy might aim at the removal of sin as the source of suffering. Or it might have reference to sin in its character of suffering, as necessarily involving ethical pain. As

a matter of fact, neither of these two ideas are involved. What is meant verse 18 explains, if we follow the rendering given by the R. V. in the margin: "For having been Himself tempted in that wherein He hath suffered, He is able to succor them that are tempted". Because Christ's sufferings were not sufferings in general, but specifically temptation-sufferings, sufferings which became for him a source of temptation, therefore He can succor those who are in an analogous situation, *i. e.*, tempted to sin by their sufferings. The Aorist participle *πειρασθείς* has a causal force and assigns the temptation-aspect of His sufferings as the ground for His ability to succor. It is not the memory of suffering in general that evokes His sympathy: the thought is much more concrete and specific: the sufferings which He has behind Him and carries with Him as a past experience (notice the perfect tense *πέπονθεν*) enable Him to know what force of temptation suffering exerts to make the sinner fall. His mercy thus grasps the sufferer in his moral capacity, in the very crisis where suffering threatens to issue into sin or actually issues into the same. And thus it becomes to Him the priestly incentive for propitiating the sins that have resulted from the temptation. What verse 17 calls "to propitiate" verse 18 calls "to succor". The latter term in itself might be of wider application, but probably the author in the present case connects the same meaning with it as with the former, understanding it of the priestly succor which consists in the propitiation of sins. It should be observed in this connection that *ἱλάσκεσθαι* does not here denote the single act of atonement on the cross, but the subsequent activity whereby the Saviour continually applies the propitiatory power of His sacrifice. Taken in this wider sense it could be easily replaced by the general term *βοηθῆσαι* "to succor".

In the second passage, iv. 14-16, we reach essentially the same conclusions. The *γάρ* at the opening of verse 15 is intended to guard against the mistaken inference, as if the exalted nature and position of the heavenly high priest

detracted in any way from His sympathy with men in their miserable state as sinners. Christ can sympathize with the "weaknesses" of the readers. The word *ἀσθένειαι* may in itself denote "weaknesses" with or without a sinful connotation, *cpr.* Chap. v. 3, where it is connected with the necessity for atonement in the case of the earthly high priests. In the passage before us, however, it is more than likely that the author thinks of weakness with which sin is not necessarily connected, though it may render human nature susceptible to temptation and sin. For it is emphasized that Jesus was "tempted in all points like as we are" and, if sinful weaknesses had been meant, such unqualified affirmation of the likeness between His temptation and that of the readers would hardly have been made. The added phrase *χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας* does not restrict the likeness of the temptation but relates exclusively to the outcome of the latter. Its proper rendering is not "except by manner of appeal to sin in Him" but "without the result of sin in His case". The analogy, therefore, between Christ's temptations and those of the readers remains unimpaired. Christ has sympathy with their weaknesses because by experience He knows these weaknesses Himself. But that the weaknesses become the occasion for sympathy from a specifically moral point of view appears here also in more than one way. It was as temptation that the weaknesses entered into the Saviour's experience, and it is as temptation that they draw forth His sympathy. The readers are assured that His pity goes out towards them as tempted, as potential sinners. Besides this they are exhorted to seek not mere mercy *ἔλεος* but *ἔλεος καὶ χάριν*, a mercy accompanied by forgiveness, whence also "the throne of *grace*" is named as that which they are to approach unto with boldness. We can, however, determine still more closely from the context what the author is specifically thinking of in connection with this temptation of Jesus and of the readers. The words *κρατῶμεν τῆς ὁμολογίας* "let us hold fast the confession", show that a temptation to apostasy, to a denial of their

Christian state is meant. If we remember that the temptation had its rise in "weakness" of a sinless kind, the conclusion lies near that the sufferings which the readers had to endure for the sake of their faith are referred to. Thus the analogy between Christ's case and that of the Hebrews appears first in its true completeness. Like they, He had been called upon "to hold fast the confession", when the human *ἀσθενεία* consisting in the fear of suffering tempted Him to swerve from His appointed path. Having this experience behind Him, He can, when sufferings tempt the readers to the denial of their faith, extend to them the intelligent sympathy which results in mercy and grace. Here also, as in ii. 18, the exercise of this priestly function is described as a "helping", the supply of *βοήθεια*.

The passage v. 7-10 primarily serves to prove the proposition that Jesus complies with the qualifications of a true high priest, because He did not take the office to Himself in any self-assertive manner, but called of God. As a fact tending to show this the author dwells upon the course of preparation He had to pass through on earth and which issued into His *τελείωσις*. This course of preparation had for its aim that He might be identified with his people. The point of identification here is the experiential knowledge of obedience, as appears from the correspondence between this conception in verse 8 and verse 9: "having learned *obedience,* He became the author of salvation to those that *obey*". It has been too quickly inferred, however, from this statement that the author of Hebrews ascribes to Jesus a progressive moral development in general and associates this with the *τελείωσις* he predicates of Him. It must be plain to the most superficial reader, that "obedience" here has a very specific meaning: it is obedience to the call of suffering, for the Saviour learned it "from what He suffered". If in the two preceding passages the suffering appeared as a school in which was learned the strength of temptation as inherent in suffering, here we meet with the positive counterpart to this conception: the suffering as a school of

obedience through the overcoming of the temptation proceeding from it. Because the obedience developed itself in suffering the period of its development is called "the days of His flesh", *i. e.*, the days in which He was subject to the weakness of the natural earthly life, and therefore had to conquer the dread of pain and death which is inseparable from this state. The prayers and supplications which He is said to have offered up were not that He might be saved from death, but that He might be saved out of it; they were expressions of that obedience He was learning, not expressions of a mood of weakness He had to unlearn. For the writer adds that He was heard, He obtained what He prayed for, and this was not escape from death, but salvation through and out of death. From the above it appears how we must understand the statement that "He learned obedience". "Learning" is not here equivalent to acquiring what was not previously there in principle, far less to acquiring that of which the opposite was previously there. Chap. x. 5-7 shows that the writer ascribes to Jesus the spirit of perfect obedience at the very moment of His coming into the world, for he makes Him say in the words of the Psalmist: "Lo, I am come to do thy will, O God", and the will of God here referred to is specifically the will that the Messiah should suffer and die. "Learning" simply means to bring out into the conscious experience of action, that which is present as an avowed principle antecedent to the action. There is a difference between the desire and resolve to obey and the carrying through of this attitude of mind in the concrete circumstances of life, whilst natural inclinations assert themselves in the opposite direction. It should be noticed that the article stands before *ὑπακοήν*, which shows once more that a specific type of obedience is in the author's mind. The contrast also indicated in the words "although being a Son" is not a contrast between sonship and obedience in general, but between sonship and obedience evinced in suffering. It is natural for a son to obey, it is not natural for a son to have to learn obedience

in this way. Now it is this training in obedience that the passage brings into connection with the τελείωσις of Christ. Having learned obedience and having been made perfect, He became the author of salvation. It is most natural to take the "having been made perfect" here as resumptive of "having learned obedience", so that it adds not a second qualification to the first, but interprets the fact of the obedience which Christ learned in its significance as a qualification for His office. The rendering strictly ought to be: "having learned obedience and thus been made perfect". This, however, does not yet decide how the author understands the "perfecting". Does he mean to say: having learned obedience and having been made perfect in obedience, He became author of salvation? Or is his meaning rather: having learned obedience and thereby been made *a perfect high priest,* He became author of salvation? The latter is to be preferred, because the emphasis in the context rests on the likeness between the obedience of Christ and that of believers. Because He practiced obedience Himself He can appreciate and reward the obedience of those who follow Him. To introduce the thought of the absolute perfection of the Saviour's obedience would tend to obscure this parallelism. Of course the author conceived of Christ's obedience as absolutely perfect. But here it was out of place to call attention to this. What he affirms is simply, that through the practice of obedience Christ became a perfect high priest, since now He is able to endow with eternal salvation all those who obey Him in however imperfect a degree.

Finally we must, in order to complete our survey of what the Epistle teaches on the τελείωσις of Christ, cast a glance at Chap. vii. 28, although this passage is of a different nature from those already discussed. The Saviour's entire separateness from sin and sinners is emphasized as essential to His priesthood. The comparison is between Christ and the Old Testament high priests, and the former is here described not as He was in His earthly life but as He now is in His exalted state. The contrast is twofold: The law

appoints *men*, the word of the oathswearing appoints *a son;* the men appointed are men *having infirmity*, the son appointed is a son *made perfect forevermore*. This second contrast creates some difficulty. The participle perfect, τετελειωμένον, undoubtedly implies that a perfecting took place with Christ during His earthly life, that there was a time when He did not yet possess this τελείωσις. And the antithetical structure of the sentence seems to require that the "perfecting" consisted in the laying aside of the "infirmity" which clung to the Old Testament high priests: they had weaknesses, He has been made perfect and is now perfect. But this exegesis, simple and inevitable as it may seem at first sight, is excluded by the observation that the author in the present case uses the term ἀσθενεία "infirmity", with a sinful connotation, for it is said that the Old Testament high priests had to offer sacrifices for their own sins, and the γάρ of verse 28 shows that it is precisely in this that their "infirmity" consists. It is impossible, therefore, that the statement should mean: "the law appoints high priests having sinful infirmities, the word of the oathswearing appoint a son made perfect of these sinful infirmities". We shall have to understand the antithesis in a different more pregnant way. Its probable meaning may be best paraphrased as follows: The law appoints as high priests men having infirmity, the word of the oathswearing appoints a Son (who not only has no infirmity but), who has been made a perfect high priest forevermore, by the practice of perfect obedience on earth and by translation into the heavenly world from which all infirmity is excluded. The contrast to "having infirmity" which finds expression in τετελειωμένον sums up in a single word the attributes severally enumerated in verse 26, "holy, guileless, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens".

We are now able from the passages discussed to answer the questions formulated at the beginning of this article concerning the temptations, the sufferings, the sympathy and the perfecting of the Saviour. Wherever the Epistle

speaks of temptations of Christ it always means to refer concretely and specifically to the temptations that arose from His call to suffer. Of temptations in general it never speaks in connection with Jesus. In thus doing it limits the sphere of the Saviour's temptations to that class of experiences wherein a real appeal to His feelings and desires was possible, and yet the mere presence and force of such an appeal could not endanger his sinlessness. For the inclination to escape from suffering, which made the temptation a real one, is in itself a natural, innocent inclination. It could assert itself in the Saviour's heart and require a positive choice of the will to overbear it and keep it down, without depending for its power on the presence of evil. A great deal that is written in connection with Hebrews on the comforting aspect of the temptations of Christ as analogous to our common experience, does not observe the careful restraint which the writer has imposed upon himself.[1] We further learned that the writer nowhere, not even in iii. 18, speaks of temptation as entailing suffering for Jesus, but always of suffering as involving temptation. Still further, the pity which these experiences of suffering and temptation call out in the Saviour, is not according to the writer's description compassion in general answering to misery as such, but specifically ethical compassion, which views the suffering as a source of moral and religious danger and treats it in that capacity. Finally the "perfecting" of the Saviour which is made so prominent in the Epistle, has two sides: it is perfecting in the sphere of sympathy with exposure to temptation and perfecting in the sphere of appreciation of obedience which overcomes temptation. In both respects the perfecting is an ethical process, since it took place by means of an ethical experience through which the Saviour passed: He became acquainted with the force of temptation and learned the practice of obedience. But so far as the

[1] Compare on this subject: Bornhäuser, *Die Versuchungen Jesu nach dem Hebräerbriefe* in *Theologische Studien Martin Kähler dargebracht*, 1905.

notion of τελείωσις in itself and from a formal point of view is concerned, the Epistle does not know this as an ethical but as an official conception. The term nowhere designates that Jesus was made ethically or religiously perfect, that His character was developed in either sense; it always designates that his qualifications for the high-priestly office were perfected, that He received the fullorbed equipment which His priestly ministry requires. The subject of the τελείωσις is always the priest, never the man. That the means through which the τελείωσις of the priest takes place, lie in the moral sphere, cannot alter this conclusion in the least. The author has nowhere said, and hardly would have said, that in His moral or religious character Jesus was made perfect.[2]

While thus, as we have seen, the Saviour's identification with man was necessary for His priesthood, on the other hand His divine sonship also appears in the Epistle as qualifying Him for the office. In Chap. i. 2, 3 the unfolding of the idea of sonship explains the possibility of Christ's making purification of sins. Only so great a person can discharge so high a function. In Chap. iv. 14 the greatness of Jesus as high priest, His heavenly ministration are summed up in this, that He is the Son of God. A connection between the sonship of Jesus and his high-priesthood is also traced in Chap. v. 5. The author here applies to the case of Christ the second general qualification which a true high priest must possess, viz., that he does not take the honor to Himself, but accepts it at the call of God, even as did Aaron. The office involves so great an honor that a divine appointment is absolutely necessary. The honor lies in the immediateness of approach to God and in the position of authority over others. Now in verse 5 God who appointed Jesus is designated as the one who said unto Him: "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee". Some

[2] Compare for a fuller discussion of this point, especially as to linguistic usage, Kögel, *Der Begriff τελειοῦν im Hebräerbrief*, in *Theologische Studien Martin Kähler dargebracht*, 1905.

assume that the author finds in these words of the Psalm the formal appointment of Jesus to the high-priestly office, so that "God who said" would be equivalent to "God when He said". But the author everywhere distinguishes sonship and priesthood. The correct view is that he wishes to bring out the congruity, from the point of view of honorable position, between the sonship of Christ and His high-priesthood. The same God called Him to the high-priestly office, who had also declared Him to be His Son. In both respects He was possessed of high honor with God. Further, in Chap. vii. 28, the sonship is named as contributing to the perfection of the high-priesthood. The law appoints to the office such as are men, the word of the oath a Son. This, it will be observed, implies a contrast between human nature and sonship: the Son as Son is not human, but divine.

The difficult passage ix. 14 must also be considered in the present connection. Here it is said that Christ "through eternal spirit offered Himself blameless unto God" and this is given as the reason why the readers may confidently believe, that His blood will purify their consciences from dead works. The clause *διὰ πνεύματος* is to be explained from the fact, that the purification which the readers need is a purification in the sphere of the spirit, a purification of the conscience. The Old Testament sacrifices sanctified unto the purity of the *σάρξ*, because they themselves belonged to the sphere of the *σάρξ*; as they were external, ceremonial, so their effect was confined to the sphere of the external. ceremonial. Nevertheless in their own sphere they were truly effective, and from this the author derives *a fortiori* the confidence that the blood of Christ, who offered Himself *διὰ πνεύματος* will be equally effective in the sphere of the spirit.[3] There has been much dispute among expositors as

[3] Intertwined with this is the other thought, that the purification effected by the blood of Christ will be eternal, *i. e.*, absolute, not standing in need of repetition. Verses 13 and 14 are by means of *γάρ* joined to the closing words of verse 12, the words "having found eternal redemption". This, obviously, is the reason why the predicate *αἰωνίου* is added to *διὰ πνεύματος*; because through *eternal* spirit Christ offered Himself, therefore He found *eternal* redemption.

to whether πνεῦμα here occurs with a metaphysical or an ethical connotation. Those who insist upon the former usually find the idea expressed, that through His having eternal spirit Christ was able to keep His life through death, and afterwards to present Himself before God, an interpretation which would make the πνεῦμα here identical with the ζωὴ ἀκαταλύτος spoken of in vii. 16. Of a reference to any such thought, however, there is no trace in the context. Those who insist upon the ethical connotation of spirit, if they do not understand it directly of the Holy Spirit, associate with it the voluntariness and selfdetermination of Christ's offering. The latter appears to us the correct interpretation in substance. The author evidently is intent upon emphasizing the fact that Christ's offering was free and spontaneous. Hence he does not say that Jesus offered up Himself *as eternal spirit,* which form of statement would have formed the exact counterpart to the offering up of the animals under the Old Covenant; he says that *through eternal spirit* He offered up Himself. And he also further indicates by giving ἑαυτόν the place before the verb, that Christ Himself was the object of the offering, that it was an act terminating on Himself. Both features undoubtedly point in the same direction: the personal initiative, the voluntariness form the most important element in the πνεῦμα -character of the offering. Still we should surely misunderstand the author, if we combined these features with the πνεῦμα on a purely ethical or even generally psychological principle. He does not mean to say that through His goodness, as a fruit of the πνεῦμα, Christ was enabled thus to offer Himself, nor even that through His being spirit in general, as all men are spirit, He could do so. The whole sharp antithesis between the ethical and the metaphysical is foreign to the author's way of thinking. We must take πνεῦμα as contrasted with σάρξ in accordance with the broad meaning the Epistle as a whole ascribes to this antithesis. The πνεῦμα is that which is characteristic of the higher, heavenly world. In its ethical or re-

ligious aspect it has its subsistence and background in a metaphysical sphere of being. If Jesus could voluntarily offer up Himself and thus impart a unique efficacy to His sacrifice, this was because He belonged to the higher world of the *πνεῦμα* to which such absolute self-determination is possible. That this is the true view of the author appears from the addition to *πνεῦμα* of the attribute *αἰωνίος* with which it is impossible to connect a purely ethical meaning. *Αἰωνίος* most frequently in the Epistle has the connotation of what belongs to the heavenly, pneumatic world, it assigns to a sphere and not merely removes limitations of time; *πνεῦμα αἰωνίον*, therefore, is such a spirit as has its home in the heavenly world. A spirit belonging to this sphere imparts to every transaction mediated by it absolute efficacy in that same sphere. But that Christ in this sense has or is *πνεῦμα αἰωνίον*, belongs to the heavenly world is, of course, something that cannot be separated from His Sonship. It is in fact but another name for that Sonship, for as Son also He belongs to that same higher world of divine realities of which His *πνεῦμα* marks Him as the inhabitant. The passage actually implies the deity of the Saviour and the familiar dogmatic thought of His deity imparting transcendent efficacy to His sacrifice, not so much, however, in virtue of the bare fact of its being deity, but rather because in virtue of its specific character of heavenly spirit it suited exactly the sphere in which the purification was to be accomplished and the finality, absoluteness which were required for it.

The sonship of Christ appears also as the determining principle of His priesthood in what the author teaches concerning the Melchizedek-order of this priesthood. In Chap. vii. 3, after having enumerated the various features which render Melchizedek a type of Christ, he declares that Melchizedek was in these features "made like unto the Son of God". This cannot refer to the Son of God in His historic appearance and priestly activity, for of these the Epistle everywhere affirms that they were after the order of Mel-

chizedek. Here on the contrary Melchizedek is declared to have been after the likeness of the Son of God. The Son of God designates Christ in His eternal, heavenly, divine existence, and Melchizedek was made like unto Him, partly in the general greatness which belongs to the delineation of his figure in Scripture (compare verse 4, "consider how great this one was", and verse 7, "without any dispute the less is blessed of the better") partly in the eternity character imparted to this figure by the narrative in Genesis. It is the Son of God as a Person, apart from His office, who thus forms the pattern after which Melchizedek was fashioned, and undoubtedly the author means to affirm the eternity-predicates which he gives to Melchizedek of the latter also as a scriptural personage, antecedenty to and apart from his priestly office. The latter half of verse 3 draws a formal inference, "because he was made like to the Son of God (as a person), he abideth (as to his office) a priest continually". The underlying principle on which the writer proceeds is that the dignity of office follows the worth of personality. Hence also the eternity ascribed to both the Son of God as the pattern and to Melchizedek as the copy, is an eternity *a parte ante* as well as *a parte post*, which fits the conception of an eternity of person, while the eternity of office is from the nature of the case restricted to the latter kind. In having no "beginning of days" as well as no "end of life", was Melchizedek made like unto the Son of God. Now, if the greatness and eternity of the Person of the Son of God determined the greatness and eternity-appearance of the figure of Melchizedek, and in consequence also determined the character of Melchizedek's priesthood, and if further the priesthood of Christ was, historically speaking, copied after the order of Melchizedek, then it follows that it is ultimately nothing else but the divine eternal nature of the Son of God by which His priesthood is shaped and from which it derives its unique character. His sonship makes His priesthood what it is in distinction from every other kind of priesthood. As to the

eternity of His life in particular, this is represented as influencing His priesthood in a twofold respect, first in regard to power, second in regard to duration. The former thought is worked out in verses 15-19. It should here again be remembered that *αἰωνίος* is for the author a predicate of quality as well as of duration. "Eternal" is that which belongs to the heavenly world and partakes of its nature and power. Thus the eternity of Christ's priesthood involves that He was made priest "after the power of an indissoluble life". The life here spoken of is not, as some have thought, the life which Christ received at His resurrection, but the eternal life of the Son of God. It was *ἀκαταλύτος* precisely for this reason that it could not be dissolved by death. Its indissoluble character made His priesthood effectual, because it enabled Him to pass through death, and as a heavenly high priest to bring His sacrifice to full fruition. The second thought, the effect of the eternity of His Person on the duration of His priesthood. is worked out in verses 23-25. The Old Testament priests were many in number, because by death they were hindered from continuing; He, because He abideth forever, has His priesthood unchangeable, because He ever lives to make intercession for those who draw near unto God through Him. In this connection it is quite possible that the author meant the *σώζειν εἰς τὸ παντελές* in part at least in the sense of duration of "saving to the uttermost point of time".

The last question we have to consider is where the author makes the priesthood of Christ begin. This has long been a controversial point. On the one hand it is urged that the Saviour's earthly work, especially its culmination in the sacrifice upon the cross, must to the author's mind have formed an integral part of His priestly ministry. On the other hand, it is said that the Epistle explicitly identifies the beginning of Christ's priesthood with His entrance into heaven. The dispute obtained doctrinal importance through the Socinian controversy. The Socinians were bent upon showing, that the death of Christ was not in any true sense

an atoning sacrifice. It seemed much easier to maintain this position with the death detached from the priesthood than otherwise, because the priestly aspect of the transaction would naturally suggest its atoning significance. Further, by confining the priesthood to the heavenly state, and separating it entirely from the death, it was no longer found difficult to modify its conception also. For the Socinians the heavenly priesthood came to mean no more than a general position of influence with God. The error of this teaching lay not so much in denying that Jesus acted with reference to His death as a priest at the moment of its occurrence, but rather in severing the death from the priesthood generally. The principle to be strenuously maintained is that the priestly activity of Christ in heaven rests on the preceding sacrifice, and therefore derives from the latter a strictly propitiatory character. Where this is once recognized it becomes a matter of secondary importance whether or not the death itself at the time it took place be considered in the light of a priestly act performed by the Saviour Himself, provided the atoning nature of the death be not denied. It has been observed that the slaying of the sacrifice was not under the Old Testament law the work of the priest, but of the offerer. Jesus might therefore be conceived as first acting in the double capacity of offerer and victim, and then acting, in His exalted state, in the capacity of priest on the basis of the preceding sacrifice. The question thus becomes largely one of dogmatic classification. That which Dogmatics subsumes under the one head of the priestly office of Christ could be distributed over the two rubrics of His sacrifice and His priesthood, and yet materially remain the same.

Our concern with the problem is the purely biblio-theological one, as to what the Epistle actually teaches concerning it. The answer is that it contains two sets of statements, the one of which seems to favor the one, the other the other position. We notice in the first place that the high-priestly ministry of Christ is frequently spoken of as

connected with the heavenly sanctuary, from which it would seem to follow that only with His entrance into heaven did His priesthood begin. In the very first passage which explicitly refers to the priesthood of Jesus, ii. 17, His being made like in all things unto his brethren is said to have been for the purpose, that He might be a merciful and faithful high priest. The likeness unto the brethren includes death, consequently the priesthood, as to its actual discharge, could not begin until after the suffering of death had been experienced. It is farfetched to explain that the passage speaks not of the Saviour's becoming a high priest in general, but of His becoming a merciful and faithful high priest, thus placing the former at an earlier point than the latter. In Chap. v. 10 also the implication is that Christ became a high priest after the order of Melchizedek after He had been made perfect, and it would certainly be against the author's intention to say that, while having been a high priest in general before, the Saviour became a high priest after the order of Melchizedek with His entrance into heaven. Again, in Chap. vi. 20, Jesus' entrance into the place within the veil as forerunner marks also the moment when He became (*γενόμενος*) high priest forever after the order of Melchizedek, and here as little as elsewhere is there any reason for distinguishing between a Melchizedek-priesthood and another priesthood in His case. Chap. vii. 26-28 also, as we have already observed, in describing Christ as high priest, describes Him as He exists in His heavenly state, and declares that His appointment by the word of the oath was the appointment of one who had been made perfect forevermore; in other words, it places His ministry after His *τελείωσις*, and Chap. v. 10 places the *τελείωσις* at the close of the earthly life. According to viii. 2 Christ is minister of the heavenly sanctuary, therefore His priesthood could not begin until after He entered that sanctuary. The strongest statement of all, viii. 4, because it seems to deny every connection of His priestly ministry with the sphere of earth, will be discussed presently.

Over against these stand certain other passages, in which the priestly character of Jesus and His acting in a priestly capacity before His entrance into heaven are implied. Not quite conclusive is Chap. i. 3, where it is said that the Son sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high after He had made purification of sins. The making of purification of sins is undoubtedly a priestly act and it precedes here the sitting down at the right hand of God. This does not necessarily prove, however, that it also precedes the entrance into heaven, or that the author identifies it with the death upon the cross. It is quite possible that the writer in connection with the phrase thought of the entrance itself of Christ into heaven, of His appearing before God, of His cleansing, as it elsewhere is expressed, of the heavenly tabernacle, cfr. Chap. ix. 23-28. No more decisive, perhaps, are the statements in ix. 11, 24, where the Saviour is represented as entering into heaven as high priest. It has been argued from this that He must have been a high priest before entering, but the possibility exists that the author looked upon the entrance itself as the first act and in so far the beginning of the high priesthood. The *ἀνίστασθαι* of the "other priest" in Chap. vii. 11 is perhaps most naturally understood of Jesus' historical appearance on earth. The same applies to *παραγενόμενος* in ix. 11. The *ἁγιάζειν* of the people to which Chap. xiii. 12 refers was certainly a priestly act, and it took place when Jesus suffered outside the gate. In Chap. x. 20 the dissolution of the *σάρξ* of Jesus, which happened at His death, is represented as the dedicating of a fresh and living way into the holy place by His blood. The dedicating of the way into the sanctuary is the work of a priest, therefore Jesus acted in a priestly capacity when He shed His blood and let His flesh be dissolved. Those passages also come under consideration in which the act of *προσφέρειν* is ascribed to Christ. From Chap. v. 1 it appears that *προσφέρειν* is a priestly act. Still it cannot be indiscriminately inferred from all such passages that the author conceived of the Saviour as a priest at the

moment of His death. The identification between the *προσφορά* and the crucifixion is not a necessary one and in each case requires special demonstration. For the *προσφέρειν* can also include and even mean exclusively the self-presentation of Christ in heaven, or the application of His blood to the heavenly things, or however this act may be called. An indiscriminate argument, therefore, cannot be drawn from the use of this expression. In Chap. viii. 3 the context immediately shows that under the *προσφέρειν* a heavenly act must be understood, for in verse 2 Jesus is called minister of the true tabernacle which God pitched, not man, and in verse 4 His offering is distinguished from that of the Old Testament priests, because it takes place in heaven. On the other hand it should be remembered, that *προσφέρειν* is in the Septuagint the translation of the entire act of giving the sacrifice to God including the bringing of it to the altar before it is slain. The presumption therefore is that in our Epistle also it will be used sometimes so as to include the self-surrender of our Lord to death on earth. And this presumption is confirmed by at least two passages. In Chap. ix. 25-28, while the *προσφέρειν* includes the appearance of Christ in heaven, it also includes the Saviour's death; the passive participle *προσενεχθείς* requires this, because in His entrance into heaven Jesus was active rather than passive. Further the statement "He was manifested" proves that a visible transaction must be thought of, such as His suffering was, not His entrance into heaven. And this is still further shown by the parallelism drawn in verses 27, 28 between the death of man in general and Christ's having "been offered", as well as by the statement that He will be *seen* again a second time without sin, viz., at the future judgment, the implication being that the first time, the time of His offering He was *seen* with sin, which could only refer to His death. It is also probable that in verses 25, 26, "nor yet that He should offer Himself often—since in that case He would have had to suffer many times since the foundation of the world", the author includes the suffering of Christ in the *προσφέρειν ἑαυτόν*. But here

we can speak only of probability, because the author may have argued on this wise, that offering in heaven presupposes death on earth, and that for this reason a repeated offering would presuppose a repeated death.

The other passage coming under consideration here is Chap. x. 10. Here we read of a *προσφορὰ τοῦ σώματος*, a form of statement scarcely applicable to the presentation in heaven, because of the latter "the blood" or "Himself" would be the natural object.

We thus undoubtedly find in the Epistle a twofold mode of representation. On the one hand the priesthood of Christ is identified with His ministry in heaven, on the other hand His death is included in the priestly ministry. Some think we must go farther than this and say that the author viewed the entire earthly life in its obedience as a priestly ministry. But this finds no support in the Epistle. The obedience is viewed as a preparation for the priesthood, not as a priestly ministry in itself. It is true that in Chap. v. 7 the verb *προσφέρειν* is used of the prayers and supplications offered by Jesus, and it has been assumed that this ascribes to these prayers and supplications the character of sacrifices. This is, however, far from certain. The word *προσφέρειν*, while describing frequently the presentation of sacrifice, is also commonly used of the bringing of prayers before God without sacrificial connotation. And elsewhere the author speaks of the sacrifice of Christ as having happened once for all.

The question must now be put: How are these two representations related to each other? It has been suggested, by way of solution of the problem, that the author distinguishes between two orders of priesthood both of which were successively possessed by Christ, first the order of Aaron, then the order of Melchizedek. This is the view of Bruce in *The Humiliation of Christ,* though not repeated in his later work, *The Epistle to the Hebrews.* Among the older expositors it is advocated by Riehm. It finds no real support in the Epistle. It would be impossible to point out in which

respect the high-priestly ministry of Jesus, while on earth, and as connected with His death, differed or fell short from being a ministry after the order of Melchizedek. If the essence of the latter be taken to consist in its eternity, its infinite duration in time, then the Saviour possessed this already while on earth. His death could hardly be considered a cessation of His priesthood, since it in itself was a priestly act. But even granting, that before His resurrection He could not have been rightly called "a priest forever", in other respects than that of mere duration His priestly ministry performed on earth certainly partook of the characteristics of the Melchizedek-order. It was eternal in its absoluteness, in its spiritual nature, in its reference to the heavenly world. In all these respects it was the very opposite of the Levitical ministry after the order of Aaron, so that it certainly could in no wise be identified with the latter. Nor is it possible to separate between the high-priestly ministry connected with the death and that performed in heaven, because the latter is but the carrying out of the former, the two constituting one continuous service, inasmuch as Jesus presented before God in heaven the offering brought on earth. For this reason, evidently, Bruce found it necessary to include in the high-priesthood after the order of Aaron not merely the offering up of Jesus on earth, but also, as inseparably connected therewith, Christ's presentation of Himself before God in heaven. But such a view deprives the Melchizedek-priesthood of the one concrete act in which it embodies itself, so far as the sacrifice is concerned, and leaves to it only the continuous intercession as based on the sacrifice. It will have to be admitted, therefore, that the distinction between two orders of priesthood does not solve the difficulty encountered.

The true explanation of the peculiar doctrine of the Epistle on this point must be sought elsewhere. It lies first of all in the Pauline conception of the exalted Lord, who in His exalted state sums up and carries in Himself all the saving power which flows from His work in the flesh, from

His death on the cross. The believer's faith according to Paul does not terminate upon the historical Christ but upon the Christ in glory. Nevertheless in the glorified Christ the believer's faith grasps all the atoning significance of the cross, because the state of glory is the product and crown of the atonement. Here we have something broadly corresponding, it will be seen, to the view of our Epistle. Apply this Pauline idea to the conception of Christ as a priest, and the peculiar representation of Hebrews will naturally result. The emphasis will rest throughout on the exalted state of the Saviour. This for all practical purposes will figure as *the* priesthood. It alone can be the expression of the absolute, final, unchangeable significance of Christ as the author of salvation. In this state the Saviour actually brings to fruition all that He has done to save the people of God. But just as little as in Paul's teaching does this mean that the author possesses no interest for His death on earth. The latter is not only the indispensable presupposition of the ministry in glory, but the ministry in glory is a perpetuated, eternalized proclamation of what the death of Christ meant. Expressed in priestly terminology, this reads that Jesus through His blood has entered into the heavenly sanctuary, that there He makes His blood purify.

But in the practical purpose of the Epistle also there was something that led to this representation. We have found reason to assume that the doctrine of Christ's priesthood was seized upon by the writer, because it furnished a ready explanation of what the readers took offense at, the invisibleness and remoteness of the Saviour's mode of existence and activity, and offered a corrective for the religious externalism in which this offense had its root. In other words, Christ is represented as priest to explain, why He must of necessity be withdrawn into the heavenly world and conduct His saving work from that invisible sphere. Of course, it was only the doctrine of a heavenly priesthood, not of priesthood in general, that was adapted to render this prac-

tical service. If Christ could have been a priest on earth, then His remoteness and invisibleness remained as unexplained as before. Hence the author is intent not so much on showing that He is a priest, but rather that He must be, if a priest, a priest in heaven, because nothing else, nothing less will suit the dignity of His Person, the absoluteness of His work. It is from this point of view that we can best understand why the author has introduced into the Epistle the peculiar typology, with its contrast between earth and heaven, that is so characteristic of its teaching as a whole. This so-called Alexandrianism of its construction of the religious universe is in reality but another argument it employs to convince the readers that a Saviour visibly existent and operative in the world of sense would be far less exalted and efficient than the Christ who forever lives and rules in the spiritual realm of heaven.

But the question may still be put: Why, if the author was intent upon thus emphasizing the heavenly priesthood of Christ, has he not been consistent in doing so? Why has he in not a few instances placed side by side with this the representation that the Saviour, at least in the great ministry of His death, was also a priest on earth? And how did he reconcile the two apparently discordant representations to himself? The problem would be insoluble, if we had to interpret Chap. viii. 4 as an explicit denial of the possibility of any priestly ministration by Christ on earth: "Now if He were on earth, He would not be a priest at all, seeing there are those who offer the gifts according to the law, who serve that which is a copy and shadow of the heavenly things". This has been understood as implying that when Jesus was on earth He was not yet a priest. But the author in making the statement evidently had not in mind the question of the locality of the performance of any single priestly act, but only the question of the locality or sphere in which the Saviour's priestly ministry is performed *as a whole*. What he means to say is, that, if Christ's priesthood *now* and *as a whole* were exercised on earth, He

could not legitimately be a priest, since the Aaronites are appointed for that and He is not of the family of Aaron. For a priestly ministry entirely exercised on earth would be a carnal, typical ministry, since earth is the sphere of the carnal, typical. But it by no means follows from this, that Jesus could not perform a single priestly act, while yet on earth. The possibility of this would depend altogether on the nature of the act and the circumstances under which it was performed.

The author, therefore, has not by any absolute denial of the possibility of a priestly act on earth, precluded the adjustment of Jesus' death on earth as a priestly act to the heavenly character of His ministry as a whole. In some way or other He must have reconciled these two in his own mind. As to how he did it we can offer only suggestions. Two observations may be made in regard to this. In the first place the author does not so much compare the ministry of Christ to the work of the Old Testament priests in general, but rather to the ministry performed by the high priest on the day of atonement. Now in the law for the day of atonement it is expressly prescribed, that the high priest must with his own hand slay the sacrificial animal, Lev. xvi. 15. Of course, this act was not a menial act, which might just as well have been performed by somebody else, it was in the strictest sense of the word an official, high-priestly act. In analogy with this the author may have looked upon the self-surrender of Christ to death as an act of priestly nature. But the slaying of the animal by the high priest took place outside of the tabernacle, and the analogy would require that Jesus' self-sacrifice also should occur outside the heavenly tabernacle, *i. e.*, on earth. Still from this single act of the high priest outside of the tabernacle it did not follow, that his ministry as a whole pertained to the court, and as little does it follow, that, because Jesus offered Himself up on earth, His ministry as a whole cannot pertain to heaven. The ministry of the high priest under the Old Covenant belonged to the holy of holies,

where he alone could officiate, and so the ministry of Christ belongs to heaven, where He alone can be a priest.

In the second place we must remember that according to our author the heavenly eternal world projects itself into the lower temporal sphere. Even now believers are come to the heavenly city and stand in true communion by faith with the eternal realities. If this applies to believers in general, how much more will it apply to Jesus, the leader and perfecter of faith. And, altogether apart from faith, though He walked on earth, yet in virtue of His origin, nature and destiny He continued to form a part of the celestial order of things. What He did was determined in its reference to sphere or place by what He was, rather than by the locality where it might be performed. It was *διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου* that He offered up Himself. The act was performed by a Person who belonged to the heavenly world, in its intrinsic nature it was a heavenly act, it looked forward to a permanent priesthood to follow in heaven, to all intents, therefore, it was an act which fell in the sphere of the *αἰωνίον*. Thus on closer investigation the problem, how an earthly sacrifice can coèxist with a heavenly priesthood, is seen to disappear. The sacrifice on the cross was one of the events in which the eternal enters into the temporal, as the headlands of a continent, to use Dr. Davidson's striking figure, project into the ocean.

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DEUTERONOMY AND THE ARGUMENT FROM STYLE.

"In the ancient world the style was not the man himself, but a garment that he could change at will."—NORDEN.

The higher critics of a certain school invariably represent the case for the division of the Pentateuch into a number of documentary sources as resting not on any single line of investigation but on the converging testimony of a number of different enquiries. Two of these may perhaps be said to enjoy a sort of pre-eminence though for different reasons—the historico-legal and the literary. I have dealt with the former on many previous occasions.[1] In the present paper it is my purpose to treat of the latter with special reference to Deuteronomy. In doing so I shall endeavor to put my case in such a form as to make it intelligible to all educated readers whether they be Hebraists or not. For reasons that will shortly appear this course is very much easier to follow than might generally be supposed.

An enquiry of this sort is the more desirable because I have quite recently given expression to my conviction that the Pentateuch is not primarily a piece of literature. What part, it may naturally be asked, do literary considerations play in determining the form of those portions with which I am chiefly concerned—the legislation and the passages that cannot be detached from that legislation? I am the more ready to essay the task of answering this question because I believe that literary criticism—in the best sense of the term—will form an integral portion of the conservative case of the future. We may fairly presume that long after the

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[1] *Studies in Biblical Law. The Churchman* (London, Elliot Stock), December, 1905; May, June, July, September, 1906; March, April, May, 1907. *Bibliotheca Sacra,* January, 1907. THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, April, 1907. See also a paper entitled "Hebrew Monotheism" which will appear in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for October, 1907.

Mosaic authenticity of the Pentateuchal legislation is universally recognized certain differences of style, together with the reasons for them, will be noted by those who devote to the Bible loving study. The future historian of Biblical science will doubtless credit the higher critics with having drawn attention to many interesting phenomena even while reprobating the fantastic theories, the inability to weigh evidence and the extravagant exaggerations that have marked their career. And this consideration helps to make clear the nature of the task that must be accomplished if the documentary theory of the Pentateuch is to be dethroned. A successful refutation cannot be merely destructive; it must be also—and principally—constructive. The reason for this is not far to seek. If a hypothesis is proved to be untenable while no explanation is offered of the phenomena for which it was designed to account, another theory must inevitably arise to fill its place. This of course holds good only where the phenomena are real. Where they are simply the creation of an overheated imagination which has been allowed to dwell too long on insignificant details, a little timely ridicule, or the diversion of the mind to another set of facts, or mere lapse of time will be sufficient to remedy the evil. It is because the so-called literary or philological argument of the higher critics is based in part on phenomena of the first class that the work of examining this portion of their case possesses some interest. Unfortunately it must be coupled with the less congenial duty of pointing out the defects in their methods, equipment and reasoning.

Our first task must be to enquire what is meant by the philological or literary argument. The word philology is often used to denote the science of the history of language. It is not in that sense that the higher critics generally use the term when they put forward their "philological" argument for the documentary theory. It is necessary to dwell on this point because many readers who are not Hebraists suppose that there are philological grounds (the term "philological" being used in the sense just indicated) for the

divisive hypothesis. That is not so. Material drawn from the real or supposed history of the Hebrew language is scarcely ever put in the forefront of the critical case. The only striking exception to this statement that occurs to me is to be found in an assertion recently made by Dr. C. A. Briggs.[2]

"The language of the four great documents is so different, that they must have been composed by different writers. The difference of language extends to a very large *vocabulary,* each of these documents having its own Lexicon. And these differences are not merely differences of synonym; they are differences representing different centuries in the historical development of the Hebrew language. These documents of the Pentateuch represent a language that did not exist until centuries after the death of Moses. The evidence for all this has been given only in part in Driver's *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament,* and in my *Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch,* and many other recent works; but it is fully given in our new Hebrew Lexicon, now completed, in which Drs. Brown and Driver and myself have carefully examined and classified the uses of all Hebrew words in the Old Testament according to their historical development in the literature. It is impossible for anyone to study the complete series of these words as we have done, without coming to the conclusion which we have reached in entire concord, that Moses could not have written any one of the great documents of which the Pentateuch is composed."

This statement is so entirely exceptional that I think it best to postpone consideration of it until we have examined the ordinary critical argument. It will be observed that Dr. Briggs himself admits that "the evidence for all this" is only put forward in part in the recognised books on the subject, and his reference to the new lexicon is too vague to be of much value. It will be best to examine the recognised evidence before attacking the newest critical position.

The following extract from the Oxford Hexateuch gives us a representative statement of the ordinary argument:[3]

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[2] *The Papal Commission and the Pentateuch,* pp. 11 and 12.

[3] *The Hexateuch,* edited by J. Estlin Carpenter and G. Harford—Battersby, 1900, p. 15.

"But it may reasonably be expected that materials of different ages, drawn from separate sources, will be marked by their own characteristics of style or expression. Peculiar turns of phrase, due to the vivacity of oral narrative, or significant of legal precision, or repeated by the impassioned earnestness of the preacher, may be found to coincide with different groups of narrative or law already distinguished from each other by incompatibilities of content. The recurrence of these peculiarities becomes in its turn a warning; and each additional instance, in accordance with the general law of probabilities, brings far more than its own individual weight. Moreover their effect is again heightened if there is reason to believe that they can be in any way connected with other forces of thought and life. The journalist who should lightly talk of 'the tendency not ourselves' or of 'sweetness and light' might safely be placed with Matthew Arnold in the second half of the Victorian age. The teacher who dwelt on 'the silences' and 'the eternities' could not have taught before Carlyle. A cause must be found for the different philosophical vocabulary of Coleridge compared with that of Hume. The devotional utterance of Watts and Doddridge is couched in a different idiom from that of Newman and Faber. In the same way if one group of chapters which there is independent reason to assign to the seventh century, shows marked affinities of expression with Jeremiah, and another group with Ezekiel, it may be possible to explain the resemblances on the hypothesis of the indebtedness of the prophets, but the student must also consider the probability that they may be due to the influences of separate religious schools."

It will be seen that nothing is here said of phonetic evolution or the history of words. The argument is not philological in the narrow sense of the word. But attention is drawn to the fact that there may be differences of style, and it is suggested that in certain circumstances there may be some connection between these and other forces of thought and life. We must notice too that in this passage—which gives us a very fair and moderate exposition of the line of argument adopted by most higher critics—several qualifications are introduced. It is first supposed that different groups of narrative or law are already distinguished by incompatibilities of content. That is to say, the writer in the

first instance assigns to the stylistic argument an ancillary character. Then he very fairly admits that resemblances between Jeremiah or Ezekiel on the one hand and certain portions of the Pentateuch on the other may possibly be explained on the hypothesis of the indebtedness of the prophets: and a moment's thought will convince any impartial reader that such a view contains nothing that is improbable. If, for example, Deuteronomy—whether a genuine work of Moses or a recent literary forgery—was discovered (or rediscovered) in the time of Jeremiah, it can occasion no surprise that it should have exercised a powerful influence on his style. A further claim is however made for the argument. "The recurrence of these peculiarities becomes in its turn a warning"; in plain English the Pentateuch is dissected in part on grounds of style.

That an argument from style is necessarily very subjective is a truism that need not be laboured. But experience in refuting other branches of the higher criticism suggests the necessity of enquiring whether in this instance those qualities which should mark all scholarly work have characterised the critical investigations. I can well remember my experiences on first entering on the consideration of the authorship of the Pentateuch. Legal studies had convinced me that there existed a quantity of material from which the authenticity of the Mosaic legislation could be proved, and I read the Oxford Hexateuch for the purpose of ascertaining on what the critics relied. While it was natural to expect that in legal matters the writers would be very much at sea, I yet supposed that in all other respects they would present me with work that would not fall short of the best achievements in other fields of study. As I read on this impression was deepened. I found that their conclusions were the result of centuries of labour. I saw great names cited. Spinoza had discerned certain difficulties in simple narrative. Now if since 1671 the best brains that had studied the Bible had been unable to answer what were alleged to be glaring discrepancies in simple narrative, was it not certain that no

adequate reply could be found? But suddenly I came across assertions that no reverence for great names, no faith in the results of century-long study, no belief in the efficacy of controversy or the efficiency of controversialists could induce me to accept without independent investigation. Thus I read that "in the narrative of the plagues it will be found that one set of stories places the Israelites in Goshen, where the wonders that are wrought in Egypt do not affect them Ex. viii. 22; ix. 26; while another locates them among the Egyptians and secures them miraculous exemption x. 21-23."[4] The results of my investigation of this statement will be found elsewhere:[5] here it is sufficient to point out that a few such assertions rapidly succeed in teaching the most unsuspicious of readers to accept no statement of fact of the higher critics without first testing it for himself. I well remember the horror produced in my mind by the results of my efforts to verify the first batch of improbable statements to which I devoted my attention—a horror which was only heightened by the transparent honesty of the writers who made them. I can offer no account at all of some of the phenomena I have observed, but in some cases a knowledge of the origin of the statements elucidates the mystery: and as this is a matter that must gravely affect the views taken of the higher criticism, it may be well to devote some lines to discussing the subject. As Dr. Driver's Deuteronomy will hereafter be taken as representative of the critical position, it is natural to select illustrations from that work, when possible.

The first cause of error to which attention may be drawn is the habit of borrowing statements from other writers—usually without any indication that they are not original. Here is an illustration:—"There are only *three* facts mentioned in Deuteronomy for which no parallel is to be found in JE: i. 23 the number (twelve) of the spies (Num. xiii. 2-16 P); x. 22 the number of souls (seventy) with which

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[4] *Oxford Hexateuch*, I., p. 32.

[5] *Studies in Biblical Law*, pp. 34-5, and *Bibliotheca Sacra*, January, 1907, p. 12.

Jacob came down into Egypt (Gen. xlvi. 27, Ex. i. 5 P); and x. 3 acacia-wood as the material of the Ark (Ex. xxv. 10 P)."[6] Dr. Driver is here arguing for the dependence of Deuteronomy on those portions of the Pentateuch which he assigns to the "sources" called JE and its independence of the other "source" called P. Now whether the Pentateuch should be divided between these (or any) sources is a matter of opinion: but once the division is effected the question whether D mentions only three events that are not to be paralleled from JE is a question of fact. Though I have not searched Deuteronomy for the purpose, I can with the help of Dr. Driver's own notes suggest at least four more, viz: iii. 27, the permission to view the promised land from afar (see Driver, p. 60); viii. 2, the period (forty years) spent in the wilderness (see Driver, p. 106); ii. 2-14, the fact that the years in the wilderness were spent in wandering, Num. xxxii. 13 P, cf. Num. xiv. 33 (P) where some read "wanderers" for "shepherds"[7]; and xxix. 12 (13) the promise to be to Abraham for a God. The last two instances are remarkable for different reasons. The wandering is a test case of first-rate importance, for in Dr. Driver's opinion JE represents the Israelites as having remained stationary at Kadesh for some 38 years (see Driver. pp. 32-3) and is in hopeless conflict with Deuteronomy. I have elsewhere[8] shown that the text of Numbers—not JE or P—is quite consistent with that of Deuteronomy, and that the contradiction has in fact been created by the documentary theory: but for the purpose of testing Dr. Driver's statements we must, of course, postulate his position and assume that there are three irreconcilable documents JE, D and P. On that assumption it is vital to the purpose in hand to note that D agrees with P and contradicts JE.

The other point is also very instructive. In commenting on Deut. xxix. 12 (13)[9] Dr. Driver expressly admits that

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[6] Driver, *Deuteronomy*, p. xvi.

[7] This only involves the change of a single letter in Hebrew.

[8] *The Churchman*, June, 1906, pp. 355-359.

[9] P. 323.

the promise 'to be to Abraham for a God' is found in Gen. xvii. 7, 8 (P), but hastens to add that "there is no mention of a corresponding promise to Isaac or Jacob". The next sentence must be transcribed: "But no doubt the reference is to passages such as Gen. xxii. 16-18, xxvi. 24, xxviii. 13f (JE), the conditions involved tacitly in the promises there recorded being converted here into a formula expressing them distinctly." So that when on his own showing a reference is to P, Dr. Driver finds an allusion to something "involved tacitly" in passages which might contain the desired statements but unfortunately do not. Attention should here be directed to the b i a s that characterises this note. It affords the key to many problems and goes far to explain the general untrustworthiness of the work of the higher critics.

Now at first sight Dr. Driver's statement appears quite inexplicable. What, it may be asked, could have led him to assert that only t h r e e facts were mentioned in Deuteronomy for which no parallel is to be found in JE, if in his own notes he recognised that there were actually many more? The answer is that the writings which pass under Dr. Driver's name are in fact often c o m p o s i t e. It is not usual to dissect the publications of contemporary writers in the way in which the higher critics dissect the Pentateuch: but this should not blind us to the facts of the case. When Dr. Driver makes his assertion about the three facts he is apparently copying Cornill—seemingly without any independent investigation of the accuracy of that author's statement. Unfortunately he gives not the slightest hint that he is basing himself on the dictum of another writer.

Next the accuracy and trustworthiness of the critical work are greatly impaired by a cause that has already been touched upon—an overwhelming bias. As already explained, Dr. Driver believes that D—the main source of Deuteronomy—was dependent on "JE" and independent of "ר" (including "H"). He appears to regard the argument n style as falling under two heads:—(1) the argument

from words and phrases, and (2) the argument from rhythm. He remarks[10] that the book "presents comparatively few exceptional words", and he presents us with the first part of his stylistic argument in the shape of a list of "the most noticeable words or phrases characteristic of Deuteronomy". This embraces some 70 numbered sections and covers nearly six pages of his introduction. The first 16 may in Dr. Driver's opinion, "have been suggested to the author" by certain sections of "JE". Now among these I find the following:[11]—"The *covenant*,[12] either with the patriarchs, or with Israel (expressing a fundamental theological idea of Deuteronomy)." Dr. Driver then gives the references in Deuteronomy and "JE". But he does not mention that in "P" the word is also very frequent in covenant passages, occurring for example no less than three times in a single verse (Lev. xxvi. 42); that some of the most important covenants are narrated in "P" only, and that it is not less a fundamental theological idea in "P"—and for that matter in "JE"—than in "D". It may be open to question whether collections of words have the probative value attributed to them by the higher critics; but if they are to be used at all the whole of the relevant facts should be fully and impartially stated.

What has been said about the inaccuracy of the critical work applies to the other branches of their case as much as to the argument from style. So do some of the other considerations that must be urged: but owing to the special character of their argument our illustrations of the other causes that are operative to render their labours nugatory will be drawn exclusively from this part of their work.

First, then, their selection of words frequently causes profound amazement. Take the following from an argument in the Oxford Hexateuch as to the first seven chapters of Leviticus: "Attention may also be called to the large group of cultus terms and formulæ, the constant repetition

[10] P. lxxvii.
[11] P. lxxix, No. 8.
[12] ברית

of which is characteristic of the legal style of P: thus. *Aaron's sons, atonement, without blemish (perfect), bring near (offer, present), burn, burn with fire, clean, guilt offering, heave offering, holy, kill, lay his hand on, meal offering, oblation, offering made by fire, sacrifice of peace offerings,* etc."[13] It will be noted that all the above are technical terms or terms that are peculiarly appropriate in regulations for sacrifice at the religious capital. This is emphasised if we take the words that might appear to an English reader to be general words and follow up the remarks made about them in the Oxford Hexateuch itself. Thus on the word "burn"[14] we find the following:[15]—"Ex. xxix. 13, Num. xviii. 17 (sacrificially) forty-four times", and of "kill"[16] we read: "Ex. xii. 6 and onwards, forty-two times, ritually".[17] The argument therefore amounts to saying that in a technical passage technical terms are used. To give it any force at all it would be necessary to prove either that "P" would have used these terms in narrative, speeches, civil laws, etc., if he had composed the whole Pentateuch, or else that "D" or "JE" would not have used them in technical sacrificial regulations. It need scarcely be said that no attempt is or can be made to prove anything of the sort.[18]

A second defect in the critical work is due to the inability of its authors to appreciate the subtle motives that influence great writers. Civilians have a division of 'things' that recurs to the mind—fungible things and non-fungible things. Fungible things are those *quae pondere, numero, mensurave*

[13] Vol. II, p. 144.

[14] הקטיר

[15] Vol. I., p. 210.

[16] שחט

[17] Vol. I., p. 214. In this latter case we are invited to "contrast J Ex. xxxiv. 25, Num. xi. 22, R[Jo] Num. xiv. 16, E Gen. xxii. 10, xxxvii. 31", but without being told what inferences, if any, we are to draw from the contrast. Are we meant to infer that in the proposed slaughter of Isaac (Gen. xxii) or in the prohibition to "kill" (R. V. ~ -) "the blood of my sacrifice" (Ex. xxxiv.) the word is not used v"?

[18] ınces from Deuteronomy will be found in the appendix to this

constant—things that are weighed, counted, or measured,—such as money, wine, oil, corn, bronze, silver, gold. Non-fungible things are all others. For the critics words are mere fungible things. For great artists they are non-fungible. That is the secret of many phenomena that puzzle modern commentators. Eye and ear—especially ear—are needed to appreciate the choice of words; and a sense of form and an apprehension of subtle shades of meaning of which no signs are to be found in the critical work. Some examples of some words and phrases from Deuteronomy, the use of which appears to me to have been dictated by considerations of euphony, will be found in the appendix. Confining ourselves to mere single words or expressions it is impossible to give instances that would be intelligible to readers who are not Hebraists, but if we go beyond these it is easy to produce a most convincing example. There can be few English readers who have not admired the sublime opening of the book of Genesis. Here is the usual critical version:—"These are the generations of the heaven and the earth when they were created. In the beginning, etc.". The explanation given by the Oxford Hexateuch should prove illuminating. "It has long been recognized that the Book of Genesis is primarily based upon a document containing a series of sections introduced by the formula 'These are the generations of . . . ' . . . The *toledhoth* (*i. e.* 'generations of' H. M. W.) formula of Gen. ii. 4a is not appropriate to the narrative which follows it in ii. 4bff., for this says nothing about the creation of the heavens or the earth, but deals with the formation of the first man after they were made. On the other hand its form and substance are both congruous with the account of the creation of the universe in i. 1-ii. 3. In other sections, however, the formula always precedes the matter which it designates. It is probable, therefore, that it originally stood before i. 1, and was transposed by the editor who combined the two documents, to serve as the link of combination."[19]

[19] Vol. II., p. 1.

So not only words, but sections and sentences are to the critics fungible things—things *quae pondere numero mensurave constant.* If I borrow a sovereign, I am under an obligation to pay back a sovereign—any sovereign—not necessarily the actual coin I borrow. All are legal tender. And similarly with the book of Genesis. If I do not begin with one sentence, I must begin with another. All are legal tender, and literary considerations—using the word "literary" in its best sense—do not enter into the question. But as all sovereigns conform to a certain type, so must all the sections of "P" in Genesis. There is no difference between the minting of coins and the minting of sections of Genesis.

But what if literature is not within the jurisdiction of the foot-rule? How if a commentator on a great author must be endowed with some appreciation of literary beauty, if he is to perform his task successfully?

The next cause that falls to be noticed is the lack of judgment and the inability to weigh evidence that characterise the application of the critical tests. For the sake of brevity the first instance will be taken from Genesis, since in that book it is easy to find examples limited to a single verse. In a genealogy we read "And Lamech lived an hundred eighty and two years, and begat a son" (Gen. v. 28). The whole of this down to "begat" is given by the Oxford Hexateuch to "P", but "a son" is assigned to "J"—an author who with truly prophetic foresight took the unusual step of composing the end of the sentence some centuries before "P" wrote the beginning. The reason given throws much light on the analysis. The preceding items in this genealogy all conform to the type "And A lived x years and begat B." Accordingly we read in the note: "The uniformity of P's style leads us to expect here the name of Noah. The compiler, however, wishing apparently to utilize J's explanation of it, has inserted it at this point, having no doubt found it in the list which traced Noah's descent ›ugh Seth iv. 25f. That pedigree has apparently been

rejected by the editor in favour of the more highly systematized scheme of P, etc.".[20] In other words "P" could not have written "a son" in vs. 28 because he has not done so in other verses, and we can feel the genius of fungible things—things *quae ponderc, numero, mensurave constant*—hovering over us. It would be interesting to know what course was open to "P" if he too desired to give an explanation of Noah's name. Are the premises in any way commensurate to the conclusion? Would it not be easier to suppose that "P" could vary his language when occasion demanded than to postulate this extraordinary machinery of lists and compilers?

Another curious instance may be taken from Dr. Driver's statement that Deut. xi. 4 follows Ex. xiv. 27 JE.[21] He is speaking of a number of incidents of which the passage of the Red Sea is one, and he writes "in the case of some which are narrated in P as well, the terms of the allusion in Deuteronomy are such as to show that the writer followed JE and not P." Here are the two passages in parallel columns:—

Ex. xiv.	Deut. xi. 4.
27. (P) And Moses stretched forth his hand over the sea, (JE) and the sea returned to its strength when the morning appeared; and the Egyptians fled against it; and the LORD overthrew the Egyptians in the midst of the sea; 28 (P) and the waters returned, and covered the chariots, and the horsemen, even all the host of Pharoah that went in after them into the sea.	And what he did unto the host of Egypt, unto their horses, and to their chariots; how he made the water of the Red Sea to overflow them as they pursued after you, and how the LORD hath destroyed them unto this day.

Is there any evidence which would justify the statement that Deuteronomy is here based on "JE" to the exclusion

[20] Vol. II., p. 8.
[21] *Deuteronomy*, pp. xv, xvi.

of "P"? Or indeed is there here any evidence which would justify any inference at all?[22]

Two other sources of error remain to be dealt with, but as they are more appropriate to the argument from rhythm I proceed at once to dispose of the list of words. For this purpose it is necessary to look at Deuteronomy itself and see what it professes to be.

The most superficial reader of the book must be aware that it consists mainly of three great speeches. He will not therefore be greatly surprised to find that the language is coloured by this fact, and that appropriate phrases and rhythm are used, or that some of the terms employed appear to be popular rather than technical.

At the conclusion of the central and longest speech we are told that "these are the words of the covenant which the LORD commanded Moses to make with the children of Israel".[23] It requires no great grasp to enable us to understand that language appropriate to a covenant is likely to be used.

The covenant embodied a code of laws. It is natural that we should find in it expressions that were proper for a law-giver to use. Nay more, the task of the law-giver was conditioned by the circumstances of the time. The people were just entering a land in which idolatrous high-places abounded, and there was grave danger that they would offer at these sacrifices which for religious and national reasons ought to be brought only to the House of the Lord. We may therefore expect to find emphasis laid on the law of the religious capital, and this again must affect

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[22] Strangely enough, Dr. Driver has a footnote on the next page (xvii) in which he says: "In xi. 4, 5 *host* (חיל), *horses and chariots*, and *pursued after them*, are points of contact with P's narrative of the passage of the Red Sea in Ex. xiv." He then collects some other "points of contact" and adds "it may be questioned whether these expressions are not too isolated, and too little distinctive, to establish dependence upon P." But, what expressions establish the dependence
' Deut. xi. 4 on JE? Where is the e v i d e n c e that supports his
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Deut. xxviii. 69 (xxix. 1).

the language. In other ways, too, the historical situation will colour the orator's phrases. What wonder if he should make frequent reference in glowing terms to the approaching entry into the land?

We have yet another piece of information about the book which must be taken into account. The book contains a code of law addressed to the people in the form of a speech. But it was not only on the occasion of its first delivery that this speech was to go before the people. On the contrary, it was to be read to them once in every seven years. Having regard to this, and also to the object of Moses, the nature of the people and the circumstances of the time, we cannot wonder if he lays stress on the duty of being faithful to God, inculcating obedience to His precepts at every opportunity, holding out inducements to those who obey Him, uttering warnings as to the result of infidelity and putting before the people the national evils of impiety.

These few and simple remarks dispose of the great bulk of Dr. Driver's numbered paragraphs. I have classified the particulars in the appendix, to which those who care for the details may turn. Of course I do not claim that all the items in this classification will commend themselves to everybody. In many cases two or more reasons have combined to make the use of a particular phrase natural. The influences that determine a great stylist's choice of language are both numerous and varied, and it would be absurd for anybody dogmatically to assign reasons for the phraseology employed by a speaker three thousand years ago, or to pretend that he can hear with the ears of an Israelite of the Mosaic age. Thus I expect that there will be many divergences of opinion both as to the phrases I have selected, and those I have omitted, and also as to the reasons assigned. But I think that when all deductions have been made, it will appear that the great bulk of Dr. Driver's selected phrases can be accounted for by a few simple considerations. Assuming that Moses did at the end of his career make speeches, one of which embodied *inter alia* a number of laws

in the form of the terms of a covenant, that the subject-matter of those laws was similar to the contents of the Deuteronomic code, and that the historical circumstances were such as the Bible represents them to have been, there is nothing in these lists to warrant any deductions as to authorship. If any critic doubt this, let me suggest to him a very simple test. Let him re-write some other portion of the Pentateuch, say chapter 1 of Genesis, as he thinks the Deuteronomist would or should have written it, with the "Hear, O Israels" and the "good lands", the "statutes and judgments" and the exhortations not to forget which are gravely put forward in evidence. Or, conversely, let him re-write some portion of Deuteronomy as he thinks P or JE would have written it. Far be it from me to affirm of any higher critic that in this way he would convince him-himself: but if he would only publish his results, he would speedily find that ridicule still has power to kill.

But it is on yet other considerations that I rely finally to clinch the matter, and these may best be advanced in connection with Dr. Driver's argument from rhythm.

"Of course a tabulated list of idioms cannot adequately characterize the style of an author; there is an effect produced by the manner in which phrases are combined, and by the structure and rhythm of sentences, which defies tabulation, or even description, and which can only be properly appreciated by repeated perusal of the work in question. Those who have by this course familiarized themselves with the style of the Deuteronomic discourses, will be conscious how greatly it differs from that of any other part of the Pentateuch,—even the parenetic sections of JE, which show a tendency to approach it, not exhibiting the *complete* Deuteronomic rhythm or expression."[24]

And here at last we are on bed-rock. In this instance Dr. Driver is right in his facts. Is he right in the interpretation he puts upon them or even in the method of his study? It is to this that the two last charges in my indictment of the critical argument from language—other than the unique dictum of Dr. Briggs—are directed.

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[24] *Deuteronomy*, p. lxxxv.

The ideal commentary on Deuteronomy would devote a section of the introduction to considering the place of Moses among the great orators of the world and to estimating his oratory as literature. Corresponding to this there would be notes dealing with details of style from the standpoint of the orator's art and in the light of the comparative material. But the ideal is not yet realised and probably no Biblical student has any conception of what we miss. After all, the speeches of Demosthenes and Cicero and Burke are also characterised by a very marked rhythm. When I look at attempts such as those of Sievers to scan certain portions of the Bible (*e. g.* Jeremiah i.) that would be regarded as prose in any other language, I cannot help feeling that a knowledge of the existence of prose rhythm would probably revolutionise the attempts of modern writers to discover metres in the Bible.[25] In the case of some authors a good deal of work has been done of recent years, and while I must not be taken as suggesting that everything that is true of other prose rhythms may be applied to Hebrew speeches, I cannot but see how a knowledge of other fields of literature would modify the conclusions of Biblical students. We should no longer be presented with the familiar lists of words, nor should we be invited to believe that *asyndeta* add a measured dignity to style,[26] but on the other hand we should have our attention drawn to numberless literary beauties to which commentators have hitherto been blind, and we should rise from a study of the Book with a truer knowledge of its place among the literatures of the world and a juster appreciation of its manifold greatness.

[25] I may be allowed to quote a sentence from the preface to the second edition of Blass' *Attische Beredsamkeit,* Vol. III., Pt. I.: "Man muss nicht mit dem maître de Philosophie bei Molière hartnäckig sagen: *tout ce qui n'est point prose est vers, et tout ce qui n'est point vers, est prose,* sondern es ist den Attikern des 4. Jahrhunderts ein mittelding zwischen beiden zuzugestehen wenn man den Thatsachen gerecht werden will." Any Hebraist who will carefully examine such a passage as Deut. xxviii. 38-41—its rhythm, its antitheses, the order of the words—will see for himself that there are grounds for supposing that a similar remark would apply to Mosaic oratory.

[26] Driver, *Deuteronomy,* p. lxxxvii, note.

And that leads me to my last point. The critical case rests on the assumption that differences of style prove differences of authorship. What has the comparative method to teach us as to this premiss? Does it confirm its soundness? The answer—which sweeps away the foundations of the critical argument—is in the negative. There is a passage in Norden's *Kunstprosa*—not to be translated for fear of losing the flavour of the original—in which the author asks what influence the individuality of the writer had on his style in the ancient world, or, in other words, how far Buffon's *le style est l'homme même* holds good for that period. Norden concludes that style was an acquired art, that individuality was subordinated in a far higher degree than to-day, and that one and the same writer could write in different styles according to the task in hand.[27] The case

[27] Bevor ich zum einzelnen übergehe, habe ich noch kurz eine Vorfrage zu berühren: welchen Einfluss hatte im Altertum die Individualität des Schriftstellers auf seinen Stil oder, mit andern Worten, wie weit gilt auch für jene Zeit Buffons Ausspruch *le style est l'homme même?* Zwar hatte auch das Altertum ein Sprichwort: οἷος ὁ τρόπος, τοιοῦτος καὶ ὁ λόγος, aber wir dürfen nicht verkennen, dass der Satz in der Praxis nicht so grosse Bedeutung hatte wie bei uns. Der Stil war damals eine erlernte Kunst, deren Regeln im allgemeinen keiner seiner Individualität zuliebe übertreten durfte, wie ja überhaupt das Altertum in viel höherem Masse als die moderne Zeit vom Individuum die Unterordnung seiner Eigenart unter die Autorität der von hervorragenden Kunstrichtern sanktionierten Tradition, die Zurückdrängung des Genialischen, verlangt hat. Daraus ergiebt sich zweierlei. Erstens: die Individuen treten zurück hinter allgemeinen Richtungen der Zeit, deren Repräsentanten sie sind. Zweitens: ein und derselbe Schriftsteller konnte nebeneinander in ganz verschiedenen Stilarten schreiben, indem er bald diese, bald jene ἰδέα verwendete, je nachdem sie ihm für das vorliegende Werk zweckentsprechend schien. Wir Moderne haben durch Verkennen dieser Thatsache vielfach geirrt, aber die Zeiten sind vorbei, wo man auf dies Argument hin dem Platon den Menexenos, dem Xenophon den Agesilaos, dem Tacitus den Dialogus, dem Appuleius die Schrift De Mundo und so vielen Autoren so vieles aberkannte, oder wo man sich darüber wunderte, dass der Aristoteles der pragmatischen Schriften in seinen Dialogen so dämonisch zu schreiben verstand. Selbst die so beliebten Schlüsse von der Stilverschiedenheit zweier Werke eines und desselben Autors auf eine verschiedene Abfassungszeit, sind selten zwingend und oft durch Thatsachen anderer Art zu widerlegen. Der Stil war im Altertum nicht der

of Moses is to some extent different from that of any classical writer. He could have had stylistic models only within very narrow limits. A few traditions, a few songs and poems, a few "dooms" pronounced by the elders, would have constituted the sum total of the Hebrew literature that he found. Nevertheless I see no difficulty in supposing that when occasion demanded he was capable of creating a style suitable for the matter in hand. After all, the purposes of the various portions of the Pentateuchal legislation are palpably diverse. While the judgments are written in a form suitable for memorising (which may have conformed to what was usual in the traditional "dooms" pronounced by the courts of elders)—it is obvious that no speech could have been composed in the same style. Here, then, necessity must have been the mother of invention. And in dealing with the third style—that of the great body of "priestly" legislation—it must be remembered that the purpose was again different. Here we are not dealing either with a speech or with dooms to be committed to memory, but with complicated and technical rules to be transmitted by a specially trained class who would teach the people.[28] It is possible to point to modern instances of similar versatility. Let the Indian Penal Code which was drafted by Macaulay be contrasted with the speeches and ballads of the same writer and similar divergences of vocabulary and rhythm will at once become apparent. If it be urged that Macaulay came after a period of long literary development, I answer (1) that it is impossible to lay down narrow rules which no genius can transcend, and (2) that no man, however gifted, could have written "dooms" and speeches in the same vocabulary and rhythm and made a success of both. A man of genius who found himself confronted with such very different tasks could not avoid creating the means of executing them. In a word, I conceive that in each case the

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Mensch selbst, sondern ein Gewand, das er nach Belieben wechseln konnte. (E. Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa* 1898 I pp. 11-12.)

[28] Deut. xxiv. 8; Lev. xiv. 54-7.

style was merely a tool forged by Moses for the accomplishment of his purpose.

We must now come back to Dr. Briggs, who claims that the language used did not exist until centuries after the death of Moses. After what has been said of the inaccuracy of the critical work it is not necessary to take this claim too seriously.[29] If and when Dr. Briggs chooses to specify the facts on which he relies there will be time enough to answer his argument, but a mere vague reference to his Lexicon is no sufficient clue to the evidence. Nevertheless it is not so difficult to answer Dr. Briggs as might appear, because it happens that I have myself had to examine the uses of a few of the words to which Dr. Briggs has devoted special attention. On the occasions on which I use his Lexicon (which is generally when I want information about some technical term) I am usually amazed at the backward state of lexicographical studies. The very first things that strike me about a word are usually points that have never been noticed at all by our lexicographers. In fact here, as elsewhere, I am separated from the higher critics by differences of training, of temperament, and of scholarly ideals. I propose to take a single example of Dr. Briggs's work and in discussing it I shall endeavor so far as may be to emphasise the distinctions between the historico-legal methods and those employed by Dr. Briggs. To this end I shall marshal a number of facts and arguments that are quite out

[29] Here is a sample from Dr. Briggs himself:

"A careful study of the term תּוֹרָה, as applied to law, makes it evident that it was the earlier usage of all the documents of the Hexateuch except P to regard תּוֹרָה as the Law in general, as embracing a complex of words, statutes, judgments, commands, and that the use of תּוֹרָה, תּוֹרוֹת for particular laws is post-Deuteronomic. Such laws are to be found only in P (See *New Hebrew Lexicon*, p. 435)" [*Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, new ed. 1897, p. 255]. But on p. 436 of the Lexicon Dr. Briggs writes of this word: "law (prop. *direction*): viz: of *special laws*, singular of Feast of Massoth Ex. xiii. 9 (J), sabbath xvi. 4 (J); of direction given by priests in particular case Deut. xvii. 11." It might be added that the language of Deut. xxiv. 8 (see Driver *ad loc.*) would in itself be sufficient to render Dr. Briggs's theory extremely improbable.

of proportion to the intrinsic importance of the statements investigated.

"The earliest type of Hebrew law is the דבר Word, not so much a particular word as a word-group—a saying, discourse, utterance, sentence."[30]

This statement occurs in an appendix on Types of Hebrew Law added to *"The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch"* in the 1897 edition as the result of the work done for the new Lexicon. We are then informed that the "word" is spoken by God either directly as in the Decalogue or "immediately [Dr. Briggs probably means mediately, H. M. W.] through Moses and the prophets who succeeded him. Accordingly דבר becomes the term for the message of the prophets, and later for the sentences of the Hebrew wise men. . . . " "These Words are in the second person singular of the verb, and with the negative, and are brief terse sentences without reasons, without specifications, and without penalty. All such additions to the Words are redactional."

I proceed to outline the methods of attacking these statements:—1. We may turn to the history and see what it has to teach us. The book of Genesis, for example, is full of law. To take a few general instances: we find traces of a law that in certain cases a slave might inherit from his master to the exclusion of that master's collateral relations;[31] we have law regulating conveyances of land,[32] law of theft,[33] law of murder, birthright, marriage, slavery, etc. In some cases this was customary law that may not have been formulated. In others—*e. g.* murder and theft—it was impossible to escape formulating it. If it be asked what evidence Dr. Briggs has that such laws were known as "words" and conformed to some particular "type" or

[30] *Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, new ed. 1897, p. 242.

[31] Gen. xv. 2-4 cf. Prov. xvii. 2, xxx. 23, and for a parallel among the Waniamwesi; see Kohler in *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft*, xv., p. 43.

[32] Gen. xxiii.

[33] Gen. xxxi. 32 xliv cf. Post, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, II., pp. 427-8, 442.

were sentences spoken by God, the inevitable answer is not merely that he has no such evidence, but that it has never even occurred to him to consider the matter. Yet if it were true that the earliest type of Hebrew law was the "Word", it would be possible to show that the earliest laws were "Words".

2. Even if we had no history to help us, we should know from the universal experience of mankind and the nature of society that the Hebrews had law as soon as a society existed. "It is an old saying, *ubi societas ibi just est:* where there is a society there is law. And perhaps no better account can be given of what is commonly understood by law than that it is a body of rules expressing the claims which, in a given society, are held to be enforceable and are more or less regularly observed. When a claim is urged but is not held to be enforceable, it is commonly called a moral claim as distinguished from a legal one. On the other hand, where no claims have become legal ones, there cannot be a society in any true sense. . . . So the maxim *ubi societas ibi jus est* correctly puts before us society and law as mutually dependent. They must have been inseparable as facts from the earliest time at which there was any intercourse between men, probably before there was any clear consciousness of the notions corresponding to the facts, and they are still inseparable in all departments of intercourse between men. Without society no law, without law no society."[34] In other words law is the necessary cement of every social fabric. Here again Dr. Briggs has never stopped to consider whether any society could exist for a single week on his "Words", or what the state of affairs was before these "Words" were given or forged. Yet the whole body of the Pentateuchal legislation presupposes the existence of a body of well-settled law dealing with the every-day occurrences of life. For example there is no rule providing for the descent of chattels or live stock on the death of the owner. Yet we cannot infer that no owner of

[34] Westlake, *Chapters on the Principles of International Law*, pp. 2-3.

moveable property ever died. The ordinary rules must have been settled long before the days of Moses, and were left practically untouched by the Mosaic legislation.[85]

3. The "words" to which Dr. Briggs refers are not laws at all. Take "thou shalt not steal". The question at once arises what penalty is to be inflicted on a thief. In Genesis and Exodus we find the following in different cases; death, slavery, manifold restitution. How could any court administer Dr. Briggs' "Words" unless there were but one penalty which was inflicted in all cases of whatever nature? Not only so; yet another argument is available. Some of his "words" deal with matters that from the nature of the case cannot possibly fall within the jurisdiction of any human tribunal. "Thou shalt not covet" is an instance. Covetousness is a purely mental affection and it must be obvious that no man can be conscious of the mental condition of another, unless and until that other gives expression to it by some overt act. "Thou shalt not covet" may be enforced by God or by a man's own conscience, but by no other power on earth.

4. There is no sufficient reason for saying that דבר meant any type of Hebrew law at all, or indeed could be used as signifying "law", except in so far as all laws consist of words. When I investigated its usage, I was unable to satisfy myself that this was the case. On the other hand I found that in some of the passages on which Dr. Briggs would probably rely it had a technical covenant meaning, expressing terms on which God and Israel entered into a covenant.[86] The fact that these terms were also Divine commands has helped to mislead our lexicographer.

5. There is no evidence whatever for most of the state-

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[85] Deut. xxi. 15 *seqq* deals with some disposition in the owner's lifetime—thus not covering cases of strict intestacy—and presupposes law permitting such dispositions. The portion given by Jacob to Joseph and not to Reuben is an interesting case that would fall within the letter—though perhaps not the spirit—of this law. That and other passages in Genesis prove a power of disposition analogous to a testamentary power.

[86] *Studies in Biblical Law*, p. 64.

ments made by Dr. Briggs which are nevertheless put forward with the utmost confidence. Dr. Orr has recently dwelt on the extraordinary dogmatism of the critics.[37] Here it is only necessary to point to the entire absence of evidence for the following assertions, all of which are made or implied in the sentences quoted:—(1) All Hebrew "Laws" once conformed to a single "type". (2) The name of that type was "Word". (3) The "Word" was in the second person singular, etc. (4) All additions that do not conform to this dictum are redactional. (5) All early Hebrew laws were spoken by God directly or immediately (? mediately). (6) This is the origin of the term "Word" as applied to the message of the prophets or the sentences of Hebrew wise men.

It would be easy to deal with all the other relevant statements in Dr. Briggs' appendix on Types of Hebrew Law in similar fashion. But it is obviously unnecessary. Sufficient light has been thrown on his methods to make clear what value should be attached to such unsupported statements as to the evidence of language.

APPENDIX.

The following table includes the bulk of the words and phrases relied on by Dr. Driver, and shows how a few simple and obvious considerations account for them:

I. (a) Words and phrases natural to speeches as opposed to narrative:—Nos. 15, "LORD thy (our, your) God" (the emphasis on the relationship expressed being most natural in a speech); 16, the LORD the God of thy (our, your, their) fathers; 50, "the priests, the Levites" [to bulk of the populace]; 59, "which thine eyes have seen"; 60, "thy (your) eyes are those that have seen"; 66, "Hear, O Israel".

(b) Words and phrases that were probably chosen wholly or in part on account of the oratorical rhythm or euphony. [It is impossible for any modern writer to feel sure of this, but on p. lxxxvii Dr. Driver himself recognizes this as the ground for the selection of alternative forms of words]:—Nos. 19, איכה (a form of the Hebrew word for "how?"); 27, "The stranger, the fatherless and the widow" (the use of these words was of course necessitated by the sense, but probably the *phrase* commended itself by its rhythm); 30, "Thy corn, and thy new wine, and thine oil" (a similar remark applies); 41, "continually"

[37] Orr, *The Problem of the Old Testament*, pp. 507-8.

(Hebrew, "all the days"); 55, "the work of the hands"; 58, קֶרֶב, "midst"; 64, "that to which thou puttest thine (ye put your) hand"; 69, מתוך האש, "out of the midst of the fire" [compare No. 58].

II. Covenant words and phrases:—Nos. 7a, "a people of special possession"; 8, "covenant"; 13, "to swear" (references to the oaths contained in former covenants); and some of the words or phrases in 37, "statutes and judgments and testimonies, etc". [*Studies in Biblical Law*, pp. 52, 59-64.]

III. (a) Law-book words and phrases:—the other words and phrases in No. 37, *e. g.* "judgment"; 9, "which I am commanding thee this day"; 57, "therefore I command thee" (this might almost equally well be put under [e]); 44, "thou (he) canst not " (= it shall not be lawful for thee to).

(b) Words and phrases connected with laws as to the religious capital:—Nos. 20, "to eat before the LORD" (*i. e.* at the temple); 63, "to make His Name dwell there" cf. 23.

(c) Laws for national purity:—No. 24, "so thou shalt exterminate the evil from thy midst".

(d) The duty of intense fidelity to God:—Nos. 1 (a) "to love" God; 2, "other gods" (not to go after, etc.); 11, "take heed to thyself (yourselves), lest"; 14, "to hearken to His voice"; 28, "to cleave to" God (Deut. always in a group with words like "to hearken to His voice"); 31, "to walk in the LORD's ways"; 45, the duty of fearing God inculcated; 48, "to do that which is right in the eyes of the LORD"; 49, "to do that which is evil in the eyes of the LORD"; 51, "with all thy (your) heart and with all thy (your) soul"; 53, "to turn neither to the right hand not to the left" used metaphorically; 62, the caution "not to forget"; 68, (a) "to observe to do", (b) "to observe and do."

(e) Exhortations and inducements to obedience:—Nos. 3, "to be long"; or "to prolong", of days (the Deuteronomic promise upon obedience); 25, "in order that the LORD may bless thee"; 36, "and it be sin in thee"; 42, "that it may be well for thee"; 67, "And . . . shall hear and fear" (of the deterrent effects of punishment).

(f) Historical reminiscences (often containing an appeal to obedience):—Nos. 5, "house of bondage"; 12, "A mighty hand and a stretched out arm"; 33, "And remember that thou wast a bondman in the land of Egypt".

IV. References to the acquisition of Canaan:—Nos. 4, "which the LORD thy (our, etc.) God is giving thee (us, etc.)," attached mostly to "the land", sometimes to "the ground", "the gates", "the cities", etc.; 6, "thy (your) gates"; 10, "to cause (others) to possess, *i. e.* to dispossess (the LORD, the Canaanites before Israel)"; 22, "the land whither thou goest in to possess it", "the land whither thou passest (ye pass) over (Jordan) to possess it"; 38, "The good land", of Canaan; 46, "to possess" (as in Nos. 4 and 22).

V. Miscellaneous:—There are also some phrases in this list that do not fall under any of the above headings and yet are obviously in place in Deuteronomy, such as Nos. 1 (b), God's love of Israel and 23, God's

choice of Israel (both topics on which it would be natural for Moses to dilate in speeches of this nature); 47, "all Israel"; 32, "who shall be in those days" (almost inevitable in a book designed to mould the future); 34, "thine eye shall not pity him" (intended to work on public opinion); 35, "be (ye) courageous and strong" (Dr. Driver says "the expression may seem to be an ordinary one; but it occurs besides only in 1 Ch. xxii. 13, xxviii. 20, 2 Ch. xxxii. 7," but his own references to Deuteronomy are xxxi. 6, 7, 23 and iii. 28—all in connection with Joshua's appointment. What could be more natural than the use of such a phrase by Moses in such a connection, and only in that connection? He also refers to five passages in Joshua which he regards as Deuteronomic. Of these no fewer than four deal with Joshua); 39, "which thou (ye) knowest (*or* knewest) not"; 29, "As the LORD hath spoken."

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SHEOL AND PIT IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

The Babylonians seem to have had a conception of the place of the dead as definite as a popular belief, the elements of which the imagination alone supplied, could well be. The prison mentioned in the "Descent of Isthar" may indicate that the moral element was not wanting in this conception. In Egypt a belief in a future life ethically conditioned was very early current, and the children of Israel must have come into frequent contact with the Egyptians. In the Old Testament, however, no trace of a moral differentiation of the inhabitants of Sheol seemed discernible, and this appeared most strange not only in view of the Babylonian and Egyptian doctrines, but also, and more especially, in view of the Apocryphal and New Testament eschatologies, which found no point of connection in this respect with the earlier Hebrew literature, at least not with that portion of it which is extant. Recently the theory has been advanced that Pit in the Old Testament is a pit in Sheol, and not Sheol as a pit.* If this view is supported by the facts, then we have the distinction in the Old Testament between the abode of the righteous dead and the wicked dead which has so far been sought in vain; then this distinction becomes important for later Jewish theology; then what has always been thought to be at most latent in the Old Testament will be found to lie on its surface. Does a close examination of the passages involved corroborate this view? Do they admit of such a distinction between Sheol and Pit?

It is difficult to find a satisfactory method of procedure for testing this opinion, because the lack of definiteness in the conceptions, due to the poetical and highly imaginative character of the language used, baffles the investigator at every turn. The meaning of Pit must be determined from the following passages: Job xvii. 14; xxxiii. 18, 22, 24, 28, 30; Ps. xvi. 10; xxviii. 1; xxx. 4; xlix. 10; lv. 24; lxxxviii. 5; cxliii. 7; Prov. i. 12; xxviii. 17 (?); Is. xiv. 15; xxxviii. 17, 18; Ez.

* Dr. Briggs advocates this view in his "Psalms" and in the Articles שְׁאוֹל, בּוֹר, אֲבַדּוֹן and שַׁחַת in Brown's Gesenius. The matter is not argued, but assumed as probable. A development in the use of the terms Sheol and Pit is said to be traceable in the Old Testament.

xxvi. 20; xxviii. 8; xxxi. 14, 16; xxxii. 18, 24, 25, 29, 30; Jn. ii. 7. In no passage is a description of Pit to be found. It is said to have loins, *i. e.*, recesses (Is. xiv. 15); those who go to it go down, and they are the men of old times (Ez. xxvi. 20). It is called a Pit of pit (Ps. lv. 24) and a pit of nothingness (Is. xxxviii. 17), but this is a heaping up of obscurities. Two words are used for Pit (בּוֹר and שַׁחַת), and it is not at all certain that the second of these means pit in all cases of its occurrence. It is very possible that there are two words שַׁחַת derived respectively from שָׁחַת and שׁוּחַ, and that it cannot be determined which derivation must be accepted in a given passage. The Septuagint and the Peshitto both favor the derivation from שָׁחַת in all cases. The term Abaddon must be included here. Once it is found in its root meaning as an abstract noun from אָבַד, destroy (Esth. ix. 5; cf. viii. 6); it is also used as a proper noun in parallelism with Sheol (Job xxvi. 6; Prov. xv. 11; xxvii. 20), with death (Job xxviii. 22), and alone (?) (Job xxxi. 12). A definite moral conception can no more be read into this word than into the Silence (דּוּמָה) of Ps. xciv. 17 and Ps. cxv. 17.

These meagre data can hardly serve as the basis of an induction; but, as far as they go, they show no necessity for regarding Sheol and Pit as anything but synonymous. In regard to Abaddon there is not even a thread from which a theory may be hung. But while no necessity is shown for distinguishing between Sheol, Pit, and Abaddon, there is also very little to indicate that these are but different names for the same thing. The verb יָרַד is a standing term for descent into Sheol and Pit; while Sheol has bars, Pit has recesses; lowest Sheol is paralleled by lowest Pit (Deut. xxxii. 22; Ps. lxxxvi. 13; cf. Lam. iii. 53, 55; Jer. xxxviii. 9). If anything is indicated by these facts, it would be that the terms are synonymous. Pit is also used by certain individuals with reference to themselves in a connection and under circumstances that hardly admit of their having regarded it as the place of the wicked dead. Job, who protests so vehemently against the charge of unrighteousness preferred against him by his friends, would hardly have spoken of Pit as his father even in a figure, if Pit for him had had an evil connotation (cf. Ps. lxxxviii). It is easy to begin with the fact that the same writer uses both terms and on the presumption that he uses them discriminatingly to evolve distinctions which are unwarranted, but why then identify the two

Pits (בור and שחת) and Abaddon to contrast them with Sheol? As far as the data are concerned, all four may have been distinct conceptions. Why not find here the four apartments of Gehenna mentioned in the Ethiopic Enoch (Chap. 22)? There is almost nothing in the Old Testament that militates against the supposition of a development in the conception of the other world, but on the other hand there is absolutely nothing that makes such a supposition necessary. The examination of the terms separately and their comparison together admits of no more positive conclusion than that they are vague, poetical generalizations, based seemingly on the actualities of death and the grave, and used sometimes in parallelism with these, sometimes together, but always in contrast with life. As to their inter-relation—whether synonymous, antonymous, or overlapping—nothing can be deduced.

To leave the question in such a condition is very unsatisfactory, and therefore as a last resource the passages in which Sheol and Pit are used in close proximity may be more carefully examined. Clearly nothing can be done with parallelisms, unless these extend beyond the clauses in which Pit and Sheol occur. Where the words are merely connected by *and*, there is no basis of comparison. Thus Ps. xxx. 4; xvi. 10; Job xxvi. 6; xxviii. 22; Prov. i. 12; xxvii. 20; xv. 11 need not delay us.

Is. xiv. 15. "Yet thou shalt be brought down to Sheol, to the recesses of Pit".—These words can be understood in either one of two ways. (1) Thou shalt be brought down to Sheol, *i. e.*, to the recesses of Pit. (2) Thou shalt be brought down to Sheol, and even lower, to the recesses of Pit. It may be that the grammatical structure favors the identity of extent of the two phrases; but it may also seem that they are climacteric, and that the latter implies a deeper degradation than the former. If exact conceptions underlie the terms, and if Isaiah used them with accuracy, we should expect the verse to read, thou shalt go down to Pit, to the recesses of Sheol, *i. e.*, if these underlying conceptions were as suggested. This accumulation of *ifs* shows the precariousness of basing any conclusion on this passage.

Psalm lxxxviii. is a petition for deliverance from imminent death, or from an anguish similar to that of death. The writer endeavors to find as many expressions as possible to describe his actual or figurative condition. Sheol, Pit, and

Abaddon are used within the range of eight verses, and their parallelism with other expressions may help to determine whether they are used discriminatingly. Reduced to a bald literalness, the lines show that Sheol, Pit, dead, slain, grave, Pit, dark places, deeps, corpse (underlying thought of vs. 8), dead, shades, grave, and Abaddon are all descriptive of one and the same condition, *death*. All are thus antonyms of life, but they need not therefore be synonyms of each other. There is no evidence of clear-cut conceptions here.

In Psalm lv. we have on the one hand a prayer that Jehovah will bring the wicked down to Sheol alive (16), and on the other hand that Jehovah will bring the wicked down to pit of Pit (24). Pit of Pit must mean pit *par excellence, the* Pit (cf., however, the question raised as to the meaning of שחת *supra*). It will be noticed that the wicked are the subjects in both cases. If in vs. 24 a pit in Sheol is meant, then the former petition becomes rather tame. The only allowable inference is that Pit and Sheol are in a general way synonymous, for here again the words are both antonyms of life. The point of view is that of the termination of this life, and to the exact relation of Pit and Sheol there is no clue. It may be argued, as Dr. Briggs seemingly would argue, that Sheol is both the designation of the underworld as a whole and the correlative of Pit, the place of the wicked. $\overset{\text{General}}{\underset{\text{Name}}{\textit{Sheol}}}\left\{\begin{matrix}\text{Sheol.}\\ \text{Pit.}\end{matrix}\right.$ The second meaning of the word may be said to have supplanted the first in the course of time. This, however, is pure theorizing. Some such conception must help us to understand the Sheol of the Old Testament as undifferentiated, but we are not justified in reading it into passages such as this, and in seeking this differentiation in a contrast between Sheol and Pit.

Is. xxxviii. 17b, 18a. "But thou hast in love to my soul delivered it from the pit of nothingness; . . . for Sheol cannot praise thee, death cannot celebrate thee; they that go down into Pit cannot hope for thy truth".—This personification of Pit and Sheol is confusing. The addition of the abstraction (nothingness) is still more confusing. Sheol, Pit, and grave may all as conceptions offer a striking contrast to life, and yet be of widely different meaning. It may be inferred, however, that the character of Hezekiah forbade his conceiving of him-

self as descending into the place of the wicked and that therefore both Pit and Sheol are non-moral.

Jon. ii. 2, 7. "Out of the belly of Shoel cried I." "Yet hast thou brought up my life from Pit."—Pit and Sheol are metaphors. This figurative use of figures would hardly warrant the conclusion that Pit is the belly of Sheol.

Job xvii. 13, 14. "If I hope, Sheol is my house; if I have spread my couch in the darkness; if I have said to Pit, thou art my father; to the worm, my mother, and my sister; where then is my hope?"—Job is absolutely hopeless. He protests vehemently against the reasoning of his friends, who by still holding out the hope of prosperity to him are changing night into day, for his death is imminent. If he waits, if he still cherishes hope, it must be a hope coupled with the thought of Sheol as his house, of darkness as his resting-place, of Pit and the worm as his intimates; for of his nearness to all this he is fully persuaded. Did anyone say that under such circumstances he had hope, then soon he and that kind of a hope would descent into, and rest in the dust. The imminence of death is the underlying thought of the passage, and here again no deeper meaning can be found for either Sheol or Pit than that which a sharp contrast with life affords. The character of the speaker here also all but forbids that Pit as a conception have moral content different from that of Sheol.

Ez. xxxi. 13-18. "Upon his ruin all the birds of the heavens shall dwell, and all the beasts of the field shall be upon his branches; to the end that none of all the trees by the waters exalt themselves in their stature, neither set their top among the thick boughs, nor that their mighty ones stand up in their height, even all that drink water: for they are all delivered unto death, to the nether parts of the earth, in the midst of the children of men, with them that go down to Pit. Thus saith the Lord Jehovah: In the day when he went down to Sheol I caused a mourning: I covered the deep for him, and I restrained the rivers thereof; and the great waters were stayed; and I caused Lebanon to mourn for him, and all the trees of the field fainted for him. I made the nations to shake at the sound of his fall, when I cast him down to Sheol with them that descend into Pit; and all the trees of Eden, the choice and best of Lebanon, all that drink water, were comforted in the nether parts of the earth. They also went down into Sheol with him

unto them that are slain by the sword; yea, they that were his arm, that dwelt under his shadow in the midst of the nations. To whom art thou thus like in glory and in greatness among the trees of Eden? Yet shalt thou be brought down with the trees of Eden unto the nether parts of the earth: thou shalt lie in the midst of the uncircumcised, with them that are slain by the sword. This is Pharoah and all his multitude, saith the Lord Jehovah."—This passage is highly figurative. Under the symbol of trees exalting themselves Assyria and her allies are held up as warnings to Egypt. These *trees* are said to be "delivered unto death, to the nether parts of the earth, in the midst of the children of men, with them that go down to Pit". The last two phrases indicate that the figure of trees is retained, and that the trees have gone down into the same place into which men go. They are inserted to prevent the reader from dropping the figure as he would be inclined to do. If this is the true explanation of these phrases, then *in the midst of the children of men* and *with those that go down into Pit* are correlative expressions; and *children of men* and *those that go down to Pit* are equivalents. This passage is strikingly similar to Ez. xxvi. 20, where Tyre as a city is threatened with descent "with them that go down into Pit, to the people of old times". Here also the two phrases are correlatives. *Children of men* and *men of old times* must be general terms equivalent to *mankind,* and therefore "those that go down into Pit" must also be a comprehensive expression for all mankind that has died. Thus the conclusion is unescapable that *all* go down into Pit and that the conception is non-moral. The remainder of the passage confirms this interpretation, and Sheol is substituted for Pit. Assyria, still under the symbol of a tree, descends into Sheol; while Jehovah to cause a mourning for him withholds water from all the trees of the field, *i. e.*, his allies, so that they faint. It seems clear that Sheol and Pit are here synonymous. While the figure of trees is in part retained for Assyria's allies —"all the trees of Eden, the choice and best of Lebanon"—it is abandoned in the *nations* of verse 16, who presumably are these same allies. In the last part of this verse the figure is, however, resumed. To indicate that his allies went down into Sheol with the Assyrian they as trees drinking water are said ו be comforted in the nether parts of the earth. Here Sheol located exactly where Pit was located before. They, the

allies, as trees went down with him unto them that are slain by the sword. Again the dropping of the figure of trees descending is guarded against, although the term now used is less comprehensive than the former. While *those that are slain by the sword* is not descriptive of all mankind, it is certainly non-moral. The figure now changes, and the allies are called the arm of the Assyrian, only however to be again designated as trees. Finally Egypt and Pharoah are threatened with the fate of Assyria's allies, and that too under the symbol of a tree. If this is the meaning of the passage, then we are sure that Pit is a non-moral conception; and if it is non-moral all reason for differentiating it from Sheol is gone. The localization of both in the *nether parts of the earth* and the parallelism of this phrase with *death* offer a very strong presumption, if not a positive proof, that they are identical.

Ez. xxxii. 18f. is bewilderingly figurative, and the attempt to coördinate the elements of the description is almost hopeless. This passage, however, is in complete agreement with the interpretation given of the preceding chapter as far as the distribution of the words Sheol and Pit is concerned; but Ezekiel cannot be expected to confine himself to exact statement. He transfers the graves of Asshur and her company to the uttermost parts of Pit (23).

Psalm xlix. was written to encourage the poor and afflicted in the thought that all alike, high and low, rich and poor, must die. The writer all but exults in the idea that death is the great leveller. A treatment of the righteous different from that of the wicked may be hinted at in vs. 16, but this does not lead to a differentiation of Sheol (xv. 15, 16) and Pit such as one would expect, if the latter were a place *in* Sheol where the wicked are confined. In vs. 10 *seeing Pit* is contrasted with *living always*. Death shepherds the flock that is appointed for Sheol, and their beauty is for it to consume (15). Redemption from Sheol is a taking by God. The point of view in this psalm is the termination of the present life, and it seems impossible to read a deeper meaning into Pit or Sheol than death or grave.

Our last resource has not then been altogether a delusion. Although no absolutely certain results have been gained, it has become clear that there is no necessity for differentiating Sheol and Pit on a moral basis. There are even a few indications that

such a differentiation is not permissible, and possibly a hint or two that the words must be synonymous. If Ezekiel, who is proverbially obscure, can throw light on such a hazy question, it may be said with assurance that Sheol and Pit are identical. We may conclude then that the evidence which can be gleaned from the Old Testament itself is, as far as it goes, opposed to a moral distinction between Pit and Sheol. If this distinction was latent in the words, it does not appear in the Old Testament.

The question may be approached in still another way; and since our results are rather disappointing, it seems worth while to exhaust all the possibilities for determining the relation of these two conceptions. A distinction between them may not lie on the surface of the Old Testament and their identity may even seem very likely, but Post-Biblical Judaism may still have found such a distinction and made it important for its eschatological speculation. Dr. Briggs asserts that this is the case, when he makes the statement that this distinction was of importance to the later Jewish theology. If the distinction was important, it is reasonable to expect that it will be reflected in the literary remains of Post-Biblical Judaism. On the authority of the rabbis Pit in the Old Testament might be said to be a Pit in Sheol and not Sheol as a Pit, if they so regarded it.

The Versions first demand investigation, and their value as witnesses will be inversely proportional to their accuracy and faithfulness as translations. The Syriac agrees with the Hebrew in every passage concerned, and it translates שַׁחַת everywhere by *h° bholo, destruction.* The Septuagint translates Sheol by (*θάνατος*) *death* in Prov. xxiii. 14, elsewhere invariably by Hades with or without the article. בּוֹר is translated by *λάκκος* or *βόθρος*, except where the text is corrupt. In Is. xiv. 15 *sides of Pit* is interpreted as *foundations of the earth.* שַׁחַת is five times rendered by *death,* and elsewhere by words containing the idea of corruption or destruction. The Vulgate, which may here be included for the sake of completeness, translates Sheol by Inferus, Inferi, or Infernus; בּוֹר by lacus; שַׁחַת by words such as corruptio, interitus, puteus, internecio. In their renderings of Sheol and Pit these three Versions commend themselves as reliable translations. They seem to demand that שַׁחַת be derived from שָׁחַת. They certainly do not indicate that

Sheol and Pit were differentiated ethically by the translators, and that the distinction was important for their theology.

With the Targums it is somewhat different. As is to be expected from their character as interpretations rather than translations, there is a great variety of renderings. Sheol is forty times transliterated as שְׁיוֹל, שְׁאוֹל or שַׁיוֹל ; three times it is once each by חַבְלָא, בֵּית מְדוֹר, נַהֲנָם, דִּין נַהֲנָם, קְטוֹל, מוֹתָא, תְּהוֹמָא, translated by קְבוּרְתָא ; twice by בֵּית קְבוּרְתָא ; twice by מְחַבְלָא, and מַשְׁרְיָתָא דִּרְשִׁיעִין. In Ps. xviii. 6 it is paraphrased by *a cohort besieges me with wickedness;* and in Ps. lxxxviii. 3 it is translated by pit itself (גּוּבָא). The Talmud translations of בּוֹר all contain the root גּוּב. In eleven passages בֵּית אַבְדָּנָא is added by way of explanation, and בֵּית אָסִירֵי once. שַׁחַת is rendered twice each by חַבָּר and חַבְלָא ; once each by קְבוּרְתָא, נַהֲנָם עֲמִיקָא and מְרִירָא לְרַשְׁעָיָא. Only three times is it translated by the root שׁוּחַ. In Ps. xlix. 10 it is rendered by דִּין נַהֲנָם. No clearer evidence than this could be desired that these were not fixed conceptions to the Talmudists. Sheol is translated by Pit. Both Sheol and Pit are called Gehenna's house or judgment. Sheol is the *camp of the wicked,* and Pit is *bitterness to the wicked.* Pit, when not followed by an appositional phrase, often has the article, which seems to indicate that it was not even regarded as a proper name. The Talmuds also derive שַׁחַת from שְׁחָת in a number of cases. It is absolutely safe to conclude that the Talmudists made no moral distinction between Pit and Sheol, and almost as safe to maintain that to them the words were synonymous, so that their occurrence side by side in the Old Testament was of no importance for their theology.

Our clearest knowledge of Jewish eschatology comes from the Ethiopic Enoch. As far as a rapid reading in translation shows, Sheol occurs in this work only five times (li. 1, lvi. 8, cii. 5, 11, ciii. 7). Chap. cii. 5 shows that the righteous descend into Sheol. Pit is not mentioned in the book. The unimportance of a distinction between Pit and Sheol to the writer or writers is evident.

Hades is of frequent occurrence in the book of Ecclesiasticus (vid. ix. 12, xiv. 12, xvii. 27, xxviii. 21, xli. 4, xlviii. 5, li. 5, 6). In ix. 9 the phrase *with thy spirit slide into destructon* occurs. Presumably the original of destruction was שְׁחַת. In xxi. 10 *pit of Hades* occurs, for which the original—if destruction renders שְׁחַת—must have been בּוֹר שְׁאוֹל. This may then be an

identification of the two, for בור as a proper name could not be a construct. All this, however, is mere conjecture; but that a distinction between Pit and Sheol was unimportant to the son of Sirach is clear.

Peter affirms in Acts that David saw corruption. He quotes the Septuagint of Psalm xvi. He either did not know of the Old Testament usage of Sheol and Pit, or else he identifies them; for if Pit for him had an evil connotation, he could not say that David saw it. At any rate a possible moral distinction between Pit and Sheol was so unimportant that he ignored it, or so little known that he was ignorant of it.

This examination of what seemed to be the best sources has not been altogether fruitless in that it has shown that the usage of Pit and Sheol side by side in the Old Testament was not important to the later Jewish theology. This, however, is absolutely demonstrated by the fact that when ethics did penetrate into the eschatological speculations of Judaism with the resulting differentiation of the underworld into an abode of the righteous and a place of punishment, a nexus for the latter was sought in Gehenna and not in Pit, while the righteous went to Paradise or the Garden of Eden. Sheol became one of the seven names of Gehenna according to Erubim 19a. How can this be, if Dr. Briggs' view of the relation of Pit and Sheol is the true one, and if, as he says, the distinction between them was important?

A theory in regard to Pit, Sheol, and Abaddon which ignores the meagre data we have, need fear neither snares nor pitfalls, for it soars high in the atmosphere of speculation, and never touches the solid earth of facts. We must conclude then that a moral differentiation of Pit and Sheol was not important to later Jewish theology, that as far as its testimony goes the Old Testament does not distinguish Pit and Sheol on a moral basis. With the elimination of a possible moral element all reason for discriminating between the conceptions disappears, and nothing remains but to regard them as in a general way synonymous. Pit and Sheol are vague abstractions used metaphorically for death and the grave in exalted style. The vision of the Old Testament writers was circumscribed by death; and they never allowed their imaginations to leap the chasm of the grave. Merely to name that which lay beyond the termination of this life seems to have satisfied them. Where the righteous and

wicked are named in connection with Sheol and Pit, these but mark the end of earthly existence. The entrance of the wicked into Sheol is prayed for, or held up as a warning to them (Ps. lv. 16; ix. 18), because all their earthly enjoyments will be ended by it. Sheol is dreaded by the righteous, because it ends, or at least interrupts, all active communion with God (Is. xxxviii. 18). Is. xiv. and Ez. xxxii. seemingly lead us into Sheol by enumerating some of its inhabitants; yet the veil that hides it only trembles, and no hand is extended to thrust it aside. The literature of the Hebrew does not show that he explored the beyond, in as far as it concerned himself as an individual.

Princeton. S. ZANDSTRA.

REVIEWS

RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHILD AND IN THE RACE. Methods and Processes. By JAMES MARK BALDWIN, M.A., Ph.D., Hon.D.Sc. (Oxon.), LL.D. (Glasgow, etc.), Professor of Philosophy and Psychology in the Johns Hopkins University; Author of *Handbook of Psychology*, etc.; Co-editor of *The Psychological Review*. With Seventeen Figures and Ten Tables. Third Edition. Revised (Seventh Printing). New York: The Macmillan Company. 1906. 8vo.; pp. xviii, 477. $2.25 net.

SOCIAL AND ETHICAL INTERPRETATIONS IN MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. A Study in Social Psychology. By the same. Work Crowned with Gold Medal of the Royal Academy of Denmark. Fourth Edition. Published by the same. 1906. 8vo.; pp. xxvi, 606. $2.60 net.

These two books are companion volumes, if, indeed, they are not parts of one whole. The first was written with the promise of the second and the second was written upon the premise of the first. In the earlier work, the author intimated that it would be followed by another under the same general heading of "Mental Development". However, for reasons which he states in the preface to the first edition of the later volume, the unity of treatment was abandoned and yet he declares that "this volume is a continuation of the studies in genetic psychology begun in my *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*" (Vol. II, p. vii).* The whole essay—a *magnum opus* indeed—is simply an inductive study of the natural history of the human mind. The point of view is persistently genetic. This is the distinctive characteristic of the "new psychology". It scorns the *a priori*. It takes up its line of work at the farthest possible remove from the eminent domain of metaphysics. It is nothing if not inductive. It knows no gospel but that of observed, ascertained, accredited fact. It must be empirical or it has no standing in court. The new psychology is a chamber in the splendid palace of science, not a cell in the dark dungeon of philosophy. This conception, great and illuminating as it is, is a comparatively recent arrival. "Now that this genetic conception has arrived, it is astonishing that it did not arrive sooner, and it is astonishing that the "new" psychology has made so little use of it" (I: 3). Borrowing from

*In this notice the two volumes will be referred to in the order stated at the beginning as I and II.

the terminology of the biologist, the development of the individual mind is called its *ontogenesis* and the mind history of the race, its *phylogenesis*. The one contemplates the individual and the other the race, using the term rather in its universal than in its ethnic signification. Speaking generally, the scope of the earlier volume is confined to the former study, while the later volume is occupied with the larger outlook of race development.

It is happily true that the columns of this REVIEW are not a proper place for an extended critique of this splendid work: otherwise, the pen of an expert must needs be summoned to the task. Such an expert, the present writer feels it unnecessary to say that he makes no pretensions to be. And yet upon the clumsy thought of the untutored ordinary mind, such a prodigious study as this cannot fail to make a deep and distinct impression. Certainly the genetic method is the favorite method of the present time. Evolution is the word of the hour, although Professor Baldwin has little to say about evolution and quietly reminds us that development, which is the term he prevailingly employs, "is a process of involution as well as of evolution" (I: 3). Our author is no mere academician; he turned his own home into a studio and his own nursery, with his own children, into his psychological laboratory. It is hard to estimate how much these observations were affected and therefore vitiated by the unavoidable circumstance that the observer was also the father. The experiment of the Columbia professor who had his children isolated from his home and from ordinary social surroundings was regarded as misleading from the very fact that their isolation rendered them morbid and exceptional. But is not the other peril as real if not so great? That Professor Baldwin's little girls H. and E. were his own daughters, whose psychological development and mental unfolding were subjected to his own personal, albeit strictly scientific, scrutiny is a factor in the result the force and effect of which it is simply impossible for him to measure or to estimate. And this fact is suggestive of the difficulties to be overcome in arriving at general psychological laws by means of inductive research. The needle is affected by the inevitable but indefinable factors present in the person of the observer. How safe is it to generalize from observations made by Prof. Baldwin in the growth of his own children (heredity) in his own quondam Princeton home (environment) and to apply that generalization to all children, even granting the impossible condition that such a trained observer as Prof. Baldwin could make the observations? In reply to a criticism by Professor Tufts, he frankly admits that his own children developed "reflective bashfulness" earlier than many and he parries the suggestion that his children are hardly fair samples of all children in this good-natured way, "I may especially thank Professor Tufts for the subtle compliment implied in the words: 'But I am convinced that few children develop in such a favorable moral atmosphere as that of the children observed by the author!'—that is, if he does not spoil it by saying he did not know the children observed by me were my own" (II: 590). This general citicism upon the empirical method is hardly a valid objection to that method, but it is

worthy of consideration as throwing doubt upon the trustworthiness of generalizations drawn from the study of specific conditions.

It is impossible even in barest outline to indicate the contents of these two volumes. The direction of functional development and differentiation, beginning with the object and passing on to the project, then to the subject and finally reaching the eject, is amply illustrated and exceedingly interesting. The psychology of suggestion and the rationale of dynamogenesis open up wide fields of inquiry which observed results will be a long time in answering. The conflict and poise between the habitual self (the conservative) and the accommodating self (the aggressive) begin to lead up to ethical elements. But this advance must wait for the later treatise. The soul is essentially a *socius*, not so much a social unit as a social outcome, and it cannot be studied or understood simply ontogentically: the ontogenesis has its place and its possibility in the larger schedule of the race.

Professor Baldwin does not end the first volume without saying a word which well meets the thought of some who have followed him thus far. Of course, mere description explains nothing. The author has touched upon the distinction between description and explanation (I: 3), and yet it seems to us that the genetic viewpoint must hold itself to describing the development which it observes. It is not the only way of expressing the truth, which he chooses when he says that the results of his method are not metaphysical explanations but empirical generalizations (II: 591). "The further philosophical questions as to the nature of mind, its worth and its dignity, remain under adjudication. We have learned too much in modern philosophy to argue from the natural history of a thing to its ultimate constitution and meaning—and we commend this consideration to the biologists" (I: 466). It is plain that the author's interest in his work grows as he proceeds to consider its social interpretations. Society is to be viewed psychologically: human history is human psychology writ large: the understanding of the ontogenesis of the soul waits for its phylogenetic valuation. The social unit must be reckoned with before we can get a clear and correct view of the individual unit. Accordingly, the second volume begins with this announcement: "It is my aim, in the present essay, to inquire to what extent the principles of the development of the individual mind apply also to the evolution of society" (II: 1). The method is still genetic, or, more particularly, it is psychogenetic. The theory of recapitulation is presupposed. But for the purposes of this essay this theory has only an anthropological application and not a broadly biological one. That is to say, it is enough to assume that the human individual traverses and capitalizes the stages which the human race has come through and not the longer road that has been covered by all the forms of the animal world. Professor Baldwin finds that the racial and the individual developments have been along the very same line. Recalling the habitual and the accommodating self of the individual, we find them in the race, now become reflective and intelligent and advancing upon its course of social development, again figuring as private selfish intent on the one hand and the public social intent on the

other. The social attitudes of the child are first inductive, then spontaneous, then reflective; and here too is described the path of the race. In every case, the organic and the inductive serve as a scaffolding for the higher intelligent and volitional. The author argues strongly and convincingly for the social origin of the moral sense and carries his argument on to the genesis and nature of the religious sentiment in which he finds two cardinal elements, namely, the feeling of dependence and the sense of mystery. All this is exceedingly rich in its implications and suggestiveness and we believe that no student of the psychological aspects of religious experience can afford to ignore such a discussion as this. Professor Baldwin would have no patience with such views as those of Benjamin Kidd: for he tells us, "that the religious is an outgrowth and constant index of the ethical sanction; that its social value is mainly on the side of its conservative influence; and that the ethical is the most important as well as the most 'rational' of all the springs of human action, whether public or private" (II: 451). With this, of course, it must be remembered that he regards the ethical which is "rational", and out of which the religious grows, as having its roots in the spontaneous, which roots itself in the instinctive, which in turn roots itself in the natural. This may suggest idealism in philosophy; but an empirical psychologist, intent upon his clinic of mental moods and tenses, is oblivious to metaphysical implications or inferences.

One of the finest insights of the work is in the distinction between the biological and the psychological in the genetic interpretation of society. Professor Baldwin has it in for the school of writers mostly evolutionistic and fitly represented by Mr. Spencer, which regards society as a huge sort of biological organism or which would interpret social phenomena in terms of physiology. "To force these things into biological moulds is simply to deform them" (II: 549). He italicizes his judgment that "the progress of society is, in its method, in its direction, and in its impelling motives, analogous to the growth of consciousness rather than to that of the biological organism" (II: 548). It is needless to point out that for a philosophical rationalè of human history this is a distinct advance upon the old physiological valuation of society, and for this we are distinctly grateful. Our author, always psychologist and never metaphysician, comes up dangerously near to the border line when he says: "The true analogy, then, is not that which likens society to a physiological organism, but rather that which likens it to a psychological organization. And the sort of psychological organization to which it is analogous is that which is found in the individual in his *ideal thinking*" (II: 571, italics his). Not the least of the reassuring implications of this generalization is in its implied distinction between psychology and physiology—a distinction which a certain class of writers persistently ignore or deny, and yet a distinction which Professor Baldwin does not think it necessary even to argue for. In the synthetic philosophy, for example, psychology spells physiology and physiology spells biology, so that psychology is biology under another name, and yet here at the conclusion of an inductive study of individual and racial consciousness we are told, as clearly as English can tell us,

that the proper terms in which to interpret human society are psychological, *and not biological.* It is of the nature of this work to deal largely in processes and sparingly in results. We incline to believe that this is a handicap which the genetic method will find much difficulty in throwing off. The phenomena of the soul, so sensitive to circumstance, so determinable by antecedent, so fugitive at the approach of the observer, so facile in the tricks of self-transformation, so responsive to undiscoverable causes, so infinite in the aspects and attitudes which it may effect, and so mysterious in its exercise of its unique prerogative of free initiative, furnish a fascinating and boundless field for the imaginations of the empiricist, but the undetermined and indeterminable factors are so many and so great that in taking the step from the fact observed to the law of which it is the index or the proof, we believe that it requires the dogmatism of the credulous to affirm the law to be either fixed or final. Professor Baldwin does well to remark that while one case may be decisive in overthrowing a theory, it is very seldom that conditions are so clear that we can establish a theory. However, we do not mean to condemn or to discourage the scientific study of the phenomena of consciousness. What if there is a vast *terra incognita* which it can never explore? Is there not a wide and enchanting tract that lies within its reach? What if it shall fail to accomplish all that its enthusiastic friends hope? Is it not glory and gain enough if it accomplish something not yet done and, if, in its very failure to do more, it has made substantial contributions to the fund of human knowledge by tracing its limits and demonstrating the factors which fix those limits? We have again and again in reading these pages asked ourselves whether Professor Baldwin is justified in employing the word "genetic" as applicable to his method. Then he is studying the *origin* of mind in the individual and in the race. Perhaps there is a sense in which this is so. In studying the infant's movements he is studying the first manifestations of its consciousness. Science cannot do more or less. Is the genetic method properly engaged in studying the earliest perceivable manifestations of mind, or the source whence it comes and the way of its coming? If this latter is the proper problem of genetic psychology, then it may argue that its task is so great that it is no task at all and that therefore it is justified in betaking itself to the next best thing, the only other thing that is possible. But we have been impressed with the thought that Professor Baldwin's great and remarkable work has been rather along the natural-history method, whether or not that is properly called also the genetic method. He has little to say about creation or evolution. It is fair to say that nothing in his method is incompatible with our unquestioning acceptance of supernatural origins and supernatural agencies. He studies what is and asks the question how it came to be. It seems to us that the weakness of the method is in the fact that it is purely descriptive. It burdens itself with data but it cannot be sure of their value. It must be content to do service for others; its very method is its own limitation. Nevertheless, this work, which has justly made its author famous among scholars the world over, cannot be too warmly commended.

The psychological interpretation of religion is a favorite idea of the present time. Free rein is given to the fallacious conception that religion is the subject of which theology is the science. This is to degrade theology to the low level of the mere natural history of man. Thus, indeed, theology, too, may be made only to spell psychology, which is biology, which is chemistry, which is mechanics, which is mere matter. What is needed is the true conception of theology, which has for its theme God, and of psychology, which has for its theme man. This book does good service in bringing its great learning and breadth of vision to bear in showing, even though it is but between the lines and without formal announcement, that psychology has for its distinct field and noble theme the consciousness of the human soul, and that in this it is once and forever to be distinguished from all disciplines which merge man in the great world in which he finds his home or the study of man in the study of the muscles and movements of biological organisms and in the actions and reactions of mechanical forces.

Trenton. HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

ESSAY ON THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION. By TH. RIBOT. Translated from the French by ALBERT H. N. BARON, Fellow in Clark University. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1906. 8vo.; pp. xix, 370.

This is an interesting study of a very interesting subject by one of the masters of modern psychology. If there be any who regard psychology as one of the "spooky sciences", they must regard that department of psychology which deals with the imagination as the spookiest of all. It is a merit of this essay that it rigidly specializes its theme, which is the "Constructive Imagination". We observe that the term used in the title of the book is less accurate, judged from the real nature of this faculty, than that employed in the text itself. The imagination is constructive, not creative. The essay is in three parts: The Analysis of the Imagination, The Development of the Imagination, and The Principal Types of the Imagination. The author conceives that what the will is to the sphere of action, the imagination is to that of intellectual order. It creates and furnishes the images which serve as the symbols of thought. Analogy is the product of imagination, involving both personification and transformation, and the meaning of the process is *Ex analogia hominis*. All minds are imaginative, the low degree of some imaginations being due to lack of either material or resourcefulness.

The author's discussion of myths is very instructive. He holds, of course, that the history of the race is that of the individual in the large, and therefore that the myth-making era of history finds its best illustration in the myth-making years of childhood. The real mark of a myth is in this *analogia hominis*. It is a humanization of nature according to processes peculiar to the imagination. "According to the definiton that seems to me best adapted for psychology, the myth is 'the psychological objectification of man in all the phenomena that he can

perceive' (Vignoli, *Mito e Scienza*, p. 27). It is a humanization of nature according to processes peculiar to the imagination" (p. 121). Animism is a faith born of the imagination. Everything either above or below man is conceived as man. Civilization is the slow process of climbing down from the heights of fancy to the *terra firma* of hard fact. Ritualism is a decadent and rationalized mythology". Vico's three successive stages of mankind are recalled, viz., the Divine or Theocratic, the Heroic or Fabulous and the Human or Historic. The great-man-theory of history, championed by Carlyle, Nietzsche *et al.*, and opposed by such evolutionary writers as Spencer, Taine and others, is proof that we have not yet advanced out of the second into the third.

The last part of the essay is full of anecdotes and incidents that show what strange freaks the imagination, following its own methods and obeying its own laws, may play. The various types of the imagination are the same in the main and the differences are due to the way in which it is put, the circumstances by which it is surrounded and the other faculties possessed by the person himself. There is less actual difference than we are inclined to suppose between the scientific imagination, the mechanical, the commercial and the Utopian. The inventor is a poet working not simply in thoughts and words, but in thoughts and things. The imagination is never exercised without the feelings being involved. To Mendelssohn words were vague and ambiguous, while music was definite and full of meaning.

The translator's work, we should say, is well done; only he has left himself open to criticism that it is not quite done—completely. Some technical terms are pardonable, such as formication, asthenic and habephrenia, but we submit that there is no good reason for sending the reader of fair intelligence to the dictionary to learn what certain words mean whose significance could easily be put into clear and sufficiently accurate English equivalents; *e. g.*, Misoneism, Crepuscular, fulgurations, psychomy and hypnogogic hallucinations.

Trenton. HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

DER KAMPF UM DIE SITTLICHE WELT. Von D. WILH. SCHMIDT, Professor an der Universität Breslau—Gütersloh. C. Bertelsmann. 1906. Pp. 334.

Lest the prospective purchaser should be disappointed in this work through a misapprehension of its character, it is well to point out that it is not a systematic treatise on morality, but a collection of popular essays. The meaning of the title is made clearer by the table of contents, which shows that the book consists of an Introduction and ten Chapters, entitled respectively Freedom of the Will, Conscience, Shakespeare the Poet of Conscience, Spencer and the Ethical Movement, The Buddhistic and the Christian Ethic, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Tolstoi, Lombroso, Man's Will and Destiny. Six of the ten chapters thus treat of the moral world as viewed by as many different influential writers. These chapters are mainly expository and contain nothing new. They

give a good popular presentation of the ethical views of Spencer, Tolstoi, etc., and should prove interesting and instructive in proportion to the reader's lack of first-hand knowledge of these authors. This perhaps in part explains the fact that the chapter on Lombroso, which contains some good criticism of that author's "statistical method", seems to me the best in the book. Prof. Schmidt's own view of the moral world is presented more directly in the chapters on Freedom, on Conscience, and on Man's Will and Destiny; though even here the impatient reader will be somewhat disconcerted by the frequent quotations, much as he may welcome the numerous references to other works as a guide to farther study. In fact there is little or no sustained argument, but much moral earnestness and copious citation from almost everything that could possibly be included in a work of little more than three hundred pages, from the Code of Hammurabi to Avenarius.

While an author who has read all the philosophical and literary works quoted by Prof. Schmidt deserves to be treated with respect, he does not contribute anything that calls for an extended notice. The gist of his position may be stated as follows: The moral world is the world of Will. The attitude we take towards all ethical questions will depend upon whether and in what sense we recognize the Will of man as the independent cause of his actions. Since we are morally accountable for our own acts, we must judge of their rightness for ourselves. This power of moral judgment is Conscience. Conscience is not a new discovery, it is as old as mankind. Moreover, Conscience is not empty of content; it judges according to a known standard of right. It is unconditonally binding, its laws are absolute and universally recognized, and yet it can err. Progress is explained by the fact that Conscience lays down laws or contains the principles of moral conduct, but error may be made in the application of innate moral principles. All this is definite enough and represents the familiar intuitional position, minus the attempt to tell us what are the universally recognized moral ideas which constitute the 'always-present indwelling norm'. Though the advocates of 'innate practical principles' differ among themselves as to the number and identity of these principles, they at least ordinarily seek to give a list of them. And though, if they were universally recognized, it might be regarded as a work of superogation to name them; since so many people seem to be in doubt about them, an author whose aim is practical and who knows what they are, ought not to keep this knowledge to himself. It should be superfluous to point out that the belief in an innate capacity to develop moral principles or to make them explicit in consciousness with growing experience, does not necessarily involve the belief in a whole brood of moral ideas existing full-fledged from the beginning of human life. The bare statement (p. 72) that Des Cartes and Leibnitz maintained, and Locke opposed, the existence of innate ideas, is superficial and misleading.

Prof. Schmidt's treatment of Free Will and Destiny is even more unsatisfactory than his treatment of Conscience, because less definite. 'What befalls us depends upon ourselves. We feel ourselves responsible for our destiny, and responsibility implies freedom.' But what is free-

dom? Freedom means, in the first place, the absence of determination by foreign or external causes; it means that we are the causes of our own volitional actions. But does freedom mean anything more than this? Does Prof. Schmidt teach the liberty of indifference and power of contrary choice, or simply the freedom of self-determination, the freedom to act in accordance with one's character? Evidently the latter: "Wie wir werden, so handen wir". "Our actions are not motiveless, they follow the momentarily strongest motive". But A's strongest motive may not be the strongest motive for B. If A and B each following the strongest motive, nevertheless act differently, this is because their natures are different. As we are, so we act. I do not see how it really adds anything to this, or helps to solve any difficulty, to say that it is equally true that: "wie wir handen, so werden wir". This is true, but irrelevant. Our acts determine our future character; but if our present character determines these acts, we are just where we started from. The acts which determine the character are themselves pre-determined by the character of the individual. We are still within the circle of self-motived conduct, of conduct determined by the nature of the self which chooses this or that—and Dr. Schmidt holds that such a view is incompatible with Freedom (p. 45).

Nor, again, do I see how the antithesis between "what we are by Nature and what we are with and through our Wills" explains how, in accordance with the author's view of freedom and responsibility, man is the architect of his own fate. Our destiny is determined not by external circumstances and gifts of fortune, but by what we make of them and of ourselves (p. 303). We show ourselves moral beings only through our Wills—that is true—but my Will is myself, willing. What, then, am I, this self that wills and in willing follows the strongest motive? A Kantian would say that my "empirical" self—the self of desires, inclinations, affections, motives—is a part of Nature, and as such is just as much determined as any object in the physical universe. Whether my 'self' is not also in some way above Nature (as the Kantian would also hold) is a fair metaphysical inquiry involving a great deal to be said in regard to both Nature and the self. But Dr. Schmidt does not enter into this inquiry. Nor would he have bettered his position in regard to Freedom and Destiny even if he had worked out an argument after the analogy of the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal self whose volitions are causally determined by the motives of the agent and the noumenal self which is free; since, quite apart from the question of the relation of man to Nature, he holds that the freedom of self-determination (which he does not escape) is not the kind of freedom which is compatible with responsibility for our Destiny.

All the arguments are in favor of determinism. Against these arguments may be set the immediate affirmation of consciousness that at any given moment we have the power of contrary choice. This consciousness may indeed be illusory: but if it be held not to be illusory, one might conceivably hold that the arguments in favor of determinism are not strong enough to offset the immediate affirmation of consciousness.

This, however, is not Prof. Schmidt's position. He first accepts psychological determinism and then seeks to escape it by adding a qualifying statement which does nothing to blunt its edge.

Princeton. GEORGE S. PATTON.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF. By JAMES BISSETT PRATT, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy in Williams College. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1907. 8vo.; pp. xii, 327.

"The aim of this book is to discover the form and basis of religious belief rather than its content." Its method is the modern and fashionable one of psychology, not the antiquated one of metaphysics. It presents the phenomena of the different varieties of religious belief; it shows us how it works; it tells us what effect it has on us: but it rigidly excludes the question whether there is any reality back of it. In gathering the phenomena of religion our author has recourse to anthropology and to the history of religion; and that he may be altogether up to date, he makes large use of the "questionaire". He addresses five hundred and fifty persons. To each one he sends ten searching and almost inquisitorial questions with regard to their deepest religious experiences, and from the answers of the eighty-three who replied he undertakes to show "the nature and the strength of the belief in God as it exists to-day in the Protestant communities of the eastern part of our country".

Our author classifies "the elements of psychic life" into "the definite, describable, communicable elements of consciousness", which may themselves be resolved into "ideation and sensory experience"; and into "the indefinite, the indescribable, the peculiarly private mass of subjective experiences which, by their nature, are not susceptible of communication", within which division we may again distinguish between "feeling and what is known as the phenomena of the background". Religious belief, as all belief, is of three kinds: "primitive credulity", which accepts whatever is presented and because it is presented; "intellectual belief", which is consciously based on reasoning; and "emotional belief", which "draws its strength from the field of vital feeling", and whose argument is, 'We feel that it *must* be real, therefore, it is real'. These three kinds of belief are illustrated in the typical forms of religion: in the animism of primitive people, in which primitive credulity plays the most important part; in the religious belief of India, in which intellectual belief is prominent, but, that it may satisfy the demands of human nature, has to turn to the religion of feeling; and religious belief in Israel, in which, while we find all three forms, it is the religion of feeling, of the consciousness of the immediate inspiration of Yahweh, which is most characteristic and most influential. These three phases of belief appear also in the development of Christianity. Authority,

even in its lower form of primitive credulity, was the great basis of faith in the earlier part of the Middle Ages. Intellectual belief became prominent "in the middle of the thirteenth century at the court of the Emperor Frederic II in southern Italy and three centuries later at the Reformation. The religion of feeling manifests itself, of course, in Mysticism. The same three forms of belief are seen in the development of the individual. Primitive credulity is supreme in early childhood; rationalism, in adolescence; the religion of feeling, in maturity. This last does not rest on the authority of the Bible. That has long been shattered. Neither does it depend on the theistic proofs, nor on the arguments of systematic theology; and as to the latter, in the words of Dr. Osler, "the battle of Armageddon has been fought and lost". The idea even of God, while valuable to many, is not indispensable to religion. The essence of this is that it is an "immediate experience of a vast reservoir of life beyond us, which is like ours and with which our life may make connections". Whether religion is really to last we cannot tell; but if it is to last, it will be because this "one dogma", if we may so call it, "will be seen in its true light as the one doctrine of the real Religion of Humanity, because it is founded on the very life of the race". In a word, religious belief will stand or fall with the religion of feeling. "Personal inner experience, the unreasoned (though by no means unreasonable) religious attitude toward the universe, is the only source from which religion in these days of naturalism and agnosticism, of indifference and hostility, can draw its life".

The first impression which this discussion is likely to make on the thoughtful reader is that the author has succeeded admirably in confining himself to the role of the psychologist. He has ruled out theology and metaphysics completely. Much as he has told us of the mode and source of religious activity, he has told us nothing as to whether it gets anywhere or rests on anything. The reviewer has tried his best, but he cannot discover whether the author does or does not himself believe in God. He congratulates him on his success. This success, however, robs psychological analysis of all save academic value. If religion be the response of the human soul to the ever living and ever blessed God, "our Father which is in heaven"; especially if it be the answer of a heart which God has regenerated and of which his Spirit has become the animating principle, to information directly communicated by him in the human and earthly life of his own Son and in 'men who spake from him being moved by the Holy Spirit',—then the psychology of religion becomes of absorbing interest. We cannot know too much of what happens when God and man meet together in living and personal communion. But if religious experience and activity do not mean this, especially if God means something altogether different from this conception of him, then it is quite otherwise. In a word, the value of facts depends on their meaning. The most wonderful machinery in the world would lose its interest for us, if we might not inquire what it signified and what it was for. Now these are just the questions which the psychologist will not ask. His aim is to study the process, but not the meaning. This, however, is not all. His method

should deprive his investigations of even academic value. For it may be presumed that this is not without regard for truth. It appreciates facts, even if it assumes indifference to their meaning. But the two are intimately related. If the meaning grows out of the fact, the fact can be fully apprehended only in the light of its meaning. One who sees in a man's turning over the ground in his field simply what he sees in a pig's turning over the mire in his sty does not see all even of the fact. He fails even as a scientific observer. It is no defense, therefore, for the psychologist to say that when he confines himself to his own method he does not exclude the metaphysician. Th point is that to work his own method rightly, he must call in the metaphysician.

Again, the pragmatic sanction for religion will not satisfy man permanently. It might be sufficient for an individual here and there, but it could not be for the race. If men are to continue to believe in God, or even in a vast reservoir of life beyond us, they must know that there is a God, or that there is such a reservoir. That is to say, a want indicates nothing of itself as to truth or fact. Sleep seems to be the supreme need of the man who is freezing. His whole nature, so far as his feeling goes, demands it. Yet sleep is the one thing that he must fight against, if he would live. In a word, it is not all feeling, not even what feels as if it were instinctive, that is trustworthy. Hence, while religious experience is indispensable to true religion, as our author rightly insists, what he does not see is that it is just as indispensable that this experience should be true, this feeling right, and that this can be determined only by the reason which he would depreciate. In the long run the prabmatic sanction must fall back on metaphysics.

Finally, we cannot see how, from our author's standpoint, there can be any question as to whether religion will "last". Of course, it cannot continue. Its reasoned foundations having been overthrown, it cannot abide even as an experience and feeling. The heart cannot speak when the head has been silenced. We are surprised that psychologists should so often forget so fundamental and outstanding a fact as that human nature is not made in segments, but is an indivisible unity. It is not true that rational religion ceases with adolescence and is then replaced by the religion of feeling. What is true is that with advancing years we appreciate the truths which we accepted in youth and feel more and more the preciousness of the Saviour in whom we have from the first believed. But this does not imply any change of base. The heart does not take the place of the head. It both confirms it and depends upon it, and when it confirms it best it depends upon it most. High thinking and deep feeling go together; and while we may have the former and not the latter, we cannot have the latter and not the former. If, therefore, as our author claims, religion belongs to "the indefinite, the indescribable, the peculiarly private mass of subjective experiences which, by their nature, are not susceptible of communication", if it is mainly a matter of "feeling and of the background", then, man, being what he is, is bound to outgrow it; and for ourselves, we do not think that he can do so too quickly.

Princeton. WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE. By HENRY W. CLARK, Author of *Meanings and Methods of the Spiritual Life, The Christ from Without and Within,* etc., etc. With an Appreciation by Marcus Dods, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 8vo., pp. 243. $1.25 net.

This book is a near approach to the remarkable. Dr. Dods' commendation of it seemed extravagant and accordingly served rather to deepen than to remove the presumptive bias against it. The recent output of books in the line of the psychological interpretation of religious experience has been so abundant that, what with Coe, Starbuck, Davenport, James and the rest, the reader has a suggestion of weariness when another is proposed. But this book certainly has extraordinary merit. It is an original interpretation of the personal religious life. It holds itself rigidly to its specific theme. It is strictly a monograph, in delightfully lucid English, with the clear expression which is the best proof of the clear conception. And there is no evidence of straining after novelty. The author's conception is self-consistent and, except perhaps to the technical critic, in entire conformity to the teachings of Scripture. It neither builds upon nor avoids Holy Writ as a source of authority in the treatment of its subject.

A brief resumè of the argument of the book would be something of this sort: Religion may be regarded either as a science or as an art. Science discovers; art creates. In this book, religion is to be viewed as an art—the art of "character production". The need of religion is universal because universal in the sense that somehow life has missed the way. Ideals have been left behind. Reflection makes it clear that life consists in right relations—the response of what is within us to what is without, or *vice versa*: it is not very important which way it is said, for both come to the same thing, namely, the harmony between the two. This harmony is broken and it is a just criticism upon religion that it too often falls short of the work of moral reconstruction. Conversion is the response of moral qualities in man to moral qualities in God. This trite religious term has been degraded to superficial or spurious connotations, such as the substitution of the attitude of attention for that of inattention to spiritual things, insurance against penalties, and availing oneself of God's help in a struggle in which we had previously been contending singlehanded.

These are partially, if not wholly, false, for conversion is nothing less than the reconstructing of our moral being. The fatherhood of God, rightly understood and experienced, secures this conversion. This fatherhood of God is much talked of and much misunderstood to-day, but what Christ intended to be the Christian conception of it was this: "that God is prepared at any moment to be the inspiration and the source of the life which moves and throbs in the spirit of man" (p. 78). It is not a past fact or relation of origination, but it is a continuous process. It is not realized except when man responds to the ever-pressing active solicitation of the Divine. God's love is always urging

men to let it pass into fatherhood, but this it does and can do only with those who consent. The love of God is the potential fatherhood of God.

Repentance is a recognition that the withholding of self from God in the past has been an injury to God; it is concerned rather with what it has done in the past than with what it may gain in the future. Here we detect a subjective theory of repentance infinitely higher and healthier than Dr. Dawson's doctrine of forgetting. In bringing about this moral reconstruction, which is conversion, the office of Christ is needful and obvious. He came not so much to reveal God as to communicate God. He is not so much the light-bearer as the life-giver. The chapter on this subject is very fresh, rich and suggestive. The author puts his thought in such a light that the Incarnation is made to seem the most natural thing to be expected. Of course, it is unique in its purpose and in its nature, and therefore we must not expect to find analogous or adequate evidences elsewhere.

Here, too, is easily seen the function of faith. Some truth is such as when believed affects the intellect only; other truth affects intellect and conduct; other truth affects intellect, conduct and character. Religion is of the last sort and it involves and influences the whole personality. Sanctification is the status set up in conversion and indefinitely sustained, and the perils of lapse and loss of the new life are a motive for constant and assiduous endeavor in spiritual self-culture.

The book is modest in its pretensions, reverent in tone and almost entirely destitute of the personal equation of the author; and it gives every evidence of devout and sincere evangelical intention. Its style raises the presumption that it was written, not for the theologian, but for the average thoughtful man who takes the twentieth century layman's view of religion generally. The theologian can find flaws that the man for whom the book was written might never dream of. The book does not say everything; indeed, it leaves unsaid some things we believe that it would have been the better for saying: but if it had tried to say everything that is true it would certainly have failed, and it would pretty certainly have said less clearly and effectively what it does say. It is a better book than Professor Drummond's *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, because it is more modest, less involved in the dubious hypotheses of science and less anxious to be epoch-making. We frankly confess we like the book. It is not a persuasive book to put into the hands of a man to induce him Christward. It is rather an essay in the way of explanation of the Christian experience upon grounds that are reasonable in themselves and are analogous to things with which we are familiar on all sides. If it is silent concerning the Atonement, the *ordo salutis*, the differentiae of sin, and the full work of the Holy Spirit in salvation, we may well believe that this silence was designed by the author in order to enable him all the more clearly to impress upon the minds of the theologically untutored some central and fundamental truths which the conventional nomenclature of the schools might have only covered up or confused.

Trenton. HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE CREED OF A LAYMAN, *Apologia Pro Fide Mea*. By FREDERIC HARRISON. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1907. 8vo.; pp. vi, 395.

We have in this volume a series of seventeen papers expository of Positivism by probably the most eminent living disciple of Auguste Comte. These papers have been prepared during the last thirty-one years. Some of them are reprints of magazine articles. Others are addresses that were delivered in connection with the celebration of the so-called Positivist sacraments, such as the Presentation of Infants, Initiation, Destination, Marriage, Burial. Probably the most important of these papers is that which gives name to the whole collection, The Creed of a Layman. In this the author expounds and vindicates formally and at length the Positivist belief. He calls attention to its excellencies, and many of these we, too, would emphasize. Such is its comprehensiveness. It combines "belief, discipline and worship". "It asserts its power over the Intellectual World, the Moral World, and the Practical World". It repudiates utterly the psychology which makes it possible for a man to accept with his heart a religion which he denies with his head. Again, it strikes hard at much of modern philosophy in insisting on a real object of worship. "Let who will and can love God and Christ, looking for a celestial crown; let them serve these. But let no one pretend to love or to serve the Infinite, or Evolution, or the idea of Good. It is a farce." So, too, it takes a firm stand against pragmatism. The question is not whether beliefs will work, but are "they true? are they real, or are they artificial?" And yet while we find much in the presuppositions of their creed with which we are in sympathy, the creed itself is the dreariest and the most impossible with which we are acquainted. No God but collective humanity; no hereafter but an immortality of influence and, if we have been great, of remembrance,—how can any bring themselves to accept so dismal a faith? how can any find it reasonable to bow down to an aggregation whose members are most of them dead? We venture to predict that Mr. Harrison's clear and frank presentation of positivism will do more to exalt the glorious gospel of the living God than will many of the apologies for it. The strongest argument for life is to bring on a corpse.

Of almost equal interest and importance with a "Layman's Creed" is the first paper, "Apologia pro Fide Mea". In this we read how the writer came to be a positivist. He carries us along with him in his descent "through all the typical phases of religious thought, from effusive Ritualism to Broad Church, to Latitudinarianism, Unitarianism, Theism, and finally to the Faith in Humanity". We cannot agree with him in his judgment that his environment was most unfavorable to his change of faith. To us nothing could more dispose one to it than the ritualism in which he was trained, and the ecclesiastical dishonesty in the atmosphere of which as a young man he lived. Had he been reared

in a Calvinistic home where the emphasis was on devotion rather than ritual, and had he associated with those who, while they professed much, sincerely believed more, we venture to say that he would not have succumbed so readily, if at all, to the influence of Comte. Even positivism is more rational and better than hypocrisy.

One lesson above all others is taught by Mr. Harrison's experience. There is no stopping place in unbelief. As Henry B. Smith said: "One thing is certain—that Infidel Science will rout everything except thorough-going Christian Orthodoxy. All the flabby theories, and the molluseous formations, and the inntermediate purgatories of speculation will go by the board. The fight will be between a stiff, thorough-going Orthodoxy, and a stiff, thorough-going Infidelity. It will be, *e. g.*, Augustine or Comte, Athanasius or Hegel, Luther or Schopenhauer, J. S. Mill or John Calvin. Arianism gets the fire from both sides: so does Arminianism: so does Universalism."

Princeton. WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

CHRISTIANITY IN THE MODERN WORLD. By the REV. D. S. CAIRNS, M.A. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. Pp. xv, 314.

"A preface, being the entrance of a book, should invite by its beauty." So said D'Israeli, and there is no disputing the remark. And while mere beauty is not to be sought for in the preface of a book with a theological subject, we naturally view first the preface as the "porch" of the author's literary edifice. In the preface of this stimulating and useful work the author refers to the "crisis" to which Christianity has come in the experiences of present-day scholarship and in "the common life of the church"; and he indicates that it is his purpose to show that the movement and uncertainty in current religious thought and feeling instead of being a "down grade" tendency is "a slow coming to life of a new and nobler world". From this statement we are prepared to find a vigorous optimistic tone to the book, and on our perusal of it we are not disappointed. Moreover, it is long since we have read a book of this class in which we have found so slight an element with which we have been compelled to disagree.

The heart of the discussion concerns the person, mission and work of Jesus Christ. Chapter II has for its title "Jesus and the Fatherhood of God". In chapter III "Jesus and the New Life" is treated. "Jesus and the Kingdom of God—Apocalypse and Ethics" forms the subject of Chapter IV. These three chapters include nearly two hundred pages, or about two-thirds of the entire volume. The last two chapters deal respectively with "The Kingdom of God and Science", and "Christianity in the Modern World". The book as a whole, then, resolves itself into a discussion of the question as to what the world of to-day is to think and do concerning Jesus who is called the Christ. Evidently the author regards the deity of Christ and the uniqueness and necessity of His redemptive mission as forming the great issue of our time as of former

periods between Christianity and unbelief. He is plainly not of those who regard Christianity minus the Incarnation and the Atonement as they have been understood by the Christian consciousness of the ages as worthy the name of Christianity. He defends these great fundamentals of Christian theology—as, for instance, against such teachers as Professor Seely and Dr. Martineau,—with fairness and dispassionateness, but also with vigor and power and, we may add, with an unhackneyed form of expression.

Mr. Cairns' criticism of "Ecco Homo", in chapter II, is very fine; and his analysis and discussion of the rationalism of the Unitarian system as summed up in the phrase of Emerson concerning "the noxious exaggeration of the person of Christ", is very brilliant and, to our mind, thoroughly convincing. Very striking is the sketch presented of the successive steps in the shifting positions of Martineau in the vain attempt of that great thinker to adjust his preconceived notion of the non-deity of Jesus to the claims of the supremely just and sane Founder of our religion concerning Himself. There is no logical resistance to be offered against the drift of his argument here. Either the wisdom and authoritativeness of the Great Teacher—which Martineau's heart forbade him to surrender—must give way at the most vital point, or the Church must retain its historical "Christolatry" which it has learned directly and unmistakably from the lips of its Founder Himself. Here the words of the author may well be quoted: "It is clear, I think, that we have here the true roots of the 'noxious exaggeration' with which, it is asserted, the Church has always thought of Jesus. He is, Himself, I believe, directly responsible for the peculiar cast of Christian life and thought. Christianity reproduces Him here as certainly as Islam reproduces Mohammed, and, on the bare Humanitarian view, the Christolatry of the Christian Church must be traced to the overweening self-estimate of its Founder, as surely as the polygamy and tyranny of Islam must be traced to the sins of its Prophet" (p. 121). And noble is the author's language in the summary of his argument in this chapter. He says: "I have endeavored to show, in the above argument, that we cannot adequately account for the Personality of Jesus Christ so long as we are content to explain Him by analogy with other great founders of world religion[s], and that we can only approximate to the truth about Him when we associate with that the further analogy of such a great cosmic change as the first appearance in the world of Self-conscious Mind. The Apostolic writers go even beyond this. They compare the appearing of Jesus to the creation of the world itself, and the rise of Christian life to a continuance of the creative fiat of God" (pp. 159, 160). We know of nothing that better indicates the essential gulf between real Christianity and its emasculated form as, for example, it presented itself to the minds of Emerson and Martineau.

We are, of course, unable in this brief review to give more than a scant and imperfect indication of the scope, method and spirit of this excellent book. We have read it through twice, and we recommend our readers to procure it and, in this particular, to follow our example.

Cranford, N. J. GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

La Question Biblique au xx^e^ Siécle, par Albert Houtin. Paris: E. Nourry. 1906. 8vo.; pp. xi, 294.

The Abbé Houtin has constituted himself the historian of recent Biblical criticism in France; the historian, and something more than the historian, of it,—the eager apologist of it, and that in its most extreme form. His *La Question Biblique chez les Catholiques de France au xix^e^ Siècle,* published in 1902 and almost immediately (before the end of that year) again in a second edition, contained a thoroughly well-informed and a very well executed account of the history of Biblical criticism among the Catholics of France during the nineteenth century; and was so written as to constitute a sharp arraignment of the Catholics of France for their attitude toward this criticism and a strong plea for entire freedom for it from all ecclesiastical interference. It was published just at the moment when the controversy which was raging about the Abbé Loisy was at its height—the second edition was exactly contemporaneous with the publication of *L'Evangile et l'Eglise* and the *Etudes Evangéliques*—and it tended greatly to influence the situation. Naturally, it was included in the condemnation of the Abbé Loisy's volumes, pronounced by the Holy Congregation of the Index at the opening of December 1903. Here is the account which M. Houtin gives of his own book:

"The two works of M. Loisy appeared at a critical moment. For many Catholic theologians the author incarnated the Biblical question. They thought that if he was suppressed, all the difficulties of the Church would pass away. His personality had recently become still more irritating, through the publication of a book which had thrown it strongly into relief. This was *La Question Biblique chez les Catholiques de France au* XIX^e^ *Siécle.* This work showed that M. Loisy stood really on the lower rungs of the Biblical controversy; that many of the ideas for which he had been persecuted had already become part of ordinary teaching; that those who attacked him had been able to work out only a puerile apologetic, tainted with charlatan processes, insolent falsehoods, shameless assertions, impudent recantations. Such a picture could not fail to arouse protestations. Some were willing to pardon the author for recognizing the greatness of the rôle M. Loisy was playing; but they could not forgive him for exposing the weakness of the official apologetics of M. Vigouroux. . . . That the author had been respectful to the Church of Rome was superabundantly proved by its conclusion, which was full of confidence for the future and expressed the conviction that Catholicism would surmount the objections of criticism. When those whom the book particularly irritated announced that it was to be put on the Index, they were not credited. It was thought that the book was open to no other condemnation than an episcopal one for infraction of the rules of the imprimatur" (pp. 74-76).

The ingenuous reader will, of course, understand that the tone of this extract is part of the artifice of M. Houtin's controversial method—as of M. Loisy's, and that of a large number of their fellow-writers. But that aside. What it concerns us now to note is that M. Houtin has followed up this former work with a sequel, in which he undertakes to continue the story of "the Biblical Question" through the

opening years of the twentieth century. The title-page of the new volume no longer bears the qualifying words, "among the Catholics of France". M. Houtin apparently wishes to sweep with his eye now a wider circle and to enter the conflict going on in a broader field. Nevertheless, his book is essentially a continuation of the former one, and its real significance lies in its minute tracing of the progress of the Loisy controversy in France through the opening years of the twentieth century. What it has to say of the broader field is little in amount, not specially important, not so thoroughly digested or indeed so well understood, and seems to be introduced chiefly as a controversial device, colored, perhaps, with the hope that thus the book may be given place and influence in the world-conflict itself, and become perhaps a factor in the determination of "the Biblical Question" not merely in France, but throughout the world.

For a proper estimate of the volume, then, it is necessary to look at it from two separate points of view. It is a detailed history of the later stages of the Loisy controversy, with an introduction designed to enable the reader to put himself at the proper angle for understanding it and an appendix designed to suggest the ultimate issue. It is also a brief for radical Biblical criticism and a demand for freedom of criticism in the churches. It is in the former of these aspects that the value of the book to the public lies: it is in the latter, apparently, that its value to the author lies. His endeavor seems to be to make use of the Loisy case in order to put in a plea for "freedom of criticism"; and the criticism for freedom for which he enters his plea is a criticism of the most radical order—a criticism which denies that there is any adequate historical evidence for even such capital facts as the resurrection of Christ or such fundamental doctrines as His deity.

The extremity of the criticism for which M. Houtin would make place in the churches and the guileful art by which he sustains his appeal for it, are illustrated on every page. Take a single incidental instance of both, which fairly illustrates the manner of the whole. In describing the controversy raised by the recently issued Declaration of certain of the Anglican clergy in favor of liberty of criticism, he remarks, after his ordinary fashion, on "the naïvity and ignorance displayed by the orthodox in the discussion",—and then adduces as shining examples of this "naïvity and ignorance" the following: "One of the orthodox alleges as proof of the dogma of the Trinity, the interpolated verse of Mat. 28[19], 'Baptize them in the name of the Father, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit' (*Standard*, 18th May). A correspondent having declared that he does not believe that Christ ever affirmed his deity, an orthodox critic cites to him nine texts of the Fourth Gospel (*Ibid* 20 May)." To this advocate of "freedom of criticism", therefore, the spuriousness of Mt. 28[19], and the historical untrustworthiness of John's Gospel are such assured results of criticism that only "ignorance" can explain appeal to them! The criticism he advocates is a criticism in effect which makes a clean sweep of all the historical foundations of the Christian system and bids men build with totally other materials—and, of course, totally different results. It is a criticism of which men like

Mr. F. C. Conybeare are the coryphæuses, while men like "the aged Professor Sanday" are mere "apologists" whose "feeble responses give the measure of a criticism which pretends to defend points which it commences by placing outside the reach of a free examination" (p. 238).

Already from these references it will be seen that the opponents of the extreme criticism which M. Houtin has undertaken to commend to us do not fare very well at his hands. The sharpness of his personal polemic is, to speak the truth, a distinct blot upon his book. He even permits himself to devote well-nigh a whole chapter to pillorying the Papal professors of Exegesis at Rome, in a humorous account of their courses of instruction. For example:

"In his introductory lecture, Father Hetzenhauer distinguished between active and passive exegesis. Active exegesis, says he, is the act of explaining, passive exegesis is the result of active exegesis. Instead of a Bible, he took a prayer-book for the text of his course. A good Catholic does not read the Bible; he reads the Scriptures as the Church places it under his eyes, in select passages distributed in the holy Liturgy, that is to say, in the Missal and the Breviary if he is a priest, and in his prayer-book if he is a layman. Here is orthodoxy! Father Hetzenhauer opens now his Liturgy and commences at the commencement, that is to say at the Gospels for the first Sabbaths of Advent. He cites the Greek, the Hebrew, and even—apropos of the stars which are to fall to the earth at the end of the world—he draws upon astronomy. Soon comes the Gospel for the Wednesday of the December fast,—the Annunciation. The Capuchin of course believes all that is in the sacred text on the subject. But that is not enough for him. What a pity it is that we do not find more of the details which our piety would like to know! Happily the scholastic method permits us to supply the lacunae. . . . (p. 205).

We raise no question whatever as to the exactitude, nor yet as to the perspective, of M. Houtin's report of Father Hetzenhauer's or Father Delattre's lectures. We raise no question even of the accuracy of his account of the descent of, say, Monsigneur Batiffol from the aspirations of his ingenuous youth when he was companion with M. Loisy under the roof of the Abbé Duchesne, to the pliant servant of authority in the name of which he now assaults M. Loisy: though we had conceived better of Monsigneur Batiffol from his published writings than M. Houtin seems to have done from a closer acquaintance. It may be that all the opponents of M. Loisy and the policy he represents—in France and elsewhere—are at once stupid and cunning. This is a question of fact and we have not at hand the documents to enable us to control M. Houtin's assertions and insinuations. But the manner in which he puts them forward does not incline us to take them, uncriticised, at the foot of the letter; and the tone which they give his book may communicate to it a certain piquancy for the desultory reading of an idle hour, but cannot add weight to it as a solid plea for the freedom of criticism in the Church. Suppose it be true that all the opponents of the "Loisyites" are animated by personal ends or are innocent of historical sense. How does that fact prove to us that "the Loisyites" are safe historical guides? Especially when we see them so lacking in historical sense as to miss the historical note in John's Gospel, to be unable to discover a historical basis for the greatest events which have occurred

in history—the Incarnation and Resurrection of Jesus Christ,—and to be incapable of discerning the purely *a priori* character of the radical criticism of the day. We hold no brief for the integrity of the historical conscience of the Roman hierarchy in France, or at Rome. But we should feel we had journeyed from the frying pan into the fire if, revolting from them, we should cast ourselves under the domination of the historical judgments of Auguste Sabatier, Eugène Ménégoz, Jean and Albert Réville. There is more than one way of being grossly unhistorical, even though we shield ourselves under the sacred name of history.

M. Houtin wishes it to be understood, to be sure, that the criticism he pleads for is purely historical. He repels with vigor the insinuation that it is governed by *a priori* presuppositions, particularly that it is determined by prejudice against the supernatural. It does not enter upon its work, he affirms over and over again, with the maxim in its hands that miracles are impossible. It simply asks with calm brow whether the evidence for the supernatural events recorded in the Gospels is satisfactory to the historical sense. And it finds it is not. We are sorry to differ with M. Houtin on a matter so fundamental to the estimate we shall form of the value of the criticism he defends. But we have no choice—our reading of the critical literature of the day convinces us beyond the possibility of hesitation, that the primary principle of the reigning criticism is precisely the impossibility or the incredibility of the directly supernatural. Many modern critics—and those not of the least esteem—openly avow it. Others, while not avowing it, and even while disavowing it, yet obviously act upon it throughout their work. Sometimes we meet side by side with the most explicit rejection of the principle that miracles are impossible, the most naïve betrayals that nevertheless the whole thought of the writer is dominated by this maxim. We read, for example, in Professor Schmiedel's famous article "Gospels" in the *Encyclopedia Biblica* (the type of criticism in which M. Houtin approves) the most emphatic statement that " it would clearly be wrong . . . to start from any such postulate or maxim as that miracles are impossible" (p. 1876); and we turn the page and read that the statement of Luke 23 " that the sun's light failed at the crucifixion is incredible, because forsooth an eclipse of the sun "is possible only at the period of the new moon and cannot happen on the 15th or 14th of a month" (p. 1878). That is to say, unless it is a purely natural event occurring naturally—it is "impossible". Mr. Alfred W. Benn similarly told us a few years ago (*The New World*, Sept. 1895)—quite in the spirit of M. Houtin,—that disbelief in the supernatural among modern historical investigators is *a posteriori* and would give way to the testimony of eye-witnesses (p. 439),—and then incidentally dropped the remark that "if the evidence of eye-witnesses could convert the rationalists to a belief in miracles, incredulity on their part would long ago have ceased to trouble the apologist" (p. 440). It is possible, to be sure, that men may deceive themselves (as well as others) on this point, and fancy that they do not deny the possibility of miracles but only find the evidence actually adduced insufficient. Does it ever

occur to them to ask themselves what kind and degree of evidence would suffice to convince them of a truly miraculous occurrence? Say of the Virgin Birth, or of the Resurrection of Christ? Asking themselves such a question and holding themselves to a precise answer, they will be apt to discover shortly that no conceivable evidence would suffice to convince them of such occurrences; and so the real state of their minds would reveal itself to themselves. When one is unreasonably exacting as to evidence it is because he is unwilling to credit the thing evidenced. In point of fact, the whole of modern criticism is founded on chariness as to the supernatural: and its demand for "historical" interpretation and for "natural" sequences of events is but another way of asserting this fundamental characteristic. For "historical" interpretation means on its lips just the explanation of every event out of the forces intrinsic in the historical development; and a "natural" sequence means a sequence explicable out of the natural causes at work and is just a synonym, as used by it, for "naturalistic" sequence. And a criticism which sets itself to explain everything that occurs out of the "historical" situation and to draw out the process of events in a "natural" order cannot stop until everything "supernatural" is eliminated from history. Anti-supernaturalism is accordingly the very principle of the presently prevalent criticism: and as supernaturalism is the very principle of Christianity, this criticism and Christianity can live together in harmony just as little as can fire and water. The Abbé Loisy, the Abbé Houtin—they may intend otherwise: they may fancy otherwise: but what they are doing—and every reader of this book will perceive that this is what they are doing—is, not striving to make a place in the Roman Communion for sober and sane history (which would no doubt be the destruction of the Roman system), but to implant within it a leaven which, if it ever becomes active in it, cannot stop working until it drives out every vestige of Christianity itself. The cause of the Roman curia in this battle is sadly confused with the cause of Christianity itself.

As the larger part of the contents of M. Houtin's book concerns the work of M. Loisy, it may be of interest to give in closing the summary estimate he passes on that writer:

"On the whole, the work of M. Loisy in the Latin countries is that which Robertson Smith accomplished in Great Britain. Like Smith he has maintained the rights of Biblical criticism against the pretensions, not less intolerant than false, of traditional dogmatism. Brought up in the strictest orthodoxy, in a manner of thinking vitiated by the strongest prejudices, he formed himself gradually by impartial search after truth. Observing how science menaced the Church, he wished, while continuing to work in an objective way, to supply means of defense for the religious society of which he was a priest. In the face of such an evolution, the impartial mind is compelled to think that if he has not succeeded it is because success is impossible.

In his scientific work, the Abbé Loisy has reached the same results as the 'rationalists'. On points of detail his conclusions are even more radical and destructive than theirs. In his theological work he has pretty nearly fallen in with the religious systems elaborated by Protestant scholars to justify the old Christianity of their youth (notably the systems of Auguste Bouvier, Auguste Sabatier and Edmond Stapfer . . .).

This is no doubt because there is scarcely more than one way open to theology, as there certainly is only one way open to reason.

But for the modern mind the problem is to discover whether there is any way to conciliate the labors of reason with the pretensions, even when pruned, of the religions called revealed. Freed from dogmatic interests, or subtleties, the modern mind, in the presence of the dissolution of the legends of the Gospels wrought by criticism, scarcely understands how Harnack, as theologian, can speak with so much enthusiasm of Christ, of whom, as historian, he tells us we know so little. Or rather we understand only too well, and fear to share this enthusiasm, lest we fall into a prejudice,—if we recall the terms in which the same historian speaks of Luther. 'To the name of Luther', says he, 'no German remains indifferent. Luther is an incomparable name for all—whether we seek to combat him or to praise and exalt him. Each party among us has its Luther, and thinks it has the true one. More than half of our nation reveres Luther, and nevertheless they are profoundly divided in the manner in which Luther is conceived.

Christ also is venerated by Catholics, Protestants, Greek and Russian Orthodox. Each believes it has the true Christ, and yet they differ profoundly in the way they understand His person and work. But the day is dawning when these differences will cease; when ancestral legends will be sacrificed to the truth; when no one will desire to celebrate Christ any more than Luther according to confessional traditions, but will seek to know Him according to rigorously historical method.

M. Loisy speaks neither of Luther nor of Christ with Harnack's enthusiasm. True Catholic, what he seeks before all to defend and to honor is the Roman Church. Working out the numerous evolutions through which it passed before it framed for itself an absolutely compact body of doctrine at the Council of Trent,—hoping that it will suffer numerous transformations more to adapt itself to the future—he has made of the incessant variation of dogma its essential character, its distinctive mark, and, so to say, the proof of its divinity. His manner of pleading his cause supplies one of the most curious and one of the most skilful apologetics ever written; but those who take history without binding it to a thesis, are not able to follow him in this theological commentary, and faithful Catholics do not follow him because the Church condemns him, though avoiding staking its infallibility upon this condemnation, at least for the present.

Discredited, from the dogmatic point of view, in the eyes of his co-religionists, sacrificing, himself, the apologetic system for which he had dreamed he might obtain the acceptance of the hierarchy, M. Loisy remains purely and simply a critic. The Protestant liberals are in error in thinking that they recognize in him a brother. If he has worked out a theodicy resembling theirs in many respects, his system has nevertheless proved for him only provisional. He subordinated its value to the acceptance of it by the Church. From the moment when he abandoned it, he ceased to be a theologian and became nothing but a historian; and it must be admitted that, in the vigor of his criticism there have been very few historians who have delivered such heavy blows upon the old dogmatics, very few historians who have unraveled so minutely the web of the Gospel narratives. His historical works remain; while the nonsuccess of his apologetics is, for the public, only a new illustration of the impossibility more and more flagrant which forbids theologians to elaborate a theory of religion which shall be at once orthodox and scientific" (pp. 150-153).

In this passage, we have, we take it, a very fair portrait of M. Loisy: and there may be read between the lines of it, also, we take it, a very fair portrait of M. Houtin.

Princeton, May, 1906. B. B. WARFIELD.

AGRAPHA. Aussercanonische Schriftfragmente gesammelt und untersucht und in zweiter völlig neu bearbeiteter durch alttestamentliche Agrapha vermehrter Auflage herausgegeben von Alfred Resch, mit fünf Registern. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1906. Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, etc., herausgegeben von Oscar v. Gebhardt und Adolf Harnack. Neue Folge XV. Band 3|4 Heft. Pp. xvi, 426.

The first edition of Resch's *Agrapha,* which appeared in 1889 as V. Band 4 Heft of the *Texte und Untersuchungen* edited by v. Gebhardt and Harnack, was reviewed in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review,* Vol. II, 1891, pp. 332f. The second edition has been entirely worked over, reorganized and enlarged by the addition of new material and of five useful indexes. The author's point of view and purpose are known from the earlier edition and these have not been changed. The chief value of the new edition consists in the new material, gathered mainly from discoveries in the field of early Christian literature which have been made since the appearance of the first edition. Another interesting feature is the beginnings of a collection of Old Testament Agrapha. The present edition has the advantage also of building upon and referring to the author's writings which have appeared since the first edition. Resch still seeks to explain the predominantly Synoptical character and the Pauline affinity of the Agrapha by his theory of a written source known to Paul and to the authors of the Synoptic Gospels. The learning and the labor revealed in this edition deserve the fullest recognition. The author has made it an indispensable storehouse of information, the more valuable by reason of the fulness with which the data are given especially in the reproduction of the context in the patristic passages cited. The discussion at times, however, seems repetitious and even in its reorganized form the work shows traces of the "aggregate" character of the first edition. On page 8, line 2 from the bottom, read, nicht; on page 16, line 24, read, Lock; on page 353, line 28, read, 30.

Princeton. WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

OUTLINE STUDIES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT: Philippians to Hebrews. By WILLIAM G. MOOREHEAD, Professor in Xenia Theological Seminary. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Pp. 249. Price, $1.20 net.

Dr. Moorehead is well known as an enthusiastic student and teacher of the Bible who combines scholarly equipment of a high order with evangelical warmth and earnestness. Dr. Moorehead's specialty is the whole Bible. His *Outline Studies in the Books of the Old Testament* is widely used by Bible teachers and he has brought out two volumes of Studies in the Gospels and Acts. The present book, as rich in insight and inspiration as any that have preceded it, covers the epistles from Philippians to Hebrews, and holds a place midway between a commentary and a more formal "introduction". The treatment of historical details is fresh and pertinent, and the analyses, comments on leading

passages and discussion of fundamental truths are helpful in opening up the spiritual treasures of the epistles. It is the work of a ripe Biblical scholar and Christian.

Lincoln University, Pa. WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON.

THE SECOND EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY. By the RIGHT REVEREND HANDLEY C. G. MOULE, D.D., Bishop of Durham. The Religious Tract Society. London. Cloth; 192 pages. Price 2 shillings.

It would be impossible to speak in too high commendation of this most helpful "Devotional Commentary". The honored and illustrious author has long been known to the Christian world as a scholarly and devout expositor of Scripture, and in this particular volume he exhibits in peculiar measure the distinguishing features of his admirable method, his lucid style and his devotional spirit. The purpose of the writer was to "take up the Epistle . . . in quest of divine messages for heart and life". It is needless to say that in this quest the distinguished commentator has been most successful. Every page is full of practical instruction and of helpful spiritual suggestion. In accomplishing his aim, Dr. Moule gives to the reader even more help than his simple purpose would suggest. First of all, might be mentioned the complete *translation* of the Epistle which is given to us. At the head of each of the brief studies is given the Authorized Version of the verses to be discussed; but there also follows an original rendering of these verses, in a version marked by peculiar accuracy, vividness, force and suggestiveness. Then, too, while literary criticism is quite aside from the purpose of the author, we are afforded the positive conclusions of the most careful critical study; and in the course of the commentary we find convincing proofs of the genuineness and authenticity of the Epistle, while its historic setting is vividly depicted. The aim of the studies is eminently practical and not exegetical, and yet the meaning of each verse of the inspired writer is set forth in clear light, and its teaching is enforced by helpful illustration. The real design of the work, as has already been suggested, is practical and experimental. This is indicated by the title of the volume: "Short Devotional Studies on the Dying Letter of St. Paul". There are in all forty-eight of these brief studies; not one is lacking in interest and value. There is no unnecessary phrase, no dealing in platitudes and commonplaces; no mysticism, no extravagances: but every sentence gives light and help. It is a delight to read a work of such exact scholarship and deep spiritual insight, which sets forth great truths in language so simple, and in a compass so brief.

As one completes the reading of this last epistle: "The Dying Letter of St. Paul", the mind naturally turns toward the unrecorded scene of martyrdom to which the great apostle points by his words of farewell. It is therefore with interest that we read the poem with which Dr. Moule closes, "The Martyrdom of St. Paul". Nearly the whole of this poem is a striking commentary on the words of the last chapter of the Epistle, which speaks of Paul's imprisonment, and of his first appearance before the emperor, in which he stands alone; but the concluding

lines suggest the scene of Paul's "departure", "Without the gate, upon the Ostian road".

The study of this brief volume cannot fail to give to any reader a new conception of the meaning and power of Paul's Second Epistle to Timothy, and it must result in fulfilling the author's desire to promote in others, "Personal attention to the very words of Scripture, in a spirit of obedience and prayer".

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE EPISTLES OF ST. PETER. By the REV. J. H. JOWETT, M.A. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1906. Crown octavo, cloth; pp. 345. Price, $1.25 net.

This volume is the farthest possible remove from a critical and exegetical commentary. It is rather a series of popular and informal essays on various themes suggested by successive phrases and verses of the Petrine Epistles. A critical commentary would have given us more clear and definite statements of doctrine, yet in its more minute investigation, and in its less connected discussions, it would have appealed to a smaller circle of readers. This is not a volume to satisfy specialists, but is well adapted to interest, to instruct and to edify the general Christian public.

In spite of his popular method, and animated literary style, the writer fails to give us a broad and comprehensive view of the Epistles as literary units, with an historical setting and atmosphere of life. After completing the volumes we feel that we have been listening to brief and serious sermons on isolated texts, rather than that we have been brought into vital contact with two living letters which are pulsating with the emotions of the great Apostle. However, the writer is always true to his aim, and is guided by his practical motive. Whatever the simple principles of spiritual life may be, which he selects for his discussion, he sets them forth with clearness, illustrates them with vividness, and applies them with vigor and fervor. The volume cannot fail to prove highly valuable for the spiritual and practical end in view. It forms one of a series which will ultimately cover the entire New Testament. This series will be known as *The Practical Commentary on the New Testament,* and will be under the able editorship of the Rev. Robertson Nicoll, D.D., LL.D. Other volumes of the series now ready are *Colossians and Thessalonians* and *Ephesians,* by Dr. Joseph Parker, and *Revelation,* by C. Anderson Scott.

Princeton. CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

VAN DE DINGEN DIE HAAST GESCHIEDEN MOETEN. "De Openbaring des Heeren aan Johannes." Voor de gemeente uitgelegd door Dr. S. Greydanus. Geref. Pred. te Rozenburg Met Titelplaat. Doesburg. J. C. Van Schenck Brill. 1906. Aflevering 1 en 2.

Works on Eschatology, either of a dogmatic or of an exegetical nature, are very scarce. Our time is not inclined to listen to men who speak to us of the future. When Constantine reigns, the millenium is

far off. In times when the Church is an *ecclesia pressa*, people are willing to lend their ears to heralds of the future.

Dr. Greydanus, in making Eschatology his theme, confines himself to an exposition of the apocalypse. It is not his aim to add a learned exegetical treatise to those already existing; his desire is to interpret the revelation, given to John, for the people. There is a place for such a book. In a time when heavenly mindedness is branded as otherworldliness, it seems to be necessary that the Church of God should listen to what the Spirit has to say about the things which must shortly came to pass.

Judging from the two parts which are before me, I think that Dr. Greydanus is the right man for the task he has undertaken.

Holland, Mich. NICHOLAS M. STEFFENS.

BIBLISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT IN VERBINDUNG mit der Redaktion der "Biblischen Studien herausgegeben von DR. JOH. GÖTTSBERGER, Professor an der Universität München und DR. JOS. SICKENBERGER, Professor an der Universität Würzburg. Vierter Jahrgang. Freiburg im Breisgau. 1906. Herdersche Verlagsbuchhandlung. B. Herder: St. Louis, Mo. Price for four numbers, $3.50.

This periodical, published by Roman-Catholic scholars, in the numbers lying before us throughout maintains the high standard, both as to learning and conservatism, it set for itself in the first three years of its existence. Especially exegesis and introduction are well represented by a series of valuable articles. What we miss are contributions dealing not so much with the externals of Biblical science as with the great historical and doctrinal problems now under debate. The comparative neglect of this is especially noticeable in the instalments of the year under review. There is not a single article dealing with a biblico-theological question. The bibliographical notices at the close of each number continue to prove a most interesting and instructive feature of this publication.

Princeton. GEERHARDUS VOS.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

DIE ÄLTESTE REDAKTION DER AUGSBURGER KONFESSION MIT MELANCHTHONS EINLE'TUNG, zum erstenmal herausgegeben und geschichtlich gewürdigt von D. THEODOR KOLDE, o. Prof. der Kirchengeschichte in Erlangen. Gütersloh: Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1906. 8vo., pp. iv. 115. 2 M., geb. 2 M. 80 Pf.

This brochure makes a considerable contribution to our knowledge of the origin of the Augsburg Confession of 1530. Having had his attention directed to a manuscript recently discovered by Dr. Karl Schornbaum in one of the Nuremberg archives, Prof. Kolde soon convinced himself that the document formed a most important link in the

history of the genesis of this Lutheran creed. With the minute knowledge of one of the foremost specialists in this department of study, the author convincingly shows that this manuscript thus suddenly brought to light is nothing other than the oldest of all known redactions of the *Confessio Augustana*.

Even the circumstances attending the origin of this document can be satisfactorily reproduced. From a letter written by the Nuremberg delegates of the diet of Augsburg and preserved in the *Corpus Reformatorum* it had been known that on the 31st of May, 1530, these men had come into possession of certain "articles" composed in Latin, though lacking the preface and conclusion, and that they intended to have these "articles" copied and forwarded to the Nuremberg Council. On the 3rd of June, though the conclusion and a number of the articles had not yet been perfected, a copy of the rest of the work was sent. The Council next day had the document submitted to learned ecclesiastics, and on the 15th (or 17th) of June the Council informed the delegates that it had ordered "an intelligible German translation" to be made from the Latin original. There can be little doubt, moreover, about Kolde's conjecture that the translator was the well-known Nuremberg councilor H. J. Baumgartner. This German translation—the erasures and emendations of the manuscript, carefully preserved in the notes of Dr. Kolde's edition, make it plain that we are dealing with a translation of a Latin original—is therefore undoubtedly a translation of the "Latin advice" sent home to Nuremberg by the delegates at Augsburg as early as the 3rd of June, together with Melanchthon's somewhat lengthy Preface. Of course the original Latin would be an even more welcome discovery, but meanwhile we must thank Professor Kolde for his careful edition of this German redaction and the illuminating remarks he makes about the historical situation at Augsburg in the summer of 1530.

In the first part of the pamphlet we have Baumgartner's text itself: the Preface (pp. 5-11), the 18 Articles of Faith (the 14th—no doubt it dealt with Ecclesiastical Orders—was inadvertently omitted by the translator, pp. 11-16), and the 7 Disputed Articles on abuses in the Church (pp. 16-31). The Preface clearly reveals Melanchthon's strong desire for mediation with Rome, and at the same time his utter lack of diplomacy in dealing with the situation. Prof. Kolde shows (pp. 47-75) that the individual articles of this German recension vary in many details from the received text of the Confession; that Luther's influence, however it may have been exerted—whether upon the basis of a Latin or a German recension or both—was exceedingly slight; and that, on the other hand, there is nothing un-Lutheran or decisively Melanchthonian in the finished Confession. It is interesting to note that this German recension conclusively proves that Arts. xx. and xxi. of the Creed as we have it were late additions, since they did not belong to this earliest redaction. Arts. iv. and v. were transposed; vii. and viii. were originally united as Art. vii. The greatest change is in Art. xvi. (xvii.), on Christ's Return to Judgment, the earlier sentences about the followers of Origen and the Anabaptists as teaching restorationism being omitted. The Thomistic conception of the resur-

rection body had, no doubt in an apologetic interest, been suggested in the earlier recension, only to be stricken out in the final text.

The second part of the pamphlet (pp. 76-106) discusses, with polemic reference to Brièger's interpretation of the facts, Melanchthon's negotiations with the imperial secretary Alphonso Valdés and the papal legate Lorenzo Campeggi. The argument is closely reasoned and the main points are conclusively established: (1) the negotiations of Melanchthon with the imperial secretaries were begun not by them but by him; (2) the reformer was acting in his private capacity as an ecclesiastical leader, and not in collusion with the electoral concilors of Saxony; and (3) he purposely delayed the completion of the *Confession* for a number of days from the 18th of June, because of his mistaken judgment that the apologetic manifesto might after all not be required at the diet; but he himself on the 21st of June resumed negotiations for the presentation of the evangelical cause at the diet upon the legal basis secured in the very summoning of that body. Prof. Kolde states fully and fairly the contentions of Brièger, and it is plain, so far as the initiation of some of the friendly relationships between Melanchthon and the Romanists is concerned, that Cochlaeus and Marius, for example, were quite as ready to come to terms as the Wittenberg professor was. But undoubtedly in all essential points the situation at Augsburg must have been very like unto that which is so skillfully reconstructed for us in this work.

In conclusion we have a number of *Beilagen*, five hitherto unpublished letters of the preacher Johannes Rurer, of Ansbach, to Andreas Althamer. The correspondence shows that as early as June 4th, 1530, Melanchthon, in a letter no longer extant, had appealed to Cardinal Albert of Mayence *"quo operam det ne res ad arma deducatur"*. The author promises to publish from time to time other letters, found in the district archives at Bamberg, as an epistolary supplement to his monograph on Althamer (Erlangen, 1895), and these documents, it is not improbable, will have additional light to throw upon the main subject of the second part of this work.

Philadelphia. FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

HEINRICH BULLINGER DER NACHFOLGER ZWINGLIS. VON GUSTAV VON SCHULTHESS-RECHBERG. Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte—22. Jahrgang. Erstes Stück. Halle a. d. Salle: Kommissionsverlag von Max Niemeyer. Zürich: Kommissionsverlag von Zürcher u. Furrer. 1904. Pp. 104.

This booklet was Professor von Schulthess-Rechberg's contribution to the quartocentenary of Bullinger's birth, celebrated at Zurich, July 18, 1904. Since the publication of the *Diarium*, which was (all too briefly) noticed in THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW for April, 1906, Vol. IV, p. 275, the student of the Swiss Reformation is pleased to receive from the pen of a learned and facile writer this sane and condensed, yet comprehensive, account of Zwingli's successor. The references—85 in all—are placed at the close of the book, and are followed

by a list of 81 publications of the Society for the History of the Reformation. After a few introductory lines, containing a eulogistic quotation from Conrad Pellican, Bullinger's contemporary, the contents are arranged into five sections as follows: (1) The Beginnings (pp. 1-10). (2) Bullinger's religious viewpoint or way of thinking (pp. 11-31). (3) Bullinger's activity in Zürich (pp. 31-51). (4) Bullinger's relation to other evangelical churches (pp. 51-89). (5) Personal (pp. 90-98). From the relative space given to these subjects, it is evident that Professor von Schulthess-Rechberg's aim is to represent Bullinger as a thoroughly cosmopolitan character.

The first section begins with Bullinger's birth at Bremgarten, July 18, 1504, traces his career at Emmerich, Cologne, Kappel and Bremgarten, and the summons to the position of *Antistes* at Zürich (1531). Already at Emmerich, but particularly during the three years at Cologne, the young student betrays the marks of an untrammeled thinker; which in those days meant heresy. It was therefore the reflective method, or, more accurately, it was by way of historical investigation that Bullinger was led to evangelical truth (p. 5). It was the early historico-critical Bullinger that made the later evangelical Bullinger a possibility. The specific influences which wrought in this intellectual development are taken up in the second section of the book. These influences came from three distinct sources: the Church Fathers, Erasmus the Humanist, and the Reformers. Bullinger's debt to Erasmus is constantly emphasized; and although he held the supernatural as distinguished from the Erasmian ethical conception of Christianity (p. 17), in no way representing the latter's intellectualistic and aesthetic Christology (p. 18), and decidedly opposing him in the doctrines of the Supper and the freedom of the will, yet throughout his whole life Bullinger remained open to the influence of the great Humanist (p. 19). Among the reformers he is influenced by Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin and Zwingli. To Luther and Melanchthon he is indebted for the Pauline gospel of justification by faith alone (p. 19), but finds difficulty (was it Erasmus again?) in holding exclusively to the forensic idea (p. 21). In this connection he cannot reconcile free grace and free will, Divine providence and human responsibility, and by apparently sacrificing the latter to the former, he becomes an ultra-determinist. *Exit* Melanchthon; *enter* Calvin. And yet: "He remains separated from Calvin and his school by his refusal to include the fall of Adam in the Divine decree" (p. 22). The will *is* free in the sense that the Christian is empowered through Divine grace to do good, and the decree of reprobation is only significant as a mental boundary (*eines Grenzgedankens*, p. 23). This relieves Bullinger of being supralapsarian. Interesting is it to notice (p. 23) that Zwingli did not influence Bullinger in his theological incipiency, but only strengthened him later in his spiritual acquisition. The author cites Bullinger's doctrine of the Eucharist which, though Zwinglian, was not derived from Zwingli but from the ancient and mediæval theology. On the other hand, he is indebted to Zwingli for his ecclesiastical and social activity and was a real follower of the great reformer. At the close of this section (pp.

28-31) we learn that Bullinger was not so original as traditional. The peculiarity of his theology is its ecclesiastical character. It is, however, none the less rational. "Er konnte nicht gläubig sein, ohne zũ wissen, dass er orthodox sei" (p. 28). His thought is never abstract, but historical and therefore practical, which is the reigning feature of the *Decades* and the *Confessio Helvetia Pasterior*. He was, moreover, no systematic theologian in the sense of being able to reduce the totality of Christian thought to a solid system (p. 31).

Bullinger's installation over the Grossmünster at Zurich, December 9, 1531, naturally placed him before the public. Basel and Berne extend calls. His policy in Zurich is to follow his predecessor and promote tolerance. Unlike Zwingli, he is no statesman; he knew and was governed by no "weltpolitisches Programm". "What guided him, was the firm belief that obedience to Divine truth is the deciding factor in human destiny, the highest source of all material and spiritual welfare of a people, the faith of the prophets of Israel and of the Puritans" (p. 40). His preaching is expository, seldom polemic. His pastoral solicitude, his active participation in the school-life at Zurich, his relation to the youth of that city, his zeal for and success in effecting social harmony—are all clearly brought out. This brief and vivid picture of Bullinger at Zurich leaves the impression that into no better hands could the distracted city of Zurich and the fate of the Swiss Reformation have been left at the time of Zwingli's tragic death.

The fourth division, on Bullinger's relations with the other evangelical churches, is the most interesting and valuable. Here the doctrine and especially the character of the Zurich pastor are presented in the company of his illustrious contemporaries: Calvin, Farel, Luther, Zwingli, Melanchthon, Bucer, *et al.* The general outline is geographical, Switzerland being first considered. The evangelicals in Locarno, the Grisons, St. Gall, and Schaffhausen find ready sympathy in Zurich. Most noteworthy, however, is the foreign intercourse. Among the south German centers are Constance (Ambrosius Blaarer), Ulm, Lindau, Memmingen, Augsburg, Mühlhausen and Hesse (Philip the Landgrave). Then follow the Lower Rhine and the Palatinate (the Elector Frederick III., Ursinus and Olevianus, and the occasion of the *Helvetica Posterior*). In Italy Bullinger's popularity grows: he has most intimate relations with Peter Martyr, but is annoyed by Occhino's skeptical tendency. He influences the church in Poland through áLasco. The Polish antitrinitarian heresy is a source of anxiety to him. It is in the portrayal of Bullinger's intercourse with England that our interest is especially centered. Bullinger is just the man for the English exiles. "One may speak of a sort of elective affinity between Bullinger's genius and the needs of the evangelical movement in England" (p. 74). His influence here at times goes beyond that of Calvin, and so popular are his writings that the book-sellers become wealthy through them (p. 74). Not even the antievangelical mania of Mary is able wholly to obliterate his influence. The archbishop of Canterbury (1586) requires each theological candidate to possess a Bible and a copy of the *Decades*, to read and excerpt daily a chapter from the former

and weekly a sermon from the latter (p. 76). "In how many an English village-pulpit, then, was the Zurich Grossmünster divine preached during the last years of the sixteenth century?" (pp. 76-77). In France Bullinger is overshadowed by Calvin, Farel and Beza, but follows the religious upheavals there. Thus did the Zurich theologian anxiously and prayerfully "encompass the whole of evangelical Christianity; a pastor of the common flock of Christ, a universal bishop of the heart, as Origen and Augustine had been in the ancient church" (p. 78).

This is not to depreciate the importance of other reformers who also possessed a universal character. Bullinger simply responded to a task laid upon him by his time. This suggests a final comparison with some of his contemporaries: Calvin, Bucer, Luther, Melanchthon. The mention of Luther recalls the Eucharistic controversy. Professor von Schulthess-Rechberg thinks that the fanatical Anabaptists drove Luther to emphasize the divinity of the external Word and the Sacrament (p. 81). The Zurich Chirstians, not being fanaitcs (*keine Schwarmgeister*), took the extreme opposite side. Bullinger, substantially Zwinglian or Calvinistic, likes to explain it thus: the believer always and everywhere (*immer und überall*) eats the body and drinks the blood of Christ, for that is nothing other than to believe (p. 80). He thoroughly appreciates the rugged intensity of Luther, but heartily resents his unreasonable slander and intolerant method. He (Bullinger) is the apostle of peace and labors for unity. "No blame attaches to him for the separation within the Reformation" (p. 85). He argues for tolerance in unessentials if in the main thing there be unity. But this (let us note) is a question of relative values, with obviously a rationally interpreted Bible as the standard. Bullinger is represented as holding, that the Lutheran and Zwinglian churches are essentially one; that "the sacramental controversy concerns a subsidiary point" (*einen Nebenpunkt*); and that he (Bullinger) never doubts that the Lutheran doctrine of a bodily presence is false and the Swiss symbolical view is true (pp. 85-86). Compared with Melanchthon, their positions were both similar and different. Both lives were complex, but the latter lacked the concentration of the former, and allowed compromises in which essentials were surrendered without corresponding returns (p. 87). With Bucer's unionistic motive Bullinger was in full sympathy, but did not like his method. The internal cleavage of the Bern, the weakening of the Basel church, and the decline of the Swiss Reformation in South Germany are laid at Bucer's door (p. 89). This section concludes with Bullinger's service in the union of the churches. Mutual recognition of the real unity and mutual tolerance of the real differences, and this end attained rather through the press than by colloquies, is the method proposed. It is a "republican" way (p. 89).

The closing section brings the reader to the very heart of Bullinger. Here he is viewed in his sermons and commentaries, in his historical and poetical labors, in his recently (1904) published *Diary*, and in the circle of his family and friends. The writer has not concealed (how could he?) his personal admiration for the subject of his sketch. He had said (p. 72): "Calvin was the teacher, Bullinger the father of the

Reformed Churches". The latter half of this statement forms the text of this account. Bullinger was by nature a pastor, and he is so presented in these pages. "There was no practical proof of his untiringly active nature which he would not have adapted to the religious and moral aims of his calling" (p. 90). His character leaves the impression of resoluteness, steadfastness, firmness. The blows of Luther and the sarcasm of Calvin were beneath him (p. 96). "Bullinger's greatness lies in the moral realm. He stands in his day as a power of earnestness, of truth, of love, and as an example of the most loyal devotion to an ideal task. He is one of the noblest characters of his century. The Swiss people honor him as one of their best men" (p. 97).

As we lay aside this study two impressions abide: the cosmopolitan character of the man and his almost anachronous zeal for union and tolerance. Surely, in the latter possession, Bullinger was somewhat in advance of his age. We could have wished for a more thorough treatment of Bullinger's position on the Supper question as related to Calvin and Zwingli than is given on page 80; or of his Federalism and Predestinarianism than we glean from pages 15 and 23. But we remind ourselves that this is, perhaps, asking too much in view of the evidently comprehensive aim of the booklet. It is not so much a theologian that Professor von Schulthess-Rechberg has given us, as a man of affairs; a man who does not even claim to be abreast with the theological literature of his day (p. 93), but whose sympathetic brotherliness is ever open to the needs of his fellow-men (pp. 96-97). To the student of Bullinger who does not care to wade through the *Lives* by Pestalozzi and Christoffel, this admirable summary will come as a most welcome substitute.

Langhorne, Pa. BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

REMINISCENCES OF BISHOPS AND ARCHBISHOPS. By HENRY CODMAN POTTER, Bishop of New York. Illustrated. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1906. 8vo.; pp. vii. 225.

In a thoroughly informal manner, making no attempt to employ the critical spirit or the graver materials of serious biography, but contenting himself with the modest aim of furnishing "some of those sidelights by means of which individuality in human portraiture may be detected", Dr. Potter here gives us a series of charming sketches, in the form of reminiscences,—beautifully illuminated miniatures we may call them—of a number of distinguished American bishops and English primates. The list includes Bishops Smith of Kentucky, Whittingham of Maryland, Williams of Connecticut, Eastburn of Massachusetts, Clark of Rhode Island, Coxe of Western New York, Wilmer of Louisiana, Clarkson of Nebraska, Brooks of Massachusetts, Dudley of Kentucky, and Archbishops Tait, Benson, and Temple, of England; a group of ecclesiastics presenting a marked variety of interests, aims, and achievements, as well as of personal peculiarities. With a characteristic breadth of sympathy and an abundance of humorous incident and com-

ment, the author introduces us, in the racy manner of a glib cicerone in a picture gallery, to the distinctive features in the personalities and the accomplishments of these altogether worthy and thoroughly interesting prelates. The sketches are too broadly and freely drawn to permit their having much historical value, although in some cases, notably that of Bishop Brooks, the author expresses judgments which, because of the specially intimate relation that existed between these two men, will be scanned with more eager interest than many of the less studied utterances may merit. Many a reader will doubtless find the chief attraction of the book in the modestly restrained yet everywhere present autobiographical element. The really good stories so freely interspersed in these pages would suffice, apart from the more serious aims of the author, to secure a generous recognition of his attempt to say a fitting word of praise for a number of very dear friends.

Philadelphia. FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

YOUNG MEN WHO OVERCAME. By ROBERT E. SPEER. Fleming H. Revell Company. 12mo., pp. 229. $1.00 net.

This inspiring book is made up of brief "sketches of the lives of fifteen real men, men who loved the highest and who made duty the first thing in their lives". Most of them were college-bred men, five being graduates of Princeton, namely, Walter Lowrie, Theodorick B. Pryor, William Earl Dodge, Cortlandt Van Rensslaer Hodge, and Isaac Parker Cooler. No one can read the story of these fifteen virile and beautiful Christian characters without having a deeper sense of the sanctifying power of divine grace and a more ardent desire to attain a higher level in daily living. Like other works by Mr. Speer, this breathes the spirit of an intelligent, manly, sympathetic, optimistic, and inspiring Christian faith. It is a book which anybody may read with profit, but it is emphatically a good book for a young man to read and re-read.

Philadelphia. FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Verzeichnis der von Adolf Hilgenfeld verfassten Schriften zusammengestellt von den Mitgliedern der neutestamentlichen Abtheilung des theologischen Seminars der Universität Jena v. S. S. 1902 durchgesehen, ergänzt und herausgegeben von Dr. Heinrich Hilgenfeld a. o. Prof. a. d. Universität. Leipzig Verlag von O. R. Reisland 1906.

This is a unique testimonial offered on a unique occasion to a man of eminent position and ability. On the 2d of June, 1903, Adolf Hilgenfeld, the well-known editor of the *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie* celebrated his eightieth birthday. The members of the Theological Seminar prepared a list of all his publications from the year 1846 up to date and offered it to the venerable theologian as a birthday remembrance. This list was republished in a supplemented form and offered by the son, Dr. Heinrich Hilgenfeld, likewise Professor in the same University of Jena, to his father on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the latter's promotion to the doctorate of philosophy at

the University of Halle, May 25, 1846. It is truly a remarkable list. Of all these sixty years there is not one in which articles and books, sometimes of lasting value and epoch-making importance, did not issue from his pen. The titles of them cover no less than 49 closely-printed pages. Dr. Hilgenfeld's first activity dates from the time when the old Tübingen School was at the acme of its prestige and influence. To some of its positions(*e. g.*, the priority of Matthew to Mark) he remained faithful to the end. Even when eighty years old and more he used with unabated vigor to follow and criticize from his own standpoint all recent developments in New Testament science. His productivity until the very last was unparalleled, hardly an instalment of his *Zeitschrift* appearing without an extended article from his hand. The interest attaching to the present pamphlet is increased by the recent death of the man whom it honors. He survived his eightieth birthday more than three years and was so active till the very last that the list offered him on the sixtieth anniversary of his doctorate will undoubtedly require once more to be supplemented. The pamphlet contains a good engraving of Hilgenfeld. It is valuable as a piece of bibliography to every writer in the field of New Testament science.

Princeton. GEERHARDUS VOS.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

THE AUTHORITY OF CHRIST. By DAVID W. FORREST, D.D., Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1906. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. Price $2.00 net. 8vo.; pp. xvi, 437.

There is a story told of an impetuous and somewhat headstrong cavalry leader in our great Civil War which is brought back to our memory by Dr. Forrest's book. He had just ordered a daring charge, when he was interrupted by an aide-de-camp, riding furiously and bringing imperative orders from the general in command, to draw back. "Of course I obey my superior officer", he said, with no attempt to conceal his chagrin. "But", he at once added, his face clearing up, "Mr. Aide-de-camp, this is a very remarkable order, which I find it difficult to understand. And how do I know it has not suffered some 'sea-change' in its transmission through you? And, indeed, how do I know 'the old man' is quite himself this morning?" "Men", he said, turning to his forces, "charge!" The authority of Christ, says Dr. Forrest, is of course final. It has in all ages been acknowledged by the Christian Church to be final (p. 1, cf. pp. 101, 392). But it certainly is not always easy to ascertain precisely the bearing of either His commands or His example (pp. 160, 393); and in point of fact men have repeatedly and in great masses and through long periods gone astray in their appeal to His authority. Nor is it easy to be sure that some of the phrases transmitted to us "have not come to us coloured by later reflection" (p. 399): His disciples certainly misunderstood Him in some of His utterances and modified them to suit their own

convictions (pp. 312, 317, 319), and though "the question of subsequent modification or interpretation touches" different parts of His teaching with more or less force, it is legitimate on all occasions to raise it (p. 292). And in any event Jesus' own outlook was bounded by the horizon of a man of His own time, race and social and intellectual opportunities. The mysteries that press on us pressed similarly on Him. The mystery of suffering for example—"we have no reason to suppose" that the data required for its solution "lay within Christ's purview more than within ours" (p. 141). "The *detailed* course of the kingdom in the world" was "inscrutable" to Him as to us; because "the influences that determined it were infinitely complex", and above all the factor of the free human will comes in to modify all forecasts (p. 300, 312). It is not difficult for us to convict Him even of positive errors. No doubt He shared the current opinion which attributed the 110th Psalm to David, and the later chapters of Isaiah to Isaiah (p. 69). Nor did He err only in matters of Biblical criticism. "His teaching in many of its parts is coloured by temporary-Jewish influences" (p. 96): even the Parables, at least those "that portray the final judgment, "are affected" by suggestions from Jewish traditional belief" (p. 292). Thus we are carried through the whole sorites and—despite the occasional accidental dropping of such a phrase as "Christ teaches with authority" (p. 331)—the only conclusion that can be reached is that no such "authority" can justly be assigned to the teaching of Christ as has "in all ages been acknowledged by the Christian Church" (p. 1). As we read we are inevitably reminded of Nelson at St. Vincent, vociferously protesting his subjection to his admiral's authority, but taking great care to clap his glass to his blind eye, and, crying out 'I see no signal', to go his own way.

And here we must emphasize the phrase "his own way". For we must not suppose that Dr. Forrest puts aside the authority of Jesus in favor of that of the Scriptures. As he says himself, generalizing on an individual instance: "He who believes that Christ's thought had its limitations will not think that Peter's knowledge on such a matter was infallible" (p. 330, cf. p. 413). "Is it at all likely", he demands, "that the Apostle was commissioned to reveal an eschatological truth which was concealed from the Lord Himself, or which He deliberately refrained from proclaiming?" We do not pause here to point out that according to John's representation (Jn. xvi. 12-13) precisely this might seem very likely; or to point out that according to Dr. Forrest's own principles there seems no good reason why the later writer, after mature reflection and the teaching of experience, might not have known better than Jesus. What we are concerned to point out here is that so far from falling back from Christ's authority upon that of the Holy Ghost speaking through the apostles, it is one of Dr. Forrest's aims in setting aside the authority of Christ to escape also from the authority of Scripture. It is, in fact, just because Christ's authority authenticates the Scripture that Christ's authority is onerous to him. He sweeps the field clean and leaves himself logically without any "external authority" at all. And he succeeds very fairly in living practically up

to this logical result (pp. 372, 382, 421, cf. 2, 64, 68). There is, of course, an appeal here and there to Scriptural teaching as if there were some good reason why we should not outrun the "scriptural warrant" for this or that (p. 50). But this occasional slip is explicable usually from the influence of long habit and from a sense of the force of the appeal upon those addressed. There is exhibited no great tendency to defer to the detailed teaching of John or Paul or Peter: but rather a suggestion here and there of an underlying hesitancy in appealing to it. At one point, no doubt (p. 330), there seems to be a hint let fall that we may appeal from any one apostle to "the common primitive faith" as a better basis of confidence. What is not shared by all or a plurality of the Apostles we are told, "according to every sound canon of Biblical criticism", "can only rank as a theologoumenon" of the individual; and as not "forming part of the common primitive faith" fails, by implication, of normative authority (p. 338). The New Testament, however, is treated on the whole as but a product of the Church (p. 383) which can possess no higher authority than belongs to the Church—even though it comes from "the creative period of the Christian faith" (p. 421). We say truly, then, that Dr. Forrest strips himself of all "external authority", and stands forth as, in some sense, autonomous. Has he not the Spirit as truly as any of the Apostles? And does not the promise of guidance into all the truth belong to him as really as to them? And does there not lie behind him a much longer and a much wider experience than lay behind them—through which the Church has learned many things?

We have thought it best to begin thus by stating briefly the central and determining line of thought of Dr. Forrest's volume, that we may have before us at once the principles which have controlled his thought, and the issue to which he would conduct us. We may properly revert now, however, to the manner in which these principles and conclusions find utterance. Dr. Forrest takes for his subject "The Authority of Christ": and his end is to determine the sphere in which that authority,—shall we say is available or shall we say is extant?—and its "character"—or shall we say its mode of operation?—within that sphere. In one word, Dr. Forrest's purpose is to investigate the limits of Christ's authority both extensively and intensively. In what sphere is He authoritative? he asks; and then, How authoritative is He in that sphere? He cannot be said to proceed in his discussion in a right line: nor does the book give the impression of a unity. One gets the suggestion as he reads that it may have been composed piece-meal, at perhaps disconnected periods, and not in all its parts with the same precise end prominently in view and with the same definitions and presuppositions vividly in mind. Nevertheless the whole is bound together in some sort of unity by the fact that the whole treats in one way or another of the authority of Christ: and if at one time there seems an implicit recognition underlying the discussion of the plenary authority of our Lord's declarations and only a zeal to provide against their misapplication, while at another there seems a tendency to deny at least absolute authority to His declarations themselves, the reader still is able with

a little care, to find his way amid the resulting ambiguities. If we may be allowed a conjecture as to the composition of the book, we may perhaps suppose that it originated in a strong feeling on Dr. Forrest's part that "the authority of Christ" has been and is frequently much too lightly asserted; and has accordingly been invoked for a multitude of points of view and conceptions, usages and practices for which no colorable warrant can be found in the recorded teaching and example of Jesus. Here is, for example, a portentous sacredotal system like that of the Church of Rome. Or here is an impracticable scheme of conduct like that propounded by Tolstoy. Or here is a thoroughly indefensible withdrawal from public life and avoidance of the common duties in which our complicated modern social organization enmeshes us. Or here is an innumerable body of particular crochets more or less offensive to sane thought. And for all of them alike "the authority of Christ" is confidently appealed to. The case obviously calls for a serious examination of the basis on which "the authority of Christ" is claimed for these things, and Dr. Forrest has felt this obligation and has given us a series of excellent chapters in which the interpretation of Christ's precepts and the general bearing of His teaching is searchingly examined and illustrated. It is a dreary mass of crass and often evident misinterpretations and misapplications of Christ's words which he has to expose.

If Dr. Forrest had stopped at this point, although there would certainly remain points of detail which would invite criticism, he would have made us all his debtors. But unfortunately there are a number of instances in which the authority of Christ is invoked for matters not to Dr. Forrest's mind, with regard to which it cannot be denied that the recorded words or example of Jesus warrant the appeal. And Dr. Forrest has unhappily permitted himself to be misled on their account into an attempt to discredit the authority of Christ. He pleads that we must not raise the dilemma in men's minds "as to whether the acceptance of His authority is compatible with loyalty to truth" in any region of their investigation (p. 2): and he does not seem to perceive, or at least does not stay at this point sufficiently to consider, that if this principle is given universal validity it amounts to saving Christ's authority in name while discarding it in fact throughout the whole range of knowledge. Under its pressure, he seeks to escape the dilemma, first, by throwing doubt upon the exact transmission of our Lord's words and example; and next by invoking a theory of the Incarnation by which the authority of His teaching and example, even when fully before us, is reduced to the vanishing point. The book thus becomes a sustained attempt to throw off the authority of Christ altogether; and by this driftage of the argument its own unity is, as we have said, seriously marred. For what is the use of arguing at great length that the teaching and example of Christ have been misapplied by this or that class of reasoners or body of Christians, if we are not quite certain what the teaching and example of Christ are, and they have no authority at any rate? The assertion in the opening chapters of the book of a theory of the Incarnation which robs the

teaching and example of Christ of all authority, antiquates beforehand the argument of the later chapters that the teaching and example of Christ have often been grossly misinterpreted by those who have appealed to them. The argument of these later chapters proceeds on a major premise which has already been discredited, and can command our attention only if the assertion of the former chapters is rejected by us. The gravamen of the case the book seeks to make out certainly lies therefore in its opening chapters, in which Dr. Forrest attempts to expound the Incarnation as in its very nature voiding the authority of Christ; and that attempt must therefore claim our previous attention. We think this unfortunate, for the excellence of the volume lies in its later chapters, in which the proper use of Christ's authority is studied. But we have no choice. Both the logic of the case and Dr. Forrest's own arrangement of his matter demand of us to seek the crux of the volume in its opening chapters and its theory of the Incarnation.

This theory of the Incarnation is nothing other than that kenotic theory which, after enjoying a remarkable vogue in the middle of the last century, has in more recent years fallen very much out of credit, as continued discussion has thrown more and more into light its inherent weaknesses, or rather impossibilities—metaphysical, exegetical, theological and religious. Respectable in the hands of its first propounders as an attempt to do justice to Christological data neglected by the Lutheran construction in which they had been bred, it has lost the respect of men when it has become only a fig-leaf to hide the nakedness of those who, fallen from their first estate of trust in the God-man, yet shrink from standing forth in a bare naturalistic conception of the person of Jesus. It is thus, unfortunately, that it appears in Dr. Forrest's pages, as in those of most of its remaining advocates. Dr. Forrest declines to enter into the deep questions which such a theory necessarily brings with it. "It is quite foolish", he says, "to seek to disparage the idea of the Son's self-limitation by asking what became of His cosmical function during the incarnate period" (p. 95). And then he enumerates a number of the suggestions which have been made to meet this and similar difficulties raised by the kenotic assumption, with the general implication that any of them will do well enough, —although no one of them has yet been invented which does not fatally infringe upon either the Christian doctrine of the Trinity or our fundamental conception of God. With these things, however, Dr. Forrest does not concern himself. His concern is rather with the right of men to hold to be false, what the Son of Man recognized as true. Says he: "The frank recognition that such was the character of the Son's incarnate state is a prime necessity for Christian faith at the present time. For this age is preèminently one of historical research, bent upon discovering as far as possible the actual facts of the past. Now it has been demonstrated beyond dispute that there are sayings of our Lord which, taken literally, seem to conflict with established results of biblical investigation, and that His teaching in many of its parts is coloured by temporary Jewish influences. When Professor Pfleiderer, on grounds such as these, ridicules the notion that Christ

is a 'final definitive authority', the only right reply is: We do not claim that Christ's word is final in all spheres. . . . We can only gain for Christ His true place and essential significance by plainly recognizing, not only that the limitations are there, but that they are the inesparable accompaniments of a historical Incarnation" (pp. 96-7). Which, being interpreted in the brutal language of the streets, means just that we cannot in the face of modern research sustain the claim of Christ to "authority". Dr. Forrest would, indeed, distinguish and say, 'except in the sphere of faith and conduct' (p. 3),—or, as he puts it here: "we do claim that He has embodied in His person and in the principles He has expounded the final revelation of religious truth and practice, of 'what man is to believe concerning God, and what duties God requires of man'" (p. 97). The care with which this language is chosen should not, however, pass unobserved. Even in "the sphere of faith and conduct" Dr. Forrest is not prepared to claim absolute and indefectible authority for every utterance of Jesus. "His teaching in many of its parts is coloured by temporary Jewish influences", and we shall need to take these into account in applying it to our own times: and this "revelation" of religious truth and practice does not find its embodiment so much in spoken words enunciating final doctrine and promulgating final precepts, as in lives quickened by the Spirit He has sent and efflorescing under His influence into true thinking and high acting. There is, thus, at least a tendency in Dr. Forrest's discussion to reduce the authority of Christ to His immanent action on the conscience of the race, or of His church. "That He constantly confronts us with an obligation which presses down upon us from the Unseen" constitutes "what we call the authority of Christ" (p. 7). This seems to mean that Christ is the incarnate conscience of the race; and His authority consists in the coincidence of His demands on us with the demands of our religious and moral nature. "He quickens the impulses and resolves" of our moral and religious nature, and we respond to it in a higher outlook and upward aspiration,—

"Then a sense of law and beauty,
A face turned from the clod—
Some call it Evolution
And others call it God."

Dr. Forrest calls it Christ: and sees here Christ's authority manifested. It is thus that Dr. Forrest adjusts his profound reverence for Jesus as the "final authority" of Christians and his inability to find in his recorded teaching a final authority for his thinking and acting. It is always painful to disturb such adjustments: and the more painful as it becomes evident that the adjustment is in the individual an expedient to retain as much as is possible to him of the higher truth. But what choice have we? In this sphere too the maxim will be found to have in all its absoluteness its inevitable application: "Ye cannot serve two masters".

Dr. Forrest's impulse to the adoption of the kenotic theory of the incarnation seems then to be rooted in mental perplexity in view of the conflict between some of Jesus' utterances or points of view and

some suggestions of recent research. This perplexity is voiced in such phrases as this: "If Christ is declared by us to guarantee the accuracy of what is scientifically disproved, or at least improbable in the last degree, we are much more likely to imperil His claim than to establish the disputed point" (p. 69). And certainly we may be permitted to suspect that the dogmatism with which the elements of the kenotic theory are asserted and the fundamental postulates of the Chalcedonian Christology are discarded, is a reflection of the terror with which the dilemma Dr. Forrest finds himself in inspires him,—the terror lest all trust in Christ be destroyed in wide circles by the conflict between His utterances and recent theory. But Dr. Forrest seeks support for his theory from Scripture. Why he should be exigent in this matter is not very apparent, in view of the weak hold which the authority of Scripture has upon him, particularly in its historical element, the only element on which he can depend for the dramatization of our Lord's life on earth, from which he derives his chief support in advocating the kenotic theory of His incarnation. But, permitting that to pass, Dr. Forrest has persuaded himself that the Scriptures give us both in their didactic teaching and in the portrait they draw of Jesus in the Gospels, a kenotized Christ; and he supports himself on this their supposed testimony. We cannot say, however, we have found anything very new or particularly strong in the exegetical argument with which he has favored us.

To the great passage, Phil. ii. 6 sq., he consecrates two long passages (pp. 98 sq.-338 sq.)—one of them a formal discussion in the kenotic interests: and, of course, he says many things in both of them which command our attention and exhibit his own careful study of the passage. But in neither discussion can he be said to have advanced the matter in hand. The more formal discussion (pp. 98 sq.) even acquires a somewhat unpleasant flavor from the sustained effort made in it to rid it of its two most obvious theological implications—that of the unbroken persistence of the Son of God "in the form of God" after His incarnation, and that of the consequent coëxisetnce in the Incarnate Son of "two natures". It is quite certain that in the phrase ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων, the participle embodies the conception of continuance and, therefore, declares not merely that Jesus was before His incarnation "in the form of God" but also that He retained that "form of God" after His incarnation. The sixth verse indeed, as its tense-forms unmistakably indicate, lays the basis in one broad negative statement for the entire positive statement given in verse seven, and there analyzed into two parts,—not less, then, for the "He humbled Himself" than for the "He emptied Himself". The unbroken continuance of our Lord "in the form of God" is therefore of the very essence of the assertion; and it is it which governs the choice of the language throughout the entire passage. It is this that accounts not only for the λάβων and the γενόμενος (in both instances), but also for the ἐν ὁμοιώματι and the σχήματι, which have seemed to many "to point to an apparent rather than to a real Incarnation" only because the ruling idea of the passage, hat Christ Jesus always continued to be—because He was by nature

and could not but be—"in the form of God", has been lost sight of. It was because He continued in His incarnation to be "in the form of God", that He is said, not to have come to be in "the form of a servant" but to have *taken* "the form of a servant": there was here no exchange of one "form" for another, but an addition of one "form" to another; as the ecclesiastical language has accurately phrased it, there was an "assumption". Accordingly He is said, not to have "become man", but to have "become in the likeness of men". The docetic inference had been excluded by the "He *took* the *form* of a servant": there is no illusion here, but a real assumption of the "form", that is, of the characterizing quality, of all that belongs to, the servant's nature. The transmutation notion is now excluded by the assertion that He did not, in assuming humanity, "become man" exactly, but only "became in the likeness of men": He remained much more than He seemed; though His humanity was a real humanity, really "assumed", and He lived in the sight of man within the limits of this humanity so as to appear only man, this was not all,—He remained "in the form of God" all the time as well, and therefore was only "in the likeness of men".

Whatever He did therefore as man,—within the limits of the humanity He had assumed—He did voluntarily, by an ever fresh act of voluntary self-abnegation. His dying, for instance,—that was not an inevitable sequence of His incarnation, but an additional act of voluntary self-devotion. He who is and remains "in the form of God" may properly at any and all times claim and exercise His right of "being on an equality with God" the deathless one, and not die: and this possibility and right is wholly unaffected by the fact that He has assumed into union with Himself, "the form of a servant", and thus has made it possible for Him to act here too "in the likeness of men". Accordingly we are told, in order that the example of our Lord in His self-abnegation may be exhibited in its full extent, that "being found in fashion as a man", "He humbled Himself"—it is a voluntary act of His own, not an inevitable consequence of His changed nature, no longer in His power to do or to prevent; and that He did this "by becoming"—it is a change to the unnecessary, not a submission to the inevitable, that is signalized by the term—"by becoming subject even unto death". Death, then at least—and all that led up to and accompanied and issued from death in His subjection to human conditions—was not the unavoidable and irresistible consequence of His incarnation, coming of itself as the necessary lot of the nature He had, not assumed, but become; but an additional act of humiliation voluntarily entered into in the prosecution of His mission by Him who, just because He remained "in the form of God", had no necessary part in death, but might well have held to His inherent right to be in this matter also, on "an equality with God". Not only is at least this much so imbedded in the passage that it cannot by any artifice of exegesis be driven out of it, but it constitutes the main and emphasized teaching of the passage, on which hangs its whole value to Paul in his exhortation to his readers

to look not to their own things but each also to the things of others, and thus to have the mind in them which was in Christ Jesus.

The meaning of the passage to us, then, is precisely that, according to Paul, the Son of God did not lay aside His divine "existence form" in "becoming man", but, retaining in full possession all that characterizes God as God and makes Him that specific Being we call God (for that is the significance of "being in the form of God"), took to Himself also all that characterizes a servant as a servant and makes Him that specific being we call a servant; and having so done, willed to live out a servant's life in the world, subjecting Himself from moment to moment, by uncompelled and free acts of His unweakened will, to the conditions of the life which, for His own high ends, He willed to live, and manifesting Himself thus to man as "in the likeness of men", "in fashion as a man", though He was all the time Lord of all. This is, of course, the precise antipodes, the express and detailed contradiction, of the entire kenotic construction. It is the assertion of the dual nature of our Lord: for according to it the humanity of our Lord was something added to (λαβών) His divine nature, not something into which His divine nature was transmuted. And this includes of course the assertion that within the person of Christ there are two "minds"; though both matters are denied by Dr. Forrest with intense dogmatism. "No matter how real may be the affinity of divine and human nature, these two diverse methods or forms of operation can by no possibility coèxist within the same conscious personality" (p. 89, cf. pp. 51, 91); "there was but one mind, that of the Word made flesh" (p. 58, cf. pp. 53, 90). It is also the assertion of the retention, in the Incarnate state, in possession and use, of the whole body of Divine attributes, which in their sum make up "the form of God"; although this too is not only denied but scoffed at by Dr. Forrest. He complains of those who occupy the same position here with Paul, that they "calmly transfer" "what is true of the Son in His timeless existence to Him in the period of His humiliation as if the continuity of His absolute attributes were self-evident" (p. 65, cf. pp. 51, 53, 59). It is further the assertion that the controlling factor in our Lord's whole earthly manifestation, as well as in His entire life-history, is His Divine nature, since it was He who was in the form of God who not only "emptied Himself" by taking the form of a servant, thus becoming in the likeness of men; but also, being found in fashion like a man, humbled Himself by becoming subject even unto death and that the death of the cross; although this too Dr. Forrest sharply denies (pp. 91-92).

But above all for our present purpose—for this is the hinge on which the whole kenotic controversy turns—it is the assertion that our Lord's life of humiliation on earth was a continuous act of voluntary self-abnegation, in which He by the strong control of His absolute will to live within the bounds of a human life, moment by moment denied Himself the exercise of His divine attributes and prerogatives in all that concerned His mission, because He had come to do a work and for the doing of it it behooved Him thus to do; and not the unavoidable natural development of a purely human life incapable as such of escaping the

changes and chances which are necessarily incident to humanity. By this assertion Paul sets aside at one stroke the whole kenotic contention, to which it is essential to hold that in our Lord's life of humiliation "there was not merely" (as Bishop O'Brien puts it in words adopted and utilized by Dr. Forrest, p. 93), "a voluntary suspension of the exercise" "of all His infinite attributes and powers", "but a voluntary *renunciation of the capacity of exercising them*, for a time". And not only Paul, we may add, but the whole Gospel narrative as well, to which Dr. Forrest would make his appeal, as if it dramatized Christ's life on earth as not only a purely human one but a helplessly human one. A very simple test will exhibit this. Let any simple reader of the Gospels be asked whether their narrative leaves upon his mind the impression that Jesus' life and acts were determined for Him by the necessary limits of a well-meaning but weak humanity; or were not rather the voluntarily chosen course of a life directed to an end for the securing of which He daily denied himself the exercise of powers beyond human forces? No simple reader of the Gospel will be easily persuaded that Jesus' life was what it was because He had for the time lost the capacity to act in superhuman powers: that it was, for example, lack of power rather than lack of will which withheld Jesus either from making the stones bread at the demand of the tempter (else where was the temptation?), or from coming down from the cross when challenged thereto by the scoffing multitude. But when we have assured ourselves that the limitations within which Jesus' life were cast were voluntary from day to day and act to act,—and not the necessary sequence of a change which had once for all befallen Him at His incarnation we have cut up the kenotic theory by the roots.

The advocate of the kenotic theory who, under the condemnation of the epistles, seeks comfort from the Gospels, certainly has a claim upon our pity. No one of the evangelists, assuredly, shares his conception. To one and all alike Jesus is God manifest in the flesh, and to each and all alike a divine manifestation is both a *manifestation* and a manifestation of *what is divine*. "Even the oldest Gospel", says that Bousset whom Dr. Forrest repeatedly quotes as if he were an "authority" in such matters,—on this occasion indeed speaking truly,—"even the oldest Gospel is written from the standpoint of faith; already for Mark Jesus is not only the Messiah of the Jewish people, but the miraculous eternal Son of God whose glory shone in the world. And it has been rightly emphasized that in this regard our three first Gospels are distinguished only in degree from the fourth". And again: "In the faith of the community, which is shared already by the oldest evangelist, Jesus is the miraculous Son of God in whom men believe, whom men set wholly by the side of God" (*Was wissen wir von Jesus*, pp. 54, 57). It would be hard if writers, writing for the express purpose of depicting a Divine Being manifesting His deity in His daily course, should have so missed their mark as to have presented us rather with a portrait in which only a human life is manifested. That they have not done so is obvious to every reader of their Gospels. And when Dr. Forrest attempts to make it appear that they have done so, he not only wilfully shuts his

eyes to one whole half of their representation, but sets himself in direct contradiction to their whole portraiture of Jesus. It is he, not they, who tells us that Jesus had "a bounded outlook", was "subject to all the influences of His immediate surroundings", and even in His "perfection" was not "absolute" but "conditioned" (pp. 11, 12). In their view Jesus' outlook had no limits, He was master of all circumstances, and His perfection was just the perfection of God. So far from Jesus' "perfection" being to them "conditioned, not absolute", "derived not creative", negative not positive ("His sinlessness means that He did not at any point of His progressive experience deflect from the specific ideal of service set before Him by God", p. 12) it was just the realization in a human life of the perfection which constitutes the ethical content of the idea of God (Mt. v. 48), asserted by Jesus as His own possession as the Son of God (cf. Volkmar Fritzsche, *Das Berufsbewusstsein Jesu*, pp. 31-32). According to the evangelists thus Jesus' perfection is the manifestation of the τελείωσις of God in flesh: a manifestation made under the conditions of human growth it is true, but a *manifestation*, and a manifestation precisely of the τελείωσις of the absolute God. Others needed daily to seek from God forgiveness of their unceasing sins: He, needing no forgiveness, is the dispenser of forgiveness to others, and even commits to others the right to remit sins. As self-evident as is the evil of all others (Mt. vii. 11), so self-evident is it that "doing the work of the Father" brings them into unison with Him (Mt. xii. 50): since whatever the Father has, in that does He share (Mt. xi. 28 sq.).

It surely is hopeless to appeal to evangelists seeking to present this conception of Jesus, in order to validate a theory that in the days of the flesh He was phenomenally mere man with no capacity left Him for Divine activities. Of course they represent Him as growing in wisdom, and as therefore at every stage of His growth lacking in complete knowledge and perfected wisdom: as subject to changing emotions,—and there might have been included, only there does not chance to be included, in this, the experience of the emotion of surprise; as making inquiries and learning by experience. All this belongs to another side of His complex personality—the human side, which the evangelists, though they do not dwell upon it so fully or make its validation so much the end of their writing, yet are as far from obscuring as His divine dignity and powers. If we begin with the dogmatic announcement: "There was but one mind in Christ", naturally —*cadit quaestio*. If there was but one mind in Christ, then certainly He could not have been at one and the same time the subject of knowledge and ignorance, He could not have been at once God and man. But then, the whole Gospel narrative becomes at once a mass of contradictions: contradictions which cannot be voided by resolutely shutting our eyes to one and that the main line of representation and focussing attention on the lower and less emphasized series. Thus we are brought, to say nothing more, into flagrant contradiction with the main purpose and general trend of the evangelical narrative. It is designed to set forth Jesus to us in His Divine majesty: to it He is the

manifestation of God in the flesh. To Dr. Forrest, He reveals nothing but human limitations in His life. "Confessedly, what we desire to discover is the revelation which God has been pleased to give us in Jesus Christ. We see that in certain instances Christ is represented as characterized by limitations. Of what value is it to say that while these existed for Him in one sense, they did not exist in another? The sphere in which they did *not* exist is, *ex hypothesi*, outside the range of the revelation" (pp. 55ff., p. 79). It is worth while to insist on this and similar passages. For they are not chance utterances but belong to the essence of the situation. What we have to interpret is a double series of parallel facts. The means of interpretation adopted is neglect of one whole series and exclusive validation of the other. The result is that all that is left to be said of Jesus in the days of His flesh is that He was subject to human limitations.

Let us not blink this shocking result. All that Christ was, in the days of His flesh, was, according to this conception, that limited nature whose outlook was bounded, which was accessible to temptation and was the subject of moral growth (p. 79). This was absolutely all there was to Him. Behind this there were no depths in that personality. The Scriptures tell us that God's outlook is boundless, that He is essentially perfect, that He is not tempted of evil. In what sense was this Jesus, then, who was nothing beyond and above the nature whose outlook was bounded, which suffered temptation and was the subject of moral growth—and who therefore was not in any recesses of His being perfect as God is perfect,—in what sense was this Being God? Dr. Forrest wishes to recognize Him as God. In order to recognize this Being as God, however, he must redefine Deity and in redefining it he must define it away. The ultimate difficulty of all theories of the class that he is defending is thus brought before us. Having set their hearts on a merely human Christ, and yet feeling unwilling to yield up frankly the Divine Christ of the Gospel revelation, they end by debasing the idea of God to the human level; so that in the end we lose not only our Divine Christ but God Himself. That simply is not God which is imperfect, and in process of perfecting by means of temptation. If this is all that Christ is, then Christ is not God; and Dr. Forrest continues to call Him such only by stress of old habit and by a willing delusion. Dr. Forrest seeks to make capital (pp. 94, 95) out of the consent of the humanitarian theorisers with the orthodox in their perception of the absurdity of the kenotic hypothesis. If it is any comfort to him to cry out against the upper and nether mill-stones grinding together, he ought not to be denied that small comfort. It ought, however, not to seem unnatural that every consistent thinker—whether his consistency is of belief or of unbelief—should think ill of a theory which inconsistently wishes to be both at once.

We cannot illustrate here in detail the straits into which Dr. Forrest is brought by his attempt to interpret the Christ of the Gospels as a mere limited human being in His phenomenal manifestation. It admits of no doubt, for instance, that the evangelists represent Him as sharer in the whole extent of the divine knowledge, differentiated from the

prophets (with whom Dr. Forrest confuses Him, p. 7, though He never calls Himself a mere prophet) just in this,—that to the prophets God reveals some items of knowledge, while His Son shares in all He knows (Mt. xi. 28 sq.). We have lately had occasion to point this out, however (see Hastings' *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels,* art. "Foresight"), and will not here go over the ground again. Let us take the sole example we can allow ourselves, then, from another sphere—that of the Divine power which the Evangelists ascribe to Christ; but which Dr. Forrest in the interests of his theory denies to Him, insisting that He wrought His mighty works, like other instruments of God's will, only by means of the power of God graciously exerted, now and again, in His behalf. In the course of his argument he necessarily, however, comes across this phenomenon of the Scriptural representation: that Jesus in working a miracle says, "I will: be thou clean"; "I say unto thee, arise"; while His disciples say, "In the name of Jesus of Nazareth"; "Jesus Christ maketh thee whole". In face of this contrast Dr. Forrest knows nothing better to urge than this paradox: that "the emphasis which He puts on His own personality is an assertion, not of His independence of the Father, but of the entireness of His dependence upon Him"! By this he apparently hopes he will persuade us that the distinction here drawn only means that Christ was more dependent—more perfectly dependent, he would say—on an exterior power for the working of His miracles than His apostles even!

Surely no one will contend that the Son is "independent" of the Father; much less that the Mediator of the Covenant, in His covenanted work, acts "independently" of the Father. Here is only one of those "undistributed middles" which are as characteristic of Dr. Forrest's reasoning as the misplaced "only" is characteristic of his style: for the whole plausibility of his paradox here depends on the ambiguity of the use of the words "dependent" and "independent". The plain man will be slow to believe, however, that the contrast between the "I will" of Jesus and the "Jesus Christ maketh thee" of His disciples, is not a contrast between the relatively independent action of the Lord and the relatively dependent or instrumental action of the Apostles, in the matter of working miracles. It is nothing less than obvious, indeed, that the difference in the modes of statement means that the power by which the miracles of Jesus were wrought was in some high and true sense His own power, while that by which those of the Apostles were wrought was not in this high and true sense their own power. So far from it being possible to say that Jesus "was not the worker of His own miracles", we must go on to say that, according to this representation, He was the worker not only of His own but also of those of His disciples as well. The whole series,—His and theirs alike,—were His work. Is this a false testimony of the authors of the historical books of the New Testament? Jesus Christ on earth or in heaven—but whether on earth or in heaven, the same Jesus Christ incarnate—is the real source of the power by which the miracles, whether of His own or of His disciples' working, were wrought: and what is really significant of the record is that it takes pains by its "I will" and "Jesus Christ maketh thee whole",

to say this of all alike. There is no such distinction then in the minds of these writers as that which Dr. Forrest draws between the earthly and the exalted Christ, in respect to this question. Of course this is not to say that God the Father was not concerned in the working of these miracles, and that they were wrought "independently" of Him: that the Man Jesus was not conscious of resting on the Father's power, or of doing merely the Father's will: that in all His mediatorial work He did not act as the "Sent of the Father"—as His "delegate", if you will. These are deeper questions than can be touched upon in this notice: but it is surely already superabundantly evident that they are not to be lightly set aside, as if there were no profound problems here of the interrelations of the Persons of the Godhead,—by the shallow expedients at the disposal of a kenotic theory. Enough that here too, as at every other point, the kenotic theory runs precisely athwart the most emphatic deliverances of the Gospel narratives.

In the failure of the kenotic theory on which he bases his whole argument, the entire structure of Dr. Forrest's attempt to reduce the authority of our Lord in sphere and character alike, of course falls to the ground. It will scarcely do to say that God is authoritative only in the spheres of faith and conduct. It is, of course, open to Dr. Forrest to follow his Bousset and his companions, and assail the trustworthiness of the Gospel report of Christ's teaching and life. We have already seen that he exhibits a tendency here and there to find in the evangelic report the intrusion of the later reflection of the community. We cannot believe, however, that he is prepared to carry this to such lengths as, like Bousset, to disengage from the Christ of faith as presented in the evangelists a Christ of fact who was merely man, and perhaps something less than an average man; much less to such lengths, as, with Pfleiderer, to lose the real Christ altogether behind the veil of the Christ of faith. The retention of the Christ of the evangelists in any recognizable form, however, entails the retention of the Christ of authority—authority in His declarations as well as in the religious impression He made, and in His declarations in all spheres as well as in those of faith and conduct. Of this Christ, it is illegitimate to speak, as Dr. Forrest speaks of his kenotic Christ, as if He were liable to repeat in His teaching Jewish errors (p. 69), and not quite able to forecast the future in which His authority might be wrongly applied. There remains to us, of course, the whole duty of carefully weighing His words and example and of seeking to apply them only according to His will. Whatever value Dr. Forrest's book possesses to us will be found to lie in its earnest attempt to perform this work in several departments of thought and action. He has, of course, not been able in even this serious and careful discussion to place himself on a plane which is above criticism: but he has led us through a study of the relation of Christ's teaching to individual and corporate duty which is cast in a high note and cannot fail to interest every reader.

We must not neglect to say frankly before closing, nevertheless, that in the course of his discussion Dr. Forrest occasionally hints at theological positions which we cannot share and which on another occasion we

should like to traverse—such as, for example, his very defective doctrine of Providence in connection with an exaggerated doctrine of freedom (pp. 139, 140, 142, 143, 146), or his conception of the gift of the Spirit without distinction of His miraculous endowment of the Apostles and His indwelling in the people of God, or, indeed, his fundamental conception of Christianity as summed up in "the filial spirit" (pp. 153, 202). Nor would we neglect to say equally frankly that we deprecate the apparently confused way in which certain findings of modern criticism are here and there utilized, as if they stood apart item from item and did not form a part of a closed system of anti-supernaturalistic interpretation. But on none of these things can we dwell now. We shall only stay to say in a word that Dr. Forrest's second work does not seem to us to fulfil the promise of his first one: but exhibits him as embarking upon a line of thought from advancing in which his well-wishers will heartily pray he may be saved.

Princeton, August, 1906. B. B. WARFIELD.

THE GOSPEL IN THE GOSPELS. By WILLIAM PORCHER DU BOSE, M.A., S.T.D., Author of *The Soteriology of the New Testament, The Ecumenical Councils;* Professor of Exegesis in the University of the South. New York, London and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co. 1906. 12mo.; pp. xiv, 289.

Dr. Du Bose certainly does not write for "the general". Some of the difficulty we have experienced in following his thought in the present volume may undoubtedly be due to our not having yet given ourselves the pleasure of reading his earlier work, on *The Soteriology of the New Testament:* it is more than likely that much which has been expounded at length and with plainness in the earlier has been presupposed in the later treatise. Some of the apparent difficulty of his thought may be due to a mere trick of style, an inordinate love of antithesis and neatly contrasted phraseology, which betrays the author into many an obscurity, and not seldom into open paradox. Some of it, again, may be due to the scheme upon which the book is ordered, which involves the occupation in turn of three different and gradually rising standpoints, and obliges an effort to attain an inclusive mode of expression in which many different points of view may find room for themselves. It cannot be doubted, however, that much of it is inherent in Dr. Du Bose's conceptions, and belongs to the type of thought of which he is an exponent. This is a type of thought which is quite alien to the ordinary mental movement of plain men. "I would describe Christianity in its largest sense", says he, in the opening paragraph of his closing chapter (p. 274), "to be the fulfilment of God in the world through the fulfilment of the world in God. This assumes that the world is completed in man, in whom alone God is completed in the world. And so, God, the world, and man are at once completed in Jesus Christ." Language like this is, of course, perfectly familiar. But we frankly confess our inability to attach to it any clear meaning.

The task which Dr. Du Bose has proposed to himself is to expound the Gospel of Jesus Christ. But, in this volume, not that Gospel in its

final and complete expression. The complete construction of the Gospel, given by Paul, is reserved for a subsequent volume. Meanwhile there is undertaken here, as the title indicates, only the exposition of the Gospel as it lies in the Gospels. But where shall we find the Gospel in the Gospels? Is it confined to the purely "reportorial" element in them—the bare record of Jesus' acts and words which may be discovered in them? Or does it include the interpretation which the evangelists give of this record, with a view to what we call "the work" of our Lord? Or, perchance also, the interpretation they suggest also with regard to His Person? According as we take one or the other of these standpoints, Dr. Du Bose supposes, we shall find ourselves more or less exactly upon the plane of one of three varying stages or degrees of faith in Christ and Christianity represented in modern life. There are those who will see nothing in Jesus but the man and find in the man as much of the Gospel and of salvation as, they think, humanity can or ought to receive on this earth. There are others who see in Jesus something more than common humanity, and cherish Him as the One who has brought something more into our nature and life than was there before. There are still others who see in Him not less than God manifest in the flesh. Taking his cue from this correspondence of varying points of view with separable elements in the contents of the Gospels, Dr. Du Bose undertakes, first, to treat of the "Gospel of the common humanity", next of "the Gospel of the Work" and last of "the Gospel of the Person" of Jesus; and orders his matter accordingly. We have no criticism to make upon this distribution of the material in itself. It is quite conceivable that it might be made the vehicle of the richest exposition of the Gospel as contained in the Gospels, rising stage upon stage to its climax. It is plain also that it might be utilized as an organon for the critical examination of the deposit of the Gospel in the Gospels. There would be an obvious gain in discussing first with critical stringency the nature of the Gospel embodied in the merely "reportorial" element of the Synoptics; then the nature of the Gospel as suggested by the Synoptic evangelists through the medium of their entire presentation; and then the nature of the Gospel as set forth by John—comparing all these together and bringing to view their relations to one another. Thus a great apologetic might be accomplished, accurately keyed to the needs of the day. Neither of these methods has been used, however, by Dr. Du Bose. The strictly critico-exegetical method one would judge to be alien to his spirit. The dogmatico-expository method, while more congenial to him, is interfered with in the present instance not only by the artificial limits imposed upon the exposition at each stage by the requirement that it shall not transcend the point of view of the class of modern theorists whose standpoint is assumed for the moment, but also by the copious intrusion into the dogmatic result of Dr. Du Bose's own preconceived opinions. The reader is continually oppressed, therefore, with the double feeling that the material under discussion is not permitted to speak out fully its message, and that what it is permitted to say it is permitted to say only through Dr. Du Bose's forms of thought. He becomes more and more aware, in

other words, not only that he is not obtaining the Gospel which lies in the Gospels, but that he is obtaining only Dr. Du Bose's gospel. This is, no doubt, very interesting to him: but it is not authoritative; and he finds it just a little difficult.

Dr. Du Bose's gospel, which he here expounds on the basis of the Gospels, centers in a doctrine of purely subjective salvation which is rooted in a doctrine of atonement that finds its affiliations with that class of theories which have been called, perhaps not very illuminatingly, theories of "salvation by sample". In Jesus Christ humanity perfected itself in the sight of God: and in Jesus Christ every member of humanity may become perfect in the sight of God. Here, in a nutshell, lies the entirety of Dr. Du Bose's doctrine of salvation. The main elements which enter into it are the following: Jesus Christ "was not one man but humanity" (p. 216); in Him God "once for all and completely incarnated Himself in humanity" (217); He is therefore not one man but "universal man" (279)—and "the fact of such a universal humanity is the truth of religion" (230). Accordingly "whatever He was or did in the name or in behalf of humanity, humanity itself did and became in His person" (260). What He did and what humanity did in Him was "to put away sin". "In Jesus Christ, humanity has accomplished its salvation through a perfection of all those dispositions, and acts, and characters which effect and constitute salvation" (p. 172). Thus humanity in Him at-one-d itself with God "by the one possible act, and in the one possible way, of self-reconciliation and reunion"; "redeemed itself by putting away sin from it and taking to it the holiness of God" (261): and "arose from the death of sin into the life of holiness and God" (p. 296). "The Gospel" thus, "as such, begins with the objective fact of the taking or putting away of sin by Jesus Christ. It proceeds with the universal proclamation of the double remission in His name, a remission of present pardon through faith in Him, and a remission of real deliverance through final participation with Him. The difference between the two is only that of different stages of relation to the same thing, between the proleptic or anticipatory appropriation of faith and the progressive and final appropriation and fruition in fact" (p. 181). The proleptic or anticipatory appropriation corresponds to what has been called justification: the progressive and final to what has been called sanctification. "We cannot bring to God at once a sin completely put away and a oneness with Him restored, but we can bring Him an attitude towards our sin which means and will never be satisfied with less than its complete putting away; and we can bring an attitude towards holiness which means and can never stop short of the most perfect actual attainment of the most perfect holiness" (p. 178). And, "if we do in reality and in sincerity bring this, then God can treat what we really mean and intend as though it really were, and by treating them so or calling them so make them so" (p. 178). This is justification by faith—and the ground of it is the germ of hatred of sin and love of holiness perceived in us, taken for the fruitage of which it contains the promise (cf. 153). As this germ develops, as this promise passes into performance, our salvation is

perfected. "Attuned to Christ by the anticipatory spell of faith, hope, and love, we shall be by a natural process of assimilation, transformed into His likeness in act, character, and life, until, coming to see Him perfectly as He is we shall be wholly what He is" (p. 289). Thus, Christ, first, in our nature perfects humanity objectively: then, we, by God's grace, accepted, as meaning and intending to share in this perfection, into a right relation to Him, are by that acceptance enabled to go on into perfection: and, perfecting ourselves, are saved. The points to be emphasized are that the entirety of salvation is subjective,—there is nothing objective in it: and that the entirety of salvation is our own work, though it is our own work only under the grace of God. "Nothing that God can do merely for us, not even anything that God alone can do in us, can effect or constitute our salvation. Only that can be our salvation which we ourselves are, and are through our own doing and becoming" (p. 173). "Christ is our salvation only because He is the power of God in us to work out our own salvation. If instead of being that, He was instead of that to us, He would be not our salvation but its opposite" (pp. 80-81).

It is characteristic of all forms of the theory of "salvation by sample" (so-called), to lay great stress upon the Incarnation and the Incarnated Life, as bearing the brunt of the saving-work, and to develop a particular conception of the nature of the Incarnation, as a taking up into the Divine of humanity as it actually exists in the objects of salvation. If salvation consists essentially in a cleansing of humanity from sin in the person of the God-man, naturally the idea of the guilt of sin retires behind that of its pollution and power; and equally naturally the humanity taken up into the God-man is conceived as the humanity which is in need of the cleansing. Dr. Du Bose, of course, does not escape either of these tendencies. In obedience to the uniform Scriptural representation, he makes a manful effort to give a primary place in the work of Christ to His sufferings and death: "only the perfect cross could earn for humanity the perfect crown", he says (p. 124), with crispness and beauty. But, after all, it is not on the death of Christ that he looks as the hinge of the saving work: "the significance and value of the death", he says plainly, "must have lain chiefly if not wholly in the fact that it is only death that sets the perfect seal or places the final valuation upon life" (p. 120). He is inclined to complain, therefore, of the current forms of doctrine that they neglect the true saving work of Christ, that long life of conflict in which He put away sin and has shown us the way by Himself entering it and so opening it for all (p. 37). Of course the "active obedience" of Christ has been as little neglected in the theological construction of His saving work as His "passive obedience"; and Dr. Du Bose's complaint is indicatory only of his own too exclusive dwelling upon one aspect of the work of the Lord—His victory over all the temptations of life. Or, as Dr. Du Bose, in accordance with his general standpoint, would represent it, His "taking away or putting away or abolishing of sin". This "taking away, or putting away, or abolishing of sin was accomplished", he explains, "by an act on His part, and it was accomplished first in His own per-

son" (p. 154). "He Himself was sinless," he continues, "not by any mere fact of His own nature—differencing it from ours—but by an act of Himself in our nature, which we too were to enter into and make our own and so perform for ourselves in and with Him". If he put away the sin of the world, He did it "by primarily putting away sin from Himself" (p. 155). In Him humanity has thrown off its old self of deficiency and insufficiency, of weakness and sin and death" (p. 172, cf. p. 204). Dr. Du Bose's hamartialogy is very obscure; but it is evident that he is inclined to follow the logic of his primal conception and to think of the flesh which the Son of God became at the incarnation, more or less explicitly, as the flesh which needed salvation.

To this type of thought, however, the sinlessness of Christ is as essential as it is essential that this sinlessness shall be conceived as a conquest of sinful tendencies in His flesh. It will not be without instruction, therefore, for us to observe how Dr. Du Bose deals with this great subject. He wishes from the outset "to guard ourselves from offense in every direction by agreeing upon the ancient formula: We do not say that our Lord as man could not have sinned if He willed, but God forbid that He should have willed" (p. 160). But the mere repetition of an ancient formula is no guarantee that its spirit is our own. In this case the question meant to be raised by the "ancient formula" is whether Jesus Christ, the Incarnate God, can be supposed to have willed to sin: and the answer meant to be suggested is that He, being what He was, was incapable of so willing. Dr. Du Bose is, however, thinking of Christ as a man, and is working under the influence of the conception that holiness and sin are the opposite results of varied reactions to the same cause or occasion, temptation; and that temptation involving the possibility of sinning is the very condition of holiness, so that—as he emphatically sums it up—"the possibility of the sin is the condition of the holiness" (p. 163 and *passim*). Of course then he is in no position to affirm the *non posse peccare* of our Lord, since that would be equivalent to saying that He could not become humanly holy, seeing that the *posse peccare* is the condition of holiness. The principle that governs the incarnated life of our Lord is accordingly unconditionally presented as that "He was born into and lived our life and was in every respect a man like us" (p. 163). Dr. Du Bose feels no impulse to limit this by adding the phrase "except sin", on account of his theory of human nature in its relation to sin: no, Christ was in every respect like us. "He was born in the flesh, because the flesh is our lowest and most earthly constituent and carries in it and with it all the possibilities, all the weaknesses and temptations and dangers, in a word all the probation of our earthly life" (p. 163). Christ in taking our flesh, took thus "all the possibilities" of our earthly life. "All these He met fairly and squarely as a man, and as a man was thoroughly proved by them and perfectly approved" (p. 163). We come now to the cardinal point: "Our Lord did not do that in our nature which no man within the limits of his own nature or by the exercise of only his own powers is capable of doing. He was not holy by nature, nor righteous by the law. . . . He was holy as a man, and in the

only way in which a man can be holy. He was holy by the conquest of sin" (pp. 163, 164). The "ambiguous middle" is obvious: say that our Lord's accomplishment was well within the powers of humanity as such: humanity as it exists is not humanity as such but humanity as sinful. When we say, therefore, that "the impossibilities of humanity were as much impossibilities for Him as for us", we need to ask whether it is the impossibilities of humanity as such or of sinful humanity that are in question. In point of fact, if our Lord did not do in our nature what that nature in its present condition of sinfulness is incapable of; then,—either we are yet in our sins, or we never needed a Saviour. The issue is brought to its height in the sentence, "He was not holy by nature, nor righteous by the law". In that case He was not Divine in nature, nor did He work out a perfect righteousness for us. What Dr. Du Bose intends by this remarkable assertion is to assimilate the Incarnate Son to us, who must acquire holiness and that through the grace of God and not by the law. But that is because we are by nature sinners, and therefore incapable of acquiring holiness by the law. The very grace of Christ consists in His undertaking what was impossible to us, and accomplishing it instead of and for us. Of course He did not accomplish it apart from God: nor was His human nature ever independent of Him in whom all live and move and have their being. Accordingly what Dr. Du Bose has further to say of His looking to God as His Help and Stay in all the prosecution of His work has its full validity. Because He was not, like us, unholy by nature, but holy,—as the angel announced Him at His conception,—He was able to work out a righteousness by the law; and in the process of working out this righteousness,—that "active obedience" He has offered for us,—of course He hungered and thirsted after it in each of its progressive stages infinitely more than any other human being ever did or ever shall. It is not improper, perhaps, even to speak of this ever growing righteousness, in the elements of it at every stage of its development, as not yet "fulfilled", as not yet "His own". But if the meaning be that He was approved by God for a righteousness not His own in the same sense that we are approved on the ground of a righteousness not our own—this is to subvert the entire Gospel. Christ's righteousness was not like ours a righteousness graciously imputed to Him on (the occasion of) faith, but precisely a righteousness of works—by the law. And therein His differs from ours by a whole diameter. And if we are to say that "no man ever so felt in himself the deficiency and poverty of mere nature, or ever so confessed in himself the impotency and insufficiency of the human will for the higher purposes of holiness, righteousness and life, as did Jesus Christ" (p. 160),—this, in harmony with the Scriptural representation, can mean nothing more than that it is a part of righteousness to know and to feel to the inmost core of the being the "utter dependence" of all His creatures on God, and therefore to know "what in God there is to depend on"—as the foundation and source of all that is good in His creatures. Christ whose heart was right towards God by nature and was held right towards Him by unbroken habit, did all He did, of course, in conscious, loving dependence on God; and thus

He was righteous in all His thought and feeling and act. But this was not that other dependence on God's grace which is the part of sinners and sinners only: and the confusion of the ontological and soteriological dependence can work nothing but ruin to our whole body of conceptions of Him and His work.

We should like to go on and draw out in some detail Dr. Du Bose's conception of the Incarnation itself, with respect both to the incarnating and to the incarnated element,—and indeed to its ultimate effects, which lead him to remark in that not very lucid language which this type of thinking seems to find congenial: "We now are the incarnation, not only incarnated but incarnating; we are the atonement, atoned and atoning" (pp. 115-116). It is not very clear how he would have us think of the Deity incarnated in Jesus Christ; and the "universal humanity" postulated as the incarnated element—is, to speak brusquely, just unthinkable. Nothing of this, however, is peculiar to Dr. Du Bose; it is the common characteristic of the type of religious thought he represents; and we are admonished that even a book-notice should observe some limits. We content ourselves, therefore, merely with noting that in all such matters Dr. Du Bose gives the common thought of his school exceptionably able and emphatic expression, and turn to remark in closing upon a quality of the work before us much more pleasing to us to draw attention to. This is the power Dr. Du Bose exhibits in it of saying good things well. His pages are studded with sentences embodying truths of importance in almost proverbial form, and now and again a longer passage attracts the eye in which a thoroughly evangelical conception is given a most attractive statement. We can here offer only samples of these words fitly spoken. Take a few brief ones first:

"Nothing can dispense us from the humble and devout use of divine means except the fact of having through their appointed use as means attained the ends for which they were instituted" (p. 55). "If God be truly in me by His Word and His Spirit, He is so not to supplant or to displace my nature or my personality, but only to complete them in their own lines and perfect them in their own activities" (p. 81). "When you have made the law as high as God Himself, you will want God Himself to enable you to fulfil it" (p. 95). "I speak only for beings like ourselves when I say that the consummate joy of holiness would be incomprehensible and impossible save through a corresponding and equal sorrow for sin" (p. 99). "There is nothing in these days so presumed upon as the mercy of God: we confirm ourselves in our indolence and indifference, in our weaknesses and failures and neglects, in our faults, our vices, our sins, with the thought that God is merciful, that it is inconsistent with His goodness that we should reap the natural consequences of our omissions and our commissions" (p. 111). "One of the most beautiful of the many anomalies of Christian character is that the more righteous it becomes the less self-righteous it becomes; the greater it grows the more modest it grows" (p. 141). "Faith does not originate or create or give, it only receives and appropriates and realizes" (p. 177).

Now let us take one or two longer passages. We shall purposely choose some in which evangelical doctrine is set forth with very notable force and precision—although we are forced to allow that the purpose of Dr. Du Bose cannot be said to be to do this. The evangelical doctrine

of the necessity of "effectual calling" could scarcely be better expressed than in the following passage:

"The coming to us of a Gospel with power, is conditioned not only upon the fact of the objective communication, but upon that of a corresponding subjective response. The need of the latter as well as the former, as coëqual and coördinate part of the gift or grace of God, is not only expressed implicitly in the necessity of a baptism with the Spirit, but is stated explicitly in the assurance that the gift in Christ includes the repentance prerequisite on our part as well as the remission consequent on God's part. . . . Deep answereth unto deep. The deep of God without us and above us is inaudible save as it is answered by the deep of God within us. There is no gospel of salvation for us which does not come by the Word through the Spirit. In a way, we may say that that means, by God through ourselves; but in a more true way, it means that while our salvation must be of ourselves as well as of God, we owe the *ourselves* in the matter as well as the divine part in it, to God, who there as elsewhere is All in all" (pp. 244, 246).

And certainly the evangelical doctrine of the substance of salvation as consisting in the sanctification of the soul could not be better put than in the following words:

"However far off it may be from us, or we from it, we cannot and ought not to think of our salvation as anything less than our own perfected and completed sinlessness and holiness. We may be to the depths of our souls grateful and happy to be sinners pardoned and forgiven by divine grace. But surely God would not have us satisfied with that as the end and substance of the salvation He gives us in His Son. Jesus Christ is the power of God in us unto salvation. It does not require an exercise of divine power to extend pardon; it does require it to endow and enoble us with all the qualities, energies and actualities that make for and that make holiness and life. See how St. Paul speaks of it when he prays, That we may know the exceeding greatness of God's power to uswards who believe, according to that working in Christ when He raised Him from the dead" (p. 175).

No doubt the reader, taking such passages in their context and interpreting them from their context, will perceive that they are not intended in quite the sense the evangelical reader will take them in, as they stand here in isolation. But they may at least stand as proofs that, despite Dr. Du Bose's erroneous general conceptions, there are the elements of evangelical truth gleaming through his less acceptable thought. And we wish to close this notice with the acknowledgment of the pleasure we have derived from the recognition of this fact. Dr. Du Bose has the qualities of his defects, if he has also the defects of his qualities; and when he comes to speak in such phrases as these we have quoted or as that beautiful passage on pp. 125 sq. in which he describes the heart of Jesus in the day of His trial, we read with our minds and hearts alike in his hands.

Princeton, July, 1906. B. B. WARFIELD.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL CRISIS. By WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, Professor of Church History in Rochester Theological Seminary. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1907. 8vo.; pp. xv, 429.

This is a plea for the Church to give herself to the propagation of Christian socialism. The author contends for this on the grounds, that

the Hebrew prophets were "the men to whose
Jesus felt most kinship" and they were, first of
of "social morality"; that though Jesus Himsel
than an ecclesiastic, yet His aim was "the king
conception, involving the whole social life of
and hope of primitive Christianity were char
in its later history its capacities for reconstruc
istic lines were paralyzed by alien influences suc
dogmatic interest, subservience to the state, etc
the Church is now in large measure emancips
influences and, on the other, Christian civiliz
great crisis of its history and is in the most
power to overcome the glaring social inequa
must soon destroy it if not themselves righte
itself has its own power and future at stake in
opment. For these reasons the Church ought
for her supreme work of social evangelization
Hebrew prophets, ought "to apply the teachin
to the pressing question of public morality".
tionized if it is to be regenerated. It is a new,
system that is demanded. The trouble is no
corrupt; it is rather that the present order is
those living under it cannot become better u
Christian love cannot long survive in the at
Inequalities in wealth must be removed, not
sists in the abundance of the things which he
spiritual and so supreme good of life is impo
tion of wealth is decidedly unequal.

This plea is urged with a vigor which c
learning which commands respect, with a sinc
to overlook its frequent onesidedness, and w
which often blinds the reader, as we are sure t
fallacies that otherwise would have been to
tolerate.

Not to emphasize these one by one or en
Christian socialism, the following general cri
must suffice:

1. Let it be admitted that the Hebrew pr
whose personality and teaching Jesus felt mo
not follow that Christian ministers ought t
socialism. The office of the Christian minister
prophet are not the same. Under the Old Disp
were united. Under the New Dispensation th
fore, while the office of the Hebrew prophet w
ious, that of the Christian minister is religious
however, it would not weaken our position
taught social morality, we may not infer that t
they would teach socialism. The two are dis
is a sin against God even more than a crime ag

to the individual. Hence, the preacher of God under either dispensation is bound to lift up his voice against it. Socialism, however, is a theory of the state which may or may not be essential to the development of righteousness. If it is, then we may in this have a reason why the preacher of righteousness ought to be a preacher of socialism, but until this has been established we have no basis for the inference that he should. In a word, our author would found his proof on what is to be proved.

2. Let it be granted that the aim of Jesus was the kingdom of God and that the kingdom of God was "a collective conception, involving the whole social life of man". It may not be concluded from this that our Lord's aim embraced the reorganization of the industrial system. This might be inferred only when it had been shown that such reorganization was indispensable to social well-being. As in the former case, therefore, our author builds on the very foundation that he is trying to lay. Besides, is it not significant that Jesus is no more a socialist than an ecclesiastic? It is commonly allowed that His proximate mission was "the training of the twelve"; and that He intended them, in their sphere and according to their measure, to be like Himself appears in His words, "as thou didst send me into the world, even so sent I them into the world" (St. John xvii. 18). Unless, therefore, he meant them to be teachers of religion rather than champions of socialism, why was it that in that age of social inequality and corruption and in that day when all possible pressure was brought to bear on him to become a political leader, He persisted in confining His activity within the lines of religion. To us at least our author's position seems to deny that Jesus is in any real sense our example. Moreover, while the kingdom of God is "a collective conception, involving the whole social life of man", it is not true that our Lord regards it as a socialistic or even as a social conception. It embraces all the institutes and the interests of society: but he views them all from the standpoint of religion; he considers them as growing up "out of the regenerated life of the invisible church"; and, consequently, he would give himself, and he would have his servants give themselves, first of all and above all, to proclaiming the gospel of deliverance, not from social and pecuniary inequality, but from that spiritual deadness and corruption from which, no doubt, much of the social inequality of our day does result.

3. Let it be conceded that the impetus and hope of primitive Christianity were characteristically social. It will not follow from this that the aim of modern Christianity should be so, too. It is only apostolic Christianity that can furnish an authoritative model; and this model, our author allows, has to be doctored somewhat if it is to be what he wishes. For example, it is hinted that the earliest Christian literature, as the Epistle of James, which is ethical and social rather than dogmatic, is more authoritative than the Pauline epistles. Yet no reason for this seems to be given except that Paul, while "a radical in theology, was a conservative in sociology". Thus, as before, what is to be established is presupposed in the proof. Moreover, is not this view of the New Testament inconsistent with any true view of the development of

doctrine? It would find the best expression of truth, not in its fullest expression, but in its first and most partial. Probably our author feels the difficulty here. Otherwise, why does he say that "if there were any radical, political, or social ideas current in early Christianity, there was good cause for not writing them down or publishing them freely"? That is, why does he suggest that if the New Testament writers had said what they thought, its trend would have been throughout distinctly social and even socialistic? Or again, why does he make the astonishing intimation that "one purpose in Luke's mind when he wrote the Book of Acts for the use of Theophilus was to present an apologetic of Christianity to the upper classes; and when Paul exhorted the Romans to obey the government, he may have had in mind the possibility that in the capital of the world his letter might drop into influential hands"? If, however, such were the motives which entered into the preparation of the New Testament, what confidence can we have in it as the Word of God? In short, our author's use of Scripture for his argument destroys the authority of Scripture as effectually as we have just seen that his use of the example of Christ robs us of him as our supreme model.

4. With regard to the alien causes which, according to our author, kept the social development of early Christianity from becoming socialistic, turned it back upon itself, and rendered it individualistic, it is pertinent to ask whether they were really "alien to Christianity". Many of them, at least, would seem to have been inseparable from it. For example, the expectation of the second advent—while we must repudiate chiliasm whether ancient or modern, must we not grant that he is no true Christian who is not ever "looking for the blessed hope and appearing of the glory of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ" (Titus ii. 13)? "Hostility to the Roman Empire and its civilization"—can we recall what they were and conceive of any other attitude toward them as possible on the part of those who were charged, "Love not the world neither the things that are in the world" (1 Jn. ii. 15)? "The otherworldliness of Christianity"—must not this be an essential characteristic of it when its teaching is that "our citizenship is in heaven" (Phil. iii. 20)? "The dogmatic interest" of our religion—how could it be otherwise when Christ came into the world "to bear witness unto the truth" (Jn. xix. 37) and when it is 'the truth that makes us free' (Jn. viii 32)? Subservience to the state—must not this be obligatory if "the powers that be are ordained of God" (Rom. xiii. 1)? In a word, does not our author make the same mistake which Gibbon made in his famous fifteenth chapter when, trying to explain the rapid diffusion of early Christianity on other grounds than its own inherent energy, he accounts for it by causes which prove to be inseparable from Christianity itself? In like manner our author, in this which he considers the great chapter of his book, defeats himself. He shows that the reason why the social trend of early Christianity did not become socialisic was just Christianity itself.

5. The chapter on "The Present Crisis" is a terrible indictment of our boasted modern and Christian civilization. Yet it is not unnatural

that our author should make it. Anyone who could be a pastor for eleven years among the working people on the West Side of New York City, as he was, and could write of social evils less earnestly than he has, would be indeed hardhearted. Nor may his individual statements be questioned. The weakness of his presentation is that it is onesided. A good man will appear bad if his sins only are related, and it is in precisely this way that our author has described modern society. Perhaps such writers as Loring Bruce in his *Gesta Christi* and R. S. Storrs in his *The Divine Origin of Christianity indicated by its Historical Effects* have gone somewhat to the other extreme, but this is no reason why our author should resort to the campaign methods of politics. To do so is unwise, to say no more. It is sure to make the judicial reader discount the indictment. Moreover, it is a fair question whether the industrial system is the cause or only the occasion of the undoubtedly many and awful social evils of our day. We confess that in most cases the latter seems to us to be the truth. It is in human sin and particularly in human selfishness that we discover the cause of the chief ills of society, and therefore it is in the grace of God rather than in social reorganization that we would find the one remedy that will strike at the root of the evil. Nor does it seem to us a tenable position that the competitive system is essentially opposed to the grace of God. There is competition and there is competition. There is the selfish strife when every man's hand is against every man's hand, and there is the generous rivalry when each man makes the most of his powers and opportunities because God has given them to him and for the sake of others; and if there is far too little of the latter in the business world or anywhere in the world, it is not to be charged up to our industrial system so much as to "the wiles of the devil" and human sin.

6. Let it be admitted that the church itself has its own power and future at stake in the issues of social development. It will not follow from this that the present mission of the church is to propagate socialism. Even had the argument established that socialism is the cure-all for social ills, it would still be an open question whether the church is as well qualified to lecture on socialism as she is to preach the Gospel and whether failure in the former might not lead to failure in the latter. To confound different spheres Dorner has characetrized as immoral; and it seems to us that no confusion of spheres could be so bad as that of which our author is guilty when he identifies religion (Vid. pp. 4, 7, and elsewhere) with morality and morality with political economy.

7. With reference to the whole discussion the reviewer would remark in closing:

a. It overlooks Providence. Inequalities in wealth and in social position are not all due to the sins of men. Often they are. A combine is formed; the market is manipulated; bread is made dear when God has given an abundant harvest; and the financiers fatten at the expense of the people. We have all seen this done and enormities just like it perpetrated again and again; and that, too, by robbers many of whom were church members. Such iniquity, of course, cannot be condemned

too unsparingly. The church is bound to lift up her voice continually against it. But there are inequalities which result from distinctions not artificial and which can be explained only on the ground that God makes men "to differ" and "divides to each one severally even as he will". This fact our author seems to overlook; and in so doing he sets himself not only against reason, but even against God.

b. The discussion ignores the Holy Spirit. The reviewer stands ready to be corrected, but he cannot recall a single direct reference to the necessity of his aid. The implication, if not the assertion, is that society will be regenerated, if only the industrial system be reorganized. This is much as if we were to be told that all that was required for the revival of a dead man was that the atmosphere around him should be purified. Nor would the case be different were it shown that the man had been asphyxiated. While it would then be true that he could not be revived without changing the air, it would be just as true that no change of air by itself could do it.

c. It is charged, and not unjustly, that the present industrial system fosters the error that a man's life does consist in the things that he possesses. Without raising the question whether this is a true consequence or a perversion of the system, it may be replied that Christian socialism makes a man's life depend on the things which he possesses. If it denies that the supreme good of life is in wealth, it conditions the spiritual and social development in which it does find it on the approximate equalization of wealth. If this be not to exalt property above men, is it not to subject God to property?

d. Finally, even Christian socialism is not a position of stable equilibrium. It is bound by its own logic to repudiate socialism or to degenerate into revolutionary socialism, anarchism, nihilism. Our author believes firmly in the right of the individual person, of the church, and especially of the family; but he has no sufficient foundation for such belief. If the state ought to appropriate the instruments of production and control the distribution of the products, it is not made clear why she should not arrogate supremacy in other spheres also nor why at last she should not usurp the throne of God himself. Indeed, Maitensen is not too severe when he says even of Christian Socialism, "the inmost core of a radically unreligious thinking becomes more and more manifest, and proves itself openly hostile to Christianity and the Church" (*Social Ethics*, p. 155).

Princeton. WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AND SOCIAL PROGRESS: A Sociological Study of Foreign Missions. By the REV. JAMES S. DENNIS, D.D., Students' Lecturer on Missions, Princeton, 1893 and 1896; Author of *Foreign Missions after a Century*; Member of the American Presbyterian Mission, Beirut, Syria. In three volumes. Volume III. Fleming H. Revell Company. 1906. 8vo., pp. xxvi. 675.

With this third portly volume Dr. Dennis brings to a close his monumental work on *Christian Missions and Social Progress.* As is well known, this noble enterprise had its inception in a course of six lectures delivered at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1893. The first four lectures, in greatly expanded form, were then published as Volume First of the present series. They bore the captions: (I) "The Sociological Scope of Christian Missions", (II) "The Social Evils of the Non-Christian World", (III) "Ineffectual Remedies and the Causes of their Failure", and (IV) "Christianity the Social Hope of the Nations". Lecture V, on "The Dawn of a Sociological Era in Missions", occupied the first one hundred pages of Volume Second, the remainder of this volume being devoted to a first installment of Lecture VI, on the "Contribution of Christian Missions to Social Progress"; the three specific topics here developed dealing with (I) the impress of missions upon individual character, (II) upon family life, and (III) upon humanitarian progress. Volume Third continues the discussion along four additional though somewhat arbitrarily differentiated lines of investigation, presenting the results of missions tending to develop the higher life of society (IV), touching national life and character (V), affecting the commercial and industrial status (VI), and marking reformed standards of religious faith and practice (VII).

This concluding volume, we need only remark in givng this purely formal notice concerning its appearance, is in scope and method, in form and content, a worthy companion to its predecessors. As the author's *Centennial Survey of Foreign Missions*—originally planned as an appendix to this work, but later published in advance as a supplemental issue—is still the most elaborate and serviceable body of missionary statistics ever published, so these three volumes themselves constitute the most thorough presentation we have of the facts pertaining to the social problems of missions in all lands. We have here the conclusion of a work which is nothing less than a comprehensive survey of missions as a world-force, an exhibition of the marvellous success with which in the opening years of this twentieth century Christianity is grappling with the stupendous task of discipling and disciplining the nations of the heathen world. The work as a whole is one of the most impressive "apologies" for the faith ever written, a masterful presentation of the argument from human experience concerning the power of the Gospel amidst the most diverse conditions of paganism. With the courage and zeal of an unwearied investigator, with a mind trained to take statesman-like views of the largest problems of social life and at the same time to collect, assess and tabulate in accurate and suggestive manner the minutest details of statistical information, with a never-failing skill in organizing and rationalizing a vast amount of heterogeneous material that must needs be looked at from many different points of sight in order to be duly appreciated, Dr. Dennis has produced a history—or perhaps we had better say a historical encyclopedia—of present-day missionary enterprise as conducted by all branches of the Church, in the most varied forms of activity, in all departments of the life of heathendom,—a truly inestimable work for all who would know to what

extent the "blessings of the kingly rule of Christ over the world he came to save" are to-day being realized even in the earth's darkest lands and remotest corners. It is the work of a highly gifted missionary specialist who has labored over a decade in exploring a field of research, the very immensity as well as the value and beauty of which he has done more than any one else to help us realize.

The press-work and the abundant illustrations are in keeping with the unique theme and the literary excellence of the work, while the elaborate hundred-page *Index*, the select *Bibliography* of recent missionary literature, the full outlines of the lectures in the *Table of Contents* and the helpful marginal captions greatly facilitate reference to the diverse riches in this store-house of missionary information.

Philadelphia. FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

VAN BETHANIE NAAR GOLGOTHA. Overdenkingen over het lyden en sterven onzes Heeren Jezus Christus, door P. BIESTERVELD, Hoogleeraar aan de Vrije Unsversiteit. Doesburg, J. C. Van Schenck Brill. 1906. Aflevering 1 en 2.

These meditations on the sufferings and death of Christ are, as far as I am able to judge from the first two parts, among the best of their kind. Professor Biesterveld's style is clear, forcible and elegant in the best sense of the word. It is a book for believers, who will enjoy the excellent exposition of Christ's passion and death. It leads them into the deep meaning of every item connected with the different scenes of Christ's atoning work. Of course I have to judge from the beginning of the work. But in this respect it is true, *ex ungue leonem*. I wish we had such kind of books for the common people. We need books which edify and strengthen the people in their most holy faith. But faith cannot grow when Christ's sufferings and death are placed in the background. We hear a great deal about the beauty of Christ's character, we need to ehar a great deal more about the glory of Christ's atoning work. If anywhere then certainly in his last struggle, the beauty of his chacacter appears in the calm majesty of self-sacrifice.

Holland, Mich. NICHOLAS M. STEFFENS.

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